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Abstract 
 
This thesis discusses the meaning of the right to self-determination in its historical and 
contemporary perspective, and examines the different options available for the 
accommodation of contested self-determination claims. Arguably, the creation of new States 
and secession are amongst the most significant and controversial issues pertaining to self-
determination beyond the colonial context. Detailing these implications in relation to the Iraqi 
Kurdistan Region (IKR), the thesis argues that even if secession is one mechanism to resolve 
self-determination disputes, this does not do away with the need to continue exploring a new 
conflict settlement approach as an alternative to extremist secession. The proposed ‘Remedial 
Earned Sovereignty’ (RES) approach affords a way of assessing post-colonial breakaway 
movements in their different manifestations. A new entity may come into being lawfully 
through negotiated and consensual constitutional processes.  
The RES approach allows another layer of consideration to be added that goes beyond the 
superficiality of pure ‘legality’, by delving into the legitimacy of the new entity. It will argue 
that legitimacy is a second layer of essential consideration, and it involves a deeper and more 
holistic level of analysis. Significantly, the thesis will argue for a need to look at the 
circumstances that led to the secession and State creation, and also at how the entity has 
conducted itself, and how it has organised itself internally. It demonstrates that outside the 
colonial context the emergence of a new State is not a matter of meeting the statehood 
criteria, but rather a politically realised legal status. Accordingly, in order to navigate through 
these considerations of legality and legitimacy, a set of guidelines for States in assessing how 
to deal with entities coming into existence because of secession have been suggested. This is 
dubbed a ‘Remedial Approach to Post-Colonial External Self Determination’. The thesis will 
then apply and refine the remedial approach to post-colonial external self-determination in 
the cases of Kosovo, Quebec and South Sudan, and ultimately test the finalised hypothesis 
idea on the IKR. 
 
This thesis is based on the situation up to (October 2014).  
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[. . .] the whole history of the right of self-determination is, for better and worse, the story of 
adaptation to the evolving struggles of peoples attempting to achieve effective control over 
their own destinies, especially in reaction to circumstances that are discriminatory and 
oppressive. 
Falk (2000: 48)
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Chapter One: The Introduction 
 
1.1. Scope of the thesis  
 
To explore self-determination is, in the words of Antonio Cassese, ‘a way of opening a 
veritable Pandora’s Box’.1  The historical evolution of the concept reveals that it has been 
subjected to ambiguity, lacks precision and contradictory application. Over the years, it was 
refined and re-applied based on the interests of practical States.  Recent events include the 
dissolution of the two multi-ethnic socialist federations, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 
giving a new perspective to the meaning of self-determination, as well as a broader 
understanding of both internal and external conceptions. This period marked not only the end 
of the communist-socialist social, political, and economic order but also the emergence of a 
number of new States.2  These events were followed by the dissolution of Czechoslovakia3, 
Eritrea successfully seceded from Ethiopia4, and East Timor5 succeeded in its drive for 
independence. Montenegro6 became an independent State, Kosovo7 declared independence 
however, it has not been universally recognised. On July 14 2011, Southern Sudan8 declared 
independence after the Sudanese people voted in a referendum, its acquisition of statehood 
has generally been accepted as a legal fact. Lastly, on 17 March 2014, the Crimean 
parliament declared independence and applied to join Russia, however; it is a referendum, 
which is argued as having no legal validity and urges the international community not to 
                                                          
1 He stated that, ‘[t]o explore self-determination . . . is also a way of opening a veritable Pandora’s Box’ because 
‘[i]n every corner of the globe peoples are claiming the right to self-determination’. See, A Cassese, 
International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 60-64. 
2 New states emerging in the territory of the SFRY were: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Macedonia and Slovenia. While the new states emerging in the territory of the 
Soviet Union were: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became independent states 
prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. See; J Vidmar, ‘Democracy and State Creation in International 
Law’ (PhD thesis, University of Nottingham 2009).  
3 J Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd  edn, OUP 2006) 402.  
4 ibid.  
5 ibid 560-562. 
6 ‘UNGA Res 60/264 (28 June 2006)’.  
7 R Wilde, ‘Kosovo (Advisory Opinion)’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, para6 
(Heidelberg and OUP 2012).  
8‘Southern Sudan Referendum Act’, 2009 trans, 2010.  
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recognise its results.9 These developments indicate that in the post-decolonisation period and 
after the dissolution of the multi-ethnic socialist federations, the exercise of the right to self-
determination and the creation and recognition of States remains relevant and important.  
This is a study about self-determination, secession, and State creation in the post-colonial, 
post-Cold War era. It is a study of the law, and a study of State practice in [Kosovo, Quebec 
and Southern Sudan], with a practical useful theory that can be applied to the difficult and on-
going situation of the Iraqi Kurdish Region (IKR). This thesis investigates how these 
elements of international law have manifested themselves on a practical level, in a 
comparison between two sorts of peoples of different geographical and historical 
backgrounds. It aims to find a suitable theoretical-legal solution to the Kurdish claim to 
statehood and independence in north Iraq. Most importantly, it suggests how the Iraqi State 
ought to treat the Kurdish claim in the future, as their right to self-determination has been 
denied in the federal constitution.  
 
This thesis presents a new understanding of self-determination in the post-colonial context, 
and from that develops an original way of guiding States in evaluating contemporary claims 
to external self-determination. The thesis argues under what circumstances, and by what 
means, could the right of secession be a just and applicable solution. The objective of the 
thesis is to examine the right of self-determination as it applies to the groups controlled by the 
State. It aims to apply a new understanding of self-determination in the case of IKR, by 
arguing a strong normative debate on the merits, advantages, and disadvantages of the theory 
of Remedial Earned Sovereignty. The Remedial approach has emerged as a response to the 
increasingly limited utility of the self-determination approach to resolving sovereignty-based 
conflicts. Under this approach, a new entity may come into being lawfully through negotiated 
and consensual constitutional processes. The general aim of this thesis is to develop and to 
propose a new normative theory (known as ‘Remedial Earned Sovereignty’ or ‘RES’) for the 
exercise of external self-determination, ultimately leading toward remedial secession and 
independence. 
  
                                                          
9 J Vidmar, ‘Crimea’s Referendum and Secession: Why It Resembles Northern Cyprus More than Kosovo’ 
(EJIL Talk, 2014) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/crimeas-referendum-and-secession-why-it-resembles-northern-
cyprus-more-than-kosovo/> accessed August 11, 2014.  
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State practice on how existing instruments of international law fit into the theoretical debate 
is lacking. The thesis analyses that there is no necessary incompatibility between the 
maintenance of the territorial integrity of an existing State, and the right of a ‘people’ to 
achieve a full measure of self-determination. Outside the colonial system, the exercise of the 
right to self-determination does not usually result in creation any State; it can only take place 
with the approval of the parent State, through a constitutional framework or follow an initial 
declaration of independence or unilateral secession. The exercise of the right of self-
determination should normally not violate the territorial integrity of a State and the right is 
normally to be exercised within the framework of the existing sovereign State, assuming that 
the government represents the people. A number of international law theories are pertinent to 
the issue of group separation from the State: secession, statehood, and recognition. It is 
necessary to examine whether a group has an international legal right to secede from the 
State; if so, whether they have satisfied the relevant criteria of statehood; and finally, whether 
recognition by the entity as a new State (or its absence) will affect the place of the entity on 
the global scene.  
 
The focus is the post-Cold-War practice of State creation. The thesis concentrates on 
situations that led to new State creation in this context, and clarifies the role of international 
law as regards the exercise of the right of self-determination of new State creations. It will 
conclude that other solutions besides independence could provide more stability for the IKR, 
while respecting Iraq territorial integrity, and avoiding encouragement to other separatist 
groups operating throughout the world. It posits that the conceptualization of ‘Remedial 
Earned Sovereignty’ (RES) is a useful approach that could be applied in the case of the IKR 
to achieve self-determination, in a manner that gains international support and causes 
minimal disruption to the region. The thesis therefore seeks to provide an overview of some 
of the advantages and risks associated with the approach.   
 
On the other hand, the thesis argues that the right of self-determination should normally be 
exercised within the framework of the existing State, whereas the right of external self-
determination appears under carefully defined circumstances. Outside the colonial paradigm, 
a non-consensual independence is much more problematic, and no right to independence is 
applicable. In other words, when a group of people is repeatedly denied the right to exercise 
self-determination and can articulate a legitimate basis for its secession, however the group 
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may legally be entitled to self-determination. If that group is systematically refused basic 
human rights and access to the democratic process, that group may be legally entitled to 
secession and international recognition. Accordingly, the thesis will demonstrate that, if the 
Kurdish right to internal self-determination will be fulfilled within the framework of the Iraqi 
State in the future, there would be no right to external self-determination and then no right to 
secede from Iraq. However, if we were to conclude that it is unlikely that Iraq would respect 
the Kurdish rights to internal self-determination in the future, and conducted itself in 
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination, then the Kurds would 
have the right to external self-determination and thus, the right to secede from Iraq. 
 
The thesis will eventually conclude that, the old restrictive doctrine of self-determination 
does not help resolve the issue in the post-colonial era. Neither does exaggerating the 
problem. Accordingly, Remedial Earned Sovereignty offers an alternative short of secession 
if it can be avoided or as a step towards independence where it is inevitable. The hypothesis 
is that RES can be a useful and legitimate tool to address secessionist conflicts if the self-
determination claim itself is deferred or denied.  
 
 1.2. Context   
 
The evolution of the right of self-determination is one of the most dramatic normative 
developments this century. During the decolonisation era, affirming rights of self-
determination seemed fully in step with the march of history, having an overall positive effect 
on the human condition, freeing millions from colonial bondage.  The result of this process 
was to extend sovereignty and statehood to all corners in the planet for the first time, and to 
transform the United Nations into a genuinely universal body representing virtually the whole 
of humanity.10 Today, what makes the right of self-determination such a difficult topic is that 
its exercise involves a clash of fundamental world order principles.11 Falk argued that, 
‘compared with the present arrangements for regional and global governance, any further 
significant fragmentation of existing states is widely seen as producing unwieldy and 
insufficient world order.’ Significantly, there is also the fear that nurturing the dream of 
statehood for many distinct peoples in the world will undoubtedly provide ample fuel for 
                                                          
10 R A Falk, Human Rights Horizons: The Pursuit of Justice in a Globalizing World (Routledge 2000) 124.  
11 ibid 97. 
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strife.12 On the other hand, is the sense that all people should be treated equally and that since 
some people have the advantage of statehood, others should be entitled to it as well.13  
 
The idea that there was a legal right of self-determination in the colonialism era was resisted 
by the colonial powers.14 It was, in their view, merely a political aspiration, but gradually, 
their resistance to the idea of a legal right became more muted.15 The development of the 
concept of self-determination was historically bound up with decolonisation with the growing 
agreement that it was obligatory to bring forward dependent peoples to independence, even 
though Article 7316 had spoken only of self-government. While Dahlitz argued that, self-
determination began to be accepted as a legal right in the context of decolonisation; it was 
never restricted to a choice for independence. In a post-colonial situation, the concept of a 
legal right to self-determination has proved controversial, but its existence cannot really be 
doubted.17 Dahlitz pointed out that, the bridge between the colonial notions and the 
contemporary notions has been provided by the evolution of the idea of self-determination as 
a human right. In 1960, UN General Assembly passed two famous resolutions 1514 and 
1541, representing the necessary elaborations and refinements of the classical right of self-
determination in colonial situations.18 Later in 1966, the text of the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights19 and the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights20 were 
concluded. Common Article I of each of these provides: ‘All people have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.’ Thus, during the process of 
decolonisation, the right of self-determination manifested itself in the creation of new 
                                                          
12 ibid. 
13 ibid. 
14 J Dahlitz (ed), Secession and International Law: Conflict Avoiding-Regional Appraisals (T.M.C. Asser Press 
2003) 24.  
15 ibid. 
16 ‘Charter of the United Nations (Chapter XI): Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories (Article 
73)’, (1945). 
17 Dahlitz, Secession and International Law: Conflict Avoiding-Regional Appraisals (n 14) 26.  
18 Resolution 1514 provides in operative paragraph 2 that ‘all peoples subject to colonial rule have the right to 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’. 
Resolution 1541 (XV) made clear that this exercise in self-determination could result in various outcomes and 
stipulated the processes required to ensure that informed, free and voluntary choice were being made.  
19 ‘The International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights’ (UNGA Res 2200A (XXI) (16 December 1966) 
(entered into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 4) 1966). 
20 ‘International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) (ICESCR), Adopted and opened for 
signature, ratification and accession by UNGA Res 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 
January 1976, in accordance with Article 27’, (1966). 
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independent States, but in non-colonial contexts, the right of self-determination has been 
clearly divorced from the notion of a ‘right to secession’.21  
 
From this time onward, repeated reference to self-determination in human rights builds on the 
old UN Charter language, while at the same time confirming that self-determination is a right 
of peoples. The Helsinki Final Act speaks of ‘the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples’, making it clear that self-determination is a right of peoples.22 
Later, the UN Declaration on Friendly Relations seems at first sight to support the view that 
self-determination is limited to a specific moment of decolonisation.23 It provides ‘inter alia, 
that a colonial or non-self-governing territory continues its separate existence ‘until the 
people of the colony or Non-Self-Governing Territory have exercised their right of self-
determination in accordance with the Charter’. Thereafter, the concept has also been adopted 
in the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights providing that ‘all peoples shall have 
the right to self-determination’ in terms that does not tie it to colonialism.24 Thus, Cassese 
argued that, the principle of self-determination has become so widely recognised in 
international law conventions that it may be considered a general principle of international 
law, conferring on the people the right to self-determination.25 In the Case Concerning East 
Timor, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) affirmed that: ‘Self-determination has been 
recognised by the United Nations Charter and in the jurisprudence of the Court, and is one of 
the essential principles of contemporary international law’.26 
 
Accordingly, Kelsen27 concluded that self-determination is a ‘principle of internal policy, the 
principle of democratic government. Emerson28 believed that the principle implies ‘the right 
                                                          
21 As observed by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Québec Case: ‘The right of colonial peoples to exercise 
their right to self-determination by breaking away from the “imperial” power is now undisputed. See ‘Reference 
re Secession of Quebec', 2 SCR 217, 218 (1998) paras 154 and 155.  
22 ‘The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Declaration)’, (1975) 14 
ILM 1292.    
23 ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among 
States. UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970) UN Doc (A/8082) 1970.’ (UNGA Res 2625 (XXV), (24 
October 1970), (Adopted on a Report from the Sixth Committee (A/8082) 1970). 
24 ‘African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (Adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) 
(1982) 21 ILM 58 (African Charter). 
25 Antonito Cassese, Self-Determination of People, A legal Reappraisal (CU: A Grotius Publication 1995) 171. 
26 ‘Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia)’, [1995] ICJ Rep 84.  
27 H Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems (London Institute 
of World Affairs 1950) 51. 
28 R Emerson, From Empire to Nation: the Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African peoples (Beacon Press 
1970) 301. 
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of self-government of peoples and not the right of secession’. Whilst, Buchheit29 found no 
right of secession, which can be ‘supported or discredited by reference to the ‘travaux 
preparatoires’ of the San Francisco Conference. Cassese concluded that ‘a generic right to 
self-government.30 In his opinion, the right of self-determination cannot be implemented if 
basic human rights and fundamental freedoms are not ensured to all members of the people 
concerned. In his words, ‘internal political self-determination, does not mean generic self-
government, but rather the right to choose freely a government exercising all the freedom 
which make the choice possible, and the right that the government once chosen continues to 
enjoy the consensus of the people and is neither oppressive nor authoritarian.’31 One can 
deduce from the debate that the principle of a people, constituting a State, choosing its own 
form of government is generally accepted.32 The right is also limited by and weighed against 
the principle of territorial integrity of States, and would normally be consummated in its 
internal mode; its exercise will normally not result in a new State being created.  
 
This thesis explores how the will of the people in the context of the right of self-
determination may be limited by the rules of international law. One source of such a 
limitation is the principle of territorial integrity of States.33 Further, what remain controversial 
are the interpretations of the phrase ‘the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples’ for possible arguments. It has been said that ‘no right of self-determination is 
accepted and no other rights of people exist, the addition of equal rights is incorrect and 
contradictory… a certain right of self-determination exists on the footing of equality between 
peoples, but then the formula ‘principle’ of self-determination is too weak. Consequently, 
both concepts in one phrase and saying they are complementary is a contradiction in 
terminis.’34  
 
                                                          
29 L C Buchheit, Secession, The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (YUP 1978) 73 Article 1 (2) was made at San 
Francisco by the four major powers at the behest of the Soviet Union. Two viewpoints emerged in the debates of 
the Technical Committee (I/1) assigned to consider the matter. It was strongly emphasised on the one hand that 
the principle of self-determination ‘corresponded closely to the will and desires of peoples everywhere and 
should be clearly enunciated’ in the Charter, and, on the other hand,; it was stated that the principle conformed 
to the purposes of the Charter only in so far as it applied the right of self-government of peoples and not the 
right of secession. See ‘UN Doc 343, I/1/16, 6 UNCIO Docs 296 [1945]’. 
30 Cassese, Self-Determination of People, A legal Reappraisal (n 25) 139.  
31 ibid 154.  
32 J Duursma, Fragmentation and the International Relations of Microstates (CUP 1996) 15. 
33  R McCorquodale, ‘Self-determination: A Human Rights Approach’ (1994) 43 Int'l & Compe LQ  857.  
34 Duursma, Fragmentation and the International Relations of Microstates (n 34) 15. 
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The second controversial argument is, whether the right of self-determination carries with it a 
right of secession.    
 
The concept of secession has no relevance to decolonisation.35 An alternative view has been 
offered by Koskenniemi,36 who commented that, ‘secession was compliance, and opposing 
rupture of old colonial State was unlawful’. He added that Article 19 (3) (b) of the 
International Law Commission’s draft articles in States Responsibility even spoke of this as 
jus cogens. Dahlitz observed that ‘there was no suggestion that the old colonial rulers should 
stay in State X, with ‘the people’ seceding, but rather that the colonial rulers should go. In 
this context, secession was not in issue. In a post-colonial context, secession is irrelevant to 
the ongoing entitlement of peoples to self-determination. Dahiltz concluded that, confusion 
has arisen when it has been stated that minorities are entitled to self-determination, and that 
may mean a right to secede.  
 
It remains to be clarified as to whether minority rights allow for self-determination. In 1992, 
the Joint Opinion prepared in Quebec by professors Shaw, Higgins, Frank, Pellet and 
Tomuschat emphasised that ‘no legal right existed in favour of secession on the alleged 
ground that the entity concerned is composed of a linguistic minority within a State in which 
the majority are of different linguistic groupings.37 Moreover, the first Badinter Opinion 
answers this question in the negative.38 ‘Serbia had invoked the principle as a basis for 
gathering together, within Serbia, Montenegro and beyond, in a new State structure, those of 
Serbian identity. In Serbia’s eyes the Serbian population in Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina had the right to ‘self-determination’ but other nascent republics were ‘seceding’ 
from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), rather than exercising a right of 
self-determination.’39 Accordingly, ‘the Badinter Commission in its First Opinion, finding 
that the exercise or disappearance of a State is simply a question of fact. No legal 
entitlements were in issue, disintegration and by implication secession too were matters of 
                                                          
35 Dahlitz, Secession and International Law: Conflict Avoiding-Regional Appraisals (n 14) 35. 
36 M Koskenniemi, ‘National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice’ (1994) 43 Int'l 
& Compe LQ 241.  
37 T M Frank (ed), Self-Determination in International Law, Quebec and Lessons Learned Opinon Directed at 
Question 2 of the Reference in Anne Bayefsky (Cambridge, Kluwer Law International 2000) 241.  
38 Dahlitz, Secession and International Law: Conflict Avoiding-Regional Appraisals (n 14) 36. 
39 ibid.  See also Steve Terrett, The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Badinter Arbitration Commission: a 
contextual study of peace-making efforts in the Post-Cold War World (Ashgate 2000) 119.  
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fact, not law.’40  However, Frank41 suggested that in extreme situations, there may be a right 
to secede if minorities’ rights are being trampled on in an unbearable or irredeemable way. In 
Kosovo there was widespread international public sympathy for the reasonable need to 
secede from Serbia. Dahiltz  argued that, in contrast, ‘governments continue to give a greater 
priority to territorial unity, and with the evolution of events and the passage of time, the 
possible pre-requirements for the true need to secede have faded.’42  
 
The difficulty of giving effect to the concept of self-determination is illustrated by unheeded 
claims of many ethnic and minority groups on the ground that established that their identity is 
not being respected and protected by the State.43 The minority rights approach has its own 
difficulties. The extent of the rights at issue, and the groups entitled to claim them remain 
matters of continuing ambiguity and debate, rendering self-determination a variable 
principle.44 For a fresh look at a persistent problem, Brilmayer suggested an imaginative 
solution to a long-standing tension between two fundamental legal norms of doubtful 
compatibility: the right of peoples to self-determination and the right of States to preserve 
their territorial integrity.45 Brilmayer46 proposed a new framework, focused on the relative 
legitimacy of competing territorial claims, as the best way to analyse and resolve secessionist 
disputes. The approach can only be understood in context, for better or for worse, the legal 
instruments establishing the right to self-determination do not identify with any precision the 
peoples entitled to exercise the right. She ‘believed that, the legitimate foundation of the 
secessionist claim must be based on territorial conflict.  The distinct culture argument does 
not, in Brilmayer’s belief, ‘represent a valid case for secession; without a claim to territory 
the argument is illegitimate’. However, what remains debatable yet are the minority rights 
still at issue, and the groups entitled to claim them, they remain a matter of continuing 
ambiguity and uncertainty, ‘rendering self-determination a highly indeterminate and variable 
principle’.47 
 
                                                          
40 Dahlitz, Secession and International Law: Conflict Avoiding-Regional Appraisals (n 14) 36. 
41 T Franck, ‘Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession”, in Peoples and Minorities in International 
Law,’ (1993)  84 NYU L Rev 13. 
42 Dahlitz, Secession and International Law: Conflict Avoiding-Regional Appraisals (n 14) 37.  
43 V P Nada, ‘Self-Determination and Secession Under International Law’ (2011) 29 Denv J int'l L & Pol'y 305. 
44 D Wippman, ‘Secession, Territorial Claim, and the Indeterminacy of Determination’ (2000) 25 YJ Int'l L 287. 
45 ibid. 
46 L Brilmayer, ‘Secession and Self-Determination : A Territorial Interpretation’ (1991) 16 Yale Law School 
Legal Scholarship Repository 177. 
47 ibid. 
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On the other hand, Crawford48 argued that in the Declaration on Friendly Relations, a number 
of commentators have asserted that the right to self-determination may ground a right to 
unilateral secession, the underlying proposition is that, when  people are blocked from the 
meaningful exercise of their right to self-determination internally. In other words, it is 
asserted that the exercise of the right of self-determination should not violate the territorial 
integrity of a ‘state’ that the right is normally to be exercised within the framework of 
existing sovereign state, assuming that the government represents the people. Consequently, 
secession as a last resort may be available in certain exceptional circumstances involving 
gross breach of fundamental human rights.49 The right of internal self-determination is ‘the 
right to authentic self-government, that is, the right for a people really and freely to choose its 
own political and economic regime which is much more than choosing among what is on 
offer perhaps from one political or economic position only’ it is entitled, as a last resort, to 
exercise this by secession. Even if Declarations do not have the same binding power, they 
must be considered as relevant in any theory of secession. The latest developments, 
especially after Kosovo and East Timor, and in the light of the Canadian Supreme Court’s 
pronouncement relating to the claim for Quebec’s secession, however, indicate that there 
could be exceptional circumstances, which might lead to the acceptance of a claim to 
unilateral secession.50 However, Nada pointed out that the exception is the case of 
undemocratic, authoritarian regimes, which are not representative, thus, not providing the 
opportunity for the ‘people’ to participate effectively in the political and economic life of the 
State, especially when there is a pattern of flagrant violations of human rights. It thus remains 
questionable whether secession is one of the means of resolving or aggravating inter-ethnic 
problems and conflicts. In other words, does international practice really decrease the support 
for secession?    
 
The recent case of South Sudan indicates that a strictly anti-colonial definition is far too 
limiting. People with no prior history of direct colonial rule have seceded and received 
recognition. In addition, while no right to independence exists under international law, 
practice shows that where the parent State waives its claim to territorial integrity, the 
                                                          
48 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (n 3). 
49 ‘Reference re Secession of Quebec' (n 21) para 126. 
50 Nada, ‘Self-Determination and Secession Under International Law’ (n 43). 
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international community promptly accepts the emergence of a new State.51  Sudan waived its 
claim to territorial integrity by enacting a clear mechanism for any secession by a prompt 
recognition of the new South Sudanese State. The consent of the parent State is the reason 
why, unlike in the situation of Kosovo, the new legal status of South Sudan is undisputed. 52 
 
The moral arguments examined by Buchanan53 have provided what is now regarded as the 
classic formulation of the remedial-rights justification for secession. His approach certainly 
represents an improvement over many attempts by philosophers to enter the fray of 
international law. Buchanan proposed certain grounds for a remedial right to secession that 
can be exercised only in exceptional circumstances when there is clear evidence that groups 
have suffered certain kinds of injustices. He argued that secessionists’ claims can be valid 
only against a State that fails to act as a trustee for the people, conceived of as an 
intergenerational community. However, what remains insufficiently explored is such claims 
cannot be valid against a democratic State in which basic individual rights may be exercised. 
In addition, he proposed that all cultural groups under certain conditions have the right to 
secede. Buchanan concentrated on the relationship between the minority groups and the state. 
He discussed two questions about secession; first, whether there is a moral right to secede, 
and whether a right to secession ought morally to be recognised in international law. The 
disagreement about the conceptualisation of both the ‘cultural groups’ and ‘nation’ have 
marked the debate.  
 
On the other hand, in its opinion on Quebec’s claim to unilaterally secede from Canada, the 
Supreme Court of Canada stated that: ‘international law expects that the right to self-
determination will be exercised by peoples within the framework of existing sovereign States 
and consistently with the maintenance of the territorial integrity of those States. Where this is 
not possible, in exceptional circumstances a right of secession may arise.54 But, what remains 
unexplored yet is the compatibility between the maintenance of the territorial integrity of 
existing States, and the right of a ‘people’ to achieve a full measure of self-determination. 
Rather, what remains somewhat unexplained also, is under what conditions would a group 
                                                          
51 J Vidmar, ‘South Sudan and the International Legal Framework Governing the Emergence and Delimitation 
of New States’ (2011) 47 Tex Int'l J 541. 
52 ibid. 
53 A Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec 
(Boulder,Westview Press 1991). 
54 'Reference re Secession of Quebec’ (n 21) para 122.  
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have a moral right to secede from the state? As it leaves aside issues about the moral 
appropriateness of various policies for dealing with secessionist crises that might be adopted 
by international institutions as well as issues about international law. 
 
Seymour on the other hand argued that, in contemporary international law, Remedial Rights 
theorists would be interested in partitioning States as a measure of protection for a minority 
population and would not be interested in breaking up a State that is democratically 
considerate of the minority territory.55 Significantly, the thesis agrees with the Buchanan 
view that there is only a remedial right to external self-determination, or secession. The 
remedial right to secession has its origin in the advisory opinion given by the second 
Commission of Rapporteurs in the 1920 Aaland Islands Case.56 The right can also be found 
in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations57, 
and the 1993 Report of the Rapporteur to the UN Sub-Commission Against the 
Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities,58 and General Recommendation XXI 
adopted in 1996 by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.59  
 
Both Buchanan and Seymour rejected the idea that nations, or for that matter any other 
cultural group, could have a primary right to secede, that is, a general right to violate the 
territorial integrity of a State and one that they would have in the absence of past injustice.60 
However, cultural groups could legitimately secede if they rectify some past injustice. 
Contrary to Buchanan, Seymour has argued that nations or peoples are somehow special and 
entitled to unique rights. Buchanan asserted that ‘there is only a remedial right to external 
self-determination, or secession.’ However, it has been insufficiently explored whether a 
                                                          
55 M Seymour, ‘Secession as a Remedial Right’, (2007) University of Montreal Publications, 
<http://www.philo.umontreal.ca/documents/cahiers/SecessionasaRemedialRight.pdf> accessed 20 February  
2013.  
56 After excluding the existence of a general right to secede, excluding the existence of a general right to secede, 
the Commission observed that ‘the separation of a minority from the State of which it forms part and its 
incorporation into another State may only be considered as an altogether exceptional solution, a last resort when 
the State lacks either the will or the power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees [for the protection of 
minorities] See Aaland Island Case, (1920) ‘League of Nations Official Journal Spec Supp 3', . 
57 ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among 
States. UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970) UN Doc (A/8082) 1970.’ (n 23).  
58 UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, ‘Report of the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protections of Minorities on its 45th Session’,‘UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34’, 1993.   
59 ‘Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination', 48th session, UN Doc A/51/18’, 
February 1996. 
60 Seymour, ‘Secession as a Remedial Right’ (n 55). 
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general primary right to self-determination entails a primary right to internal self-
determination, understood as the ability for a people to develop itself within the 
encompassing state and to determine its own political status within that state. It is thus 
questionable whether the violation of internal self-determination can be a remedial right for 
seceding. In other words, could secession remedy harms that undermined internal self-
determination?  
 
International law appears to emphasise the importance of the territorial integrity of States. 
Generally, the preference is to rely on internal domestic laws of existing states to adjudicate 
the succession and establishment of new States.61 In Kadic v Karadzic62 the Second Circuit of 
the United States Court of Appeal was presented with the question of whether a self-
proclaimed Bosnian-Serb republic within Bosnia-Herzegovina, referred to as Republika 
Sprska could be considered a State. The court summarised its conclusion that Srpska met the 
definition of a State by noting that it ‘is alleged to control defined territory, control 
populations within its power, and to have entered into agreements with other governments’. It 
has a president, a legislature, and its own currency. The court emphasised that ‘These 
circumstances readily appear to satisfy the criteria for a state in all respects of international 
law.’ Sprska, by virtue of its state-like characteristics, was indeed a de facto state entitled to 
the rights and encumbered by the responsibilities of a State within the international system.63 
The court has long recognised ‘any government, however violent and wrongful in its origin, 
must be considered a de facto government if it was in the full and actual exercise of 
sovereignty over a territory and people large enough for a nation’.64 
 
The events of 1991 have given a new perspective to the meaning of statehood and changed it 
to some degree. Arguments have been made based on the State’s practice, that achieving 
statehood criteria will not necessarily be enough for a State’s creation. Crawford argued that 
additional ones have supplemented the traditional statehood criteria and an entity, which does 
meet them, is not a State.65 Dugard66 argued that the creation of an entity in breach of jus 
                                                          
61 ‘UN Charter, Article 2 (4)’.  
62 ‘Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236–237 US Court of Appeals 2nd Cir’, 1995, 93. 
63 ibid. See also A K Eggers, ‘When is a State a State ? The Case for Recognition of Somaliland’ (2007) 30 BC 
Int'l & Comp L Rev 211. 
64 ibid. 
65 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (n 3) 96-173. 
66 J Dugard, Recognition and the United Nations (Grotius Publications, Cambridge 1987). 
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cogens is illegal and cannot produce legal rights to the wrongdoer; such an entity cannot 
become a State. He concluded that the ‘United Nations has for practical purposes become the 
collective arbiter of statehood through the process of admission and non-recognition’.67  
However, what remains questionable is thus, has UN membership become a criterion for 
statehood? In particular, the principle of effectiveness has undergone a dynamic change in the 
following time due to the swift change of the political situation in the world and describes the 
shift from effectiveness to legitimacy and consequently international recognition.68  
 
In recent years, recognition of States has become much more important because of its results. 
Grant69 argued that, ‘recognition of an entity doesn’t mean only that this entity has met the 
required qualifications, but also that the recognising State will enter into relations with the 
recognised State and let that State  enjoy usual legal consequences of recognition such as 
privileges and immunities within the domestic legal order.’ Lauterpacht70 and Guggenheim 
asserted that recognition is constitutive.71 While Brownlie72 argued that ‘recognition is an 
optional and political act and there is no duty in this regard.’ However, the key question in 
the discussion about the legal effect of recognition is whether the formation (and continued 
existence) of a State is dependent or independent of recognition by the existing States: in 
other words, may a political entity be considered a State under international law, even if it is 
not recognised as such by the existing States?73 It is thus questionable whether recognition 
has re-emerged as an important legitimising criterion for statehood and how it has been 
modified through the changes in world order.   
 
Fulfilling the criteria for statehood and self-determination does not automatically lead to the 
formation of a new State. Secession could jeopardize groups’ chances of international 
                                                          
67 ibid.  
68 S Nijhawan, ‘The Criteria for Statehood in International Law are Based on the Principle of Effectiveness not 
Legitimacy.’’ essay submitted to the School of Oriental and African Studies (London, Faculty of Law and 
Social Sciences Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy 2003) 
<http://tamilnation.co/selfdetermination/03_criteria_for_statehood.pdf> accessed 20 February 2013.  
69 T D Grant, The Recognition of States: Law and Practice in Debate and Evolution (Greenwood Publishing 
Group 1999) 83.   
70 H Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (CUP, Cambridge) 1948) 401-407.  
71 I Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th edn, OUP 2008) 86.  
72 ibid 87. 
73 A Z Zadeh, ‘International Law and the Criteria for Statehood: The Sustainability of the Declaratory and 
Constitutive Theories as the Method for Assessing the Creation and Continued Existence of States’ (LLM 
thesis, University of Tilburg 2011). 
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recognition, which depends largely on political persuasion. Williams74 and Scharf75 have 
recently applied a useful approach in the Nagorno Karabagh/Azerbaijan situation, combining 
‘Earned Sovereignty’, and ‘Earned recognition’ to achieve self-determination. Williams 
described ES as entailing ‘the conditional and progressive devolution of sovereign powers 
and authority from a State to a sub-State entity under international supervision.’76 The 
reconceptualization of RES would follow, including a process of determination by an 
international mechanism to give effect to the referenda within a sub-State, with the result 
being its recognition by the international community as an independent State. The use of 
legal norms such as RES and plebiscite legalises the process of recognising emerging 
independent States or, in the alternative, recognising the sovereign rights attributed to sub-
States.77 RES provides the legal framework resolution and addresses international legal 
status, and the plebiscite ensures that the framework attains legal status only after a popular 
consultation with the people.   
 
RES provides an ideal legal solution for IKR because it recognises the Kurdish right to self-
determination and sovereign powers without the use of secession, which would effectively 
destroy Iraq’s territorial integrity. Therefore, this methodology provides an additional option 
to the Kurdish/Iraqi dispute outside of the traditional legal dispute resolution mechanisms. 
RES, approved by plebiscite (through a referendum), can be the best possible legal 
methodology for an agreement on the future of IKR. The Kurds have to contemplate first a 
negotiated grant of a level of sovereignty for a period, during which both parties would 
establish a system of protection of minority rights and human rights and engage in a series of 
defined confidence-building measures. This would take place with the support of the 
international community. During the interim period IKR has to prove it stabilised its internal 
political strife and began successfully rebuilding a civil society and community services, and 
solving its constitutional disputes within the State, and that they have earned their 
sovereignty. Later, an assessment of the will of the people, presumably through a referendum, 
would also guide the decision on the final status of the region.   
                                                          
74 P R Williams and F J Pecci, ‘Earned Sovereignty : Bridging the Gap Between Sovereignty and Self-
Determination’ (2004) 40 Stan J Int'l  L 347.  
75 M P Scharf, ‘Earned Sovereignty: Juridical Underpinnings’ (2012) 31 Denv J Int'l L & Pol'y 373.  
76 Williams and Pecci, ‘Earned Sovereignty : Bridging the Gap Between Sovereignty and Self-Determination’ (n 
74). 
77 K Heymann, ‘Earned Sovereignty for Kashmir : The Legal Methodology to Avoiding a Nuclear Holocaust’ 
(2003) 19 Am U Int'l L Rev 153. 
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Today Iraqi Kurdistan exists in a de facto sense, but struggles to exist in a de jure sense. The 
area itself became essentially independent of Saddam Hussein’s regime after the 1991 
uprising. Thanks to the U.S.-British-French enforced no-fly zone established in the wake of 
the first Gulf War, Iraq‘s Kurds were able to go about their own business unencumbered by 
Baghdad’s retention of nominal and geographic unencumbered sovereignty.78 Despite having 
a distinct language, common culture, ancient land, shared history, and a large population, 
there is an existential dilemma; the Kurds are deprived of a recognised State. Statelessness 
has created a sense of pessimism within the Kurdish psyche that they see no remedy for, 
except through some form of self-rule.79 The Iraqi election in 2005 is viewed by most as a 
success for the Kurds, they won the large number of seats as an appositive and deserved 
outcome. However, many obstacles stand in the way of their autonomy. These include the 
style of government in Iraq, as the federal state structure is opposed by many, including the 
Arabs and Turkmen of Kirkuk.80 In addition, the claim of Kirkuk as the capital of the Kurdish 
regional government KRG has instilled fear among Iraq’s neighbours and poses a threat to 
the future of the Iraqi State itself.81 The city has become a source of ethnic-sectarian 
conflicts, as well as the possibility of a regional conflict.82 Accordingly, what remains 
questionable is whether federalism will become the road to secession for the Kurds, as the 
language of the new constitution is problematic and illustrates a lack of sophistication in 
constitutional writing.83  
 
The Constitution establishes Iraq as a federal entity, meaning the union of various 
independent entities.84 However, Article 1 states that ‘the Republic of Iraq is an independent, 
sovereign nation, and the system of rule in it is a democratic, federal, parliamentary republic’. 
The Preamble affirms that ‘adhering to this Constitution shall preserve for Iraq its free union 
of people, land, and sovereignty’. Dawoody argued that, by identifying the unity of Iraq as a 
                                                          
78 M J Kelly, ‘The Kurdish Regional Constitution within the Framework of the Iraqi Federal Constitution: A 
Struggle for Sovereignty , Oil , Ethnic Identity , and the Prospects for a Reverse Supremacy Clause’ (2010) 114 
Penn State L Rev707. 
79 A Dawoody, ‘The Kurdish Quest for Autonomy and Iraq’s Statehood’ (2006) 41 JAAS  483.  
80 R M Usherwood, ‘World War I and the Principle of National Self- Determination: A Closer Look at 
Kurdistan’ (Anthropology theses, paper 6, Georgia State University 2005).  
81 ibid.  
82 ibid. 
83 Dawoody, ‘The Kurdish Quest for Autonomy and Iraq’s Statehood’ (n 79). 
84 ‘Iraqi Constitution’, 2005 <http://www.iraqinationality.gov.iq/attach/iraqi_constitution.pdf>accessed 20 
December 2013, Article 1. 
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‘free’ act of its people, it at least indirectly acknowledges that the Iraqi union is a form of 
‘union at will’ that is subject to change according to the determination of its groups.85  
Furthermore, Article 107 states that ‘the federal authority will maintain the unity of Iraq, its 
integrity, independence, sovereignty and its democratic federal system’.86 This means that the 
task of maintaining the integrity of the Iraqi state is by the federal government alone, in 
effect, Dawoody pointed out that, ‘the constitution exonerates the Kurdish region from such 
obligation and frees it to break away if it chooses to do so in the future.’87 Thus, IKR can be 
granted self-determination if such an act will not infringe upon the territorial integrity of a 
State.88 The thesis explores that there is no way for Iraqi Kurds to attain self-determination 
without threatening the territorial integrity of their sovereign state. However, what remains 
unexplored yet is what would happen if Iraq proves to be a failed State that cannot sustain a 
federal democracy?    
 
It is thus suggested that a people of a given ethnic group or religious group or tribal group can 
only have a meaningful communal existence if they are an independent nation, not if they 
have genuine autonomy, or if there are no human rights abuses and oppression. Whether they 
must actually be independent is a questionable assertion in a global economy where 
cooperation pays greater benefits in every area of life than destructive competition.89 Here, 
serious questions should be asked when a people thinks it should be independent in order to 
have a meaningful political existence: first, is there any violation of human rights? Are the 
rights of the group seeking self-determination respected by the State? Will it be better or 
worse off if they are independent, or have a federalist system?  Nonetheless, if every ethnic, 
racial, and religious group that occupies a piece of land became a separate nation, the world 
might have more than thousand countries and have a very difficult time having a functioning 
global policy or a functioning economy.90  
 
 
                                                          
85 Dawoody, ‘The Kurdish Quest for Autonomy and Iraq’s Statehood’ (n 79). 
86 ‘Iraqi Constitution’ (n 84) Article 107.  
87 Dawoody, ‘The Kurdish Quest for Autonomy and Iraq’s Statehood’ (n 79). 
88 Usherwood, ‘World War I and the Principle of National Self- Determination : A Closer Look at Kurdistan’ (n 
80). 
89 Nada, ‘Self-Determination and Secession Under International Law’ (n 43) . 
90 A Beicgman, ‘Secessions vs. Praise for Unity’ The Washington Times (Washington October 18 1999) 
<http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-56474142.html> accessed 19 February 2013.  
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1.3. Thesis statement and research questions  
 
This thesis will present a new understanding of self-determination in the post-colonial 
context, and from that, develop an original way of guiding states in evaluating contemporary 
claims to external self-determination. 
 
International law provides that for a group to be entitled to exercise its right to self-
determination, it must qualify as a ‘people’. At the same time, it stresses that the territorial 
integrity of States must be respected. Both are fundamental principles of the international 
order. Even so, the orthodox view is that the right to self-determination to is to be exercised 
within the framework of the existing sovereign State; that is to say, the right to self-
determination is subordinated to the territorial sovereignty of the parent State. Thus, a 
colonised people would exercise their choice, for example through a referendum, within and 
as part of that colonial empire. If that is not possible, for example, because the colonial 
empire refuses to countenance the risk of a break-up, the colonised people may have to take 
control of their political future through unilateral non-consensual secession (I am not making 
any observations on the right to use force in struggles for self-determination). 
 
Nevertheless, what does the right to self-determination mean today? The normative scope of 
the right of the principle of self-determination continues to lack precision. Firstly, it is unclear 
whether the concept of ‘peoples’ now includes minorities, and secondly, it is unclear what the 
appropriate objective remedy  for a claim of self-determination should be in a post-colonial 
context (for example, creation of an independent State, or any other political status freely 
determined, as stated in the UN Friendly Relations Declaration). The Scottish example 
provided an illustration of an exercise of the right to self-determination that is taking place in 
a post-colonial context and within the framework of the existing parent State. If separation 
was to be the will of the Scottish people in the referendum, Westminster were committed to 
allowing a process of secession. However, is there any role for unilateral, non-consensual 
secession in the post-colonial world?  Authority for this comes from the landmark finding of 
the Supreme Court of Canada, that territorial changes without the consent of the State can be 
a remedy in extreme circumstances involving grave breaches of fundamental human rights. 
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This thesis takes up the argument of ‘earned sovereignty’ as a fresh way of looking at the 
content of the right to self-determination, and providing grounds for overcoming the default 
presumption of territorial integrity.  Alan Buchanan originally developed the theory. In 1991, 
he launched the contemporary debate about the morality of secession. However, his initial 
theories were taken further in his 2004 magnum opus, where he proposed a justice-based 
reorganisation of international law, incorporating a ‘just cause’ theory of secession as a 
remedial right only. In his view, secession can only be justified if important harms have been 
committed to the seceding people or entity. This seems, to me, to say that it is not enough that 
a ‘people’ wishes to have a future outside of and independent from the parent State; these 
‘people’, entitled to the right to self-determination, must have a good cause for wishing to 
secede from their parent State. There is an additional element here, which did not exist for 
colonial peoples (possibly, the mere fact of being colonised can be equated with this modern 
additional element). Buchanan stipulated that a ‘people’ entitled to the right to self-
determination are also entitled to secede unilaterally when confronted with the parent State's 
persistent violation of previous agreements affording them some limited form of self-
government. In the situation where there may be autonomy arrangements within the 
constitution, systematic violations by the parent State may provide justification for secession, 
he argued. 
 
Accepting and building on Buchanan’s, ‘earned sovereignty’ theory, and arguments raised by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in the matter of Quebec, I propose a new way of guiding the 
international community in this area, a new method for assessing the legality and legitimacy 
of external self-determination claims within the post-colonial international law framework.  I 
call my new method the ‘Remedial Approach to Post-Colonial External Self Determination’ 
because I see the creation of the would-be State through secession as a remedy in certain 
limited circumstances. Starting with the right to self-determination, I analyse the right from 
its colonial-era roots to the contemporary post-colonial era. I argue that the right to self-
determination has never been monolithic. It has had different aspects depending on the group 
one was dealing with. It is now uncontroversial that colonised people had the right to 
determine their political future and destiny, but these people lived with others within the 
colonial empire that also had entitlements. These others, such as those within the 
Metropolitan area, may not have been ‘colonised’, but they did have rights to determine their 
political future and destiny (at least once democracy had spread around the world). These 
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rights were exercised in different ways – one gave the opportunity for externality, and the 
other for internality; another way of looking at it is that one gave the right to choose (among a 
range of options) external self-determination (from among a range of options), and the other 
gave the right to make choices internally, the right of self-determination exercised within the 
State. My point is that self-determination, already at the colonial stage, had inherent 
flexibility and this links to the flexibility that I believe it must have today. 
 
I argue, moving out of the colonial era, that self-determination still exists for all ‘people’. 
However, it now takes an internal shape; another way of looking at it is that the default is 
self-determination is to be exercised internally, within the legal and socio-political structures 
and procedures of a State. Democratic participation, I would argue, is about exercising the 
right to self-determination internally. This is the default position. 
 
However, I argue that in exceptional (and necessarily limited) situations, the default position 
can be overridden. There has to be a way to manage situations where the exercise of the right 
to self-determination, understood in this internal way, is impossible or involves breaches of 
fundamental norms of international law. My argument is that if the right to self-determination 
is to have a moral and just content, it must allow for escape routes, or exceptions, when 
things just do not work out. These are the remedies that I refer to. In support of this, I draw 
from the Supreme Court of Canada and Buchanan, and argue that in certain extreme 
circumstances, the modern right to self-determination must include an external element, the 
right to secede from the parent State. 
 
My argument is that the ‘Remedial Earned Sovereignty’ approach affords a way of assessing 
post-colonial breakaway movements in their different manifestations. A new entity may come 
into being lawfully through negotiated and consensual constitutional processes; on the other 
hand, a new entity may come into being through the use of force as the only remedy for the 
‘people’ denied a right to determine their future internally. The latter are of interest to me, as 
this is where the controversy lies. We should look at whether these entities have earned their 
sovereignty. Some such movements may be lawful at creation; some may be unlawful at 
creation. What is lawful may become unlawful, what is unlawful may become lawful; 
although the fact of statehood, once accepted, is a mere fact, a State exists or does not exist.  
The ‘Remedial Earned Sovereignty’ approaches allow us to add another layer of 
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consideration that goes beyond the superficiality of pure ‘legality’, by delving into the 
legitimacy of the new entity. I argue that legitimacy is a second layer of essential 
consideration, and it involves a deeper and more holistic level of analysis. Consideration of 
legitimacy involves but goes beyond consideration of criteria relevant to the ‘Remedial 
Earned Sovereignty’ argument. We have to look at the circumstances that led to the 
secession, also how the entity has conducted itself, and how it has organised itself internally. 
In order to navigate through these considerations of legality and legitimacy, I will develop a 
set of guidelines for States in assessing how to deal with entities coming into existence 
because of secession. This is my ‘Remedial Approach to Post-Colonial External Self 
Determination’. 
 
From this starting point, which emerges from chapter three, I will test and refine the 
‘Remedial Approach to Post-Colonial External Self Determination’ by applying it to Kosovo, 
Quebec and Southern Sudan, and ultimately test the finalised hypothesis idea on the Iraqi 
Kurdish Region. 
 
The following research questions will assist in the development of the thesis statement:   
 
1. What is the content of the right to self-determination in the post-colonial world order? 
Does it include the right to secede from the parent State? If so, in what context?  
2. Is the theory of ‘earned sovereignty’ adequate for addressing external self-determination?  
If not, how can it be improved?   
3. Can a doctrinally sound and practical method for assessing the legality and legitimacy of 
external self-determination claims be developed?  
4. Do the peoples of the Iraqi Kurdish region, specifically the Kurds, have a right to external 
self-determination that would enable them to establish their own state in accordance with 
international law?     
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1.4. Methodology  
 
1.4.1. Technical approaches 
 
The thesis approach draws on a traditional international law methodology, relying on the 
doctrinally accepted ways of sourcing international law, with a practical focus on customary 
international law. It is a conventional ‘black letter legal analyse’. Accordingly, the thesis 
proposes the following methodology:    
 
1.4.2. Conceptual approaches 
 
Firstly: This thesis will examine the right to self-determination as an important legal 
principle in international law, defined in Articles 1-(2) and Article (55) of the United Nations 
Charter. This review will show that the right has generally been overlooked as a viable option 
for the people. I will critically discuss whether the right carries with it a right of secession. It 
shall be illustrated that the entitlement of every ‘people’ to self-determination under 
international law leaves some questions unanswered, namely, what does self-determination 
mean, and what is a ‘people’?    
 
To illustrate this methodology, two arguments should be noted: 
 
1) -The ICCPR states that peoples ‘freely determine their political status.’ ‘This language 
strongly suggests the ability to determine political dependence or independence, and in fact, 
General Assembly Resolution 1514 declares that self-determination includes the right to 
complete independence, at least in the colonial setting.’ 
 
2) -Nevertheless, self-determination is not limited to a simple alternative between 
independence and dependence. General Assembly Resolution 2625 speaks of several 
different modes of exercising self-determination: ‘The establishment of a sovereign and 
independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the 
emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of 
implementing the right of self-determination by that people.’  
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Second: After analysing the right of self-determination, the thesis explores whether the right 
of self-determination includes the possibility of secession, in other words, does the right of 
self-determination suggest a right of secession? Here three arguments should be considered:  
 
1) Whether the right of self-determination carries with it a right of secession that will be 
argued in both the colonial and post-colonial era. It will be argued that the right has no 
relevance to decolonisation, and secession is also irrelevant to the ongoing entitlement of 
peoples to self-determination in the post-colonial era.  
 
2) Whether minority rights allow for self-determination. To answer this question the thesis 
will argue The Joint Opinion prepared in 1992 in Quebec, and the First Badinter Opinion 
regarding the status in SFRY, arguing that in extreme circumstances there may be a right to 
secede if minorities’ rights are being violated in an irredeemable way.  
 
3) The thesis will essentially evaluate the post-Cold-War State practice creation. Mainly, the 
statehood criteria and recognition theories will be outlined. It shall consider which statehood 
criteria have effects on the law of statehood, what is the role of effectiveness, sovereignty, 
human rights, and recognition, do they have a central role in the creation of a new State in 
pre-1991 practice? The thesis will create an argument in favour of the concept of the 
additional statehood criteria, and the relationship between the statehood criteria and 
recognition requirements, between recognition and non-recognition through doctrinal law 
methodology, as it tries to clarify the importance of some additional basic criteria of creating 
new States and to examine the post-Cold era State practice.  
 
Third: the thesis will discuss and critically examine Allen Buchanan’s theory of secession. It 
will analyse both primary right theories and remedial right only theories, it will question the 
continued value of the concept of nationhood in this context.  Buchanan’s remedial right only 
theory of secession will be compared with some primary right theories. On the other hand, to 
analyse and resolve secessionist disputes, the thesis will evaluate Brilmayer’s proposed 
framework regarding the relative legitimacy of competing territory claims, as the best way to 
end the disputes. Thereafter, the thesis will deal with the problems of normative and liberal 
theories, special rights to secede, and conditions of groups and ask if constitutions should 
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include a right to secede. Eventually, after excluding the existence of a general right to self-
determination and secession, excluding the existence of a general right to secede, the thesis 
will turn to bridge the gap between the right of self-determination and sovereignty of the 
State through the theory of Remedial Earned Sovereignty ‘RES’. By providing a mechanism 
whereby some sub-State entities may be guided through a process of transition to heightened 
autonomy or statehood in such a way so as not to undermine the legitimate interests of parent 
States and of the international community. Such a viable option could have been envisioned 
to the situation of IKR if the Kurds have failed to break away from Iraq in democratic 
fashion, RES, can be a useful and legitimate tool for the exercise of external self-
determination, ultimately leading toward remedial secession and independence.  
 
Fourth: the research picks up several case studies, the specific disputable situation of 
Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence. These include the right of self-determination, 
statehood criteria, recognition, and remedial secession theory. Quebec and South Sudan, as a 
struggle by a group against an existing State. The thesis evaluates that groups can only have a 
meaningful communal existence if they are a ‘people’ and their right to internal self-
determination has been directly or indirectly violated, not if there is no violation of human 
rights and no oppression, not if they have a genuine (federal or autonomy political system). 
The will of the people, those seeking separation or autonomy and presumably resistance by 
the State to preserve its territorial integrity will be considered properly.  
 
Fifth: after providing an overview of the right to self-determination and the legality of the 
right to secession in both theory and practice and minority rights, this thesis turns to analyse 
the Kurdish question in Iraq. To illustrate this methodology two arguments should be noted: 
 
1)-The thesis argues how the Kurds in Kurdistan of Iraq have made a significant achievement 
in securing their rights, and controlling their region since 1991. The factual situations, what 
the Kurds have achieved, upon the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990, and how far these 
situations have given rise to Kurdish expectations of greater autonomy and Federalism.  
 
2)-The thesis analyses, how the Kurds and Iraqi government are sharply divided over the 
most fundamental issues in the constitution relating to the nature of their future State and to 
the governmental system that is to play a role in it. In particular, whether the Kurdish region 
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will be defined territorially or ethnically, and whether it will include Kirkuk. A continuing 
territorial dispute between the central government in Baghdad and Kurdistan Region 
Government over the area in and around the city of Kirkuk may be at the crux of a stable 
Iraq. It will argue, how long the Iraqi Kurds can be persuaded to remain part of a federal Iraq. 
A constitutional framework will closely examine the major controversial issues between the 
IKR and the State.   
 
Finally: The methods used in the investigation forming the basis for this thesis follow the 
traditional pattern of research and States practice, case law, and doctrine. This project relies 
on materials from a varied assortment of sources, chief among which are the international 
legal instruments and the case law pertaining to the right to self-determination and the 
creation of States on grounds of this right. All of the sources referred to in the investigation 
are listed in the bibliography at the end of the thesis.  
 
1.5. Structure  
 
Followed by the methodology presented above, this thesis will be structured in seven 
Chapters. 
Chapter 1: is the introduction of the thesis as shown in this chapter. 
Chapter 2: comprehensively presents the relevant legal issues and literature review.  
 
This chapter deals with the right of self-determination, the rights of minorities, the act of 
recognition, the law of statehood and secession. It considers that, for a group to be entitled to 
exercise its right to self-determination, it must qualify as a ‘people’. It will examine how the 
exercise of the right of self-determination should not violate the ‘territorial integrity’ of a 
State that the right is normally to be exercised within the framework of an existing sovereign 
State.  
 
This chapter evaluates how to identify a group as a minority. It will argue how the right of 
minority groups or sub-groups is distinguishable from the right to self-determination. The 
focus of this chapter will be the concept of statehood in international law. It will outline the 
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classic statehood criteria and the development of the additional criteria and analyse the role 
and the significance of recognition. It will argue how recognition lets the State enjoy the 
usual legal consequences within the domestic legal order and international community. It will 
examine the obligation to withhold recognition and the additional statehood criteria to see if 
they are problematic in light of the perceived role of recognition in contemporary internal 
law. The chapter will then overview the fundamental debate about secession. It will argue 
that, secession, as a last resort may be available in certain exceptional circumstances. It will 
analyse how the international community needs to overcome the default presumption against 
secession, on the other hand, it needs to establish a means to assess and recognise secession 
claims within an international law framework.  
 
Chapter 3: is (Theories of secession) and the evaluation of the concept of (Earned 
Sovereignty and plebiscite), as an additional option outside of the traditional legal dispute 
resolution mechanisms.  
 
This chapter reviews theories of secession, and identifies what they have in common and 
where they differ. It will argue, under what conditions a group within an existing community 
may, with justification separate from the larger group in order to establish its own self-
governing community. It begins the task of remedying the controversial debate on moral 
secession, evaluating under what grounds and under what conditions is secession morally 
justified. It will argue how international law should deal with secession. It examines whether 
the international law of self-determination authorises a right to secession as a remedy for the 
violation of the right to self-determination of peoples. 
 
Normative theories of secession provided by Allen Buchanan and Lea Brilmayer will be 
taken as representative examples of just-cause theories. Thereafter, Beran’s account on liberal 
democratic theories will be examined. The chapter will then turn to discuss the legal aspects 
of secession, especially as it relates to the constitutional laws of sovereign States. It evaluates 
rules for achieving independence, arguing international law may provide guidance on how it 
may be achieved, especially when a people are entitled to restore remedial secession. 
Thereafter, the chapter will examine the role of plebiscite in recognising the creation of a new 
independent State. It will illustrate how the will of the people occurs through the legal norm 
of plebiscite. The chapter will then turn to discuss the legal aspects of secession, especially as 
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it relates to the constitutional laws of sovereign states. The chapter will address the 
theoretical justifications for constitutional secession. 
 
Later, the chapter will turn to explore a fresh balanced theory on the external right to self-
determination (Remedial Earned sovereignty), as a remedial approach to the right of self-
determination in international politics. It will discuss both advantages and disadvantages of 
the theory, and drawing some cautious policy conclusions from the approach. Accordingly, 
this chapter will be arguing both politics and legal theories of secession, as multidisciplinary 
approaches seems to be the most effective way to approach secession and self-determination. 
 
Chapter 4: is the assessment of State practice, to illustrate the discrepancy of results 
attached to the self-determination struggles by different people.   
 
This chapter presents different cases around the world. It articulates a variety of arguments 
that purport to justify secession under certain circumstances. It will address whether 
international law and State practice really declines the support for secession, or rather is 
allowed only in certain circumstances. Recent endorsement of Kosovo, South Sudan and 
Quebec, have indicated that the premise that the separation of ethnic groups is supposedly 
legitimate in certain exceptional cases. This applies alternatively when the mother State 
rejects every compromise solution in a conflict situation, or when there is no realistic 
prospect of a conflict being resolved, especially when the methods of peaceful conflict 
resolution appear to have been exhausted.  
 
Chapter 5: is the Kurdish question in Iraq:  
 
The chapter in part (1) provides an overview of the roots of the Kurdish question in Iraq, 
(Historical Perspective). The chapter evaluates the Kurdish origins to demonstrate the 
distinctive Kurdish cultural identity and the Kurdish claim to territory. It analyses a historical 
explanation for the unjust annexation of the Kurdistan Region into the Iraqi State, arguing 
how the Iraqi Kurds were oppressed and subjected to some of the worst atrocities of 
humanity through their history. It outlines the elements of self-determination and considers 
whether the Iraqi Kurds possess this right. Then the chapter in part (2) will turn to evaluate 
the constitutional framework between Iraq and the IKR. It will critically analyse why the 
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Kurds supported the constitution in 2005, as it appeared to meet their significant demands as 
well as, not only to preserve the Kurdish autonomy, but also to include the Kurds insistence 
on de-facto-federalism or a formal creation of each region with its own regional government. 
Finally, the part will examine the Kurdish drive for secession based on a constitutional 
framework, identifying challenges facing the Iraqi Kurds’ quest for independence and 
statehood. The ramifications of the impending Iraqi federalism for the future of Iraq as a 
country will be discussed also.  
 
Chapter 6: Is the application of the reconceptualised theory of ‘RES’ to the situation of the 
IKR.  
The chapter will apply the concluded work presented in chapters II, III, IV, and V, in the IKR 
situation in northern Iraq. In order to assess the claim of the IKR to independence or 
secession, this chapter will turn to the examination of the three core issues described above, 
statehood, secession, and recognition, under international law as it applies to the situation of 
the IKR. This chapter will argue that for an entity to become a State, it has firstly to fulfil the 
requirements of statehood and secondly, to have been created lawfully. Later, it will examine 
the Kurdish drive for self-determination based on the theory of ‘Remedial Earned 
Sovereignty’ as a settlement short of secession and alternative to change established 
international boundaries. The chapter will argue that for the Kurds to obtain international 
legitimisation and gain some degree of self-determination, they must fulfil several guidelines. 
Eventually, it will demonstrate issues surrounding the IKR independence.  
Last, Chapter 7: is the conclusion of the thesis. The chapter evaluates important questions 
regarding the modern-day understanding of the right of self-determination and of the 
international legal theories of secession, statehood, and recognition. Moreover, it challenges 
to assert new theories as justification for the IKR persuading for the creation of an 
independent entity from its mother-state through the process of RES. The chapter will argue 
that for a successful self-determination struggle it is important for the Kurds to demonstrate 
to the outside world that it has achieved statehood, and view its struggle as legitimate to the 
superpower States. Rather, it suggests that a possible peaceful solution should have been 
considered especially for disputed areas before any declaration of independence or secession, 
which may probably, embraced the neighbours’ countries and the international community.  
This chapter will conclude that as a remedial approach, ‘RES’  will be a useful and legitimate 
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tool to address ongoing post-colonial self-determination cases and guide international 
responses in future if the self-determination claim itself is denied or deferred by the State. 
This approach can be used as a fresh way of looking at the content of the right to self-
determination, and providing grounds for overcoming the default presumption of territorial 
integrity. 
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Chapter Two: Towards a New Understanding of the Concepts of Self-
determination, Minorities, Statehood, Recognition, and Secession in 
Contemporary International Law 
 
2.1. Introduction  
 
This chapter examines the crucial legal issues relevant to this thesis, and focuses on the right 
of self-determination, the rights of minorities, the act of recognition, the law of statehood and 
secession. This is essential in order to identify the central of applicable rules to these 
international concepts, and to lay the groundwork for the development of our original 
contribution in this area. The aim of the chapter is to scrutinize and analyse the legal theory 
of self-determination within the context of international law. The concept of ‘people’ and its  
differentiation from the term ‘minorities’ will be addressed in order to establish a foundation 
of the group’s claim as a separate and distinct nation. Most importantly, the problems with 
regard to the application of the right of self-determination have shifted from the question of 
who are the holders of the right, to the question of when does the right take precedence over 
the obligation to respect the territorial integrity of a State. This holds true especially 
concerning national minorities, which have not traditionally been considered recipients of this 
right. In this regard, the chapter will evaluate how to identify a group as a minority. This 
chapter will argue how the right of minority groups or sub-groups is distinguishable from the 
right to self-determination. Thereafter, the chapter will examine the evolution and the 
contents of the right of self-determination, and attempts to define the necessary elements of 
statehood and illustrate the importance of international State recognition thereto. The chapter 
will then overview the fundamental debate about secession. It will argue how the 
international community views secession with suspicion, and traditionally, the right to 
independence or secession as a mode of self-determination has only been applied to people 
under colonial domination or some kind of oppression. Theories of secession will be dealt 
with in chapter 3, in the context of a theoretical discussion of the legal and political right of 
secession.   
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2.2. The right of self-determination  
 
2.2.1. What is the right of self-determination?   
 
The right of self-determination is one of the most important, yet controversial, principles of 
international law. It has served as a strong slogan and a vital justification for the 
independence of many peoples, specifically the independence of colonial peoples. The right 
of a fundamental principle of human rights law, is an individual and collective right to ‘freely 
determine political status and to freely pursue economic, social and cultural development.91  
Significantly, the right is linked to many of the most important and fundamental principles of 
public international law and that it embodies the concept of the right of peoples to determine 
their own destiny without outside interference or subjugation, presupposing all peoples are 
equal. The right complements fundamental principles of public international law like the 
equality of States, State sovereignty, and territorial integrity, including the prohibition of 
force and the principle of non-intervention. With self-determination as a slogan, indigenous 
groups or minorities raise claims of either secession from an independent State entity or 
independence and freedom from foreign domination. This right does not only exist under 
public international law but also under international human rights law ‘IHRL’ where it 
contains, among other things, of the equal rights of people within a State.   
In fact, to say that under international law every ‘people’ is entitled to self-determination 
leaves unanswered problems that are still very much in flux and vague, namely, what does 
self-determination mean, and what is ‘a people’?   
Articles 1 (2) and 55 of the United Nations Charter mention the right of self-determination, 
and although not expressly mentioned, it constitutes the foundation for the chapters 
concerning the non-self-governing territories and the trusteeship system. Article 1 (2) 
declares that one of the fundamental purposes of the United Nations is to ‘develop friendly 
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples’. Article 55 is part of the chapter concerning international economic 
and social cooperation. It can therefore be said that all States, which have become members 
                                                          
91 ‘The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (n 19). Also Art (1) of the ‘International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) (ICESCR) (n 20).    
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of the UN by ratifying the UN Charter, have accepted the principle of respect for the self-
determination of peoples. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights UDHR followed the 
UN Charter. The rights elaborated in two more detailed international covenants which, unlike 
the Declaration itself, are treaties intended to have legal force. Article (1) of the ICCPR states 
that ‘All peoples have the right to self-determination, and ‘may freely determine their 
political statues’.92 Accordingly, a nation, which is a signatory of an international treaty, is 
obliged under international law to ‘refrain from acts which would defeat the purpose and 
object of the treaty’ (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 18, and codifying 
earlier customary international law.93  
The language of the common Article 1 of the ICCPR strongly suggests the ability to 
determine political dependence or independence, and in fact, General Assembly Resolution 
1514 declares that self-determination includes the right to complete independence, at least in 
the colonial setting.94 Nevertheless, self-determination is not limited to a simple alternative 
between independence and dependence. General Assembly Resolution 2625 speaks of several 
different modes of exercising self-determination: ‘The establishment of a sovereign and 
independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the 
emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitutes modes of 
implementing the right of self-determination by that people’.95  
In fact, since the ICCPR came into force in 1976 there has been widespread concern that if 
the right to self-determination in Article 1 is applied literally, this could lead to the break-up 
of many existing States.96 Particularly, this applies to Africa, whose national boundaries are 
mostly colonial era constructs, but also to numerous other States with an ethnic minority 
population who form a majority in particular regions.97  Harris argued that, the consensus, 
                                                          
92 ‘The International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights’ (n 19).  
93 Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, 1993, (adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights), UN 
Doc A/Conf.157/23. 
94 ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA Res (1514) (XV), 15 
UN GAOR Supp (No 16) at 66, UN Doc A/4684 (1961).’ (Res 1514(XV) (December 1960), (947th plenary 
meeting) 1960). Article 1 of the Declaration states that ‘The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, 
domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the 
UN and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation’.  
95 ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among 
States (n 23).  The Declaration states that ‘alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation are a violation of the 
principle of self-determination, as well as a denial of fundamental human rights, and is contrary to the UN 
Charter’.  
96 P Harris, ‘Is Tibet entitled to self-determination?’ (CCPL Occasional Paper 18, 2008)  
<http://www.law.hku.hk/ccpl/pub/Documents/OccasionalpaperNo.18Eng.pdf> accessed 22 June 2013.   
97 ibid. 
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which has emerged, is that the right to self-determination for the purpose of ICCPR Article 1 
applies only to the following: (1) entire populations living in independent states, (2) entire 
population of territories yet to receive independence, and (3) territories under foreign military 
occupation.98  
In addition, Sterio argued that self-determination in international law is the legal right for a 
people to attain a certain degree of autonomy from its sovereign.99 President Woodrow 
Wilson, in introducing the concept to the League of Nations in 1919, described self-
determination as ‘the right of every people to choose the sovereign under which they live, to 
be free of alien masters, and not to be handed about from sovereign to sovereign as if they 
were property.’100 Subsequently, other writers have described the right as ‘a right which 
arises when there is international recognition of the rights of the inhabitants of a colony to 
choose freely their independence or association with another State.’101 Alternatively, when 
there is a collective right of a people sharing similar objective characteristics to ‘freely 
determine their own form of government while further developing their economic, social, and 
cultural status.’102 Judge Dillard in a separate opinion in the ‘Western Sahara Case’ stated 
that ‘It is for people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the territory the destiny 
of the people’.103  Therefore, it can be argued that self-determination encapsulates three basic 
ideas (1) there has to be a group (2) that group has to be concerned about its political status; 
and (3) that group must be able to exercise its own choice with regard to its political future.104    
Similarly, self-determination has been one of the most important driving forces in the new 
international community; it has set in motion a restructuring and redefinition of the world 
community’s basic rules of the game.105 The definition was elaborated regarding the manner 
in which the right could be implemented. The right can be exercised in one of three ways, 
integration, free association or independence, but whichever method is chosen, ‘it is clear that 
                                                          
98 ibid. 
99 M Sterio, ‘On the Right to External Self Determination: “Selfistans,” Secession and the Great Powers’ Rule’ 
(2010) 19 M J Int'l L 29.  
100 E M Amberg, ‘Self-determination in Hong Cong: A New Challenge to an Old Doctrine’ (1985) 22 San D L 
Rev 839. 
101 ibid. 
102 J A Collins, ‘Self-Determination in International Law: The Palestinians’ (1980) 12 Case W Res J Int'l L 137.  
103 ‘Western Sahara Case' [1975] ICJ Rep 12.  
104 D Z Case, ‘Re-Thinking Self-Determination: A Critical Analysis of Current International Law Theories’ 
(1992) 18 Syracuse J Int’I L & Com 21. 
105 Cassese, Self-Determination of People, A legal Reappraisal (n 25) 1. 
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it is the process itself, which is the essential feature.’106 Accordingly, the precise scope of the 
principle of self-determination, both as to its substantive content, the legal rights it confers 
and the entities to which it applies is still vaguely defined. This tends to make it particularly 
attractive as an elastic principle, which can be moulded to fit a variety of very different 
situations and aspirations.107 On the other hand, outside the context of decolonisation, the 
right has an ‘internal nature’, that consists of a people’s right to freely pursue their social, 
economic, and cultural development, ideally through democratic governance.   
The right has also been used in conjunction with principle of ‘territorial integrity’108 to 
protect the territorial framework of the colonial period in the decolonisation process and to 
prevent a rule permitting secession from independent states from arising.109 The Canadian 
Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec case noted that ‘international law expects that the 
right to self-determination will be exercised by peoples within the framework of existing 
sovereign states and consistently with the maintenance of the territorial integrity of those 
states’.110 However, as a concept, self-determination is capable of developing further to 
include the right to secession from existing states, but that has not yet convincingly 
happened.111 
The principle of self-determination has evolved into a part of positive international law. The 
right is indisputably a norm of jus cogens112, the norms are the highest rules of international 
law, and they must be strictly obeyed at all times.113 The International Law Commission takes 
the stand, in light of, inter alia, the East Timor case, that the obligation to respect the right is 
‘jus cogens’.114 In addition, many scholars will even go further to state that the right 
constitutes a norm of 'erga omnes’.  The ICJ has affirmed in the ‘East Timor’ case that the 
                                                          
106 ‘Western Sahara Case'  (n 103).  
107 K Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq, the Past, Present and Future (Rev edn, London, Pluto Press 2007) 191. 
108 Territorial integrity has been defined as the material expression of state sovereignty and jurisdiction (land, 
water, subsoil, airspace, population), and in some instances, state ownership of such material expression 
(aircraft, space vehicles, ships). See C L Rozakis, ‘Territorial integrity and Political independence’, in R 
Brernhardt (ed), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, IV (North-Holland Publishing Co 2000) 812-818.  
109 T M Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (OUP, USA 1990) 153. 
110 ‘Reference re Secession of Quebec' (n 21) para 122. 
111 ibid. 
112 The term of ‘Jus cogens’, ‘refers to certain fundamental, overriding principles of international law, from 
which no derogation is ever permitted’. See, I Brownile, Principle of Public International Law (5th edn, OUP 
1998) 517.  
113 K Parker, ‘Understanding Self-Determination, The Basics’ (Association of Humanitarian Lawyers, Geneva 
2000) <http://www.guidetoaction.org/parker/selfdet.html>accessed 23 March 2013.  
114 ‘Case Concerning East Timor' (Portugal v Australia) [1995] ICJ Rep 84.  
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right to self-determination has an ‘erga omnes character’.115 The Court went on to state that 
the right of peoples to self-determination is ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary 
international law’.116 Both the ICJ and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of 
the Organisation of American States have ruled on cases in a way that supports the view that 
the principle of self-determination also has the legal status of ‘erga omnes’.117 Accordingly, 
due to the normative quality of ‘erga omnes’ rights and obligations, the ‘erga omnes’ 
character of the right to self-determination can only apply to well-established definitions of 
that right. This may include the right to some measure of internal self-determination. In other 
words, ‘erga omnes’ obligations of a State are owed to the international community as a 
whole when a principle achieves the status of erga omnes the rest of the international 
community is under a mandatory duty to respect it in all circumstances in their relations with 
each other.118  
Meanwhile, the right clearly applies within the context of decolonisation of the European 
empires and thus provides the peoples of such territories with a degree of international 
personality.119 The principle of self-determination provides that the people of the colonially 
defined territorial unit in question may freely determine their political status.120 Such 
determination may result in independence, integration, with a neighbouring state, free 
association with an independent state or any other political status freely decided upon by the 
people concerned.121  In addition, the principle also has a role within the context of the 
creation of statehood, preserving the sovereignty and independence of states, in providing 
criteria for the resolution of disputes, and in the area of the permanent sovereignty of states 
over natural resources.122 Thus, the definition and the scope of the rights are unclear but its 
development into a rule of law in Public International Law is almost indisputable. One field 
of application that is free from doubts is that of foreign domination and other forms of alien 
governance and subjugation, which initially referred to colonialism, but has evolved beyond 
that to include current forms of alien governance. In other words, the right evolved from a 
                                                          
115 ibid.  
116 ibid. 
117 The term "erga omnes" means flowing to all. It can also be described as a [law applies as against every 
individual person or State without distinction]. See,  Parker, ‘Understanding Self-Determination: The Basics (n 
113).   
118 ibid. 
119 M N Shaw, International Law (6th  edn, CUP 2008) 257.  
120 ibid.  
121 ‘Western Sahara Case’ (n 103).  
122 ‘Case Concerning East Timor ' (n 114).  
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mere slogan to a principle and later into an actual right in international law even though its 
scope is far from undisputed. Not only is it unclear but it also includes many elements. The 
only element of the right that is certain and indisputable is the element regarding 
independence from colonial or foreign domination.123 Beyond that, there are different views 
on what this right includes. The right is thus, it has been construed as the right of peoples to 
determine their own destiny and form of government. For instance, self-determination can be 
based on a peoples' desire to be free from colonial rule. ‘Self-determination may be 
exercised, inter alia, through the establishment of a sovereign independent state, by 
integration, or by association with another state. Thus, the exact meaning of self-
determination is enmeshed in controversy’.124 
 
2.2.2. Background and development of the right to self-determination 
 
2.2.2.1. Self-determination and Colonialism  
 
The principle of self-determination is linked to the decolonisation process that took place 
after the promulgation of the UN Charter of 1945. There began in the 1950s to be a moral 
stand taken on the issue by the General Assembly. In the 1960’s, the right became 
increasingly invoked as a right of dependent peoples, with the increase in Afro-Asian 
membership. As a legal right, the right was first resisted by several colonial powers; it was in 
their view, merely a political aspiration. However, their resistance of a legal right gradually 
became muted, as they accepted under Article 73 (e) a broader interpretation of their duties.  
Thus, the concept of self-determination was historically bound up with decolonisation that it 
was to bring forward dependent peoples to independence if they choose it, even though 
Article 73 has spoken only of self-government. The development of the concept within the 
body politic of the UN received early support from the ICJ, in the Namibia Advisory 
Opinion125, and in the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion.126 The International Court of 
                                                          
123 M Abdullah, ‘The Right to Self-Determination in International Law’ (University of Göteborg 2006) 
124 P L Okoronkwo, ‘Self-Determination and the Legality of Biafra’s Secession under International Law’ (2002) 
25 Loy LA Int’l & Comp L Rev 63.   
125 The Court had affirmed that’ the subsequent development of international law concerning non-self-governing 
territories as enshrined in the Charter of the UN, made the principles of self-determination applicable to all of 
them. See, Namibia Opinion [1971] ICJ Rep 1971 16.  
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Justice (ICJ) refers to the right to self-determination as a right held by people rather than a 
right held by governments alone.127 Accordingly, the legal concept of self-determination as a 
right of peoples of territory under colonial rule to determine their own destiny was firmly 
established.128 In 1960 the Colonial Declaration, which confirmed the right of all people to 
self-determination, suggested that self-determination was not limited to colonial territories 
but might have a wider application.129 By the late 1960s, even fairly Orthodox scholars of 
international law came to the inescapable conclusion that self-determination had developed 
into an international legal right, though its scope and extent were still open to some debate.130  
These entitlements of the people’s ability to determine their future, found its place in the 
United Nations Declaration of Friendly Relations of 1970. The Declaration speaks of self-
determination being available in situations of colonialism and the ‘subjection of peoples to 
alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation’.131 The Declaration was designed to protect 
peoples in such territories, not just by humanitarian law, but also by insistence upon their 
right to self-determination. It is notable that the UN Charter has the implementation of self-
determination as one of its purpose, although the provisions which deal specifically with 
dependent territories Chapter (XI)132 make no reference to statehood as an option for the 
people of such territories.133 Nonetheless, independent statehood did become the practically 
inevitable result of the exercise of the right of self-determination.134 The General Assembly 
confirmed that statehood was one option for dependent people135 and it was the option, which 
they generally chose, fuelling the greatest expansion in the number of member States of all 
time.136  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
126 The Court again affirmed the linkage between self-determination and the right of peoples under colonial rule, 
when it spoke of the ‘principle of self-determination as a right of peoples, and its application for the purpose of 
bringing all colonial situations to a speedy end’. See, ‘Western Sahara Case' (n 103).  
127 ibid. 
128 Dahlitz, Secession and International Law (n 14) 26.  
129 ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’ (n 94).  
130 A Heraclides, The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics (London: Frank Cass & Co Ltd, 
Routledge 1991) 21-24.  
131 ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among 
States’ (n 23).  
132 ‘Charter of the United Nations (Chapter XI): Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories (Article 
73)’, 1945.  
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Thus, it was therefore clear that the right of self-determination was applied to [all inhabitants] 
of a colonial territory and not to minority groups or segments of the population within that 
territory.137 In addition, the right was granted to Trust Territories and Non-Self-Governing 
Territories as a whole.138 However, exceptions were accepted. If there was a clear, wish of 
the majority of all inhabitants of the territory in question, such as, the express wishes of the 
inhabitants of the Ellice Islands, which became the State of Tuvalu.139 For colonised people 
Sterio argued that the right to self-determination entitled the [choice] to ‘freely decide their 
future status, and belonged to a people as a whole living in a given colonial territory. 
Whereas Non-colonised people had the right to self-determination within their mother States, 
they did not have the right to seek independence based on the theory of self-
determination’.140 Thus, as observed by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Québec Case 
that: ‘[The right of colonial peoples to exercise their right to self-determination by breaking 
away from the ‘imperial’ power is now undisputed]’.141 Hence, the right existed for all 
peoples, but was limited in its scope with respect to non-colonised peoples, and was limited 
in its application to colonised peoples.  
 
2.2.2.2. Self-determination in the Post-Colonial World 
 
The concept of a legal right of self-determination has become controversial in the post-
colonial context. The evolution of the idea of self-determination as a human right appeared 
through the famous UN General Assembly resolutions 1514 and 1541 in 1960.142 In addition, 
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the right to self-determination and the duty on all states to promote it is also incorporated as 
Article 1 in both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)143 and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)144, which 
together are considered to constitute the International ‘Bill of Rights’.  
In 1960 the Colonial Declaration, which confirmed the right of all people to self-
determination, suggested, that self-determination is not limited to colonial territories but 
might have a wider application.145Ten years later in 1970, The Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the UN annexed to Resolution 2625146(XXV) of 1970, stated 
that every state has an obligation to promote the realisation of the right of self-
determination.147  Gradually, after the adoption of International Covenants, there was a shift 
in international documents and legal literature towards the internal aspect of self-
determination. One of the first instruments that recorded this shift was the 1975 Final Act of 
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe148 (Helsinki Declaration), which 
made it clear that self-determination is a right of peoples.149 In this regard, Principle VII 
reads: ‘By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples 
always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and 
external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their 
political, economic, social and cultural development’.150 Indeed, the specific language, 
providing that all "peoples "always" have the right to determine their internal and external 
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political status, goes beyond the more terse formulation in the covenants on human rights.151 
However, Hannum argued that, this formulation must be understood in the context of the 
principles of the inviolability of frontiers (principle III) and the territorial integrity of states 
(principle IV) proclaimed in the Helsinki Final Act.152 Cassese is of the opinion that this 
statement means that the Act goes further than the FRD in connecting the internal aspect of 
the principle of self-determination to democratic rule, as well as once and for all confirming 
that the right to self- determination is continuous.153 Still, the Act cannot be said to grant 
external self-determination to national minorities, especially since it explicitly upholds the 
virtues of territorial integrity.154  
For a considerable period, there was substantial resistance to the suggestion that self-
determination might have any application outside the colonial context, shared by the Eastern 
European States and the new States.155 There was little desire of Eastern European States to 
concede that people had an entitlement to determine their own political and economic 
destiny. Dahlitz argued that, the phenomenon was appropriate for decolonisation only and 
many of the new States regarded self-determination as a matter between them and their 
colonial masters, not as between them and their own population.156 On the other hand, part of 
‘the fear of Third World States was that post-colonial self-determination would necessarily 
result in the fragmentation of the new nation States, with ethnic or religious groups in one 
country seeking to secede or to join with the same ethnic groups or religious population in 
another country’.157 However, the Human Rights Committee, acting under the ICCPR has, 
consistently fostered the idea that self-determination is of continuing applicability.158 Thus, it 
is accepted that the right exists; the debate is however, about the forms that it can take.  
Higgins believed that the Committee on Human Rights established under the covenants, 
played a key role in this evolutionary process.159 The Committee addressed the matter in 
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virtually every single examination of a State upon the report that it is required to submit 
periodically. In this regard, ‘the committee took a robust view about continued application of 
self-determination to post-colonial situations’.160  In addition, Tomuschat stressed that the 
fact that the emergence of the IHRL and its consolidation amount to a general recognition 
that states are no longer the sole subjects of international law and that the main objective and 
raison deter of a state is to provide a service to their citizens.161 However, if they fail in a 
fundamental way to meet their essential responsibilities; they begin to lose their legitimacy 
and thus their very existence can be called into question.162  
The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights to self-determination is also in terms that 
do not tie it to colonialism.163 In 1960, Biafra seceded from Nigeria and gained few 
recognitions. However, as a result of a civil war, it was reintegrated into Nigeria in 1970.164 
In its drive to secession, Biafra received less substantial external support than Katanga; there 
was no substantial UN involvement, although the Organisation of African Unity OAU was a 
strong supporter of the central government.165  Biafra's secession from Nigeria, based on the 
principle of self-determination, was legally justified under the following factors: there were 
gross violations of Biafran's human rights; Biafra had a historical claim to independence; it 
was the most plausible way of restoring peace in Nigeria; and the Nigerian government 
discriminated against the Biafran population.166 However, the majority of states Crawford 
argued adjudged that it did not qualify for recognition as a state; there was no case even of 
belligerent recognition in the civil war, the case that Biafra was not a state167. Most recently, 
the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the right to self-determination regarding the 
proposed separation of Quebec from Canada.168 Embracing the Aland Island169 precedent, the 
Supreme Court of Canada distinguished the right to internal self-determination from an 
external one. The Supreme Court, like the League of Nations, held that a people has a right to 
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internal self-determination first, and that only if that right is not respected by the mother-
state, the same people’s right to break off may accrue.170 In other words, the right to separate 
is conditioned on the non-respect of the right to some form of provincial to separate 
autonomy.171 Dahlitz concluded that ‘all people determine their political and economic 
destiny is that they can participate in periodic free elections in which they can choose 
between pluralities of possibilities.172  Thus, it has been evidenced that Post-colonial self-
determination has become indissolubly linked with notions of democracy and good 
governance. 
Accordingly, the right to self-determination is granted first to peoples in non-self-governing 
peoples (mandates, colonies, and so on). However, since it is bestowed upon ‘all peoples’ (as 
spelt out by Article 1 (1) of the 1966 Covenants) subject to no exception whatever; it is also 
vested in peoples co-existing within the present boundaries of an independent State.173  This 
means that, the right to self-determination is accorded not only to peoples under colonial 
domination, but also to peoples living within independent nations, as well as to those existing 
within nations just as a people.  Hence, during this era four principles characterise self-
determination, as Hannum pointed out. First, ‘self-determination referred only to 
decolonisation. Second, it did not apply to peoples but to territories. Third, self-determination 
was now considered an absolute right though, again, for colonies only; this marked a 
significant change from the previous era. Finally, self-determination did not allow for 
secession; instead, the territorial integrity of existing states and most colonial territories was 
assumed’.174 Thereafter, in the late 1970s the right was refined to mean that every distinctive 
ethnic or national group has a right to independence; however, the right has not been accepted 
by any state or by international law on this new meaning in a popular sense. It was a unique 
process for each territory, allowing its people to escape from external domination.175 Where 
those people wished for statehood, that was the only legitimate end, the most notable example 
being East Timor, which became independent as Timor-Leste in 2002, having being invaded 
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in 1975 by Indonesia, an action deemed by the United Nations to be unlawful because of its 
incompatibility with self-determination.176     
Provisional steps towards a broader approach have been based on the so-called ‘safeguard 
clause’, first articulated in principle 5, paragraph (7) of the FRD.177 The United Nations 
World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993,178 in slightly different language, 
also reaffirmed it. Consequently, Crawford argued that, ‘a State whose government represents 
the whole people of its territory without distinction of any kind, that is to say, on a basis of 
equality, and in particular without discrimination on grounds of race, creed or colour, 
complies with the principles of self-determination in respect of all of its people and is entitled 
to the protection of its territorial integrity.179 To put it another way, the people of such a State 
exercise the right of self-determination through their participation in the government of the 
state on a basis of equality’.180 This issue occurred before the Supreme Court of Canada in 
the Quebec case. By no stretch of the imagination could it be said that the people of Quebec 
were oppressed or that Canada was not governed by a constitutional system ‘representing the 
whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind.181 However, the 
Government of Canada relied on the observance of the ‘safeguard clause’, without 
committing itself to the idea of ‘remedial secession’, it argued that the ‘safeguard clause’ was 
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a safeguard against secession for those states that complied with it’.182 At least, many 
international documents have established a right to self-determination as a right, but it has 
never been defined.183  
Thus, the application of the right of self-determination beyond the colonial framework is, 
however, a much more complex and disputable question, as it collides with the principle of 
territorial integrity. In addition, it has been clearly divorced from the notion ‘right to 
secession’. The right outside the colonial context is primarily known as a process by which 
the peoples of the various states determine their future through Constitutional Processes 
without external interference. This position was observed by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
the Quebec case; the Court stated that ‘The recognised sources of international law establish 
that the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-
determination, a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development 
within a framework of an existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this 
case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only 
the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances’.184  In other 
words, the right of self-determination is understood as a ‘legal right’ for a people to attain a 
degree of autonomy from its sovereign. This may include political and representative rights 
within a central State. Alternatively, it may amount a remedial secession and ultimately 
independence.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
182 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (n 3) 119.  
183 The committee of the Rapporteur appointed by the League of Nations to investigate aspects of the dispute 
over the Aland Islands, stated that the ‘separation of a minority from the state of which it forms a part and its 
incorporation in another state can only be considered as an altogether exceptional situation, a last resort when 
the state lacks either the will or the power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees. There is, however, no 
conclusive body of legal principles or state practice of clarity application of the right of self-determination in 
respect of this possible third category, which remains ‘acutely controversial’. See, ‘Aland Island Case', (n 169). 
184 ‘Reference re Secession of Quebec’ (n 21) para 122. 
45 
 
2.2.3 Holders of the right to self-determination 
 
2.2.3.1. The concept of ‘People’  
 
The dilemma concerning the right of self-determination can ultimately be described in terms 
of which groups are entitled to exercise a right to self-determination. The critical uncertainty 
here is whether the right attaches to all people in a literal sense, or only to those within 
existing colonial boundaries.   
Peoples are groups of persons who, whatever, their appellation, have been separated from 
each other on ethnical, racial, linguistic, cultural, religious, traditional, or historical 
grounds.185 Whatever, they are called, Dahlitz argued that, communities, minorities or 
peoples, these elements have always been enunciated. According to the Arbitration 
Commission on Yugoslavia, a people and minority are ethnic, religious, or linguistic 
communities,186  while the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec case defined a people as 
‘a portion of the population of an existing state’.187  The Commission of Jurists who 
arbitrated the status of the Aland Islands in 1921 found that for the purpose of self-
determination one cannot treat a small fraction of peoples as one would a nation as a 
whole.188 Thus, the Swedes on the Aland Islands, who were only a small fraction of the 
totality of the Swedish ‘people’ did not have a strong claim to secession in comparison to, for 
example, Finland, which, when it broke away from Russian rule, contained the near totality 
of the Finnish people.   
In fact, a people has a right to determine its 'self' by deciding what form of self-determination 
it will choose. However, international law does not provide any clear standard on how to 
define a 'people'. Gruda argued that, ‘Although the term ‘people’ is ambiguous and vague 
under international law, it typically refers to ‘people who live within the same state or people 
organised into a state’. Thus, ‘people’ is a legal rather than natural category..189 Likewise, 
Brown pointed out that, the term ‘people’ has been purposely left undefined in international 
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law, because if the right to self-determination were to be applied broadly to all conceivable 
groups, this could destabilize states and cause peace and security problems.190  
On the other hand, Fitzmaurice has obviously noted that 'it is in fact ridiculous because the 
people cannot decide until somebody decides who the people are’.191 Whether a certain group 
constitutes a people is rather a question of fact than a question of law. Nonetheless, 
determination of this fact is important for the application of law. In order to determine 
whether a certain group of individuals constitutes a people, it is necessary to have enough 
criteria to define a people. Crawford claimed that a people can be identified with 'reasonable 
precision’, he tends to use a vague term 'self-determination unit' in order to define the subject 
of the right.192 Higgins has described ’self-determination unit’ as the ‘right of the majority 
within a generally accepted political unit to the exercise of power. In other words, it is 
necessary to start with stable boundaries and permit political change within them.193 
However, Crawford argued that, the definition of a ‘people’ at large, outside the context of 
‘generally accepted political units’ has proved fraught with difficulty’.194   
Furthermore, some authors have tried to suggest a workable definition of a ‘people’. 
Murswiek in his definition links a people to a territory. He defined a people as ‘a group which 
can be a holder of the right to self-determination which exists only if it lives in a distinct 
territory, where it constitutes the majority and where it is able to speak its own language, 
develop its own culture, cultivate its traditions or practice its particular religion’.195 However, 
there are sovereign tribes that issue license plates, operate courts, and perform similar state 
functions that exercise no territorial sovereignty, but nonetheless exercise authority over 
members of the tribe.196  
Adam has suggested that 'to grant the right of self-determination exclusively to those who 
have a distinct ethnic, religious, or culture background' actually increases the danger of ethnic 
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or religious cleansing.'197 If only those groups that have a distinct language and culture are 
entitled to self-determination, then leaders fearful of such claims may go out of their way to 
destroy the traditions and languages that make the people unique.198 This is a recurrent theme 
in world history, from Turkey's ban on the Kurdish language and names, to the Soviets' 
attempts to stamp out non-Russian languages and traditions.199  
Significantly, a number of scholars have agreed that distinct 'racial groups' are generally 
entitled to qualify as a people.200 Some of them suggest that a people, or nation, be regarded 
as any group 'having a common and distinctive history, language, culture, and/or religion.201 
At last, more ambiguous than groups distinguished by culture are differences, which can best 
be described as political. The differences between Taiwan and mainland China, for example, 
are more political than cultural.202   
In their final Report and Recommendations, the International Experts on the Concept of 
Peoples,203 described ‘people’ as a group of individual human beings who enjoy some or all 
of the common features. Sterio in her definition has suggested testing ‘the degree to which 
the group can form a viable entity’.204 Adding this ‘viability’ requirement in the subjective 
prong could also add precision to the UNESCO definition of a people. 
Besides, it is important to differentiate between a nation and a ‘people’.205 ‘There is an Indian 
nation and a Bengali people, an Israeli nation and a Jewish people. A nation is easy to define 
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inasmuch as; it consists of the entire citizen body of a State’.206 All the nationals of the State 
form the nation. In each State, there is one nation, and this is why the terms ‘State’ and 
‘nation’ have become practically interchangeable.207 However, within the compass of one 
State and one nation there can exist several peoples, large and small, such a State is usually 
called ‘multi-national’, but what is actually meant is that the (one) nation comprises several 
peoples.208   
Countries with indigenous populations209 however, were obviously hesitant to accept a strong 
interpretation of self-determination because they feared that their own indigenous minorities 
might assert claims of independence. In this group, the United States can be included, which 
remains fearful of the demand of some Native American nations for independence.210   
Thus, it has become clear that the term of ‘people’211 has become controversial over which 
group are entitled to self-determination amongst scholars and writers. Many believe that the 
‘people’ should be defined prior to any rights being awarded. Jennings212 stated ‘on the 
surface it seems reasonable; let the people decide. It is in fact ridiculous because the people 
cannot decide until somebody decides who the people are’. Emmerson213 believed that ‘what 
emerges beyond dispute is that all peoples do not have the right of self- determination: they 
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never had it and they never will have it. The changing content of natural law in the era of 
decolonisation has brought no change in this basic proposition?’ In addition, Higgins214 
acknowledged that the argument over which groups are deserving of self-determination has 
not been adequately resolved. She asserted that, ‘self-determination has developed into an 
international legal right, and is not an essentially domestic matter. The extent and scope of 
the right is still open to some debate’. Therefore it seems that the scholars cannot agree on 
who deserves rights of self-determination. They cannot then determine who the self is.  
Thus, the controversy over who constitutes a people and merits the rights of self-
determination continues. It is commonly accepted today that people who struggle for self-
determination are defined as a people by their struggle. External definitions are superfluous. 
In some cases, external definitions are a deliberate attempt to deny groups rights to self-
determination.215 External definitions, generally, do not work to assist groups in their cause; 
rather they work to maintain the status quo.216 In addition, ‘people’ and minority are two 
different concepts. Minorities do not fall into the category of ‘all people’, from common 
Article 1 of the ICCPR, and thus are not entitled to the right of self-determination.  
Significantly, under the principle of self-determination a group with a common identity and 
link to a defined territory is allowed to decide its political future in a democratic fashion.217 
For a group to be entitled to exercise its collective right to self-determination, it must qualify 
as a ‘people’.218  
Finally, to determine when a group qualifies as a people, a two-part test has been applied; in 
other words, peoplehood must be seen as contingent on subjective and objective elements. 
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The first element is objective, and seeks to evaluate the group to determine to what extent its 
members ‘share a common racial background, ethnicity, language, religion, history, and 
cultural heritage’.219 Dinstein has suggested that the link must express itself, inter alia, in a 
common territory, religion, or language, but these requirements are excessively tough.220 The 
second element is subjective and examines ‘the extent to which individuals within the group 
self-consciously perceive themselves collectively as a distinct ‘people’ and the degree to 
consciously perceive themselves collectively as a distinct which the group can form a viable 
political entity?’221 In this regard, it is not enough to have an ethnic link in the sense of past 
genealogy and history, it is essential to have a present ethos or state of mind.222 A people is 
both required and entitled to identify it as such. Dinstein argued that an individual cannot gate 
crash and compel a people to admit him to its fold; the group has to make up its collective 
mind and resolve whether such an individual qualifies.223 Thus, it can be concluded that for 
the group to be considered as a ‘people’ they must perceive themselves to have a special 
relationship to the territory and thus the state, and therefore seem to expect that all other 
inhabitants from other ethnic groups share their connection and commitment.  
One must concede that, giving a unique right to certain groups and not others might cause 
infraction between various groups in society. The best way to prevent this sort of friction is to 
recognise that any distinct group, which is a majority in its region, is entitled to the same 
right of self-determination as any other group.'224 For instance, if Quebec left Canada, why 
shouldn't the ‘Maritime Provinces’225 be allowed to join Quebec or the United States? Hence, 
it has been suggested, if self-determination is a tool designed to prevent conflict, it can best 
do its job the more widely it is applied. This suggests that the concept of ‘a people’ under 
international law ought to be applied not simply to religious or cultural minorities, but even to 
‘political minorities’.226 ‘The most obvious example of this would be Taiwan, which is 
distinct from mainland China more by politics than by culture. As well as this, the ‘people of 
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Nova Scotia’ are a distinct political entity, as much as ‘the people of Quebec’ or ‘the people 
of Hawaii’.227 
 
2.2.3.2. The right-holder  
 
The fundamental approach to the question remains that all peoples, as defined by objective 
and subjective factors, have a full right of self-determination that is a free choice of internal 
and external self-determination. The critical question here is whether the right of self-
determination attaches to all people in a literal sense, or only to those peoples within colonial 
boundaries.  
In general, two trends can be identified in the literature.  
The first trend is represented by Harries who believed that General Assembly Resolution 
1514, the first to deal comprehensively with self-determination contemplates the right within 
existing boundaries of the colonial structure.228 He argued that, pragmatically, that this 
limitation is necessary in the interests of international harmony.229 Accordingly, ethnic 
minorities, not within definite colonial boundaries, are not entitled to exercise a right of self-
determination. Therefore, under a strict reading utilising this approach, many recent claims 
would fail.230 These would include, for instance, claims by the peoples of the Kurdistan 
region from Iraq, Quebec from Canada, and the Bouganville claim against Papua New 
Guinea.231 In addition, Nada argued that, under this approach, the claims of the peoples of 
Baltic States who are arguably resident within pre-existing but dormant colonial boundaries 
would have some validity.     
On the other hand, Dahiltz has argued that, people living under colonial domination are 
granted full self-determination, irrespective of the territorial integrity principle.232 The 
inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories were granted the right of self-
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determination because they were a people.233 He further argued, with respect to the 
inhabitants of existing states, the right of self-determination of colonial territories is the 
combination of the right of self-determination of the different peoples, fractions of peoples or 
one homogenous people living in the territory. Thus, it was not necessary for the GA and the 
Special Committee of Twenty-Four to ascertain the homogeneity of the population of the 
territories. However, they did in general; assure themselves of the indigenous ties existing 
between the people and the territory.234 Significantly, the territory of a colony was given a 
status separate from the territory of the state administrating it,235 and the integration of a 
colony was considered a ‘legal fiction’.236 For that reason, Dahiltiz stated that, the 
independence of a colony could not result in a partial disruption of the territorial integrity of 
the Metropolitan state. Hence, people in similar circumstances as colonies, will enjoy a 
complete right of self-determination even if they are not specifically mentioned on the list of 
Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, such as Bengali people in East Pakistan, which 
was geographically separate from West Pakistan.237     
A different a more controversial trend is adopted by others, Nada asserted that the right of 
self-determination extends beyond the colonial context although a formal set of criteria must 
first be satisfied for the group to qualify for the right.  In addition, Collins argued that, it is 
only political exigencies, which have focused the right of self-determination onto colonial 
territories.238  
He stated that: ‘Although political events have concentrated the UN’s focus on colonial 
territories and the UN stands firm on the concept of territorial integrity, the principle of self-
determination should not be considered strictly as a colonial right’.239    
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Which trend to self-determination is appropriate? 
It should be clear then that these two trends, which have been controversial, are inconsistent. 
However, the majority of scholars have agreed that in certain circumstances, the right to self-
determination should be made available to the ‘people’. In other words, the right should be 
available to an independent people that is the permanent population of an existing state, 
which has the right to self-determination. In this regard, Dahiltz demonstrated that, this 
population may well comprise one homogenous people or a collection of different peoples 
and fractions of peoples.240 He stated that, the right of self-determination in the latter case, of 
the inhabitants of a state is the compilation of the right of self-determination of the different 
peoples living in the state’s territory. Significantly, the international community accepts the 
exercise of the right of self-determination of fractions of peoples, which find themselves 
within the borders of an existing state.241 In 1991, the Arbitration Committee on Yugoslavia, 
asked whether the Serbian population in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, considered as one 
of the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia, have the right to self-determination.  
 [1-The Committee considers that, whatever the circumstances, the right to self-determination must not 
involve changes to existing frontiers at the time of independence (uti possidetis juris) except where the 
states concerned agree otherwise. 2- Where there are one or more groups within a state constituting one or 
more ethnic, religious or language communities, they have the right to recognition of their identity under 
international law].242  
Moreover, the Aland Islands report found that there was no right of secession in the absence 
of ‘a manifest and continued abuse of sovereign power to the detriment of a section of 
population’.243 In a like manner, the Serbs were responsible for serious human rights abuses 
against the Kosovars, as Resolution 1244 notes, a ‘grave humanitarian situation’ and a threat 
to international peace and security’.244 While the Supreme Court of Canada in re-secession of 
Quebec found that ‘a right to external self-determination, which in this case potentially takes 
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the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession, arises only in the most extreme 
cases and even then, under carefully defined circumstances.245  
Thus, the peoples who have a relationship with the territory of an existing state may exercise 
a full right of self-determination over the whole of the territory. Hence, the principle of 
inviolability of territorial integrity is respected and does not clash with the right of self-
determination as long as the decisions concern the whole territory. As a result, the population 
of an existing state may therefore decide its form of government and determine its 
international status.  
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2.2.4. External and internal self-determination 
 
As the principle of self-determination is a very broad concept, for theoretical purposes it is 
usually divided into internal and external forms. The right can be satisfied either externally 
for example, by the establishment of a new State, or internally, through a variety of 
autonomous arrangements.   
In fact, an important characteristic of the right to self-determination in the colonial context is 
its external appearance, meaning the aspiration to own an independent sovereign state. The 
external form of self-determination requires actions from, and imposes obligations on states 
to facilitate, and supports a people’s aspirations to achieve independence. In contrast, self-
determination outside the colonial context has an internal nature that consists of a people’s 
right to freely develop its own economic, social and cultural institutions, ideally through 
democratic governance.  
Cassese has defined internal self-determination as ‘the right to authentic self-government, 
that is, the right for a people really and freely to choose its own political and economic 
regime.246 Hannum argued that the, internal aspect of self-determination is democracy, 
meaning that people have right to representative and democratic.247 McCorquodale 
considered that the internal aspect of the right concerns the right of peoples within a state to 
choose their political status.248 Moreover, Simpson presented that internal self-determination 
is alternatively called democratic self-determination;249 while Bring has attached another 
element to the internal aspect, namely the right to freedom from outside interference and 
intervention in accordance with the principles of the UN and international law. He argued 
that most often, ‘what is meant by internal self-determination is the element of non-
interference, a negative obligation imposed on States (as opposed to the positive obligation 
imposed regarding external self-determination).’250  
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Crawford pointed out that self-determination is a continuing, and not for all right.251 Unlike 
external self-determination for colonial peoples, which ceases to exist under customary 
international law once it is implemented, Cassese argued that, ‘the right to internal self-
determination is neither destroyed nor diminished by its having already once been invoked 
and put into effect; thus, internal self-determination is being exercised continuously’.252 
Internal self-determination may take various forms, including, autonomy within a state, 
federal arrangements, or any other special constitutional arrangements for the people 
concerned. On the other hand, external self-determination can be seen as the right to decide 
on the political status of a people and its place in the international community in relation to 
other states, including the right to separate [secede] from the existing state of which the group 
concerned is a part, and to set up a new independent state.253 The right will be further 
addressed in part 5, while discussing secession in international law.  
Thus, Raič concluded that the exact content of internal and external aspects is however of 
little importance, as we are not dealing with two different rights but with the same right, and 
there are no differences of opinion regarding the material content of these aspects of rights.254 
Accordingly, when discussing a people’s right to self-determination and development within 
an independent state the legal foundation is used, for instance in the form of a UN Resolution 
such as the FRD, also serves as the legal foundation for the principles of non-interference and 
non-intervention. However, the fact that the right to self-determination is wisely used in the 
rhetoric must not be forgotten. The majority of scholarly writers agree upon the aspects and 
the elements that constitute the right, however, these elements are sometimes interpreted in 
different lights according to the interests they are meant to serve. In addition, there is a 
consensus on the fact that the right of self-determination applies beyond the colonial context. 
This is supported not only by the FRD but also by the UN bodies like the Human Rights 
Committee HRC (in its General Comment on Article 1 of the ICCPR) and state practice and 
statements. However, one must concede that it is the scope of the right in the post-colonial 
era that can manifest itself differently depending on who is arguing. 
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2.3. The Rights of Minorities  
 
Minorities did not receive much attention from the international community before the 
foundation of the League of Nations. The League of Nations paid significant concern to 
minorities’ rights, through the adoption of several treaties.255 When the UN was set up, a 
number of norms, procedures, and mechanisms concerning minorities were developed, in 
particular, the ICCPR and the 1992 Declaration of the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. However, in practice, these rights are 
far from being realised.  
Historically, the failure to protect the minority rights has prompted international 
responsibility that collides against the principle of non-interference into the internal affairs of 
sovereign States. Nonetheless, it comes as no surprise that international minority rights have 
lagged behind the development of other branches of human rights. This is because of the 
international law is made by the governments most of whom are unwilling to recognise even 
the existence of minority in their territories let alone to ensure their protection and enjoyment 
of legal rights. In the past few years, community conflicts have emerged as the most serious 
threat to international and national peace. Notably, ‘the majority of all conflicts that afflicted 
the World were within countries between communities and not between countries. Most of 
these conflicts, in turn, had their roots in the inability of cultural, ethnic, or religious 
communities to coexist peacefully’.256  
In fact, ‘tension between communities within the same societies arises when such 
communities believe that their basic rights are being ignored or that their interests are being 
threatened’. The tension will be aggravated when the communities in question are also 
minority, and are, or feel, unable to secure what they perceive to be their reasonable interests 
through democratic means.257 Frequently, the gap between minorities and majorities in multi-
ethnic religious societies causes tension, leading to the violence and conflict, when the 
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minorities in such communities were discriminated, ignored, and oppressed in many different 
ways by the majority.  
Today, protected minorities often seek to be recognised as such by their government and wish 
to secure their rights to identity, to use their own language in both public and private, to 
profess and practice their own religion, to enjoy their own culture, and to establish and 
maintain their own associations. They also want to participate in public and political life and 
in constituting and implementing development policies and projects that affect them. 
However, in many parts of the world, the status of minority communities remains a central 
political issue, as minorities and majorities across the globe still clash over such issues as 
language rights, religious freedom, education curricula, land claims, regional autonomy, and 
national symbols.258 
 
2.3.1. The International Protection of Minorities in History 
 
The root of minority rights can be traced back in the seventeenth century reform regarding 
protection of religious minorities.259 In contrast, Sigler argued that ‘the contemporary 
minority issues with which we have familiarity are largely rooted in the nineteenth 
century'.260 Until the eighteenth century, religion was certainly the most significant 
distinction among most groups; however, since the nineteenth century was ‘concerned less 
with religious or racial groups than with linguistic and ethnic groups’.261 In other words, most 
of the early provisions for the protection of minorities were concerned with what today might 
be viewed as freedom of religion rather than group rights.262 ‘The three great congresses of 
the nineteenth century, Vienna (1814-15), Paris (1856), and Berlin (1878), encompassed 
minority protection provisions in treaties establishing rights and security of populations that 
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were to be transferred to a foreign sovereignty’.263 Rehman argued that, the Peace Festival 
Convention in 1648 can be considered the first international law instrument for the protection 
of Minorities Rights. Article 5 of this Convention stated the admission of the equality of the 
Protestant and the Catholic creeds, national issues came up to the scene on the 19th century, 
then the concept of the National Minorities appeared also.264 Nonetheless, it is more 
reasonable to claim that modern international protection was systematically prescribed for the 
first time in the Treaty of Versailles, after the First World War.   
The League of Nations paid a significant interest towards minorities’ right, through the Peace 
Treaties of (1920-1921). The interests had given to individuals belonging to minorities 
without any actual political recognition of the existence of minorities’ community. In 
addition, the development of the protection of minorities’ instruments had political goals 
rather than humanity purposes. Accordingly, proceeding to the 20th century, the first 
document to mention is the Treaty of Versailles of 1919,265 the peace agreement that formally 
ended World War I.266 The Treaty, the peace agreement that formally ended World War I and 
gave birth to the League of Nations, was the first of these instruments concentrating on the 
protection of minorities.267 The League of Nations system for the international protection of 
minorities originates from the Paris peace conference held in 1919.268 The international law 
of the time involved supporting the rights of minorities through a series of treaties, which 
reflected major boundary changes after the end of the WWI; these treaties were signed as part 
of the Pact of Paris. Brownlie demonstrated that the Minorities Treaties under the League of 
Nations system had provisions for the protections for the civil and political rights of members 
of racial, religious and linguistic minorities, they were mostly similar in content concentrating 
in the norms of the protection of rights to life, liberty, and equality before the law and in the 
exercise of civil and political rights.269   
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Thus, the League of Nations was taken a significant step to protect minority’s rights. The 
little Treaty of Versailles or the Polish Minority Treaties had an influence on the international 
standards towards the protection of minority’s rights. However, the League failed to fulfil its 
goals. This is primarily because the Pact of the League of the Nations contained no provision 
regarding human rights; it incorporated two related systems of mandates and minorities.270 
On the other hand, the League failed to establish an effective minorities system reflected the 
economic, social, and political problems of the inter-war period and contributed to the fall of 
the Wilsonian vision system and disarmament that resulted with the World War II.271 For that 
reason, the League was considered as a new organisation in the history of the international 
relations and mutual co-operation between States but it could, just in practice, to shed a light 
on conflicts and disputes without solving them. The League failed to fulfil its 
implementations and to achieve its goals, but it became a foundation for the establishment of 
a new international instrument to maintain and protect minority’s rights the United Nations.  
The idea of human rights protection was emerged stronger after the WWII’s extermination 
peoples that would be considered minorities from today's perspective. Since then, those 
people did not enjoy any rights. When the UN was established in 1945, most member States 
did not acknowledged existence of minority problems. Even today most countries who have 
declared to be unitary ones such as, China, Russia and Spain, fear that recognition of minority 
groups within their territories would rekindle the regional claims against which they have had 
to fight in the past. 
After World War II, ‘the possibility of ethnic conflicts and endangering stability arising out 
of discontents of minority groups led several European countries to negotiate bilateral 
agreements with neighbouring states for protection of kin-minorities’.272 Notable among 
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these are the 1946 ‘Austro-Italian’ agreement on the status of South Tyrol, and the 1955 
agreement between ‘Germany and Denmark’ on the rights of the Danish and German 
minorities on both sides of the German-Danish border.273 Another instrument bearing on 
minority protection during this period was the adoption of the Genocide Convention in 
1948.274 Thereafter, neither the United Nations Charter nor the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights was mentioned the rights of minorities, but instead the Declaration 
emphasised of individual human rights. In other words, the Charter did not contain any 
explicit provision for the protection of minorities. A significant move with minorities’ rights 
towards individual and human being rights occurred obviously in the charter of the United 
Nations. To prevent the denial of minorities’ rights, the United Nations has created a global 
structure for protecting their rights at the San Francisco Conference.275 The right of minorities 
was also specifically excluded from the UDHR.276  
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further recognition in the CSCE’s creation in 1992 of the office of High Commissioner on National Minorities.  
15- The Council of Europe reiterates the link between individual and group rights in the Declaration on Human 
Rights and in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, both 
adopted in 1993. 16- At the global level the UN’s World Conference on Human Rights issued the Vienna 
Declaration in 1993. 17- Reflecting the Europeans’ pivotal role in championing minority rights, ten Central 
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The Declaration is considered as being non-obligatory,277 containing general standards of 
conduct, containing no dispute resolution but some formal monitoring or enforcement. 
Obviously, the UDHR does not contain any reference to minorities.278 Instead, it referred to 
rights pertinent to minority rights, the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion 
Article 18, promises equality Article 7 the right to freedom of opinion and expression Article 
19, the right of peaceful assembly and association Article 20.  Article 26 stated the rights of 
education, and the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community Article 
27.279   
The Charter of the United Nations likewise recognises ‘the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples’. Rossouw and Geldenhuys argued that the ‘peoples’ referred to, at 
least in the UN Charter, were not national minorities within states, but rather entire national 
populations, especially those in colonial territories.280 Although, many attempts were made to 
mention minorities, but not before 1966 when the General Assembly adopted the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, which considered as a first legally 
binding treaty mentioning minority’s rights explicitly. Article 27 of the ICCPR has had an 
influence on other international instruments protecting minority rights. 281 Musgrave has 
pointed out that; Article 27 is the only article of the Covenant, which directly addresses the 
issue of minorities.282 An Article 27 legally binding instrument is considered the first 
international standard that universalises the concept of minority rights. The article makes 
provision for group rights, and grants persons belonging to minorities the rights to national, 
ethnic, religious, or linguistic identity, or a combination thereof, and to preserve the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
European states in 1994 proposed the Central European Initiative Instrument for the Protection of Minority 
Rights article (7). 18- Finally, Inter-American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, 1995. The states 
involved ‘recognisee that the indigenous peoples are entitled to collective rights in so far as they are 
indispensable to the enjoyment of the individual rights of their members. See Further, Rossouw and 
Geldenhuys, ‘The International Protection of Minority Rights’ (n 256).  
277 Scholars were divided regarding the legal status of the UDHR. Some consider it as a non-binding 
Declaration.  The head of the Committee of Human Rights emphasizes that the Declaration not considered as an 
International Treaty or International Convention, in addition the Declaration does not include any legal binding 
obligation.  At the same time, the head of the Committee considered the Declaration as an implementing body of 
Human Rights principles. For more details see, A E Alcock, A History of the Protection of Regional Cultural 
Minorities in Europe: From the Edict of the Nantes to the Present Day (MacMillan, UK 2003).  
278 Article 2 states that: ‘everyone is entitled to the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status’. This Article stated non-discrimination as basic principle, and does not 
including any text protecting minorities’ rights. See, Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (n 
276).  
279 ibid, Articles 7-18-19-20-26 and 27.  
280 Rossouw and Geldenhuys, ‘The International Protection of Minority Rights’ (n 256).  
281 See, ICCPR, Article 27 (n 19).  
282 T D Musgrave, Self-Determination and National Minorities (OUP, New York 1997) 135-136.  
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characteristic, which they wish to maintain and develop. It grants individual rights rather than 
collective group rights, has been mentioned in Article 1 of the Covenant. Moreover, it 
requires that a member of a minority shall not be denied his right to enjoy his culture.283 
Thus, Article 27 of the Covenant shows a significant step of norms on minorities’ rights and 
its impact has an important role in guiding the development of the new minorities’ 
protections system.  
In addition, Article 1 of the International Covenant has generally been applied to trust 
colonies, the right of people to be free from external domination, the right to support internal 
self-determination, which enables a minority group to submit a claim for a kind of 
autonomy.284 While, Article 40 of the ICCPR, is obliging states parties to submit periodical 
reports to the Human Rights Committee (HRC).285  This procedure is considered to be the 
only binding procedure of the rights shown on the International Covenant and providing 
International legal protection to minority rights.  
In 1992, the UN adopted by the General Assembly, the Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, the United Nations 
Declaration on Minorities (UNDM).286 The most important feature of the Declaration in 
Article 4 (1) is that it includes provisions imposing certain positive obligations on states 
regarding their minorities.287 However, it is not a binding instrument, but the Declaration is 
inspired by Article 27 of the ICCPR. Thus, Petričušić argued that, when the UN has been 
established, the most developed countries of the world did not acknowledge existence of 
minority problems. Even today, many states, who have declared to be unitary ones, fear that 
                                                          
283 Article 27 of ICCPR states: ‘In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exists, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right in the community with the other members of their 
group to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language’. See, 
Article 27 of The International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (n 19).  
284 See, Article 1 ICCPR.  
285 See, Article 40 ICCPR.   
286 Article 1 of the declaration provides that States shall protect all kinds of minorities that inhabit its territories, 
establishing conditions for the promotion of the protection of minority rights, preserving their identity, adopting 
appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve those ends. While, Article (2/1) states: 
“Persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities have the right to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, and to use their own language, in private and public, freely 
and without interference or any form of discrimination.” See, ‘Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging 
to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities' (n 255).   
287 Article 4 paragraph (1) provides that: ‘States shall take measures to create favourable conditions to enable 
persons belonging to minorities to express their characteristics and develop their culture, language, religion, 
traditions and customs, except where specific practices are in violation of national law and contrary to 
international standards’. See Article 4 (1) ibid.  
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recognition of minority groups within their territories would rekindle the regional claims 
against which they have had to fight in the past.288    
 
2.3.2. The concept of minority: who are protected minorities under international law?  
 
It has been easier to set standards for the development of minority protection in international 
law than to define who the beneficiaries of such standards should be. It is a well-known fact 
that there is no definition of the concept of ‘minority’ in international law, which grants these 
units special protections. A number of contemporary scholars are reluctant to use the term 
‘minority,’ claiming this term was closely connected with the League of Nations system and 
therefore is obsolete.289 Others, on the contrary, argue that since minority implicates the 
group of people that is numerically smaller than the dominant group, this leaves out non-
dominant groups that are majorities in their countries.290 Therefore, following changes to the 
term were suggested: ‘communities’, ‘communalities’, ‘social groups’, and recently even 
term ‘peoples’.291   
Moreover, despite the fact that the question of minorities presently enjoys such international 
prominence, surprisingly little has until relatively recently been done to formulate an 
authoritative, generally acceptable definition of a ‘minority’.292 A plausible reason for this 
neglect, as Deon pointed out, is that ‘the lack of a definition could be used by states as an 
excuse not to deal at all with potentially contentious minority issues at home by claiming that 
the relevant group was not a ‘minority’ and had no claims to special rights, but was simply 
part of the broader national population’.293 National minorities are ‘neither the pristine 
reproduction of their ‘mother people’, although they are tied to their people particularly by 
culture and language, nor a reflection of the sociological and ideological satisfaction of the 
dominant people, to whom they are linked by their geographical situation and economic, 
                                                          
288 Petričušić, ‘The Rights of Minorities in International Law: Tracing Developments in Normative 
Arrangements of International Organizations’ (n 263).  
289  ibid.  
290  ibid.  
291 ibid, For specified definitions of mentioned terms, See, N Lerner, Group Rights and Discrimination in 
International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1991) 28-34.   
292 Rossouw and Geldenhuys, ‘The International Protection Of Minority Rights’ (n 256).   
293 ibid.  
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cultural, historical and political features’.294 Therefore, they deserve an ‘exceptional 
accomplishment of their preserving and fostering in the state they inhibit, though the kin-
states as well shape minority policies’.295 
Certain scholars, most notably the United Nations Special Rapporteurs such as Francesco 
Capotorti and Jules Deschenes, have developed definitions, which have gained some 
scholarly support. However, relevant international instruments have generally not even 
attempted to define the concept. Despite many references to ‘minorities’ in international legal 
instruments, there is no universally agreed, legally binding definition of the term.296 This is 
primarily because of a feeling that the concept of ‘minority’ is inherently vague and 
imprecise and that no proposed definition would ever be able to provide for the innumerable 
minority groups that could possibly exist.297 Moreover, the diverse contexts of different 
groups claiming minority status also make it challenging to formulate a solution of universal 
application. Consequently, Rehman argued that international law has found it difficult to 
provide any firm guideline in relation to defining the concept.298 Nonetheless, the efforts 
made so far at various forums and by many international scholars and lawyers into 
consideration in developing a definition of the term of minority.  
Accordingly, minority can be described as a small group in a society that is different from the 
rest of the citizens of a state on the grounds of race, ethnicity, and religion, linguistic or 
political belief. Francesco Capotorti, defined a minority group, with the application of Article 
27 of ICCPR in mind, as:   
[A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State,  in a non-dominant position, whose 
members - being nationals of the State - possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing 
from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards 
preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language].299  
                                                          
294 Petričušić, ‘The Rights of Minorities in International Law’ (n 263). See further, M Komac, ‘Nationalities and 
Minorities in Yugoslavia, European Minorities’ (1991) 4 Con EA 129.   
295 Petričušić, ‘The Rights of Minorities in International Law’ (n 263).  
296 F Capotorti, ‘Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities’ (NY, 
United Nations, 1991) 5.  
297 Khan and Rahman, ‘Protection of Minorities’ (n 267).  
298 Rehman, The Weaknesses in the International Protection of Minority Rights (n 264) 14.  
299‘Minority Rights : International Standards and Guidance for Implementation’ (United Nations, Human Rights, 
Office of the High Commissioner 2010).  See also, E/CN 4/Sub 2/384/Rev 1, para 568. The subjective elements 
of defining a group as a minority were well described by the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) as 
early as 1930, when it referred to minorities or communities as: a group of persons  living in a given country or 
locality, having a race, religion, language and traditions of their  own and united by this identity of race, 
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The basic standard required by Capotorti’s definition is: a minority has to be a group that 
exists in a non-dominant position, must have shared ethnic, religious, or linguistic feature, 
which can be distinguished from the majority of society. The minority group needs either 
implicitly or explicitly to show a sense of solidarity towards preservation of its identity. 
Rather, in most instances, a minority group will be a numerical minority, but in others, a 
numerical majority may also find itself in a minority-like or non-dominant position, for 
example, Blacks under the apartheid regime in South Africa.300 In a certain situation, a group, 
which constitutes a majority in a state as a whole, may be in a non-dominant position within a 
particular region of the state in question. In addition, the ‘numerical inferiority’ is determined 
by referring to the size of the rest of the population of the rest of the state. In a situation 
where there is no clear majority, the expression ‘the rest of the people’ is explained to 
indicate to the aggregate of all groups of the population of the state concerned. A criticism 
arose here, that the comparison is between a culturally homogenous group and a non – 
classified one. Capotorti’s definition did not mention the numerical strength of the group. It is 
now well settled that a minority forms a sufficient number for the state to recognise it as a 
distinct part of the society and to justify the state making the effort to protect and promote it.  
Additionally, Benedikter has defined a minority as ‘A non-dominant institutionalised group 
sharing a distinct cultural identity that it wishes to preserve’.301 While, Akermark has 
described a minority as ‘A non–dominant institutionalised group sharing a distinct cultural 
identity that it wishes to preserve’.302 In 1985, Jules Deschenes prepared another text on the 
definition of minority to the Sub-Commission to the Commission on Human Rights. 
However, the Commission did not accept the definition.303  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
religion, language and traditions in a sentiment of  solidarity, with a view to preserving their traditions, 
maintaining their form of worship, ensuring the instruction and upbringing of their children in accordance with 
the spirit and traditions of their race and rendering mutual assistance to each other. See, ‘Greco-Bulgarian 
Communities (Advisory Opinion) [1930] PCIG Series B NO 17’. 
300 ‘Minority Rights : International Standards and Guidance for Implementation’ (n 299). 
301 T Benedikter, ‘Minorities in Europe: Legal Instrument of Minority Protection in Europe, an Overview’ 
[2006] Bolzano/Bozen < http://www.gfbv.it/3dossier/eu-min/autonomy-eu.html> accessed 25 March, 2013.  
302  Geldenhuys and Rossouw , ‘The International Protection Of Minority Rights’ (n 256).  
303According to this definition, minority is: ‘A group of citizens of a State, constituting a numerical minority and 
in a non-dominant position in that State, endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ 
from those of the majority of the population, having a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated, if only 
implicitly, by a collective will to survive and whose aim it is to achieve equality with the majority in fact and in 
law’. See, Jelena Pejic, ‘Minority Rights in International Law’ (1997) 19 HRQ 671.  
 A C Helton, ‘International Legal Principles Concerning National Minorities,Prepared by the Open Society 
Institute Forced Migration Projects, for the seminar on New Diasporas of Eastern Europe Budapest’, (1998)   
<http://vlib.iue.it/hist-romania/minorities.html> accessed 28 March, 2013.   
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The HRC (General Comment) Article 27 of the Covenant provides that, ‘in those States in 
which ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to these minorities 
shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy 
their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.’304  
The Committee observes that this article establishes and recognises a right which is conferred 
on individuals belonging to minority groups and which is distinct from, and additional to, all 
the other rights, which, as individuals in common with everyone else, they are already 
entitled to enjoy under the Covenant.305  
Consequently, ‘adopted by consensus in 1992, the United Nations Minorities Declaration in 
its Article 1 refers to minorities as ‘based on national or ethnic, cultural, religious and 
linguistic identity, and provides that States should protect their existence.’ There is no 
internationally agreed definition as to which groups constitute minorities’.306 In 1993, the 
European Commission for Democracy through Law and the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe essentially repeated Capotorti's conception.307 The regime on minority 
rights, as part of a wider human rights regime, recognises that membership of a minority 
group is a matter of personal choice; a person may not be ascribed to a minority group against 
their will.308 However, it has been argued that, ‘the difficulty in arriving at a widely 
acceptable definition lies in the variety of situations in which minorities live.’ Some live 
together in well-defined areas, separated from the dominant part of the population. Others are 
scattered throughout the country. Some minorities have a strong sense of collective identity 
and recorded history; others retain only a fragmented notion of their common heritage’. 309  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
304 ‘The High Commissioner of Human Rights, General Comment No 23: The rights of minorities (Art 27) 
(Fiftieth session, 1994)’ 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/fb7fb12c2fb8bb21c12563ed004df111?Opendocument>accessed 
28 June, 2013. 
305 ibid. 
306 Article 1 states: 1. States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and 
linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage conditions for the 
promotion of that identity. 2. States shall adopt appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve those ends. 
See, UNGA Res A/RES/47/135’ (n 255).  
307  Geldenhuys and Rossouw, ‘The International Protection Of Minority Rights’ (n 256).  
308 Article 3(1) Framework Convention on National Minorities states that: “Every person belonging to a national 
minority shall have the right freely to choose to be treated or not to be treated as such and no disadvantage shall 
result from this choice or from the exercise of the rights which are connected to that choice.” See, ‘Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1 September 1995) Strasbourg’ 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/157.htm> accessed 28 June, 2013.   
309 ‘Minority Rights : International Standards and Guidance for Implementation’ (n 299). 
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Thus, in the absence of the precise definition of minority in international law, the existence of 
a minority is a question of fact and not of definition.310 The numerical inferiority on the other 
hand, is determined by referring to the size of the rest of the population of the rest of the 
state. In a situation where there is no clear majority, the expression ‘the rest of the people is 
explained to indicate to the aggregate of all groups of the population of the state concerned. 
Consequently, the comparison is between a culturally homogenous group and a non–
classified one. Capotorti’s definition did not mention the numerical strength of the group. It is 
now well settled that a minority forms a sufficient number for the state to recognise it as a 
distinct part of society and to justify the state making the effort to protect and promote it. 
Thus, the absence of a unique definition cannot be solved merely by finding a more precise 
definition. Accordingly, based on the definitions above, the Kurds of Iraq would not be a 
minority, because they are a ‘national group’ a ‘people’ for the purpose of the right of self-
determination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
310 The OSCE states that ‘to belong to a national minority is a matter of a person’s individual choice’. The 
existence of a minority does not depend on a decision by the State, determined by objective criteria such as 
language, ethnicity, or religion, but on self-identification. It depends on the will and decision of those 
individuals who collectively see themselves as different to the majority, on a sense of belonging to the group 
and a commitment to the preservation of the identity of the group. See, ‘OSCE, High Commissioner on National 
Minorities’, 1995 <http://www.osce.org/hcnm/43201> accessed 29 June, 2013.   
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2.3.3. Relationship between Minority, Indigenous people, and People  
 
The right of minority groups or sub-groups is distinguishable from the right to self-
determination. Minority rights, ‘which do not include the right to secede but are, 
nevertheless, general and broad in scope, are available to all ethnic, cultural, religious and 
linguistic groups within any type of nation-State’.311 On the other hand, self-determination 
includes the right to form an independent State, but is recognised and designed to govern only 
certain special territorial situations concerning certain special categories of rights of certain 
special 'peoples'.312  
An important issue is whether protected 'minorities' also fall under the category of 'all 
peoples' entitled to the right of self-determination. Certainly, 'minorities' and 'peoples' are two 
separate concepts.313 While the concept of self-determination is elaborated in the common 
Article 1 of the Covenants, the ICCPR elaborates minority rights in Article 27. It is clear that 
the rights of minorities under international law do not necessarily include or commingle with 
the right to self-determination. Hence, protected minorities do not automatically qualify as a 
'people' eligible to the right to self-determination.314  
On the other hand, the concept of ‘indigenous peoples’315 in international practice has not 
been accompanied by any general agreement as to its meaning, nor even by agreement or a 
                                                          
311 J Shen, ‘Sovereignty, Statehood, Self-Determination, and the Issue of Taiwan’ (2000) 15 Am U Int'l L Rev 
1101. See also, Article 27 The International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights’ (n 19). 
312 Shen, ‘Sovereignty, Statehood, Self-Determination, and the Issue of Taiwan’ (n 311) 
313 J Vidmar, ‘Montenegro’s Path to Independence': A Study of Self-Determination, Statehood and Recognition’ 
(2007) 3 HL Rev 73.  See for example, the question of minority’s right to self-determination considered by 
Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission (Badinter Commission). The Commission treated the 
Bosnian Serb population as a “minority” and denied that they have any right to form an independent state. 
Although some scholars interpret that, this opinion of Badinter Commission “effectively reflected the orthodox 
view that minorities were not peoples with the right to self-determination.” It is clear that Badinter Commission 
did not deny that Serbian minority is a subject or right to self-determination. See, Crawford, The Creation of 
States in International Law (n 3) 407.  
314 Shen, ‘Sovereignty, Statehood, Self-Determination, and the Issue of Taiwan’ (n 311).  
315 Martinez Cobo a (UN Special Rapporteur) has defined ‘indigenous peoples’ as ‘Indigenous communities, 
peoples, and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial society 
that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now 
prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are 
determined to preserve, develop, and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic 
identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own culture patterns, 
social institutions, and legal systems. See, B Kingsbury, ‘Indigenous Peoples in International Law: A 
Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy’ (1998) 92 Ame J Int’l L, 414.  However, Cobo’s definition is 
always problematic for groups who do not continue to live in accordance with traditional norms or who share 
the same geographic area with others who also claim to be indigenous. It implies that the group must have been 
colonized or invaded.32 Because colonization or invasion does not always occur, groups in such situations may 
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process by which its meaning might be established. While indigenous peoples can claim 
minority rights under international law, there are UN mandates and mechanisms dedicated 
specially to protecting their rights.316 The UN in its work has applied the principle of self-
identification with regard to indigenous peoples and minorities. In practical terms, a number 
of connections exist between indigenous peoples and national, ethnic, linguistic and religious 
minorities.317 Both groups are in a non-dominant position in the society in which they live. 
Both minorities and indigenous peoples wish to promote and retain their identity. Some 
minorities have strong and long-standing attachments to their lands as do indigenous peoples. 
However, minorities do not necessarily have long ancestral, traditional attachments to their 
lands and territories that are usually associated with self-identification as indigenous 
peoples.318  
Accordingly, the definition of 'indigenous people' confirms that international law treats 
indigenous groups as distinct from minority groups'.319 However, there are groups that fall 
under the legal definition of both concepts. Clearly, while an indigenous people may qualify 
as a minority, not all minorities are indigenous.320 There is however, little debate that 
indigenous groups can be treated as minorities as long as they are numerically inferior to the 
rest of the population of the State in which they live.321 In Bolivia and Guatemala however, 
the indigenous groups are numerically superior and hence cannot be treated as minorities.322 
Dahiltz concluded that, indigenous peoples, by virtue of their special circumstances as first 
peoples, and their close association with the land, may more often than most need and benefit 
from a high degree of autonomy, negotiated between them and the national government as 
equal.323  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
fear that their  Status as indigenous would be in doubt. See, Y T Jabareen, ‘Redefining Minority Rights: 
Successes and Shortcoming of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2012) 18 AKH-JCIR 
Rev 120.  
316 ‘Minority Rights: International Standards and Guidance for Implementation’ (n 299). 
317 ibid. 
318 ibid. 
319 B Khan and and M M Rahman, Protection of Minorities,Regimes, Norms and Issues in South Asia (CSP 
2012) 16.  
320 As far as Article 27 of the ICCPR is, concerned, indigenous peoples are in many instances classified as both 
minority and indigenous at the same time. See, ibid. 
321 ibid. 
322 ibid. 
323 Dahlitz, Secession and International Law  (n 14) 34-35.  
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2.4. Statehood  
2.4.1. General Observations  
 
Since the development of the modern international system, statehood has been regarded as 
the paramount type of international personality.324 Clearly, in doctrine and in practice, states 
have until recently been regarded as the only international legal person.325 In all legal 
systems, the subject of law is an entity, which has enforceable rights and duties at the law. It 
can be an individual or a company and both are defined as 'legal person' by the law.326 Legal 
personality is the main clause for the entities to function or in other words, to enforce and 
allege a claim.327  
The traditional understanding was that international law deals with states and state activities. 
Today, international law has a wide range of interests, and there are a range of participants in 
the international system, 'Public international law covers relations between states, and 
regulates the operation of many international institutions'.328 Nevertheless, 'states were the 
original, and remain the primary actors in the international legal system.329 Under the modern 
conception, participants can be regarded as; states, international organisations, regional 
organisations, non-governmental organisations, public companies, private companies and 
individuals.330   
Some scholars have suggested  that the concept of statehood does not have a separate place in 
international law, they have even come close to deny the existence of statehood as a legal 
concept altogether. While these views might contribute to view the State in non-absolute 
terms, they are difficult to match with the extensive reliance on the concept in international 
constitutional documents such as the United Nations Charter (UN Charter) or State 
practice.331 In addition, the separate position of the state is rather underscored by the 
recognition of the existence of certain essential rights and obligations of states in 
international law. Many of these fundamental rights and duties, Werner argued, may be 
                                                          
324 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (n 3) 4-5. 
325 ibid 17-18. 
326 Shaw, International Law  (n 119) 195. 
327 ibid.  
328 ibid 2. 
329 ibid 218. 
330 ibid 196.  
331 J Crawford, ‘The Criteria for Statehood In International Law’ (1977) 48 BYIL Int'l L 93. 
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summarised in three principles closely related to the principles of liberty, equality, and 
fraternity as those developed in the domestic sphere: the independence of states, the 
sovereign equality of states and the obligation of states to peacefully coexist.332 In a like 
manner, Crawford observed that ‘States possess certain exclusive and general legal 
characteristics, which he divides into five principles that constitute in legal terms the hard 
core of the concept of statehood, the essence of the special position in customary 
international law of States.333 
 
2.4.2. International Law and the criteria of Statehood   
 
Since Westphalian times,334 the concept of statehood has become one of the fundamental 
pillars of the international legal system. The term, 'State', has a specific meaning and when it 
is used in the context of the international legal system, it refers to the 'nation-State'.335 What 
this means is that for an entity to be accepted as a 'State' and for it to take its place in the 
global community, it must meet the defined requirements laid down by international law.336  
The relationship in this area between factual and legal criteria, as Shaw argued, is a crucial 
shifting one.337 Whether the birth of a new State is primarily a question of fact or law, and 
how the interaction between the criteria of effectiveness and other relevant legal principles 
may be reconciled are questions of considerable complexity and significance.338  
                                                          
332 The independence and equality of States includes for example, the right of States to choose their own 
constitution, to exercise (exclusive) jurisdiction over their territory and if necessary, to defend the State against 
an armed attack. The obligation of peaceful coexistence implies, among other things, that States have the duty to 
refrain from intervention in the (internal or external) affairs of other States, from using their territory (or 
allowing it to be used) for activities that violate the rights of other States, or form a threat to international peace 
and security, and to comply with obligations imposed on them by international law in accordance with the 
principle of good faith. The last requirement implies, for example, that States are obliged to respect human 
rights on their territory. For more details see, N Horbach,  R Lefeber, and O Ribbelink, Handboek 
Internationaal Recht (Den Haag: Asser Press 2007) 160.   
333 Crawford, ‘The Criteria for Statehood In International Law’ (n 331) 94-108.  
334 ‘Treaty of Westphalia', 24 October [1648] Peace Treaty between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of 
France and their respective Allies <http://dc144.4shared.com/doc/0fKS3sl9/preview.html> accessed 25 March 
2013. 
335 N Wallace-Bruce, ‘Of Collapsed, Dysfunctional and Disoriented States: Challenges to International Law’ 
(2000) 47 Neth Int'l L Rev 53. 
336 ibid. 
337 Shaw, International Law (n  119) 197. 
338 M N Shaw, International Law (3th  edn, CUP 1991) 138.  
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 Now that the decolonisation process is at an end, the creation of new States in the future can 
only be accomplished because of the diminution or disappearance of existing States, and the 
need for careful regulation thus arises.339 This can be seen for example, in the break-up of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia. Warbrick argued 
that, in international law, an entity, which meets the international legal criteria of statehood, 
is able to be a State.340 The Arbitration Commission of the European Conference on 
Yugoslavia in Opinion No 1 declared that ‘the State is commonly defined as a community 
which consists of a territory and a population subject to an organised political authority’ and 
that such a State is characterised by sovereignty’.341 Similarly, Article 1 of the Montevideo 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States provides the criteria of the statehood.342 These 
provisions have acquired the status of customary international law.343 According to the 
Convention a State should have; a) a permanent population b) a defined territory c) 
government and d) capacity to enter into relations with other States. Moreover, scholars have 
elaborated additional criteria for statehood, including independence, sovereignty, 
permanence, willingness, and ability to observe international law, a certain degree of 
civilization, and, in some cases, recognition.344 However, the question remains whether these 
criteria are sufficient for Statehood, as well as being always necessary.  
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2.4.2.1. The classic criteria of statehood (Montevideo Criteria)  
 
2.4.2.1.1. Defined territory:  
 
As Crawford observed that, ‘States are territorial entities’.345 The control of territory is the 
essence of a State.346 This is the basis of the central notion of territorial sovereignty, 
establishing the exclusive competence to take legal and factual measures within that territory 
and prohibiting foreign governments from exercising authority in the same area without 
consent.347 According to Judge Huber, ‘Territorial sovereignty involves the exclusive right to 
display the activities of a States.348 Crawford stated that, ‘Territorial sovereignty is not 
ownership of but governing power with respect to territory’.349  In contrast, Crawford added 
that the right to be a State ‘is dependent at least in the first instance upon the exercise of full 
governmental powers with respect to some area of territory’.350  
The need for a defined territory focuses upon the requirement for a particular territory based 
upon which to operate.351 However, Shaw argued ‘there is no necessity in international law 
for defined and settled boundaries. He added, ‘a State may be recognised as a legal person 
even though it is involved in a dispute with its neighbours as to the precise demarcation of its 
frontiers, so long as there is a consistent band of territory, which is undeniably controlled by 
the government of the alleged State’.352 For example, Albania prior to the First World War 
was recognised by many countries even though its borders were in dispute.353 More recently, 
Israel has been accepted by the majority of nations as well as the UN as a valid State in spite 
                                                          
345 ibid 46.   
346 P Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th  Rev edn,  Routledge 1997) 75.  
347 ibid.  
348‘Island of Palmas Case' (Netherlands v USA) [1928] IAA Rep 829, 871, 4 ILR 3.    
349 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (n 3) 56.  
350 ibid 46.   
351 Shaw, International Law (n 119) 199. 
352 Shaw, International Law (n 338) 139.  
353 The ICJ held ‘The appurtenance of a given area, considered as an entity, in no way governs the precise 
determination of its boundaries, any more that uncertainty as to boundaries can affect territorial rights. There is 
for instance no rule that the land frontiers of s State must be fully delimited and defined, and often in various 
places and for long periods they are not. See, ‘The North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of 
Germany v Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep 3, 33 (1969).    
75 
 
of the unsettled status of its borders in the Arab-Israel conflict and territorial delineation.354 
Even more recently, Palestine has been accepted as a State.355   
Thus, the delimitation of States boundaries is important, but absolute certainly about a State's 
frontiers is not required. As to the criterion of defined territory, international law does not 
require that all borders of a State need to be undisputed but rather demands “sufficient 
consistency” of the territory.356 Here, it is possible for the territory of the State to be split into 
distinct parts, for instance, Pakistan prior to the Bangladesh secession of 1971 or present-day 
Azerbaijan.357  
 
2.4.2.1.2. Permanent population  
 
The criterion of a ‘permanent population’ is connected with that of territory and constitutes 
the physical basis for the existence of a State.358 In fact, there must be some people to 
establish the existence of a State but there is not a specification of a minimum number of 
people and again there is not a requirement that all of the people be nationals of the State.359 
Importantly, ‘since in the absence of the physical basis for an organised community; it will be 
difficult to establish the existence of a State’.360 However, in the ‘Falkland Islands’ conflict, 
one of the issues raised related to the question of an acceptable minimum with regard to self-
determination, and it may be that the matter needs further clarification as there exists a 
number of small islands awaiting decolonisation.361  
A population or 'people' has been defined by Oppenheim as ‘an aggregate of individuals who 
live together as a community, though they may belong to different races or creeds or cultures, 
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or be of different colour’.362 Accordingly, for the purpose of statehood, an entity's population 
must first live together as one people, and secondly must form a national community.363 The 
permanent population requirement suggests that 'there must be people identifying themselves 
with the territory no matter how small or large the population might be’.364 Hence, Vidmar 
argued that, ‘A group of people without a territory cannot establish a State and a territory 
alone cannot be considered a State without a group of people intending to inhabit it 
permanently’.365 Furthermore, a qualifying group of people may consist of different peoples, 
and ‘people of different nationalities’,366 in spite of the fact that they may belong to different 
races or creeds, or be different in colour.367  
Crawford pointed out that, ‘the rule under discussion requires States to have a permanent 
population; it is not a rule relating to the nationality of that population’.368 The internal law of 
a State determines who belongs to the ‘permanent population’ of a State by nationality, which 
international law leaves to the discretion of States, except for a number of limited 
circumstances.369 In addition, many States have a multinational composition as regards 
population. So that, it would be inconsequent to legally require any cultural, ethnic, linguistic, 
historical, or religious homogeneity in the sense of antiquated political concept of the nation-
State.370 Issues arise again under the topic of self-determination and indigenous peoples and 
the rights of minorities, ‘but they are irrelevant as criteria to determine the existence of a 
State’. Moreover, Brownlie argued that the, ‘criterion is intended to be used in association 
with that of territory, and connotes a stable community’.371 As regards numbers, Crawford 
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observed that, ‘no minimum limit is apparently prescribed’.372 Thus, the ‘existence of States 
with very small populations is generally accepted’; although Duursma has explained that the 
‘diminutive size of a population may cast doubts on a State’s ability to comply with certain 
requirements of membership of international organisations.’373 This, however, did not serve 
as a bar to premiership of the UN. Microstates like ‘the Marshall Islands, San Marino, 
Monaco, Andorra, and Palau all have obtained full membership of the United Nations’.374  
 
2.4.2.1.3. Government or (Central control)  
 
A government is an indispensable requirement for statehood375, since all the others depend 
upon it.376 This is so because ‘governmental authority is the basis for normal inter-State 
relations; what is an act of a State is defined primarily by reference to its organs of 
government, legislative, executive, or judicial.’377 A government of a State needs not only to 
exist as an authority but also to ‘exercise effective control in the territory of a State, as well as 
to operate independently from the authority of governments of other States’.378 Crawford 
argued that, ‘what is essential for statehood is a stable central political organisation that 
exercises effective public power within a defined territory and over a permanent population, 
acts as the executive organs responsible for the external relations of the State, and is not 
subject to the sovereignty of any other authority’.379  
The point about government as Crawford pointed out, is that it has two aspects: the actual 
exercise of authority, and the right or title to exercise that authority.380 A government's 
effectiveness or its actual exercise of authority ‘refers to its structural coherence and its 
general capacity to maintain law and order within an area it controls or purports to control’.381 
However, there are some especial situations admitted exceptions regarding the standards and 
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degree of effectiveness. Besides, legitimacy, or legal title, ‘refers to the government's 
exclusive sovereign and legal right to govern a territory under international law.'382 
Elsewhere, it is possible that ‘the territory came into acquisition by way of succession, 
prescription, or cession by the former sovereignty of the territory’.383 However, a territory can 
be obtained in accordance with the principle of self-determination. ‘Therefore, the 
government criterion possesses both legal and factual dimensions’.384  
It is also noteworthy that, ‘the existence of effective government is in certain cases either 
insufficient or unnecessary to support statehood. Brownlie argued, some States, ‘have arisen 
before government was very well organised, as, for example, Poland in 1919 and Burundi 
and Rwanda, admitted to membership of the UN at the seventeenth session of the General 
Assembly’.385   
Obviously, ‘effectiveness is an essentially relative notion when applied to the criterion of 
government’. Brownlie demonstrated that, ‘the existence of effective government is in certain 
cases either unnecessary or insufficient to support statehood’. Thus, ‘the principle of self-
determination will be set against the concept of effective government, when the latter is used 
in arguments for continuation of colonial rule.’386  In addition, the lack of actual exercise of 
authority, and a weak legal title would require a higher degree of effectiveness. This inverse 
provides an explanation why (the former Belgian Congo) Zaire in 1960 was accorded 
precipitate recognition when its new government 'was divided, bankrupt, and hardly able to 
control even the capital’.387 Rhodesia on the other hand lacked the legal title on the part of the 
government, ‘which assumed power in violation of the principle of self-determination, to 
govern the territory in question resulted in almost universal non-recognition of the regime as 
a State or government, even if it maintained effective control over the territory at the time’.388  
More recently, Kosovo declared independence in 2008 with certain Serb-inhabited areas 
apparently not under the control of the central government.389  
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Moreover, Harris argued that ‘State practice suggests that the requirement of a ‘stable 
political organisation’ in control of the territory does not apply during a [civil war] in a State 
that already exists (e.g. the Lebanese Civil War 1975-1990).’390 A State that currently has 
problems of effective government is Somalia. ‘Since guerrillas overthrew the Government in 
1991, fighting has persisted between rival clan-based militias with different territorial bases. 
A separate State of Somaliland declared its independence in the north west of Somalia, but 
has not gained international recognition.’ The Djibouti Conference of interested States and 
parties led to the establishment of an interim Government, but this does not have effective 
control of Mogadishu, the capital, or the country at large. UN forces were sent into Somalia 
between 1992 and 1995, but failed to bring the situation under control. Despite these 
problems, Somalia remains a UN member and continues to be recognised as a State by the 
international community.’391  
Thus, what remain questionable is whether the lack of a government in Somalia, which was 
described as a 'unique case' in the resolution of the Security Council authorising the UN 
humanitarian intervention, abolish the international legal personality of the country as 
such.392 In this regard, Evans argued that ‘the final situation to be considered is where there is 
no government at all, in what was undoubtedly a State.' Does the absence of the government 
call into question the continued existence of the State? Such occasions are rare’.393 In 1991, 
Somalia remained without a government until 2005 (and even after that date, the 
effectiveness of the formal government was far from apparent, the President being unwilling 
to return to the capital, Mogadishu, which was under the control of his rivals)’. However, 
there was no suggestion that Somalia ceased to be a State. It remained a member of the UN. 
States conducted themselves on the basis that there would eventually be a government of 
Somalia’.394  
Here, in such situations, the lack of effective central control might be balanced by significant 
international recognition, culminating in membership of the UN nevertheless; a foundation of 
effective control is required for statehood.395 However, the loss of control by the central 
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authorities in an independent State will not avoid statehood.396 Once a State has been 
established, ‘extensive civil strife or the breakdown of order through natural disaster or 
foreign invasion’,397 ‘the collapse governance within a State (sometimes referred to as ‘failed 
State’) are not considered to affect upon the statute of that State as a State’.398  
 
2.4.2.1.4. Capacity to enter into relations with other States  
 
The capacity to enter into relations with other States is said to be a corollary of a sovereign 
and independent government, which exercises jurisdiction on the territory of the State.399  As 
such, Crawford argued it is ‘a consequence of statehood, not a criterion for it’.400 The 
criterion as Crawford pointed out, ‘is not the exclusive entitlement of States: autonomous 
national authorities, liberation movements, and insurgents are all capable of maintaining 
relations with States and other subjects of international law’.401 In other words, ‘it is capacity 
not limited to sovereign nations, since international organisations, non-independent States 
and other bodies can enter into legal relations with other entities under the rules of 
international law’.402 Here, ‘it is essential for a sovereign State to be able to create such legal 
relations with other units as it sees fit’,403 as non-State entities cannot enter into relations with 
foreign States on the same level as do States. Once they become a State, they will have this 
capacity. This capacity is also ‘significant for international organisations and even for 
subunits of States’.404 Such a limited capacity however; cannot imply statehood of the subunit 
in question.405    
Shen argued that the criterion thus refers to the ‘legal capacity or legal competence of an 
entity to participate in public international relations, including the legal competence to 
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discharge its international obligations’.406 Relatively, this legal capacity is related with 
monetary or economic ability or military or political power. Some developing States lack the 
economic capacity to engage in active relations with other nations, they are however, 
recognised States.407 For instance, ‘California possesses more than abundant economic power 
to fully participate in the international system, yet it is not and cannot be recognised as a State 
in the sense of international law, because it does not possess the legal competence to act as a 
State on the international plane’.408  
Thus, it can be said that, the capacity to enter into a full range of international relations can be 
a useful measure, since such capacity is independent of its recognition by other States and of 
its exercise by the entity concerned.409 However, capacity or competence in this sense 
depends in part on the power of the government, without which, a State cannot carry out its 
international obligations.410 The ability of the government to carry out its obligations 
independently and accept responsibility for them in turn greatly depends on the requirements 
of effective government and independence.411 A State cannot be recognised as a State, and 
enter into relations with other States if it is not recognised.412 Simply, ‘the law of statehood 
does not impose an obligation upon States to enter into relations with other States if they do 
not wish to do so’. 413 
Thus, the capacity to enter into relations seems to be in fact a consequence of independence 
rather than a constitutive element of statehood. Moreover, the capacity to enter into relations, 
its taking effect, also depends on the attitude of the other States, particularly on recognition. 
However, Crawford argued that, ‘it is precisely within the latter context that the normative 
character of the criterion seems to lie. An entity may be formally independent, but without 
being recognised as such it cannot possibly materialise its capacity to enter into relations and, 
consequently, lacks real independence.’414 Thus, ‘in the sense that the capacity to enter into 
relations expresses both the ability to enter into the whole scale of international relations and 
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its actual realisation, thereby giving evidence of a State’s full independence, it may be 
regarded as a useful criterion for statehood.’415  
 
2.4.2.2. The additional statehood criteria 
 
Some scholars refer to other additional factors that may be relevant as criteria for States, such 
as independence, sovereignty, respect of the right to self-determination and human rights. 
Malanczuk argued that these are not generally regarded as constitutive elements for a State 
and it is agreed that what matters in essence is territorial effectiveness’.416  
 
2.4.2.2.1. Independence and (Sovereignty) 
 
Many jurists have stressed independence as a central criterion of statehood. Guggenheim417 
distinguished the State from other legal entities by means which he regards as quantitate 
rather than qualitative. First, ‘the State has a degree of centralisation of its organs not found 
in the world community. Second, the State must be independent of other legal orders, and any 
interference by such legal orders, or by an international agency, must be based on a title of 
international law’.418 Crawford similarly recognised the importance of the independence 
element by stating, ‘Each State is an original foundation predicated on a certain basic 
independence’.419 This was represented in the Montevideo formula by 'capacity to enter into 
relations with other States’.420  
It has been argued that, different legal consequences may be attached to lack of independence 
in certain cases. Lake of independence, as Crawford stated, ‘may also be so complete that the 
entity concerned is not a State but an internationally indistinguishable part of another 
dominates State’.421 ‘A grant of independence may be a legal nullity in certain circumstances, 
or an entity may be independent in some basic sense but act in a specific matter under the 
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control of another State so that the relation becomes one of agency, and the responsibility of 
the latter State is attracted for acts of the former’.422 Here, it is important to differentiate 
between independence as an initial qualification for statehood and as a condition for 
continued existence.  
A new State formed by secession will have to demonstrate substantial independence, both 
formal and real, before it will be regarded as definitively created.423 On the other hand, ‘the 
independence of an existing State is protected by international law rules against illegal 
invasion and annexation, so that the State may considerably continue to exist as a legal entity 
despite lack of effectiveness’.424 Certainly, if an entity has its own executive and other 
organs, conducts its foreign relations through its own organs, has its own system of courts 
and legal system and, particularly important, a nationality law of its own then there is prima 
facie evidence of statehood.425 However, as Brownlie argued that, there is no justification for 
ignoring evidence ‘of foreign control which is exercised in fact through the outwardly 
independent machinery of State’.426 Any economic or political dependence ‘that may in 
reality exist does not affect the legal independence of the State, unless that State is formally 
compelled to submit to the demands of a superior State, in which case dependent statute is 
concerned’.427  
A discussion on the nature and meaning of independence took place in the Austro-German 
Custom Union case428 before the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1931. The term 
of ‘independence’ ‘in a treaty is designed to guarantee the continuance of Austria and its 
separation from Germany; thus the context was that of the putative loss of independence of 
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an existing State’.429 The judgment draws a distinction between independence as a criterion 
for statehood and independence as a right of States.430 Hence, the notion of independence in 
international law implies a number of rights and duties, for example, the ‘right to exercise its 
jurisdiction over its permanent population and territory, or the right to engage upon an act of 
self-defence in certain situations. It implies also the duty not to intervene in the internal 
affairs of other States’.431 Thus, under general State practice what degree of independence is 
therefore necessary? Arbitrator Huber declared in the Island of Palmas case432: ‘Sovereignty 
in the relations between signifies independence. Independence concerning a portion of the 
globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of the 
State’.433   
It has been argued that, ‘both independence and sovereignty are used as equivalents. This 
position has occasionally been adopted in doctrine.’434 Scholars have distinguished between 
the two terms.435 Sovereignty is considered a consequence of statehood, not prerequisite 
thereof.436 It is the totality of international rights and duties recognised by international law 
vested in States.437  Independence concentrates on the rights, ‘which an entity has to the 
exclusion of other States.’438 The concepts are different, but interrelated. ‘A substantial 
limitation of sovereignty in favour of a third State leads to loss of independence and therefore 
loss of statehood.’439  Thus, since the two terms are distinct, it is better to use the term 
‘independence’ as Crawford argued to ‘denote the prerequisite for statehood and 
‘sovereignty’ the legal incident.440   
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2.4.2.2.2. Respect of the right to self-determination and respect for human rights 
 
The right of self-determination is expressed in the common Article 1 of the ICCPR441 and the 
ICESCR.442 Rather, this right has been declared in other international instruments and 
treaties443 ‘is generally accepted as customary international law, and could even form part of 
jus cogens'.444 In the case of the South African 'Homelands' the right of self-determination 
was not applied to the entire people who would qualify for it and that the initial organisation 
of the black population of South Africa into bantustans was imposed without their 
participation.445 Thus, Crawford argued that ‘the creation of the ‘homelands’ States was not 
an expression of the right of self-determination as maintained by South Africa, but its 
violation, which attempted to prevent self-determination of a lager unit.’446 In this regard, the 
violation of the right of self-determination and the pursuance racist policies, were a source of 
the illegality of the State-creation.  
Furthermore, In the case of Rhodesia, UN Resolutions denied the legal validity of the 
unilateral declaration of independence on 11 November 1965 and called upon member States 
not to recognise it.447 ‘No State did recognise Rhodesia and a civil war eventually resulted in 
its transformation into the recognised State of Zimbabwe.’448 Rhodesia might have been 
regarded as a State as Shaw pointed out, ‘by virtue of its satisfaction of the factual 
requirements of statehood, but this is a doubtful proposition’.449 Thus, to accept the 
development of self-determination as an additional criteria of statehood, denial of which 
would obviate statehood. This can only be acknowledged as Shaw argued ‘in relation to self-
determination situations and would not operate in cases, for example, of secessions from 
existing States.’450    
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On the other hand, the principle of self-determination is itself an aspect of human rights law, 
however, the question remains of whether human rights plays any significant role in the 
creation of States. In this regard, Crawford argued: 
[There is so far in modern practice no suggestion that as regards statehood itself, there exists any criterion 
requiring regard for fundamental human rights. The cases are numerous of governments violating 
fundamental norms of human rights; there is no case where such violations have called in question 
statehood itself].451 
In the decolonisation era, there have been references to certain human rights made in relation 
to the creation of States, ‘but it has been established that human rights standards invoked in 
this context aimed to foster the exercise of the right of self-determination and were not 
expressed as conditions for statehood. In connection with Southern Rhodesia, it has been 
suggested that, the establishment of a racist regime hindered the creation of the State. The 
General Assembly called upon all States not to recognise Southern Rhodesia ‘without the 
prior establishment of a government based on majority rule.’452 The establishment of 
Bantustans was not recognised by the UN member States because it was designed ‘to 
consolidate the inhuman policy of apartheid’ and ‘to perpetuate white minority 
domination.’453 The independence of the Homelands States was rejected as ‘invalid’.454  In 
addition, Crawford argued that ‘States have gone further in some cases intervening whether 
‘the results of democratic elections have not been respected or where violence has threatened 
human rights values’.455 Likewise, in case of interventions, it has been suggested as a 
standard by which such interventions may be assessed. Crawford argued ‘but above all the 
criterion for the lawfulness of interventions of this kind, if they are ever lawful, is that the 
intervention must be carried out for the humanitarian purpose, cannot entail any acquisition 
of territory and must be brought to an end as soon as possible once the humanitarian situation 
has been restored’.456  
As shown above, the statehood criteria are only relevant in relation to the creation of new 
States and not in relation to existing ones. Thus, the statehood of existing States could not be 
disputed because of human rights violations, even if respect of human rights were accepted as 
                                                          
451 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (n 3) 148.  
452 GA Res 2379 (XXIII) 25 October’, 1968. 
453 GA Res 32/105 14 December’, 1977. 
454 GA Res 31/6A 26 October’, 1976.  
455 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (n 3) 149.  
456 ibid 150. 
87 
 
a criterion of statehood.457 Hence, an entity willing to become a State can simply adopt 
jurisdiction provisions for the protection of human rights, but there can be no guarantee that it 
would not violate them in practice.458 In the decolonisation era, human rights were not a 
statehood criteria, however, ‘it might be possible to argue that this is not the case when 
human rights of a jus cogens character are in question.’459 An entity cannot claim statehood if 
its creation was founded and made possible by the violation of a rule of jus cogens.460 In 
regard to the illegal creation of Southern Rhodesia, some maintained that it was in fact an 
illegal State, while others denied the existence of Southern Rhodesia’s statehood.461 Here, 
statehood from an overall legal point of view should not be accepted. If the creation of the 
entity is rooted in a breach of jus cogens, this violation should not have any legal effect, 
especially in the case of a breach of peremptory norms of international law, no legal 
consequences should be accepted which are to the advantage of those who infringed the rules 
of jus cogens.462 Thus, the idea is that an entity unwilling or unable to respect human rights, 
especially the right to self-determination,463 should be barred from statehood.  
On the other hand, State practice provides examples of the link between the compliance with 
basic human rights and the recognition of new States. At the time of the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, ‘the Members of the then The European Commission EC464 made clear that 
they saw the respect for certain human rights as a precondition for the recognition of the 
claims to independence of various republics of the former Soviet Union empire’.465 A similar 
policy was followed when the SFRY began to collapse. However, Kreijen argued that, 'in the 
light of the State practice there seems to be insufficient evidence that the respect of human 
rights and self-termination have hardened into criteria for statehood.’466 Obviously, 
international law allows certain conditions to be applied in respect of the recognition of new 
States in order to protect human rights, ‘but to contend that the conditions themselves have 
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become generally accepted criteria for statehood would carry the matter too far.’467  
However, ‘it is arguable that in the context of the decolonisation of Africa, self-determination 
as well the doctrine of uti possidetis juris, which was applied in close association with the 
former right, are constituent elements of statehood.’468 Rather, it is a matter of fact that basic 
human rights have been violated in many States around the world. However, these violations 
per se do not seem to cast serious doubts on statehood.  Dugard argued that, 'if the systematic 
denial of basic human rights, including the right to participate in government by means of 
free elections is to become a bar to statehood, it would mean that many existing States would 
cease to qualify as States.’469   
 
2.4.2.2.3. The prohibition of the illegal use of force 
 
Additionally, the prohibition of use of force and acquisition of territory by means of force 
acts of aggression are generally accepted to be outlawed by a rule of jus cogens. Article 2(4) 
of the UN Charter expressed the prohibition of the use of force.470  It prohibits the use of 
force between States. International law protects ‘existing States from having their 
international personality extinguished, even when the effective situation suggests that a State 
no longer exists’. In this regard, the UN organs have condemned the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait471 and the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus after Turkish 
armed intervention in Northern Cyprus.472 Duursma argued that ‘the only exception to this 
rule seems to be a justification under another rule of jus cogens’.473  ‘Indian troops aided 
Bangladesh to become an independent State, which possess the right of self-determination 
with force of jus cogens’.474 Thus, Evans argued that when a new effective entity emerges 
because of an illegal use of force, such an entity will not acquire statehood. Indeed, it might 
be said, of any use of force, ‘for the circumstances can hardly be imagined in which the 
exercise of the right of self-defence could authorise one State to establish a new State on the 
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territory of yet another State’.475  ‘If the permanent transfer of territory is not compatible with 
the use of force, even in self-defence, it is likewise with the creation of a State’.476 Thus, even 
if the Turkish intervention in Cyprus was lawful under the Zurich Accords, Evans argued, ‘it 
does not necessarily follow that the creation of a Turkish Republic on Northern Cyprus was 
also a lawful act’.477 Finally, this argument was given some cautions support even in the 
Kosovo Advisory Opinion, where the ICJ held that illegality of a declaration of independence 
may stem from 'the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general 
international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens)’.478 However, 
Vidmar argued that this pronouncement from the ICJ remains ambiguous and does not link to 
illegality of State creation exclusively to (jus cogens).479 In addition, it remains controversial 
whether the illegality is really a matter of additional statehood criteria or should better be 
seen as a matter of recognition requirements.      
 
2.4.2.2.4. Effectiveness and the principle of legality of creating new States 
 
The principle of effectiveness is used in international law to determine whether claimed 
rights actually exist and consequently must be recognised.  Its aim is to give full legal effect 
to factual situations. Accordingly, effectiveness is a ‘precondition’ for the attribution of a 
legal statue. Crawford argued that, 'effectiveness plays a crucial role in the concept of 
statehood. It is 'a characteristic of the classic criteria of permanent population, defined 
territory, and government 'that they are based on the principal of effectiveness.’480 However, 
he demonstrated that 'the view that effectiveness is always central to statehood is not in 
conformity with modern practice.'481  
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Raič argued that, the importance of the role played by effectiveness is limited to situations 
where statehood has to be 'proved' or 'claimed'.482 The attitude of the parent State has to be 
taken into account, when it consents to the attribution of statehood to a territorial entity by the 
way of treaty or other source of law’. In the case of Kosovo, the statehood contestation by 
Serbia requires a strict application of the concept of statehood. At the same time, 
effectiveness is not strictly applied when the lack of an effective government is the result of 
an unlawful conduct of the parent State. Thus, in cases relating to colonisation, ‘the lack of 
effective government is compensated by an applicable right of external self-determination’.483 
Moreover, State practice proves that effectiveness is not the only criteria for statehood. For 
example, the Baltic States, Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Kuwait were regarded as 
States whereas they were not effective entities. On the other hand, Rhodesia, the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus and Taiwan, which were regarded effective entities were not 
regarded as States.484 In addition, scholars have distinguished between 'effectiveness as the 
'traditional criteria' and 'legality' as the 'modern criteria'.  The legality has sometimes been 
rejected, arguing that the non-attribution of statehood to an effective entity because of its 
illegality will consequently leave this entity in a legal vacuum.  In this regard, Crawford 
argued that 'international law applies as well to 'de facto entities'.485 For instance, Taiwan, 
which is considered as an effective entity, but not a State, cannot act contrary to international 
law. Thus, the purpose of the legality criteria is to prevent the creation of a State, which is in 
fact an effective entity, but is in infringement of peremptory norms of international law.486 
Raič concluded that 'in the case of formation of States 'from the State non-recognition 
practice, the legality criterion covers three areas: (a) the prohibition of aggression. (b) the 
prohibition of the violation of the right of self-determination of peoples (in the colonial 
context at least and (c) the prohibition of systematic racial discrimination, including the 
prohibition of Apartheid’.487 Hence, Crawford believed that the violation of a peremptory 
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norm makes the act invalid and that no State is created. Thus, the criterion of effectiveness is 
not enough. Raič argued 'Where the effectiveness criteria is fulfilled, the entity is 'an effective 
territorial entity'488 but not a State, unless it has been created lawfully. Nonetheless, what 
remains controversial yet is whether the ‘illegality’ is really a matter of additional statehood 
criteria or should be better as a matter of recognition requirements. In this regard, it has been 
argued that illegal declarations of independence are not, more broadly, illegal States, but they 
are nevertheless still States, and that the ‘additional criteria of legality proposed are not 
criteria of statehood but merely conditions for recognition, via reasons for not recognising 
existing States’.489   
Finally, in addition to the role of effectiveness and the principle of legality in creating a new 
State, one may encounter such criteria for statehood as a degree of permanence, function as 
State, willingness to observe international law, and a certain degree of civilization. Brownlie 
observed that ‘as these criteria either relate to peripheral problems or lack common 
acceptance in modern doctrine they usually do not figure prominently in current discourse on 
statehood’.490   
Overall, it seems fair to conclude that, the concept of the additional statehood has not been 
acknowledged by all scholars and remains controversial. They set legality-based standards for 
entities wishing to become States and thus look beyond mere effectiveness as adhered to by 
the traditional criteria. However, this does not mean that traditional criteria are no longer 
important but rather that the additional set of criteria may prevent effective entities from 
acquiring statehood. In other words, the additional criteria as discussed above find 
insufficient support in State practice to justify their characterisation as accepted criteria for 
statehood, though they may play a decisive role in particular cases. 
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2.5. Recognition 
 
2.5.1. The Recognition of States 
 
Recognition constitutes the acknowledgment of statehood, whereas statehood is the gateway 
to international legal personality, recognition may be seen as the key to statehood. 
Accordingly, Kreijen argued that ‘recognition indirectly enables a political community to 
accept the full range of rights and obligations constituted by international law, though it is for 
the community concerned to decide to what extent it will bind itself.’491 Okafor explained 
that, recognition may be seen as a principle of peer review, 'the process of the determination 
of the legitimacy of a State, according to the ipse dixit or say-so of a given pre-existing 
society of States without necessary reference to the standpoint of the would-be State, or any 
of its constituent sub-State groups.'492 If this is the case, Kreijen demonstrated that, such as, 
for example, in the ‘colonialism era, recognition is used as a means to exclude. whilst, 
modern international law rather is inclined to use recognition primarily as a means of 
inclusion in order to guarantee the existence of a universal community of formally equal and 
sovereign States.’493   
The term 'recognition' can be used in at least two ways. First, ‘a State may explicitly express 
its view with regard to the legal status of a certain political community. An example of such 
an explicit recognition is the recognition of Israel as a sovereign State by the United 
Kingdom. In April 1950, the government of the United Kingdom declared: ‘His Majesty's 
Government have decided to accord de jure recognition to the State of Israel’. Secondly, a 
State may indicate that it considers a community to be a State under international law, by 
entering into certain relations with that community (for example, by concluding a treaty with 
the State, by entering into diplomatic relationships, or by beginning a dispute settlement 
proceeding before the ICJ). Such a form of recognition is also called an implicit or tacit 
recognition. Whether entering into such relations may be considered the recognition of a 
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particular political entity as a State under international law, must be inferred from the specific 
circumstances.’494  
The recognition of a new State or a new government of an existing State is a unilateral act, 
which the recognising government can grant or withhold.495 In the eighteenth century, the 
existence of a State was believed to be founded on its internal sovereignty and did not require 
recognition by other States or monarch.496 Under the influence of the positivist theory, ‘which 
is based on the obligation to respect international law on the consent of individual States, 
effective statehood became more dependent on international recognition.’497 In other words, 
once the three classic criteria of a territory, a population, and government are met, ‘this 
factuality must then be confirmed by the existing States, only then, after being constituted, 
may it enjoy rights inherent in States under international law.’498 Talmon argued that, ‘this 
interpretation fits within the 19th century positivist view of international law as a purely 
consensual system, where legal relations may only arise with the consent of those 
concerned.’499  The positivist theory believed that the creation of a new State also created 
legal obligations for existing States.500 As such, ‘the existing States either had to consent to 
the creation of new State, or to its accession to international law and international 
community.’ This sort of recognition ‘considered matters such as, 'the degree of civilization' 
as measured by Western standards and dynastic legitimacy.’501  
This argument developed into the constitutive theory in the early twentieth century. 
According to the constitutive theory, an entity may only become a State by virtue of 
recognition.502 Thus, recognition was the only way to give an international personality to the 
State. The formation of a State remained a question of fact, but whether it could become a 
subject of international law was a question of law, that is of recognition.503 Thereafter, the 
concept of recognition has become much more important because of its results, as each State 
creation put the concept on the agenda of international community. According to Crawford, 
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‘the beginning of the twentieth century, there were nearly fifty States in the World arena, 
immediately before the World War II, the number reached approximately seventy-five, and in 
2005, there were almost 200.’504   
Today, recognition doesn’t mean only that the recognised entity has met the required 
qualifications, ‘but also that the recognising State will enter into relations with the recognised 
State and let that State enjoy usual legal consequences of recognition such as privileges and 
immunities within the domestic legal order.’505 Hence, it has been claimed that ‘the decision 
whether to recognise or not generally depends on political views rather than legal grounds.506 
Hence, ‘the relationship between factual situations and the creation of legal rights by the act 
of recognition remains controversial in international law, since the act has legal 
consequences, while it is primarily based on political or other non-legal considerations.’507  
Recognition has been defined as a ‘statement by an international legal person as to the status 
in international law of another real or alleged international legal person or of the validity of a 
particular factual situation’.508 Grant has defined recognition as ‘a procedure whereby the 
governments of existing States respond to certain changes in the world community.’509  
Recognition is then an activity of States as a ‘legal person’ of international law.510 Once 
recognition occurs, the new situation is deemed opposable to the recognising State that is that 
pertinent legal consequences will flow.511 It constitutes, Shaw argued that ‘participation in the 
international legal process generally while also being important within the context of bilateral 
relations and, of course, domestically.’512 However, the key question is whether the formation 
of a State is dependent or independent of recognition by existing States; in other words, may 
a political entity be considered a State under international law, even if it is not recognised as 
such by the existing State? To answer this question the section will argue both constitutive 
and declaratory theories of recognition.  
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2.5.2. Recognition theories  
 
Recognition of a new State means only that the recognised authority proposes to treat the 
entity as a State under international law.513 Traditionally, there are two theories on the nature 
of recognition in international law: constitutive and declaratory.   
 
2.5.2.1. Constitutive theory  
 
The constitutive theory perceives recognition as ‘a necessary act before the recognised entity 
can enjoy an international personality’514, and the creation of a new State depends on the 
consent of the present State. The theory maintains ‘that it is the act of recognition by other 
States that creates a new State and endows it with legal personality and not the process by 
which it actually obtained independence.’515 Accordingly, the new State will have the rights 
and duties at the time of being recognised.516 However, ‘the situation in which one State may 
be recognised by some States but not by others is an evident problem and thus a great 
deficiency of the constitutive theory.’517  
Arguably, in the absence of a central international authority for granting of recognition, this 
would mean that such an entity does not have an international personality.518 The theory has 
numerous weaknesses, for example, what will happen if some existing States recognise the 
new one and the others do not? Rather, how it could be possible to put in force some 
restraints, such as the prohibition on aggression, against unrecognised States?519 Therefore, 
the majority of scholars have adopted a view that recognition is declaratory.  
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For Brownlie, political recognition can be seen as constitutive for the recognised State 
because the act of recognition is a condition for the establishment of a formal diplomatic 
relations with the new State.520 Shaw also concluded that the act of recognition is legally 
constitutive, because State rights and obligations do not arise automatically as the result of 
recognition.521 He further argued that, equally if an entity went very unrecognised, this would 
not amount to a decisive argument against statehood.522 Thus, Kreijen concluded that ‘since 
the act of recognition is perceived as generating a distinctive legal effect, namely the final 
creation of the State, it is a legal act. From this point of view recognition is one of the 
constitutive elements of statehood.’523  
 
2.5.2.2. Declaratory theory  
 
The declaratory theory adopts the opposite approach and is more in accord with practical 
reality. It maintains that recognition of a new State is a political act, ‘which is, in principle 
independent of the existence of the new State as a subject of international law.’524 Shaw 
explained that under this view, recognition is merely an acceptance by States of an already 
existing situation.525 This approach is laid down in the first sentence of Art 3 of the 
Montevideo Convention 1933, 'The political existence of the State is independent of 
recognition by other States'.526 Thus, in the declaratist’s view, the formation of a new State is 
a matter of fact. Kreijen argued that, ‘recognition serves as the formal act of acknowledgment 
of a factual situation and thus is of a declaratory nature only.’527  
Under the declaratory theory, a State will be formed free from like prohibition on aggression, 
against the consents of the other States, just after meeting the international requirements.528 In 
this regard, Talmon argued that, ‘an entity becomes a State for the reason that it meets all the 
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international legal criteria for statehood and the recognising State’ merely establishes, 
confirms or provides evidence of the objective legal situation, that is, the existence of a 
State’.529  
Accordingly, a ‘State may exist without being recognised, and if it does exist, in fact, then 
whether or not it has been formally recognised by other States; it has a right to be treated by 
them as a State.530 Here, when recognition actually follows, other States merely recognise a 
pre-existing situation.531 According to this view, a new State will acquire capacity in 
international law not by virtue of the consent of others but by virtue of a particular factual 
situation, as well as, it will be legally constituted by its own circumstances and efforts and 
will not have to await the procedure of recognition by other States.532 Under this view, 
outside States can choose to recognise the new State, or not, but that decision does not 
influence the legal determination of statehood.533 Thus, ‘an entity that meets the criteria of 
statehood immediately enjoys all the rights and duties of a State regardless of the views of 
other States.’534  
In its first Opinion on 29 November 1991, the Badinter Commission, which was charged with 
the task of studying questions relating to the recognition of new States and State succession, 
which resulted from the dismemberment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY), expressed that:  
[The principles of public international law serve to define the conditions on which an entity constitutes a 
State; that is in this respect, the existence of the State is a question of fact; that the effect of recognition by 
other States are purely declaratory]. 535 
It is true that most writers support the declaratory theory under which the international 
personality of a State is determined by objective criteria of international law only.536 Thus, 
                                                          
529 Talmon, ‘The Constitutive versus the Declaratory Theory of Recognition: Tertium Non Datur?’ (n 489).  
530 Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law. The Emergence of New States in Post-Cold War 
Practice (n 365) 43.  
531 ibid.  
532 Shaw, International Law (n 119) 243.  
533  J Dunoff, S R Ratner and D Wippman, International Law Norms Actors Process (2nd  edn, Aspen Publisher 
2006) 138.  
534 ibid.  
535‘Opinion No I [Disintegration of the SFRY] (1991) 92 ILR 162, 164-165. Affirmed in Opinion No 8 
[Extinction of the SFRY] (1992) ILR 199,  201.  
536 Crawford stated that ‘[a]mong writers the declaratory doctrine, with differences in emphasis, is now 
predominant’, while ‘States do not in practice regard unrecognised States as exempt from international law’. 
See, Crawford states, The Creation of States in International Law (n 3) 23. See also, Brownlie, Principle of 
Public International Law (n 269) 90. On the other hand it is argued that ‘Only by being granted recognition is a 
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even if a State is not recognised, it will have international rights and duties opposable to the 
international community.537 Whether an entity is a State is then a matter of fact, not 
recognition.538  While on the other hand, for the constitutive theorist, an unrecognised State 
can have no rights or obligations in international law.539 Similarly, Crawford questioned, can 
States legitimately refuse to treat entities as States, which do in fact qualify?540 State practice 
has not accepted a right of recognition nor a duty to recognise. Recognition, being within the 
direction of every State, can therefore be withheld, for political or alleged legal reasons, from 
an entity, which qualifies as a State under general international law.541 For example, in the 
case of Rhodesia, Kosovo, Katanga, and East Timor, States looked for a new State having to 
obey some fundamental standards of the international community in order to obtain 
statehood.542 This is the consequences of the declaratory theory. As a result, Duursma pointed 
out, legitimate but non-recognised States will have more difficulties in being accepted as 
Member States of international organisations.543 As well as this, they cannot enter into 
diplomatic relations with the international community. These are practical, not legal 
effects.544   
In fact, since the recognition has a political side, in practice many States prefer a middle way 
between these two doctrines, in addition to classic qualifications to seek some basic 
requirements of international law for recognition.545 Hillgruber argued that, ‘legal personality 
under international law, which non-recognition was intended to prevent, would already have 
been acquired, and non-recognition would then in a sense be futile, without this flaw of non-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
new state fully admitted by an existing state into its circle of bilateral relations within the framework of 
international law; this is precisely what the existing state intends when granting recognition, and what it knows 
it is preventing when withholding recognition.’ See, Jennings and Watts (ed), Oppenheim, International Law (n 
362) 129-30.    
537 Duursma, Fragmentation and the International Relations of Microstates (n 373) 110-115.  
538 ibid. 
539 Shaw, International Law (n 119) 446. 
540 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (n 3) 100.  
541 Duursma, Fragmentation and the International Relations of Microstates (n 373) 115.  
542 For example: ‘The EU foreign ministers, concerned with the existence and mal-treatment of minorities within 
the former Soviet Union and the SFRY, announced that one of the criteria of recognition of new states within 
the EU would be the respect of human rights, as well as the protection of minority rights. See, ‘Declaration on 
the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, 31 ILM 1486 
(1992)’ (n 463).  (requiring ‘respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations … especially with 
regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights,’ and ‘guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national 
groups and minorities’ in order for a new state to be recognised).  
543 Duursma, Fragmentation and the International Relations of Microstates (n 373) 
544 ibid. 
545 Yamali, ‘What is meant by state recognition in international law’ (n 505). See also Shaw, International Law 
(n 119) 446.  
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recognition having any significant legal consequences under international law.’546 In this 
regard, despite the general perception of recognition as being declaratory, it is also possible to 
have constitutive elements, since international personality may depend on recognition.547 
Lauterpacht asked for an ‘external independence and effective government within a 
reasonably well-defined territory.’548 If these objective criteria were complied with, he 
believed that the international community would be under a duty to recognise the new 
State.549  Such a solution would be both constitutive and declaratory, ‘since it acknowledges a 
factual situation, meeting of the statehood criteria, and creates a new legal situation, awards 
statehood to the entity in question.’550 This proposal has been challenged for its 
‘contradictory nature, as well as for insufficient State practice proving that States accept such 
a duty to recognise entities fulfilling the statehood criteria.’551  
On the other hand, despite the considerable support for the declaratory theory in international 
law, the debate between the constitutive and declaratory theories continues, as international 
law does not have any mechanism for authoritatively determining whether an entity fulfils the 
factual criteria for statehood.552 The proponents of the constitutive theory have used this point 
to argue for the importance attached to recognition by existing States. Kelsen for instance, 
argued that ‘international law provides existing States the freedom to determine in each case 
separately whether an entity meets the necessary criteria for statehood.553 He noted that, 
‘recognition is a determination of facts: a determination of the existence of a sufficiently 
effective and independent authority (government) over a territory and a population’.554 
Hence, it would not be possible to speak of the existence of a State under international law, 
without such an approval. According to this view, the existence of a States is relative: an 
                                                          
546 It is only by recognition that the new state acquires the status of a sovereign state under international law in 
its relations with the third states recognising it as such. If it were to acquire this legal status before and 
independently of recognition by the existing states, this legal consequence under international law would occur 
automatically and could no longer be prevented by withholding recognition of the entity as a state. See,  C 
Hillgruber, ‘The Admission of New States to the International Community’ (1998) 9 Eur J Int’l L 491.  
547 Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law. The Emergence of New States in Post-Cold War 
Practice (n 365) 43.    
548 H Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (CUP, Cambridge 1948) 31.  
549 ibid 6.   
550 Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law. The Emergence of New States in Post-Cold War 
Practice (n 365) 43.  
551 Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (n 548) 12-24.  
552 Horbach, Lefeber and Ribbelink, Handbook in Inteenational Law  (n 332) 179.  
553 ibid. 
554 ibid. 
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entity is considered a State by some States (those who have recognised it) and not a State by 
other States (those who have not recognised it).555  
The question, which arises here, is what rights such a territorial entity is entitled to, and what 
is the status of such entity under international law? Is such entity entitled to any form of 
sovereignty?   
In general, an entity claiming to be a State cannot conduct international relations with other 
States, unless those other States are willing to enter into such relations with that entity.556 In 
other words, the conduct of international relations is a two-way street, involving the new 
‘State’ as well as outside actors that have to be willing to accept the new ‘State’ as their 
sovereign partner.557 In fact, no State can exist in a vacuum, a fact well established by 
international practice. For example, in 1965 when Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) 
decided to separate from Great Britain and form an independent State, most of the 
international community refused to recognise it as a State.558 Consequently, it remained 
isolated from the world and was unable to conduct international relations.559 The non-
recognition of Southern Rhodesia by outside actors prevented it from fully exercising the 
attributes of legal statehood.560  
Recognition thus, has a direct impact on the pragmatic determination of statehood, whether it 
is considered as a political or legal act, or whether an entity will be able to truly act as a State 
on the international scene. Cassese concluded that, ‘there have been cases in which it was 
doubtful that a new State had actually been created, or else a new entity had been set up but 
in grave breach of international rules.561 Rather, other States did not consider it to be 
independent of the State that had been instrumental in its establishment with the consequence 
                                                          
555 Zadeh, ‘International Law and the Criteria for Statehood’ (n 410). 
556 Arguing that ‘if states refuse to acknowledge that an entity meets these criteria… they might continue to treat 
the claimant as something less than a state’; thus, an unrecognised state may find that its passports are 
unacceptable to the immigration authorities of other states. See, Dunoff, Ranter, and Wippman,  International 
Law Norms Actors Process (n 533).  
557 Jennings and Watts (ed), Oppenheim’s International Law, (n 362)  133.  
558 The UN Security Council condemned the Southern Rhodesia declaration of independence and declared that it 
had no legal validity. See, ‘UNSC Res 217 (20 November 1965) UN S/RES/217’. 
559 Dunoff, Ratner, and Wippman, International Law Norms Actors Process (n 533) 138. (Noting that nearly all 
states refused to conclude treaties with Southern Rhodesia). 
560 In 1978, following a peace accord, which led to a majority government in Zimbabwe the situation, was 
resolved. See, ibid.  
561 He gave the examples of the case of Southern Rhodesia, from its UDI 1965, to when its internal political 
system accepted majority rule 1980. In addition, the case of Taiwan (Formosa) as it has all the hallmarks of a 
State. However, China’s claim that it is part of its territory and subject to its sovereignty prevents Taiwan from 
entertaining intercourse with all other states. See, A Cassese, International Law (2nd  edn, OUP 2005) 76.  
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that they withheld recognition’.562 Thus, the strong point of the supporter of the declaratory 
theory is that ‘the formation of a State, at least the acquisition of its basic rights and 
obligations, takes place independently of any legal act of recognition and justifies the 
conclusion that the birth of a State is a factual matter.’563     
Overall, it seems that scholars have advanced a third intermediary view on declaratory and 
constitutive recognition. The emerging picture rather suggests that recognition is of a 
composite nature, that it possesses both declaratory and constitutive aspects.564 Depending on 
certain circumstances of the particular case, ‘the one or the other aspect will appear in front 
of the footlights. In other words, while recognition is declaratory in principle, it may thus be 
of great importance in a particular case. For instance, in certain cases of decolonisation’565, 
‘recognition was granted despite the clear non-fulfilment of basic factual criteria, the criteria 
of effective government in particular, while as regards cases of State failure recognition 
continues without exception despite the loss of some of the essential hallmarks of statehood, 
for example, the capacity to enter into relations and effective government.’566   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
562 This last instance occurred with regard to the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’, proclaimed on 15 
November 1983 and recognised by Turkey only. The UN SC, the Commonwealth Heads of Government, and 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe considered the Declaration of independence ‘legally 
invalid’, required its ‘withdrawal’, and called upon all States ‘not to recognise any Cypriot State other than the 
Republic of Cyprus’. See, ‘UNSC Rec 541 (18 November 1983).’   
563 See for example the ‘Arab-Israeli conflict’ as cited by Brownlie, Principle of Public International Law (n 
359) 90.  
564 The writers supporting this theory ‘advance the argument that recognition is declaratory with regard to 
certain minimum rights of existence, but constitutive with regard to more specific rights.’ Proponents of this 
group include Guggenheim, Kunz, and Verdross. See, Kreijen, State Failure, Sovereignty, and Effectiveness: 
Legal Lessons from the Decolonization of Sub-Saharan Africa (Developments in International Law) (n 428) 17.  
565 See for example: Ruanda-Urundi and the Belgian Congo.   
566 See for instance: the case of Somalia. See, Kreijen, State Failure, Sovereignty, and Effectiveness: Legal 
Lessons from the Decolonization of Sub-Saharan Africa (Developments in International Law)  (n 428) 101. 
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2.5.4. The legal effects of recognition  
 
Although recognition may be regarded as a political act, it is also entails important 
consequences in the legal field.  In fact, where States grant recognition to an entity, it means 
that they will have relations subject to international law on a State-to-State basis.567  In 
practice, as claimed by the supporter of the declaratory theory, the political existence of a 
State is independent of recognition by other States, and thus even an unrecognised State has 
to act in compliance with the rules of international law.568 Shaw argued that, such an entity 
cannot ‘consider itself free from restraints as to aggressive behaviour, nor can its territory be 
regarded as terra nullius’.569 In addition, States, which have signed international agreements, 
are entitled to assume that, ‘States which have not recognised but which have signed the 
agreement are bound by that agreement’.570  
Moreover, Cassese argued that, it is legally relevant for it proves ‘the recognising States 
consider that in their view the entity fulfils all the factual conditions considered important for 
becoming an international subject’.571 Accordingly, the recognising States would respect the 
right of the new State, which was indicated in the 1949 International Law Commission Draft 
Declaration on Rights and Duties of States. For example, the ‘right to independence and 
hence to exercise freely, right to exercise jurisdiction over its territory and over all persons, 
right to equality in law with every other State, right of individual or collective self-defence 
against armed attack’.572 Thus, engaging in international relations is not the only result of 
recognition; the recognised State will be also able to enjoy usual legal consequences of 
recognition such as, immunities and privileges, within the domestic legal order. In this 
regard, Almqvist concluded that, recognition appears to be an essential condition for the new 
State to be able to exercise in an effective manner, the international rights and obligations that 
                                                          
567 Warbrick, 'States and Recognition in International Law’ in Malcolm D Evans (ed), International Law  (n 
340) 250.  
568 Shaw, International Law (n 119) 471.  
569 ibid. 
570 For example, the United Kingdom treated the German Democratic Republic as bound by its signature of the 
1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty even when the state was not recognised by the UK. See, ibid. thus, it  can be 
argued that, under the Vienna Convention only States may be party to treaties. See ‘Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, (23 May 1969) 1155 UNTS 331, Art 53’ (n 486).  
571 Cassese, International Law (n 561) 
572 UNGA 'Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States' (6 December 1949) A/RES/375. Link to 
‘Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States. 
UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970) UN Doc (A/8082) 1970’ (n 23).  
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correspond to the status of statehood, including entering into international relations with other 
States, and in this way becoming a full member of the international community.573  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
573 J Almqvist, ‘The Politics of Recognition, Kosovo and International Law’ (2009) 
<http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/59fc54004f018b9cbaacfe3170baead1/WP-
14_Almqvist_Kosovo_International_Law.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=59fc54004f018b9cbaacfe3170bae
ad1>accessed 13 May 2014.  
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2.6. Secession as a remedy for the violation of the right to self-
determination of peoples  
 
2.6.1. Secession 
 
The right of self-determination has been constructed as the right of peoples to determine their 
own destiny and form of government. For instance, ‘self-determination can be based on a 
people’s desire to be free of colonial rule. Self-determination may be exercised, inter alia, 
through the establishment of a sovereign independent State, by integration, or by association 
with another State.’574  
The right to external self-determination is an aspect that has been causing much controversy 
in legal theory. The right in its external manifestation was an important feature in the context 
of decolonisation, that is, self-determination in most cases realised through the formation of 
an independent State. Raic argued that, this manifestation of self-determination, ‘has led to 
statements that once independence was achieved by dependent territory, the right was 
consumed’. For instance, self-determination was regarded as a right which operated only 
under certain specific circumstances and therefore had an inherently temporary nature’.575 
Thus, McCorquodale argued that, external self-determination ‘was applied most frequently to 
colonial situations as it concerns the territory of the State, its division, enlargement or change 
and the State’s consequent international (external) relations with other States’.576  Hence, the 
creation of independent sovereign States by colonial people has been considered as an 
exercise of external self-determination. Conversely, self-determination outside the context of 
decolonisation has an internal nature that consists of a people’s right to freely pursue their 
economic, social, and cultural development, ideally through democratic governance.    
                                                          
574 Okoronkwo, ‘Self-Determination and the Legality of Biafra’s Secession under International Law’ (n 124). 
575 In 1967, in the context of the debates leading up to the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 2625 in 
1970, the representative of Burma stated: [t]he sum total of the experience gained by the United Nations in the 
implementation of the principle [of self-determination] had clearly and incontrovertibly established its meaning 
and its purpose, namely that it was relevant only to colonialism and was to be specifically applied in the 
promotion of the independence of peoples under colonial domination. See, ‘UN Doc. A/AC 125/SR 68, (4 
December 1967)’.  See also, Raic, Developments in International Law: Statehood and the Law of Self-
Determination (n 137) 226.  
576 McCorquodale, 'Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach’ (n 124) 863.  
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In fact, the emergence of a new State to the detriment of an older sovereign entity disrupts the 
composition of international society and challenges the very foundations of its main actors. 
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the creation of new States in the Americas, 
the idea of and consequently, the term ‘decolonisation did not exist.’577 Consequently, ‘the 
process of what was the first phenomenon of independence of colonies from their European 
metropolises took the form of secession.’578 In other words, no new States were created 
because of the existence of any right to independence under international law. Kohen argued, 
their existence ‘came into being as a matter of fact and recognition by the other members of 
more limited community of States of the time.’579 However, during the UN era, this approach 
has drastically been changed. During the second half of the twentieth century, 
‘decolonisation, the most important means of creating new States, was not viewed by the 
international legal order as a case of secession.’ One of the reasons for this was summarised 
in the Declaration of Principles of International Law embodied in UNGA Resolution 2625 
(XXV): 'the territory of the colony or other non-self-governing territory has, under the 
Charter, a status separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering it.’580 
Moreover, another reason lies in the emergence of the principles of self-determination as a 
right of all peoples. For the first time in history, ‘international law continued a rule granting a 
right to some communities, those that qualified as 'peoples' to create their own independent 
States. However, despite this completely new phenomenon, secession remained, actually or 
potentially, as another important way to create States in the contemporary world.’581   
Secession under international law refers to ‘separation of a portion of an existing State, 
whereby the separating entity seeks either to become a new State or to join yet another State, 
and whereby the original State remains in existence without the breaking off territory.’582 
Historically, successful secessions around the world have been rare, because secession seems 
inherently at odds with the principles of State sovereignty and territorial integrity, which have 
been core values of international law for centuries.583  This is without prejudice to any 
different legal consequences, which might arise from State secession. It has been seen in the 
                                                          
577 M Kohen, Introduction to Secession: International Law Perspectives (CUP 2006) 1. 
578 ibid.  
579 ibid.  
580 ‘UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970) UN Doc (A/8082) 1970’ (n 23).  
581 Kohen, Introduction to Secession: International Law Perspectives (n 577) 1-2.  
582  Dunoff, Ranter, and Wippman, International Law Norms Actors Process (n 533) 122.  
583 Describing the few successful secessions in international law, which include the secession of Bangladesh 
from Pakistan in 1971, of Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1993, and of the three Baltic States from the former Soviet 
Union in 1990.  See,  ibid. Also Scharf, ‘Earned Sovereignty: Juridical Underpinnings’ (n 217).  
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preceding section that, positions of States have varied. Some accepted the right of secession 
of minorities that is a distinct people or fraction of a people in a State, while others have been 
denied. The only textual reference to a justification of the partial or total disruption of the 
territorial integrity of an existing State can be found in paragraph 7 of the principle of self-
determination of General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV). ‘The full right of self-
determination takes precedence if the government does not represent ‘the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.’584 In fact, Paragraph 
7 is one of the most important provisions of the Declaration because it makes ‘a bold attempt 
to reconcile the conflict between the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity 
of States’.585 The Paragraph has been generally described as a ‘safeguard clause’.586 
However, Simpson argued that ‘paragraph 7 made the principle of territorial integrity ‘a 
rebuttable presumption that can only be invoked by States that act in accordance with the 
principle of self-determination’.587 Thus, Nanda argued that, ‘The logical reading of the 
Declaration is that a State must possess a government representing the whole people for it to 
be entitled to the protection of its territorial integrity against secession’.588 Moreover, ‘the 
Declaration does not provide authorisation to infringe the territory of a State, which in 
particular has a government reflecting the entire population of the territory. Thus, no 
secession claim can be derived from this clause, even in the event of the most severe human 
rights violations.’589  
In fact, the international community has viewed secession unfavourably, it being contrary to 
the territorial integrity of sovereign States. Some scholars have argued that ‘territorial 
integrity’ merely safeguards the inviolability of international borders but does not regulate an 
internal affair such as secession. While others claim that territorial integrity prohibits 
                                                          
584 ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among 
States. UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970) UN Doc (A/8082) 1970’ (n 23 ). 
585 Okoronkwo, ‘Self-Determination and the Legality of Biafra’s Secession under International Law’ (n 124). 
586 See, J Crawford, ‘State Practice and International Law in Relation to Unilateral Secession (85 BYIL 1998) 
113. 
587 Simpson, ‘The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age’ (n 249). 
588 V P Nada, ‘Revisiting Self-Determination as an International Law Concept: A Major Challenge in the Post-
Cold War Era’ (1997) 3 J Int’l & Comp L 443. 
589 Krüger argued that ‘this also applies in the event of political discriminations. A different result could only be 
arrived at by an argumentum e contrario, which is not covered by the purposes of the Declaration however. A 
secession claim for minorities who feel politically marginalised would represent a considerable factor of 
instability and uncertainty for numerous States and regions worldwide. See, H Krüger, The Nagorno-Karabakh 
Conflict: A Legal Analysis (Springer 2010) 84.    
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secession because secession dismembers the territory of the State.590 However, it cannot be 
said that secession is illegal per se. In essence, international law justified secession as a 
remedy of last resort for persistent and serious injustices. For instance, the ICJ found that 
Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence was not in violation of international law.591 The Court 
noted that ‘there is no applicable rule of international law under which such declarations can 
be disallowed. The Court did not say that Kosovo had a right to secede from Serbia. Further, 
the Court did not rule on the legal consequences of this Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence UDI. It explicitly refused to say whether or not Kosovo has the status of a 
State, and did not tell States, whether they should recognise Kosovo as a State’.592 While 
some of the UNSC, resolutions have declared certain acts of secession illegal;593 the act of 
secession itself is not regulated by any international legal rules. Thus, the absence of an 
international rule prohibiting secession does not create a positive right to secession, which 
would oblige citizens or States to recognise it or conform to it. In other words, there is no 
conclusive body of legal principles or State practice to clarify application of the right 
secession, which remains acutely controversial. Crawford demonstrated that ‘this is partly 
due to the dilemma that this would cause indeed, it is difficult to imagine how a seceding 
entity could manage to act contrary to international law while not being considered an 
international legal subject’.594 A frequent question is under what circumstances a minority 
group seeking to separate from its mother State has the legal right to do so.   
For a group to be entitled to exercise its collective right to self-determination, it must qualify 
as a ‘people’.595 In other words, groups with a common identity and link to a defined territory 
are allowed to determine their political future in a democratic fashion. Hence, once the 
determination has been made that a specific group qualifies as a people and thus has the right 
to self-determination, the relevant inquiry, for the purposes of secession, becomes whether 
the right to self-determination carries with it a right of secession or to create independence. In 
                                                          
590 S Dion, ‘Secession and the virtues of clarity’ [2011] Macdonald-Laurier Institute for Public Policy 1–12 
<http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/files/pdf/Secession_and_the_Virtues_of_Clarity.pdf>accessed 23 September 
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591 D Akande, ‘ICJ finds that Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence not in Violation of International Law’, 
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592 ibid. 
593 See for example, ‘UNSC Res 169 (24 November 1961) UN Doc [S/ 5002] 1961.’And  ‘UNSC Res 216 (12 
November 1965) UN Doc [1258] 1965.’   
594 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (n 3) 389.  
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other words, as mentioned above, the right to self-determination can take different forms, 
such as self-government, autonomy, or free association, that are less intrusive on state 
sovereignty than secession is.  
Above all, it can be concluded that, the principle of self-determination lends itself to 
restrictive or expansive interpretations. ‘Some argue that self-determination only allows for 
the creation of new States in the context of decolonisation’. Many others assert that, the right 
to self-determination legally entitles peoples subject to extreme persecution to remedy their 
situation through secession.596 While most scholars agree that, the definition of the ‘People’ 
with collective rights to self-determination is unclear.597 Here, to say under international law 
every ‘people’ is entitled to self-determination leaves unanswered two problems still very 
much in flux, namely, what is a ‘people’ and what does ‘self-determination’ mean? Secession 
according to the idea of a remedial right was argued by Buchheit to mean that it ‘assumes that 
international law provides a right to secession for people subject to extreme persecution or 
unable to internally realise their right to self-determination.’598 This theory Roethke argued, 
postulates that if a groups falls victim to ‘serious breaches of fundamental human and civil 
rights’ through the ‘abuse of power,’ then international law recognises the right of the 
afflicted group to secede from the offending State’.599 In some cases however, Buchanan 
argued that, ‘the grosser injustices are perpetrated, not against the citizenry at large, but 
against a particular group, concentrated in a region of the State’. Consider, for example, Iraq's 
genocide policies against Kurds in northern Iraq. Secession may be justified, and may be 
feasible, as a response to selective tyranny, when revolution is not a practical prospect.600   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
596 See for example, Franck, ‘Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession'  (n 159) 13.    
597 Murswiek, 'The Issue of a Right to Secession - Reconsidered (161) 101-114. See also, ‘Reference re 
Secession of Quebec' (n 21).  
598 Buchheit, Secession, The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (n 29) 220-23.  
599 P Roethke, ‘The Right to Secede Under International Law: The Case of Somaliland”  [2011] Fall J Int’l 
Service 36.  
600 A Buchanan, ‘Theories of Secession’ (1997) 26 Philosophy & Public Affairs 31. 
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2.6.2. The aversion of States and the international community to secession 
2.6.2.1. Secession in international law   
 
Under international law,601 any attempt at unilateral secession, that is, secession with no 
agreement negotiated with the mother State, is without legal foundation.602 International law 
views secession with doubt, and traditionally, the right to independence or secession as a 
mode of self-determination has only applied to people under colonial domination or some 
kind of oppression.603 However, international law has come recently to embrace the right of 
non-colonial people to secede from an existing State, ‘when the group is collectively denied 
civil and political rights and subject to egregious abuses’.604  
This right has become known as the ‘remedial right to secession’, and has its origin in the 
infamous 1920 ‘Aaland Islands Case’. The League of Nations appointed The Committee of 
Rapporteurs to investigate aspects of the dispute over the Aland Islands and stated ‘that the 
separation of a minority from the State of which it forms a part and its incorporation in 
another State can only be considered as an altogether exceptional situation, a last resort when 
the State lacks either the will or the power to enact and apply just and effective 
guarantees’.605 Similarly, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations strikes a balance between the right to self-determination and territorial 
integrity by preconditioning the right of non-colonial people to separate from an existing 
State on the denial of the right to a democratic self-government by the mother-State.606 A 
                                                          
601 Buchanan has divided secession into ‘unilateral and consensual secession that ‘the unilateral right is the right 
of a group to attempt to form its own independent territorial political unit and seek recognition as a legitimate 
state in a portion of the territory of an existing state absent consent or constitutional authorization; the 
consensual right to secede is generated by a process of negotiation or exercised in accordance with 
constitutional processes. See, A Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for 
International Law (OUP 2004) 338.  
602 Dion, ‘Secession and the virtues of clarity’ (n 590).  
603  (Noting that secession is “synonymous with the dismemberment of sates). See, Scharf, ‘Earned Sovereignty: 
Juridical Underpinnings’ (n 217).  
604 ibid. 
605 Once again returning to the Aaland Islands Case, the International Committee of Rapporteurs quite neatly 
summarised the view of secession at the beginning of the 20th century in the following statement: ‘To concede 
to minorities, either of language or religion, or to any fractions of a population the right of withdrawing from the 
community to which they belong, because it is their wish or their good pleasure, would be to destroy order and 
stability within States and to inaugurate anarchy in international life; it would be to uphold a theory 
incompatible with the very idea of a State as a territorial and political unity’. Aland Island Case, ‘League of 
Nations Official Journal Spec Supp 3, 3’ (n 169).  
606 [Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which 
would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity of political unity of sovereign and 
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
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similar clause was inserted in the 1993 Vienna Declaration of the World Conference on 
Human Rights, accepted by all UN member States.607 Moreover, other UN bodies have also 
referred to the right to remedial secession, such as the 1993 Report of the Rapporteur to the 
UN Sub-Commission against the Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities608 and the 
General Recommendation XXI adopted in 1996 by the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination.609  
In addition, in the case of Quebec the Supreme Court of Canada like the League of Nations, 
held that a people ‘has a right to internal self-determination first, and that only if that right is 
not respected by the mother-State, the same people’s right to break off may accrue.’610 In 
other words, ‘the right to separate is conditioned on the non-respect of the right to some form 
of provincial autonomy.’611  It held that  ‘a right to external self-determination (which in this 
case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only 
the most extreme cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances.’612 In addition, 
recent developments in international law may also lend credence to the idea that the right to 
remedial secession has crystallised as a norm. For instance, Scharf argued that ‘in the case of 
the former Yugoslavia, the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Macedonia were entitled to secede because they had been denied the proper exercise of their 
right to democratic self-government, and, in some cases, had been subjected to ethnic 
violence by the central government in Belgrade’.613 Moreover, in 2010, the ICJ declared in an 
advisory opinion that in the unilateral declaration of independence, Kosovo did not violate 
international law. The Court noted that there is no applicable rule in international law under 
which such declarations can be disallowed.614 The Court explicitly refused to say ‘whether or 
not Kosovo has the status of a State, and did not tell States, whether they should recognise 
Kosovo as a State’. In this regard, the absence of an international rule prohibiting secession 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour].  'UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) (24 October 
1970) UN Doc (A/8082) 1970’ (n 23).  
607 ‘Vienna Declaration, World Conference on Human Rights  [1993] UN Doc A/CONF 157/24 1993' 
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/l1viedec.html>accessed 29 March, 2013  (n 91).   
608 ‘UN Doc. E/CN 4/Sub 2/1993/34’ (1993). 
609 ‘Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 48th session, UN Doc. A/51/18’, 
February 1996.  
610 ‘Reference re Secession of Quebec’ (n 21) para 122. 
611 Noting that when ‘the ability of a people to exercise its right to self-determination internally is somehow 
being totally frustrated,’ only then does the right to external self-determination accrue). See,  ibid. 
612 ibid. 
613 Scharf, ‘Earned Sovereignty: Juridical Underpinnings’ (n 217).  
614 Akande, ‘ICJ finds that Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence not in Violation of International Law’ (n 
591).  
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does not create a positive right to secession, which would oblige citizens or States to 
recognise it or conform to it.615 
Thus, it is suggested that if a government is at the high end of the scale of a representative 
government, the only modes of self-determination that will be given international backing are 
those with a minimal destabilising effect and achieved by consent of all parties.  On the other 
hand, if a government is extremely unrepresentative and abusive, then much more potentially 
destabilising modes of self-government, including independence, may be recognised as 
legitimate. In the latter case, Scharf argued that ‘the secessionist group would be fully entitled 
to seek and receive external aid, and third-party States and organisations would have no duty 
to refrain from providing support’.616 
Finally, the Supreme Court of Canada observed that ‘despite there is no right, under the 
constitution or at international law, to unilateral secession, this does not rule out the 
possibility of an unconstitutional Declaration of Independence leading to a de facto secession. 
This ultimate success of such secession would be dependent on [Recognition] by the 
international community, which is likely to consider the legality and legitimacy of 
secession’.617 On the other hand, neither the ‘Political Covenant’ nor any other international 
law requires the members of the international community to deny recognition to a successful 
secession. In this regards the Permanent Court of International Justice PCIJ in the Lotus case 
held that ‘an entity may exercise its right to independence, on any matter, even if there is no 
specific rule of international law permitting it to do so. In these instances, an entity has a 
wide measure of discretion, which is only limited by the prohibitive rules of international 
law’.618 
Moreover, it should be made by explaining, why in some cases unlawful territorial situations 
become legalised, whereas in others they do not. In other words, if there are no rules in 
international law prohibiting the act of unilateral secession, how can it be said whether it is 
lawful or unlawful?   
                                                          
615 Dion, ‘Secession and the virtues of clarity’ (n 590).  
616 Scharf, ‘Earned Sovereignty: Juridical Underpinnings’ (n 217). 
617 ‘Reference re Secession of Quebec’ (n 21) para 155. 
618 ‘S.S. Lotus' (France v Turkey) [7 September1927] PCIJ (ser. A) No 10. 
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In this regard, the Supreme Court of Canada held that ‘the right to secede and the possibility 
that a certain secession, once factually established, creates legal effects at international level 
were two different matters from a legal point of view.’ 
[The legalisation of the effective situation would not change the violating nature of the unilateral 
secession. However, the concept of legitimacy would present the link between those two gaps between 
violation and legality. If the purported secession of Quebec was declared in defiance of the Canadian 
Constitutional principles, democratic principles, federal principle, rule of law, and the fundamental 
principles of the international community, respect Human rights, peaceful settlement of the 
disputes...etc...’  The process would most likely be seen as illegitimate and gain only limited if any 
recognition in the international community].
619 
Hence, the role of effectiveness Milano argued is ‘enhanced by the legitimacy of the claim 
and the legitimacy of the process through which a claim is articulated’.620 In fact, ‘legitimacy 
is not a concept foreign to the law, but it builds on the basic legal principle of a certain 
community, be it national or international.’621  
The Supreme Court goes so far as to state that: ‘One of the legal norms which may be 
recognised by States in granting or withholding recognition of emergent States is the 
[legitimacy] by which the de facto secession is, or was, being pursued’.622  
Similarly, Buchheit623 explained the recognition and non-recognition of attempted secessions 
through the lenses of legitimacy. He defined legitimacy through two criteria: the internal 
merit of the claim and the disruption factor. The first refers to ‘criteria of effectiveness of the 
self-determination unit, such as the ethnic and social cohesiveness, the occupation of a 
distinct territorial basis and the economic viability of a future State.’624 Whereas the second 
refers to ‘the potential threat of the secession for regional and international peace and 
security, and its compliance with fundamental international norms, such as, fundamental 
human rights and respect for the existence of minorities in the self-governing unit’.625 Thus, it 
seems Buchheit envisaged legitimacy built within an international legal framework as being 
[pre-conditional] to the legalisation of an effective secession. 
                                                          
619 ‘Reference re Secession of Quebec’ (n 21) 143 and 144. 
620 E Milano, Unlawful Territorial Situations in International Law (Reconciling Effectiveness, Legality and 
Legitimacy) (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston 2006) 194.  
621 ibid. 
622 ‘Reference re Secession of Quebec’ (n 21) para 143. 
623 Buchheit, Secession, The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (n 29) 228-238.  
624 ibid. 
625 ibid. 
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2.6.2.2. Secession and national law  
 
In terms of national law, many States confirm their indivisibility in their constitution or their 
jurisprudence.626 For example, United States, France, Spain, Italy, Australia, and Sweden, 
consider themselves inseparable entities. It is understood that, the rules governing secession 
from an existing State do not fall under the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of that State.627  
It is not up to one State to decide whether to reject the secession of a part of its territory, for 
such a decision involves the balancing between the right of self-determination and the respect 
for territorial integrity, which should therefore be decided on the basis of international law. 
International law determines whether a people has the right to self-determination and decides 
whether the territorial integrity of a state deserves protection.628 If the decision were left to 
the discretion of individual States, it would result in the denial of the international charter of 
the competing rules in questions.629 In 1991, the Security Council considered the Yugoslavian 
secession dispute as an internal issue. It is a lack of clarity of international law, Dahlitz 
argued that, in a matter of secession, which, unjustly, leads to the qualification of the dispute 
as internal.630 The right of secession has been incorporated in some national constitutions, 
which, in all cases, did not require justificative reasons.631 However, these clauses were 
frequently deleted from the constitution. Under Soviet law, secession was possible without 
justification, providing that certain procedural rules were respected.632   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
626 Dion, ‘Secession and the virtues of clarity’ (n 590). 
627  Dahlitz, Secession and International Law: Conflict Avoiding-Regional Appraisals (n 14) 89.  
628 Duursma, Fragmentation and the International Relations of Microstates (n 373). 
629 See for example; when the Yugoslavia delegation requested the Security Council of the United Nations to 
impose an arm embargo against it, the members of the Security Council generally considered the Yugoslavian 
dispute an internal affair. ‘UNSC Res 713 (25 September 1991) UN Doc S/23069 1991.   
630 Dahlitz, Secession and International Law: Conflict Avoiding-Regional Appraisals (n 14) 90.  
631 ibid. 
632 ibid. 
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2.6.2.3. Secession and State practice 
 
It has been argued in the preceding section that secession is a concept that has no relevance to 
decolonisation. In other words, the concept is irrelevant to the on-going entitlement of 
peoples to self-determination in the post-colonial era. Alternatively, Koskenniemi argued that 
‘secession was compliance, and opposing rupture of old colonial State was unlawful.633 He 
further added that ‘Article 19 (3)(b) of the International Law Commission's draft articles on 
State Responsibility even spoke of this as jus cogens’.634 However, confusion arises when it 
has been stated that minorities are entitled to self-determination, and that may mean a right to 
secede. However, the point of departure is incorrect. ‘This is also the clear implication from 
the Second Opinion of the Badinter Commission’.635  
Furthermore, Crawford argued that ‘the wealth of State practice in the context of 
decolonisation demonstrating that the exercise of self-determination has in practice nearly 
always taken place through agreement with the parent State’.636 Foster argued that ‘self-
determination has been in the first instance a right to which the colonial authority must give 
effect’.637 The UN has supported unilateral secession only if the colonial authority has stood 
in the way of self-determination.  
In fact, State practice is extremely reluctant to recognise unilateral secession outside the 
colonial context. After World War II, no State created by unilateral secession has been 
admitted to the UN against the declared will of the government of the Predecessor State.638  
According to State practice, two situations of secession should be distinguished: first, if the 
secession has been realised after an amicable agreement between the secessional and 
remaining parties, the international community has always endorsed this situation.639 The 
separation of the Slovak and Czech Republic in 1993 has been conducted on friendly terms 
                                                          
633 M Koskenniemi, ‘National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice’ (1994) 43 
ICLQ 241. 
634 ibid. 
635 Pellet, 'The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee', Opinion No 2 (n 186).  
636 Crawford, 'State Practice and International Law in Relation to Unilateral Secession', (n 586).   
637 C Foster, ‘Articulating Self-Determination in the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ 
(2001) 12 EJIL 141. 
638 Dion, ‘Secession and the virtues of clarity’ (n 590).  
639 Such secession based on mutual accord was a accomplished by Senegal, which left the Mali Federation in 
1960, by Singapore, which seceded from the Malaysian Federation in 1965, and by Syria, which separated from 
the United Arab Republic in 1961. See,  Buchheit, Secession, The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (n 29) 89-
99.  
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and based on a mutual agreement.640 On the other hand, if the authorities of the central State 
oppose the secession of a part of the territory or the total disruption of its territorial integrity, 
the reactions of the other States have a great influence on the solution of the problem.641  
In like manner, it should be observed that, the serious denial of a people’s fundamental 
human rights does not as such legitimate secession automatically. In this regard, the Supreme 
Court of Canada held that (when a people is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right 
to self-determination internally, it is entitled, as a last resort, to exercise it by secession).642  
However, the Canadian Supreme Court declined to answer the issue of under what 
circumstances such a right to secession accrues, as it determined that the population of 
Quebec is entitled to meaningful internal self-determination and thus not in a position to 
claim the right to external self-determination’.643 However morally acceptable, it has not been 
proved a customary rule in international law by a consistent State practice. The denial of 
group’s basic human rights has been invoked in a number of cases. For instance, the massacre 
and the systematic riot of Ibos living in Nigeria can be mentioned. In 1967, the people of 
Biafra have tried to secede from the Federation of Nigeria and established the Republic of 
Biafra.644 On May 30, 1967, Biafra unilaterally declared its independence from the Eastern 
region of Nigeria. The declaration came after a series of complicated political upheavals that 
led to the death of many Biafrans. A series of massacres, oppression, injustice and the 
expulsion of East Nigerian from regions other than East Nigeria catalysed this movement. 
The justification for the extreme step of secession Okoronkwo argued ‘rests both on the 
denial of human rights and the dim prospects for the Biafrans' future development’.645 In 
other words, the gross violations of the Biafrans' human rights provide a legal justification for 
Biafra's secession from the Nigerian government. As observed by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in, ‘the right of self-determination has developed largely as [a] human right’.646  
Therefore, ‘violations of self-determination are violations of human rights’.647  
                                                          
640 Dahlitz, Secession and International Law: Conflict Avoiding-Regional Appraisals (n 14) 91.  
641 ibid. 
642 ‘Reference re Secession of Quebec’ (n 21) para 126.   
643 See,  Dunoff, Ratner, and Wippman, International Law Norms Actors Process (n 533) 222. 
644 ‘Proclamation of the Republic of Biafra (1967)’ <www.worldstatesmen.org/Biafra.doc>accessed 31 March 
2013.  
645 Okoronkwo, ‘Self-Determination and the Legality of Biafra’s Secession under International Law’ (n 124). 
646 ‘Reference re Secession of Quebec’ (n 21) paras 113-122. 
647 See, Thornberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities (n 275) 883.  
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However, Biafra's attempt to secede from Nigeria did not receive international recognition; as 
a result, the Nigerian army forcefully regained power in 1970. The situation was not 
discussed by the UN, which termed the situation an internal affair under Nigerian 
responsibility. In this secession, many political and economic interests were at stake.648 It is 
true that, Biafra was undermined in its efforts, which did not render secession illegal under 
international law. ‘It demonstrates the extent to which the self-interests of the superpower 
nations could undermine a peoples' genuine attempt to exercise their right of self-
determination through secession’.649 Both the UN and the OAU willingly played as pawns on 
behalf of the interests of the superpowers.  
 In addition, we might examine the proclamation of an independent Republic of Nagorno 
Karabakh, which was confirmed by referendum and formalised in 1992 by a newly elected 
parliament. The underlying reason for this secession was the long-standing resentment in the 
Armenian community of Nagorno Karabakh against serious limitations of its cultural and 
religious freedom by central Soviet and Azerbaijani authorities. However, its statehood has 
only been recognised by Armenia. Azerbaijan’s National Assembly cancelled the autonomy 
of the Nagorno Karabakh region, placing it under its direct control, and regarded the situation 
as one of territorial integrity coming under its internal affairs.650 These examples show that 
secession will not automatically be recognised in the absence of an accord even if a group’s 
human rights are seriously violated.   
As explained above that ‘the existence of this right is highly questionable, due to the 
international community’s continued and consistent support for the principle of territorial 
integrity. In addition, even if a legal source to a remedial right to secession could be found 
under certain extreme circumstances, as in the case of Kosovo, doubt remains as to whom the 
recipients of this right would be. Should this right be granted to the Kosovar Albanians 
exclusively? This problem becomes even more complex  in the case of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, due to the absence of caucuses representative of the entire population of these 
territories-including the ethnic Georgians displaced by the military conflict. In addition, it is 
questionable whether both Abkhazia and South Ossetia have fulfilled the de fact Montevideo 
criteria; they are in fact dominated by Russia and then cannot be considered sovereign 
                                                          
648 Dahlitz, Secession and International Law: Conflict Avoiding-Regional Appraisals (n 14) 93.  
649 Okoronkwo, ‘Self-Determination and the Legality of Biafra’s Secession under International Law’ (n 124).  
650 Dahlitz, Secession and International Law: Conflict Avoiding-Regional Appraisals (n 14) 94.  
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subjects of international law.651 In other words, Russia is their Patron State, with both entities 
highly dependent politically and economically on Russia. Thus, how can State sovereignty be 
recognised when one of its primary components, independence is arguably missing?  
Moreover, Raič defined Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s attempts at secession, ‘absent 
fulfilment of the qualifying criteria as an abuse of right and violation of the law of self-
determination’.652 In his view, this is why the international community has not generally 
recognised these two fledgling States. On the other hand, Fabry argued that, it is contrary to 
international law liberal thought to force groups, who have shown that they do not wish to co-
exist, to do so’. For that reason, he proposed that ‘a shift in international practice towards the 
recognition of de fact independent entities, claiming their sovereignty on grounds of self-
determination, would be beneficial to the international community’.653 Thus, if Kosovo, 
Abkhazia, or South Ossetia is to be considered, external self-determination on grounds of 
ethnic oppression and non-viability of co-existing, similar attention must be given to the 
Kurds in northern Iraq, the Tibetans, Kashmiri, and the Chechens. International law must not 
treat similar cases differently. The reasons why international law, national law, and State 
practice have such reservations toward secession are firstly, the States are concerned that 
their own territorial integrity may not be challenged. The second reason is the constant 
concern for international law stability.654 What remains doubtful however; is why 
international law and State practice have only recognised a right to secession in situations of 
colonisation and grave breaches of human rights.  
The reason is the territorial integrity of the State has always taken precedence over a potential 
right to self-determination of that State’s national minorities, in order to ensure the stability 
of the international community. Remedial secession on the other hand, may be allowed in 
extraordinary circumstances, when the internal self-determination of a minority is utterly 
                                                          
651 M Fabry, Recognizing States (OUP, USA 2010) 180.  
652  Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (n 254) 450.  
653 Fabry, Recognizing States (n 651) 223.  
654 Separatist movements are potential factors of disorder. If the international community is so clearly opposed 
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each claiming a collective identity for itself in the world, and because the creation of each new State would risk 
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frustrated. Thus, in the period since 1945, a part from Bangladesh655, only Eritrea and now 
Kosovo and South Sudan have successfully claimed independence from a formerly 
recognised sovereign following secessionist conflict, and received significant international 
recognition.   
In extreme circumstances where States refuse to treat a group of citizens equally, and violate 
their rights to internal self-determination, it is argued that, these peoples have the right to 
determine their destiny. In other words, groups can qualify as a ‘people’ and obtain the right 
of self-determination if the groups experiences: (1) external or internal domination;656 (2) 
oppression;657 (3) serious or grave human rights violations658; (4) foreign or alien 
subjugation659; (5) great repression660;  (6) or denial of representation and participation in the 
government of the State.661  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
655 Note that ‘the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan, a State established through the process of 
decolonisation, constituted a breach of Pakistan’s territorial integrity and of the principle uti possidetis 
juris.’see, Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (n 3) 393.  
656 See, ‘Declaration on Friendly Relations' (n 23). 
657 ‘Reference re Secession of Quebec’ (n 21) paras 122 and 126. 
658 Consider for example the case of Bangladesh and Kosovo, see, ‘Declaration on Friendly Relations’ (n 23). 
659 ibid. 
660 ibid. 
661 See, ibid. See also, ‘Vienna Declaration, and Programme of Action [1993]’ (n 93). And ‘Reference re 
Secession of Quebec’ (n 21) para 136 and 154. 
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2.7. Conclusion  
 
It was demonstrated that the right of self-determination could be considered the political and 
legal processes through which a people gain and maintain control over their economy, 
culture, and society. With the foundation of the UN, self-determination of peoples became an 
established principle of international law. The right has been conceived as a tool for the 
preservation of peace and promotion of human rights. However, the concept has been 
characterised as disruptive because of the principle's mismanagement. Different international 
instruments and State practice demonstrate that, under some proper conditions, international 
law recognises secession and legitimates it as a mode of exercising the right to self-
determination.  
In addition, it was explained that there is no international legal definition of ‘peoples’, who 
are entitled to the right of self-determination. The term has been used to describe a population 
who shares the following characteristics: (1) a common historical tradition; (2) self-identity 
as a distinctive cultural group; (3) a shared language; (4) a shared religion; and (5) a 
traditional territorial connection. The right can also be applied also for a people, which are 
not only deprived of its human rights, but also living under a non-representative or 
undemocratic government. They base themselves on paragraph 7 of General Assembly 
Resolution 2625 (XXV) on Friendly Relations among States. Rather, a several denial of the 
group’s human rights is usually required, which means domination, subjugation and 
exploitation or the violation of human rights identity. Moreover, in case of secession, it was 
suggested that, the people do not have any alternative in order to preserve its values and that 
the interests of secession override the interests of the dominant State. However, whatever the 
definition, minorities do not appear to have the right to self-determination in the form of 
secession.  
Moreover, it was explained in this chapter that once States have obtained statehood, it is 
difficult to lose it, even in the absence of the traditional criteria. Statehood criteria only apply 
to newly created States and not existing ones.662 Accordingly, the traditional criteria are 
                                                          
662 Somalia is a clear example, ‘which continues to be a state and retains its UN memberships, although its 
government does not exercise effective control over its territory’. See A Aust, Handbook of International Law,  
(2nd edn, CUP 2010) 16. Also, R McCorquodale, ‘The Creation and Recognition of States’ in R Piotrowicz and 
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criticised for being essentially based on the principle of effectiveness,663 as international law 
in the nineteenth century was ready to recognise statehood to any entity fulfilling the 
traditional criteria and showing sufficient strength of its existence. However, in essence, in 
contemporary international law, effectiveness is no longer the only principle governing the 
law of statehood, but there are some additional criteria also considered. They set legality-
based standards for entities wishing to become States and thus look beyond mere 
effectiveness as adhered to by the traditional criteria. Nevertheless, this does not mean that 
traditional criteria are no longer important, but rather that the additional set of criteria may 
prevent effective entities from acquiring statehood.  
It was further argued that, recognition doesn’t mean only that the recognised entity has met 
the required qualifications, but also that the recognising State will enter into relations with the 
recognised State and let that State enjoy the usual legal consequences of recognition such as 
privileges and immunities within the domestic legal order. It has been suggested also that in 
certain circumstances recognition may have constitutive effects. However, it has been 
claimed that the decision to recognise or not generally depends on political views rather than 
legal grounds. In this regard, most writers support the declaratory theory under which the 
international personality of a State is determined by the objective criteria of international law 
only. Thus, even if a State is not recognised, it will have international rights and duties 
opposable to the international community. 
Additionally, it was argued that in international law, any attempt at unilateral secession with 
no agreement with the existing State, is without legal foundation. On the other hand, 
international law does not prohibit unilateral secession; international instruments contain 
neither explicit prohibiting nor explicit recognition of such a right. Secession in this regard 
may simply mean that secession lies in an international law-free zone. Moreover, the ICJ did 
not express the opinion that there is no permission of secession or no legal entitlement to 
secession in international (customary) law. Different from secession, a right (entitlement) to 
secession is a legal category that could be an object of (international) law and thus the 
question of legality of secession could be posed. Similarly, the right to unilateral secession 
could be justified in certain circumstances. If ‘the people in question have suffered grievous 
wrongs at the hand of the parent State from which it wishes to secede, consisting of either a 
serious violation or denial of the right of internal self-determination and serious violations of 
                                                          
663 See, Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (n 3) 97.  
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the fundamental human rights of the people concerned. In addition, there must be no (further) 
realistic and effective remedies for the peaceful settlement of the conflict. 
In addition to this discussion, it was argued that outside the colonial context, State practice is 
extremely reluctant to recognise unilateral secession. No state created by unilateral secession 
has been admitted to the UN without the consent of its parent State. At the same time, there is 
no material customary rule of international law, which can decide the balance process 
between the right of self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity of a State. 
Moreover, in extreme circumstances when a people are blocked from the meaningful exercise 
of its right to self-determination, the right to secession should be recognised. This means, a 
multinational States must respect secessionist demands, if they are truly clear and within the 
framework of legality. Finally, Buchannan divides all right to secession theories in two 
groups: Remedial Right Only and Primary Right theories. These issues will be further 
considered in the next chapter while discussion theories of secession.     
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Chapter Three: Theories of Secession and the Evolution of the Theory of 
Remedial Earned Sovereignty as a Remedial Approach to the External 
Right of Self-Determination 
 
3.1. Introduction   
 
In accordance with the right of self-determination, all peoples have the right to decide freely 
and without external political influence on their political status and to structure their 
economic, social, and cultural development.664 It is thus unquestionable that ‘peoples are able 
to set down the conditions for relations within their community, that is, exercise the right to 
self-determination internally’.665 On the other hand, there should be no doubt that peoples 
have the right to be free from subjugation, exploitation  and foreign rule and ‘to be able to 
restructure themselves and the national entity they have set up with validity to the outside, for 
example by breaking up or secession of individual parts’.666   
For Dahlitz, the issue of secession arises ‘whenever a significant proportion of the population 
of a given territory, being part of a State, express the wish by word or by deed to become a 
sovereign State in itself or to join with and become part of another sovereign State’.667  
Kohen argued that, secession is the ‘creation of a new independent entity through the 
separation of part of the territory and population of an existing State, without the consent of 
the latter’.668 However, when a new State is formed from part of the territory of another State 
with its consent, it is a situation of ‘devolution’ rather than ‘secession’.669 Thus, in recent 
years, the lack of the consent of the Predecessor State has become the key element that 
characterises a strict notion of secession.  
The creation of States has traditionally been perceived as a matter of fact. The traditional 
view was, when a secessionist movement when not under foreign control, it was simply an 
internal affair. According to this view, international law neither encourages secessionism nor 
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prohibits it.670 Thus, secession was a matter of fact: Kohen argued that, ‘if the secessionist 
forces were able to impose the existence of a new State, then the international legal system 
was to record the fact of the existence of this new entity’.671 In recent times, the other cases of 
some new States, which emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union and SFRY, did not 
benefit from international legal support.672 These States came into being as a matter of fact, a 
situation which international law, neither sanctions nor prevents. In other words, Corten 
comes to conclude that, ‘international law’s ‘neutrality’ in this respect is less and less evident, 
since the mechanisms to protect States from disruption are even stronger today than 
before’.673 Franck claimed that, ‘it cannot seriously be argued today that international law 
prohibits secession. It cannot seriously be denied that international law permits secession. 
There is a privilege of secession recognised in international law and the law imposes no duty 
on any people not to secede’.674 Thus, Peter argued that, the silence of international law 
concerning secession may simply mean that secession lies in an ‘international law-free 
zone’.675 In addition, Cassese agreed that, while State practice and the majority view of States 
remained opposed to secession; secession 'is a fact of life, outside the realm of law’.676  
At the same time, it has even approved exceptions under certain circumstances and 
conditions, when the external right to self-determination can prevail over the principle of 
territorial integrity. This particularly, Cassese argued, affects constellations677 of 
colonialisation, which has been considered in the previous chapter. The question is rather 
whether an exception outside the colonial context applies for the benefit of secessionist 
movements. Seen in terms of international law, this is the decisive point for the legality or 
legitimacy of the breakaway of the entity from its parent State. In this regard, the Canadian 
Supreme Court concluded ‘it was clear that international law does not specifically grant 
component parts of sovereign States the legal right to secede unilaterally from their parent 
State’.678 However, the Court admitted that under certain circumstances secession is 
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implicitly allowed under the right of self-determination of peoples’.679 Thus, international law 
is in fact neutral with respect to secession, and in certain circumstances, Lalonde argued, it 
might well adapt to recognise effective political realities’.680 Therefore, in the Quebec case, 
many commentators have argued that ‘the consequences of a unilateral declaration of 
independence, if successful, might eventually be regulated internationally’.681 
It is true that, scholars had long been deeply divided on the issue of self-determination and 
independence. The demands of secessionist movements, such as in Quebec, Scotland, 
Kosovo, East Timor, and in Southern Sudan, raise important philosophic issues about the 
State. Among the most important of these are questions about legitimacy and the authority of 
the State over territory and its population. Secessionist demands, Copp argued, also raise 
questions about the moral status of secession, and raise deep questions about democracy and 
liberalism, since the population might reveal in a democratic plebiscite that its support for 
secession takes priority over its desire for justice.682 On the one hand, it is understood that the 
right of people to self-determination should normally be exercised internally within the 
framework of an existing sovereign State. Rather, secessionists have always insisted that they 
met the conditions that giving rise to external self-determination, understood as a right to 
independence.  
The right to self-determination is enshrined in the UN Charter and based on democratic and 
liberal values. However, until recently, the international community has interpreted this 
principle very restrictively; it has amounted to little more that the right to be free from 
European colonialism.683 However, reviewing ethno-nationalist conflicts around the world, 
and the collapse of the USSR and SFRY, have given rise to a new thinking about the right to 
self-determination in political theory.    
Many political philosophers working in this area have turned their attention to secession. 
There has been a wide range of positions-for and against the right of secession. Even so, there 
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has still been no systematic account of the various normative theories of secession. Nor has 
there been a systematic assessment of the comparative strengths and the weaknesses of the 
theoretical options. In addition, contemporary scholarship on international law does not 
contain opposing views on whether or under what conditions there is a legal right to secede.  
This chapter reviews theories of secession, and identifies what they have in common and 
where they differ, bringing together some of the most respected scholars in their field. It will 
consider the conditions under which a group within an existing community may, with 
justification, separate from the larger group in order to establish its own self-governing 
community. In other words, what arguments justify their pleas for secession? The chapter 
deals with problems of normative and liberal theories, special rights to secede, conditions of 
groups and ask if constitutions should include a right to secede. It begins the task with the 
controversial moral debate on secession, evaluating under what grounds and under what 
conditions may secession be morally justified, if at all. It also evaluates how international law 
should deal with secession. One of the crucial issues here is whether the international law of 
self-determination authorises any right to secession as a remedy to violation of the right to 
self-determination of peoples.  
Normative theories of secession provided by Allen Buchanan and Lea Brilmayer will be 
taken as representative examples of just-cause theories. In this regard, both general unilateral 
theories of secession provided by Buchanan, primary right theories, and remedial right only 
theories, will be examined.  Primary right theories stipulate that nations also have a general 
primary right to unilaterally secede in the absence of past injustice if there were a special 
right to do so. Remedial Right Only theories suggest on the contrary that unilateral secession 
can only be justified if important harms have been to the seceding nation. Buchanan in his 
recent work on secession stipulated that, international law should recognise the remedial right 
to secede but not a general right to self-determination that includes the right to secede for all 
people or nations. Hence, from the standpoint of international law, Buchanan argued that ‘the 
unilateral right to secede, the right to secede without consent or constitutional authorisation, 
should be understood as a remedial right only, a last resort response to serious injustice’.684 
Based on this argument, the chapter will argue that, for all peoples in international law, the 
right to secede, the right to unilateral secession without the consent of the parent State is 
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without legal foundation, and should be understood as a remedial right only, a last resort to 
remedy the harm.  
As with the territorial claim theory provided by Brilmayer, she has suggested a new 
framework, focused on the relative legitimacy of competing territorial claims, as the best way 
to resolve secessionist disputes. Her imaginative solution to a long-standing tension between 
the right of States to preserve their territorial integrity and the right of peoples to self-
determination will be analysed. The chapter also discusses, the ‘Plebiscite approach’, which 
attempts to discuss various arguments regarding the notion whether all people have a right to 
self-determination as a matter of right, regardless of their current political status. Beran’s 
liberal democratic theories will also be examined. He argued that, liberal nationalist theories 
might support the right to national self-determination if the victims of serious and persistent 
human rights violations constitute a nation.  
The chapter will turn then to discuss the legal aspects of secession, especially as it relates to 
the constitutional laws of sovereign States. The chapter will address the theoretical 
justifications for constitutional secession. Should the right of secession be constitutionalised? 
If so, what should be the nature of such a right? To answer these theoretical questions, 
assessment of arguments both for and against constitutionalising secession will be made.   
Having evaluated the conceptual field, the chapter will then turn to propose a fresh balanced 
theory of an external right to self-determination, that of ‘Remedial Earned Sovereignty’, as a 
remedial approach to the right of self-determination. This will be robustly interrogated, 
evaluating both advantages and disadvantages, and drawing some cautious policy 
implications. Thus, this chapter will be arguing both politics and legal theories of secession, 
as multidisciplinary approaches seems to be the most effective way to approach secession and 
self-determination.  
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3.2. Allen Buchanan and normative theories of secession   
 
All theories of secession either understand the right as a remedial right only or recognise a 
primary right to secede.  
 
3.2.1. Primary Right Theories 
 
Primary Right theories argue that certain groups have a general right to secede if these groups 
believe that it is the most feasible way of existence. They advocate for a people’s general 
right to secede and ‘do not make the unilateral right to secede derivative upon violation of 
other, more basic rights’.685 They argue that secession is justifiable via association or 
ascription, through a democratic process by majority votes. Primary Right theories stipulate 
that some groups may unilaterally secede in the absence of past injustice.686 They do not limit 
legitimate secession to being a means of remedying an injustice.687 They consider peoples or 
nations, as such, have a collective right to self-determination, and are entitled to secede based 
on attributes that they have.688 According to Primary Right theories, there is a general right to 
secede that is not merely remedial.689   
According to Buchanan Primary Right theories fall into two main classes: Ascriptive Group 
theories and Associative Group theories.  
 
3.2.1.1. Ascriptive Group theories:  
 
Under this version of Primary Right theory, it is groups whose memberships are defined by 
what are sometimes-called ascriptive characteristics that have the right to secede (even in the 
absence of injustice).690 This means that it is primarily certain non-political characteristics of 
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groups that ground the group’s right to an independent political association.691 Accordingly, 
being a people or a nation is an ascriptive characteristic.692 In addition, Buchanan argued that, 
‘no actual political organisation of the group; nor any actual collective choice to form a 
political association, is necessary for the group to be a nation or people’.693   
Thus, according to Ascriptive Group theories, people have an intrinsic value and for this 
reason have a primary right to secede even in the absence of injustice, whether on the 
nationalist principle or not. In other words, such theories do not require, as a necessary 
condition of a group's having the right to secede, that it has been subject to injustice.694 Copp 
explained that these theories most often have a touch of ethno-nationalism, concentrating on 
shared cultural characteristics and mutual heritage of history and language as justification for 
a split.695  Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz have defended a theory of this kind as a theory of 
the moral right to secede.696  
 
3.2.1.2. Associative Group Theories (Choice Theories)  
 
These 'attribute the right to secede to groups on the basis of the expressed voluntary 
preference of a sufficient proportion of the members of the group that the group form its own 
State’.697 These theories do not require that a group have any ascriptive characteristic in 
common such as ethnicity or an encompassing culture, even as a necessary condition for 
having a right to secede.698 They focus on voluntary political choice of the members of a 
group, or the majority take a decision to form their own independent political unit. These 
theories do not require a group to have been treated unjustly, or that it share ascriptive 
characteristics, although a plausible theory of this kind would require, in Buchanan’s view 
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that ‘the group have sufficient resources and territory to be able of constituting a viable 
State’.699 The simplest version of Associative group theory is ‘the pure plebiscite theory’. 
According to this theory, a majority in a given association of persons on a given territory that 
wishes to secede is entitled to do so. In other words, any group that can constitute a majority 
(or a substantial majority) in favour of secession within a portion of the State has the right to 
secede.700 It is not required for secessionists to have any common connection, territory or the 
historical claim they wish to make into their own State. ‘All that matters is that the members 
of the group voluntarily choose to associate together in an independent political unit of their 
own’.701 Harry Beran and Christopher Wellman have defended these theories.       
Beran offered something more, adding that it is necessary that the group will be able to 
marshal the resources necessary for a viable independent State.702 He grounded his theory of 
the right to secede in a consent theory of political obligation.703 According to Beran, ‘actual 
(not hypothetical or ideal contract-arian) consent of the governed is a necessary condition for 
political obligation, and consent cannot be assured unless those who wish to secede are 
allowed to do so’.704 Christopher Wellman on the other hand, has another advanced variant of 
plebiscite theory.705 According to his version, there is a primary right of political association, 
or of political self-determination. Wellman’s right of political association becomes the right 
of any group that resides in a territory to form its own State if (1) that group constitutes a 
majority in that territory, if (2) the entity it forms will be able to carry out effectively, the 
legitimating functions of a State (pre-eminently the provision of justice and security); and if 
(3)   its serving the territory from the existing State will not impair the latter’s ability to carry 
out effectively those same legitimating functions.706  
In fact, both Beran’s and Wellman’s theories seem to rely on an associative group, rather than 
an ascriptive group. Because any group, Buchanan argued, that ‘satisfies these three criteria, 
not just those with ascriptive properties (such as peoples, nations, ethnic groups, culture 
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groups, or encompassing groups) is said to have the right to secede’.707 In addition, Beran and 
Wellman have argued that, there can be a right to secede based on the need to remedy 
injustices, and thus to argue against all remedial right only theories.    
In sum, primary right theories do not require injustice as a condition for the existence of a 
unilateral claim or right to secede. They are primary right theories ‘because they do not make 
the unilateral claim or right to secede derivative upon the violation of other, more basic 
rights, as the remedial right only theories do’.708 However, according to Buchanan, primary 
right theories are far from offering an accurate account a right to secede, because ascriptive 
and associative suffer from serious weakness. For example, they are considered as a direct 
threat to the territorial integrity of the State by ‘authorising the dismemberment of States even 
when those States are perfectly performing what are generally recognised as the legitimating 
functions of States’.709 In addition, associative theories have also been criticised for not 
focusing on peoples, as an objective, ‘and they, do not necessarily invoke a right to self-
determination’.710 Buchanan’s main point is ‘to uncouple the unilateral claim right to secede 
from the various legitimate interests that groups including national minorities can have in 
various forms of self-determination short of statehood’.711  
Hence, if Buchanan succeeded in justifying unavoidable limitation of the primary right 
approaches, then he also partially demonstrated the appeal of moral causes to support the 
remedial right only theory. He proceeded with powerful rebuttals to most of the criticism 
especially coming from primary right approaches to secession; he manages to list convincing 
reasons for why remedial theory makes a difference and how it is important for the sake of 
theory as well as for the world political to have such a position regarding the issue of 
secession.  
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3.2.2.  Remedial Right Only Theories  
 
According to this type of theory, international law provides a right to secession for people 
subject to extreme persecution or unable to realise their right to self-determination 
internally.712  Buchanan demonstrated that secession must be ‘a remedy of last resort for 
persistent and grave injustices, understood as violations of basic human rights’.713 
Accordingly, he argued that ‘cultural groups may instrumentally acquire a moral value for 
individuals and can, for this reason, be the subject of collective rights’.714 They earn such an 
instrumental value because individual agents treat them as social goods. Therefore, cultural 
groups are entitled to cultural protection. He also explained that ‘nations’ are just one of 
many other cultural groups’ (linguistic, immigrant, religious etc...) and as such, they do not 
deserve the right to self-determination.715 Thus, he rejected the idea that nations, ‘or for that 
matter any other cultural group, could have a primary right to secede, that is, a general right 
to violate the territorial integrity of a State and one that they would have in the absence of 
past injustice’.716 However, all cultural groups could legitimately secede if (i): there were 
systematic violations of basic human rights, as with the Kosovars in Kosovo (ii): serious and 
persisting violations of intrastate power-sharing or autonomy agreements by the State, as 
occurred in Chechnya, as well as, the brutal secessionist conflicts that have occurred in 
Sudan, Eritrea and Kosovo.717 In these cases, secession would be acceptable only if there 
were no other solutions, and that secession is the remedy of last resort. However, even if 
Buchanan added the later condition to his account, there is still not a general primary right to 
self-determination, there are just general remedial rights to self-determination and secession. 
In addition, it is important to mention that Buchanan’s remedial theory ‘only concerned the 
grounds for a unilateral right to secede’.718 He presumably acknowledged that consensual 
secessions results from negotiations, agreement, and deliberation between the different 
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parties, are morally acceptable. In what follows, this chapter will be concerned only with 
unilateral secession as opposed to consensual secession reached between a seceding people 
and the parent State.   
On the other hand, Buchanan has drawn parallels between the remedial right to secession and 
the remedial right to revolution. The latter is originally based on Locke’s theory, according to 
‘which the people have the right to overthrow the government if their fundamental rights are 
violated, and more peaceful means have been to no avail’.719 Revolution as a last resort is 
also reflected in legal sources, most notably in the UDHR: ‘Whereas it is essential, if man is 
not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and 
oppression, that  should be protected by the rule of human rights law’.720 However, 
conversely from revolution Buchanan argued that, ‘the object of right to secede is not to 
overthrow the government, but only to sever the government’s control over that portion of the 
territory’.721 
It is true that Remedial Right Only theories postulates that if a group falls victim to ‘serious 
breaches of fundamental human and civil rights’ through the ‘abuse of power,’ then 
international law recognises the right of the afflicted group to secede from the offending 
State. Buchanan would add that there has to be no other option. Accordingly, the ‘general 
right’ to secession exists only where the group in question has suffered injustices. However 
Buchanan pointed out that outside of such extreme conditions, there can be ‘special rights’ to 
secede if (1) ‘the State grants a right to secede (as with the secession of Norway from Sweden 
in 1905), or if (2) the constitution of the State includes a right to secede (as does the 1993 
Ethiopian Constitution), or perhaps if (3) the agreement by which the State was initially 
created out of previously independent political units included the implicit or explicit 
assumption that secession at a later point was permissible (as some American Southerners 
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argued was true of the States of the Union)’.722  Thus, Buchanan concluded that, ‘if any of 
these three conditions obtain, we can speak of a special right to secede.723  
The doctrine of remedial secession is based on general principle of law that applied to the 
right to self-determination of peoples. In this regard, Ryngaert and Griffioen have argued that 
‘what if a State persistently denies a people the fundamental right of internal self-
determination? What if a people does not have free choice but is repressed and suffers from 
gross violations of basic human rights, and all possible remedies for a peaceful solution to the 
conflict have been exhausted? Should that people not be allowed a ‘self-help remedy’ in the 
form of external self-determination?’724 Tomuschat also argued in favour of ‘ubi jus ibi 
remedium’ applying to international law, arguing that, and ‘if international law is to remain 
faithful to its own premises, it must give victims a remedy enabling them to live in 
dignity’.725 It is also submitted that, a remedial theory is primarily based on legal, 
philosophical, moral and human rights approaches. In this regard, a remedial right to protect 
human rights, right to self-determination is compliant with the premises of international legal 
order.726 Thus, if there is people’s right to self-determination, and that right has been violated, 
there must be a remedy. In other words, if people’s right to internal self-determination is 
violated, the right to remedial secession might arise as a remedy to the injustice. In this way, 
by effecting remedial secession, people may realise to their right to self-determination 
externally.  
Over the past few decades, ‘growing attention has been turned to the treatment dispensed by 
States to the populations concerned’.727 This has become a matter of concern in contemporary 
international law’.728 Throughout the last decades, the UN General Assembly passed several 
resolutions reminding States to protect and empower their inhabitants, and prevent them from 
criminal activities against their population. In this connection, two illustrations will be 
recalled. 
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First: the ‘safeguard clause‘ in the UN General Assembly Resolution 2625, considered as an 
important pillar is used by remedial secession theory proponents to prove the theory’s basis in 
customary international law. The Declaration states in paragraph 5 (7): that,  
[Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorising or encouraging any action, which 
would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent. States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole 
people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour].729  
The Declaration addresses, inter alia, self-determination. Proponents of the remedial 
secession doctrine claim that an inverted reading of the ‘safeguard clause’730 of Principle V 
gives rise to the doctrine.731 Accordingly, Hannum pointed out that 'the requirement of 
representativeness suggests internal democracy’.732 However, Murswiek argued that, the 
doctrine of remedial secession authorised secession as a potential option, although in certain 
exceptional circumstances.733 Likewise, Cassese emphasised that ‘impairment of territorial 
integrity is not totally excluded, it is logically admitted’.734 He argued that ‘a State whose 
government represents the whole people of its territory without distinction of any kind, that is 
to say, on a basis of equality, and in particular without discrimination on grounds of race, 
creed or colour, complies with the principle of self-determination in respect of all of its 
people and is entitled to be protected of its territorial integrity’.735  In other words, the people 
of such a State exercise the right of self-determination through their participation in the 
government of the State on a basis of equality.736 Thus, according to the remedial secession 
doctrine, if the State failed to comply with principles of equal rights and self-determination 
and denies a people its right to internal self-determination, such State loses the safeguard 
from dismemberment of its territory and the particulars people may choose secession as a 
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remedy to injustice. Hence, ‘the government of a State which commits grave and systematic 
violations of human rights ceases to represent the people or population victimised.’737   
This understanding has been reaffirmed, in even stronger terms, in the second World 
Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna, by the 1993 Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action (para 2).738 In fact, the Declaration went further than the 1970 
Declaration of Principles, in proscribing discrimination ‘of any kind’.739 In particular, ‘the 
entitlement to self-determination of the victimised population emerged, as the willing 
victimisers could no longer rely upon the claim to territorial integrity’.740   
Accordingly, Simpson argued that the Declarations make ‘territorial integrity a rebuttable 
presumption, which can be invoked only by States who act in accordance with the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination’.741 Therefore, the right to self-determination arises as a 
remedy when the State's actions extinguish that presumption. Simpson agreed that 'assertion 
of the right of secession would be a remedy of last resort for peoples and groups’.742 In the 
same way, Tomuschat asserted that, 'secession can only be a step of last resort and should not 
be granted lightly as remedy’.743 Buchanan does not derive a right to secession from the 
‘safeguard clause’ but uses a similar logic to the suggested ‘rebuttable presumption’ in the 
clause. He argued that ‘there is a presumption that existing States that are accorded 
legitimacy under international law have valid claim to their territories, but such claim can be 
overridden or extinguished in the face of persistent patterns of serious injustice toward groups 
within a State’.744  The validity of a State's claim to territory ‘cannot be supported if the 
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remedy that can assure that the fundamental rights of the group will be respected is 
secession’.745              
In addition, Dugard and Raic have argued that the Declaration was intended to be addressed 
to third States.746 The name of the Declaration and the notion of co-operation between States 
in accordance with the UN Charter suggest that addresses are the ‘States’, especially third 
States not directly engaged. For that reason, they argued that, ‘safeguard clause’ formula is 
directed to the States: ‘it may be argued a contrario that third States would be entitled to 
support a people which attempts to secede, even if such support eventually leads to 
infringement of the territorial integrity of the target State’.747   
Judge Trindade argued in his Separate Opinions in the Kosovo matter that, recent 
developments in international law and international practice (of States and of international 
organisations) ‘provide support for the exercise of self-determination by peoples, under 
permanent adversity or systematic repression, beyond the traditional confines of the historical 
process of decolonisation’.748 For example, the UNSC resolution 1244 condemned all acts of 
violence against and repression of, the population in Kosovo.749 It was clear that the Serbs 
were responsible for serious human rights violations against the Kosovars, which led to 
NATO’s 1999 intervention and eventually Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence. A 
significant number of States addressed remedial secession in their ICJ written and oral 
pleadings, such as Germany and Netherlands.750 They based their theory on the UNGA 
resolution 2625s ‘safeguard clause’ which if read a contrario imposes the requirements for a 
State to respect a right to self-determination in order to invoke territorial integrity. The Dutch 
argued that the right to ‘external self-determination must meet two conditions: 1. substantive 
condition–serious breach of obligation to respect self-determination by the State 2. 
Procedural condition–all effective remedies must have been exhausted’.751 In the Aaland 
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Island Case, the Committee of Rapporteurs, states that, ‘The separation of a minority from 
the State of which it forms a part and its incorporation in another State can only be 
considered as an altogether exceptional solution, a last resort when the State lacks either the 
will or the power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees’.752 The Report does not 
exclude the possibility of secession as a remedy from State abuses. Dugard and Raic argued 
that, ‘The commission denied the existence of any absolute entitlement to secession by a 
minority, but it did not rule out a right of secession under all circumstances’.753 Crawford 
concluded that ‘both reports admit the possibility that the principle will apply to territories 
that are so badly misgoverned that they are in effect alienated from their ‘parent’ State’.754 
Another decision referred to ground remedial secession theory is ‘The African Commission 
Report on Katanga’.755 Dugard and Raic pointed out that ‘The Commission was of the 
opinion that in the case of serious violations of human rights and a denial of internal self-
determination, the Katangese people would be entitled to exercise a form of self-
determination which would lead to disruption of the territorial integrity of Zaire’.756 Thus, 
one must concede that this decision is primarily based on Remedial Right theory. In Sudan, 
where for years the government engaged in a consistent policy of ethnic war, remedial 
criteria would conclude that the South had the moral right to secede. However, these 
circumstances did not create a right to independence under international law.757 By contrast, 
in the Quebec case, where the Canadian government has granted vast autonomy and 
procedural equality and self-determination, the remedial approach would lead to the 
conclusion that Quebec has no moral claim to any sort of hard, external self-determination. 
The government in Canada relied on the safeguard clause, without committing itself to the 
idea of remedial secession: the safeguard clause protected law-abiding States against 
                                                          
752 ‘Aland Island Case', (n 169).   
753 Dugard and Raic, 'The Role of Recognition in the Law and Practice of Secession (n 746) 107.  
754 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (n 3) 111. 
755 The African Commission  inter alia concluded that: ‘In the absence of concrete evidence of violations of 
human rights to the point that the territorial integrity of Zaire should be called to question and in the absence of 
evidence that the people of Katanga are denied the right to participate in Government as guaranteed by Article 
13(1) of the African Charter, the Commission holds the view that Katanga is obliged to exercise a variant of 
self-determination that is compatible with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire.’ See, Katangese 
Peoples, Congress v Zaire, (1995) African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Comm. No 75/92.  
756 Dugard and Raic, ‘The Role of Recognition in the Law and Practice of Secession (n 746) 108. 
757 Vidmar argued that ‘an argument could be made that South Sudan is a matter of independence under the 
doctrine of ‘remedial secession’, which has some support in academic writings and, possibly, also in the 
framework of the African regional human rights system. Nevertheless, it can only be said that decades of 
violence and oppression created political circumstances in which Sudan accepted South Sudanese independence. 
Secession still was not an entitlement under international law; it clearly followed from domestic constitutional 
provisions’. See, Vidmar, 'South Sudan and the International Legal Framework Governing the Emergence and 
Delimitation of New States' (n 51).    
138 
 
secession.758 The Court took a similar line, holding that the right to self-determination of 
people is ‘normally fulfilled through internal self-determination, a people’s pursuit of its 
political, economic, social, and cultural development within the framework of an existing 
State.759 The right to external self-determination only appeared ‘in the most extreme of cases 
and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances’,760 ‘having regard to the parallel need 
for respect for the territorial integrity of States’.761 Following an analysis of potential State 
practice of remedial secession, in Kosovo, Aaland Islands, Katanga, and Quebec, Vidmar 
suggested that ‘remedial secession has the following function in international law: although 
not a legal entitlement, remedial secession confers political and normative legitimacy on 
oppressed secessionist groups and may encourage States to recognise their independence’.762 
Thus, it is important to note that none of the participating States contested the binding effect 
of UNGA resolution 2625 as a reflection of customary international law. Rather the States 
have differently interpreted the content of provisions regulating the right to self-
determination.   
In general, remedial right theorist Buchanan puts 'significant constraint on unilateral 
secession’.763 This means that the remedial right to secession as an exercise of self-
determination, very strict standards would be met by secessionists.  The most comprehensive 
criteria of remedial secession is provided by Dugard and Raic. They stated that: 
(a) There must be a people, which, though forming a numerical minority in relation to the rest 
of the population of the parent State, form a majority within a part of the territory of that 
State. 
(b) ‘The State from which the people in question wish to secede must have exposed that 
people to serious grievances (carence de souverainete), consisting of either 
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(i) A serious violation or denial of the right of internal self-determination of the people 
concerned (through, for instance, a pattern of discrimination) 
(ii) Serious and widespread violations of fundamental human rights of the members of that 
people 
(c) There must be no (further) realistic and effective remedies for the peaceful settlement of 
the conflict’.764  
In addition, Cassese pointed out that ‘there must be gross breaches of fundamental human 
rights and the exclusion of any likelihood for a possible peaceful solution’.765  While Borgen 
claimed that, any attempt to claim secession in order to trump territorial integrity must at least 
show that: ‘(a) the secessionists are a ‘people’ in the ethnographic sense; (b) the State from 
which they are seceding seriously violates their human rights; and (c) there are no other 
effective remedies under either domestic law or international law’.766 Schachter articulated 
several possible conditions for triggering a right to remedial secession, which command 
varying degrees of support: (1) the claimant community should have a distinct identity, and 
inhabit a region that largely supports secession. (2) The community has been subjected to a 
pattern of systematic economic or political discrimination or (3) The central government has 
rejected reasonable proposals for autonomy and minority rights of the claimant 
community.767 Two additional conditions have been suggested sometimes as important, but 
they are less supported and difficult to implement in practice: (1) ‘secession should not be 
likely to result in armed conflict between the old and new State; and (2) ‘the seceding areas 
should not have a disproportionate share of the county’s wealth’.768   
Thus, it can be concluded that, a remedial right to secession comes into existence when all 
these conditions are met:  
1- Secessionists must qualify as a ‘people’, for the purpose of ascriptive self-
determination.  
2- There must be serious human rights violations, or a denial of self-determination. 
3- Secession must be the only solution to remedy the injustice.  
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However, this argument is somehow controversial and needs to be clarified. First, it is 
unclear who constitutes a people, as the meaning of ‘people’ is somewhat uncertain. Second, 
what constitutes a denial of self-determination or ‘grave humanitarian situation’ and what can 
be considered a remedy? Human rights violations must qualify as ‘grave’, serious’, and such 
violations must be systematic, persistent and massive. Finally, and most importantly, it is 
unclear who decides: that secessionists are a 'people', that serious human rights violations and 
a denial of self-determination were committed, and that the other solution or 'remedies' are 
not effective or are unavailable.  
Thus, even if the international community could agree on which conditions would trigger a 
right to remedial secession; ‘there is as yet no effective mechanism for deciding whether or 
not the necessary conditions have been met or for adjudicating claims related to the exercise 
of the right’.769 Rather, without objective criteria for determining which circumstances could 
trigger the right, any claim of such a right is likely to be disputed vigorously.770 In addition, 
according to the ICCPR, the territorial integrity of governments representing the ‘whole 
people’ will be respected, however; what does this representation mean? Should a distinction 
be made between governments that treat their citizens badly, and governments that provide a 
measure of democracy and respect human rights?  
Thus follows the remedial argument; secessionists should only claim to secede as a last resort 
remedy. This is because secession that would be incompatible with the right to self-
determination as defined in the safeguard clause, which would prevent assistance from other, 
States and would cause non-recognition of the seceding entity. 
In addition, following the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia, the 
EU countries have developed guidelines on the legitimate recognition of new States in 
Europe. Within the Europe Guidelines, inter alia, invoke ‘the principle of self-
determination,’ ‘rights of ethnic and national groups ‘respect for the inviolability of all 
frontiers which can and minorities’, and only be changed by peaceful means and by common 
agreement’.771 The document spells out that, ‘The Community and its Member States will not 
recognise entities which are the result of aggression’.772 With this requirement, the EC 
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Guidelines follow the obligation to withhold recognition where an entity is created 
illegally.773 In addition, new States must ‘have constituted themselves on a democratic basis, 
have accepted the appropriate international obligations and have committed themselves in 
good faith to a peaceful process and to negotiations’.774 However, because of the political 
nature of recognition, States are never under an obligation to grant recognition.775 Therefore, 
Vidmar argued that, ‘there may be States, which remain non-recognised, sometimes virtually 
universally, on political grounds’.776 Thus, the withholding of recognition is not always a 
matter of policy, but may be required by international law. This obligation thus makes the 
political act of recognition an act, which is at least partly governed by law, in the sense that 
States are not always free to grant recognition.  
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3.3. Normative Justifications of the Right to Choose Secession  
 
3.3.1. Choice and Liberal Democratic Theories of Secession   
 
According to choice theory, 'in some important sense, the State is a voluntary association into 
which citizens and groups of citizens can enter and form which they can exist by their own 
choice’.777 Norman argued that this approach derives from an application or extension of the 
notion of liberal democracy, although it is also applied to concepts of nationalism and 
national self-determination.778 Many theorists use the analogy of divorce, as one can choose, 
unilaterally, to divorce a person, so one can choose unilaterally to secede from a State. It is 
also assumed that the choice citizens’ face is an informed and free choice between remaining 
in the parent State and withdrawing from it.  
Moreover, it is argued that, self-determination through secession represents an extension of 
liberal democratic rights.779 It is thus, incompatible to advocate one principle without 
defending the other. In this regard, Philpott proposed that, both plebiscitary right and 
democracy to secede are justified by the value of individual autonomy. He stated that, ‘any 
group of individuals within a defined territory which desires to govern itself more 
independently enjoys a prima facie right to self-determination, a legal arrangement which 
gives it independent statehood or greater autonomy within a federal State’.780  He added, ‘that 
this prima facie right to self-determination is fundamental to the individual’s ‘political’ self is 
accepted almost intuitively: ‘Self-determination is inextricable from democracy; our ideals 
commit us to it’.781 Copp, on the other hand demonstrated that a fundamental and equal 
respect for persons justifies both notions.782 Whereas, Buchanan disagreed by stating that 
both views can be mutually invalidated since, in a democracy, it is not the case that each 
individual is self-governed; rather, individuals are governed by the majority of the 
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community.783 Thus, it can be argued that the proponents of choice theory share these two 
ideas about the nature of the State and choice, they differ in their views on: first, the 
procedures of choice and second, the type of group entitled to the choice.784 In other words, 
who is to decide on the competition of the overall group that should vote on the question of 
secession? Coppieters and Sakwa argued ‘equal respect for all individuals would indicate an 
all-encompassing group, rather than a select group which happens to correspond to the 
demanding secession in the first place’.785 
One may argue that Beran’s liberal theories deals not with a loosely defined notion of self-
determination but rather with the act of secession. He stated that, ‘liberal political philosophy 
requires that secession be permitted if it is effectively desired by a territorially concentrated 
group within a State and is morally and practically possible’.786 In his view, democratic 
theory assumes the majority decision-making procedure as the only legitimate procedure 
through which secession becomes admissible. He argued that 'for a group to be entitled to a 
territory and thus to the right to secede, it is sufficient: that the territory has been in common 
habitat for a few generations, that it does not depend on other groups for its everyday needs, 
and that a majority of the group decided to secede from the parent State’.787 Accordingly, the 
group's entitlement to territory is mostly derived from its historical settlement. The majority 
decision can be reached ‘through either their representative bodies or plebiscite’.788 This 
theory ensures that all groups have equal rights; it also ensures that smaller groups have equal 
rights within the majority including the right to secession from the host State. Hence, the 
unity of the State has to be based on the willingness of its citizens to be part of it. 
Accordingly, groups, which have the right to occupy the territory on which they live, must 
have a collective right of self-determination, including secession.789 Similarly, Buchanan 
explained that, ‘the liberal State is the agent of the people, and in liberal theory, it cannot 
plausibly be claimed that this agency relationship is irrevocable’. Therefore, all rights the 
State holds, including the right to territory, must be derived from the people whose agent it is. 
                                                          
783 A Buchanan, 'Democracy and Secession', in Margaret Moore (ed), National Self-Determination and 
Secession (OUP, 2003) 14–34. 
784 Pavkovic and Radan, Creating New States: Theory and Practice of Secession (n 777) 202. 
785 Coppieters and Sakwa, Contextualizing Secession: Normative Studies in a Comparative Perspective (n 779) 
73.  
786 H Beran, ‘A Liberal Theory of Secession’ (1984) 32 Political Studies 21. 
787 ibid. 
788 ibid. 
789 ibid. 
144 
 
Thus, ‘if a part of a State’s population no longer wishes the present State to be its agent; it 
may terminate the agency relationship and remove itself from the State with its land’.790 
However, Pavkovic and Radan argued that this theory would allow a ‘continued change in 
the number of States and the unimpeded secession of wealthy territories and groups from 
poorer ones’.791 Although, in 1998, Beran suggested that ‘an international adjudicating body 
should ensure a just distribution of wealth between the remaining and the seceding State, 
without, however, impeding the secession of wealthy territories from poorer ones’.792 
Wellman on the other hand, demonstrated that 'any group choosing to secede has a primary 
right to secede if the seceding group and the rump State ‘are capable of maintaining a secure 
and just political environment.793 He thus, dispensed with the requirement of a 'common 
habitat' and of an international body remedying economic injustice. 
Thus, it can be argued that the choice theories restrict both the holders of the right of 
secession and the exercise of that right. For example, Philpot’s theory restricts the rights of a 
group, which desires to enhance their political participation, for instance, through direct 
democracy.794 Margalit’s and Raz’s, theory restricts the right to 'encompassing group', groups 
which are larger than families but share a common cultural (and which include nations).795 
While Miller's theory restricts ‘the right to national groups because a nation-State provides a 
national/cultural background against which more individual choice about how to live can be 
made'.796 In the same way, the entitlement of the territory appears to be derived either from a 
group's shared national or cultural characteristics or from a group’s political preferences, such 
as, for enhanced political participation. Hence, Pavkovic and Radan argued, ‘since the choice 
appears to be restricted to a specific group, the right to secession is denied to groups or 
individuals which do not possess the required characteristics or preferences; this breaches the 
liberal principle of equal rights’.797 Thus, since the democratic procedure is not deemed 
important, all restricted choice theories (except for ‘Margalit and Raz') also breach the 
principle of majoritarian decision-making.  
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Nonetheless, all choice theorists have insisted on avoiding certain harmful consequences of 
secession. For example, Margalit and Raz argued that a justified secession must avoid 'a large 
scale new minority problem in the new State, disrespect for the basic rights of all inhabitants 
of the new State and any substantial damage to the interests of inhabitants of other 
countries’.798 For Philpott, ‘secession should not augur evil consequences’.799 However, 
unlike remedial theories, choice theories did not explain why some sorts of harms are 
acceptable and others not.  It is also not clear, in the case of secession attempts, if harm is to 
be avoided or prohibited, who is to prohibit and enforce them?  
In fact, democracy and liberalism are both, of course, open to challenge. Democratic theory is 
a view of legitimate power, and locates such power in the people, whereas the logic of 
liberalism is grounded in individual-related values, such as human rights or autonomy. In 
other words, democratic theory grants power to the people rather than the government, 
whether it is liberal or not, and it is reluctant to limit the power of democratic government, 
whereas, liberalism puts limits on the legitimate power of governments, whether they are 
democratic or not. In this regard, Gewirth argued that liberal-democratic theory ‘seeks to 
show either that liberal premise about individuals’ values entails democratic political 
conclusion, or that the collective value of democratic politics entails liberal conclusions’.800 
However, Freeman pointed out that, these approaches may lead to different conclusions. For 
example, ‘liberal democrats, tend to favour the constitutional protection of individual rights 
against the decision of majorities, while democratic liberals prefer disputes about rights to be 
settled by democratic means’.801 
It is true that the majority of modern national self-determination theories are democratic 
rather than liberal. Philpott for example, has proposed that ‘self-determination was invented 
by liberal democrats, and its intellectual history is a discussion among them’.802 He 
emphasised that self-determination has traditionally been a liberal democratic right. However, 
he argued that individual moral autonomy is the basis of both democracy and liberalism.803 
This theory is not very different from Beran’s liberal theory, although to some extent it 
                                                          
798 Margalit and Raz, 'National Self-Determination ' (n 696). 
799 Philpott, 'In Defense of Self-Determination' (n 780). 
800 A Gewirth, The Community of Rights (Chicago UP 1996) 318-348. 
801 Freeman, 'The Right to Self-Determination in International Political: Six Theories in Search of a Policy' (n 
683). 
802 Philpott, 'In Defense of Self-Determination' (n 780).     
803 Philpott argued that, ‘Democracy we may think of as the activity of governing oneself, of exercising one's 
autonomy in the political realm. It consists of two elements: participation and representation. See, ibid. 
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emphasises the democratic rather than the liberal. Particularly, as the right to national self-
determination has been interpreted as the right to a democratic government.804 The 
democratic case for national self-determination, however Cassese argued requires, a 
consideration of communitarianism.805   
Accordingly, it can be argued that the liberal democratic theory of national self-determination 
is about a given right which primarily depends on the choice of the secessionist groups. Such 
groups generally make claims on separation due to preserving or asserting their identity and 
culture, to resist tyrant regimes and to save their lives under any legal institution. 
Consequently, the motivation of separatist movements is not achieving statehood, and the 
level of gradation is context-bound and may change accordingly. However, Moore argued 
that liberal approaches, unlike nationalist claims are mainly arguing about just distribution of 
goods and resources: ‘they haven’t become so responsive to the issues of group identity, 
membership in the State became so responsive to the issues of (inclusion/exclusion policies), 
or cultural biases of the State’.806 Unlike Buchanan, Moore has a positive assessment of 
national and cultural identity. She argued that ‘theory of secession should be concerned 
primarily with the legitimacy of nationalist claims and with the potential problems attached to 
conferring political rights on nations’.807 Thus, it can be argued that, in practice both 
democratic and liberal theories of national self-determination, capture attention to the 
promotion of a right to secede that should be qualified and circumscribed in order to reduce 
further injustice. Accordingly, in light of these difficulties with the theory, the approach taken 
by Buchanan and Moore seems to be the correct one. 
As a democratic theory in action, plebiscite theory is found in human rights treaties intended 
to have universal applicability. According to the plebiscite approach, all people are entitled to 
self-determination as a matter of right, regardless of their current political status.808 Judge 
Dillard, in his separate opinion in the Western Sahara case, indicated that ‘it is for the people 
to determine the destiny of the territory and not the territory the destiny of the people’.809 
                                                          
804 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peopels, legal Reappraisal (n 25) 101-133.  
805 According to communitarianism theories, nations are communities, most people are born into their nation, 
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Under the plebiscite notion people have a right to determine their political status by means of 
a plebiscite or similar approach, even if that preference is outright independence. This 
understanding is broadly derived from the Human Rights Covenants (the covenants, 
consisting of the ICCPR and the ICESCR). ‘All people have the right of self-determination. 
By virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social, and cultural development’.810 Accordingly, increasing numbers of 
secessionist groups have asserted that they, too, should have the right to declare 
independence, and to control territory, exercise autonomy, and enjoy all the prerogative 
statehood.811 The plebiscite approach asserts their right to do so.  
However, for the purpose of plebiscite theory it is not clear how people belonging to multiple 
sub-groups would be categorised. In this regard, Hannum enquired that, since the world is not 
divided neatly into homogenous enclaves, what should be done with the settler population?812  
In addition, what are we doing with a ‘people’ who desire self-determination but who also 
evidence an intention to discriminate against and deny the right to others within their 
territory?813 Here the problem arises when the ‘people’ in question in part define themselves 
by a legacy of historical injustice and violence, which can lead to confrontation. Thus, 
allowing all ‘people’ to freely determine their political destiny would imply chaos and 
endless territorial disputes, and it would rather create perverse incentives.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
810 See Art 1 (1) from ‘International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)' (n 20). And The 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights’ (n 19). 
811 Ahrens, 'Chechnya, and the Right of Self-Determination’ (n 769). 
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Hannum, 'Rethinking Self-determination' (n 151) 36-37. 
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determination does not abridge the rights of other groups to self-determination. See, D A Valentine, 'Note, The 
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3.3.2. The Territorial claim   
 
It is argued that self-determination is not merely about creating a self-governing region or a 
new State; it also places the territory under a new kind of sovereignty. This raises a general 
question about self-determination: must a group establish a claim to land rather to its claim to 
a new government? In fact, both Brilmayer and Buchanan argued that a territorial claim is 
important and present methods for establishing it. For Buchanan, a group making a territorial 
claim must either (1) ‘show the ill-begotten nature of the larger State's dominion and 
demonstrate its own historical claim or (2) evince a threat of genocide, discriminatory 
redistribution of wealth, or the erosion of its distinctive culture’.814 Whereas Brilmayer 
provided a ‘historical grievance’ as the most conjecturally appealing and direct justifications, 
for a group making a territorial claim.815 In her opinion, ‘politically self-conscious, 
geographically concentrated ethnic groups that differ significantly from the rest of the 
population in the State in which they reside might reasonably claim to constitute the peoples 
at issue’.816 In the case of Crimea’s controversial secession from Ukraine, she wrote that 
‘what makes a secessionist claim successful in the eyes of the international community, 
indeed, in the eyes of the people fighting for secession, is the existing of a historical 
grievance over territory, no such claim can be made surrounding Crimea’.817 Accordingly, 
she built her opinion upon a claim to territory; people must have a ‘legitimate historical 
claim’ to the territory.   
It is notable that international law cannot be completely relied upon secession. As Brilmayer 
has rightly stressed, ‘secession is not simply the formation of a new political association 
among individuals or the repudiation by a group of persons of their obligation to obey the 
State's laws’.818 She stated: 
[The principle of self-determination of peoples suggests that every ‘people’ has a right to its own nation-
State. While the positive law status of this norm and its applicability to the secessionist context are 
debatable, on a rhetorical level few deny the principle's appeal. Unfortunately, it seems directly contrary 
                                                          
814 Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (n 53) 104-
114. 
815 Brilmayer, 'Secession and Self-Determination : A Territorial Interpretation' (n 46).  
816 ibid. 
817 L Brilmayer, ‘Why the Crimean Referendum Is Illegal,’ The Guardian (London, 14 March 2014).  
818 Brilmayer, 'Secession and Self-Determination : A Territorial Interpretation' (n 46).  
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to another, equally venerable, principle of international law, which upholds the territorial integrity of 
existing States.]819 
Brilmayer’s framework focused on the relative legitimacy of competing territorial claims as 
the best way to resolve secessionist disputes. In her view, the legitimate foundation of the 
secessionist claim is the territorial sovereignty. This approach focuses on ‘the degree of 
control exercised over a territory’.820 In addition, she identified an active dispute between 
rights of people and territorial claims. Even so, the two concepts work together to compose a 
valid claim for the separate group, with the claim to territory being the core of the 
argument.821 In Brilmayer’s opinion, a distinct cultural argument does not itself represent a 
valid case for secession; without a claim to territory; the argument is illegitimate.822 She 
argued that ‘international law concentrates on the distinctiveness of the oppressed group, 
overlooking the importance of a valid claim to territory. She contended that ‘the crux of the 
argument is not bilateral, between the distinct people and the State, rather it is a trilateral 
relationship combined of people, State and territory’.823 From political theory, Brilmayer 
correctly rejected the notion that democratic principles support a right of ethnically distinct 
peoples to secede. Instead, she maintained, the critical question is whether such peoples have 
a legitimate historical claim to the land on which they seek to establish their new State.824 She 
believed that ‘all sufficiently cohesive and distinct sub-state ethnic groups could form their 
own State, if they have been a victim of historical injustice’.825 She argued that every 
separatist movement is built upon a claim to territory, usually based on a historical 
grievance826, and that without a normatively sound claim to territory; self-determination 
arguments do not form a plausible basis for secession.827 Brilmayer believed that, this 
approach resolves the tension between self-determination and territorial integrity ‘because it 
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permits secession only when a State’s sovereignty over the territory at issue is illegitimate, 
that is only in situations in which territorial integrity properly understood is not at issue’.828  
In fact, there is no general agreement between philosophers of the arguments that secession is 
based on rights of self-determination and secession is founded on a territorial claim. It is 
argued that a focus on legitimacy of past territorial injustice may obscure other important 
issues.829 Territorial sovereignty provides a more legitimate claim for secession than the right 
of people in the self-determination argument. Hence, the concept of territorial sovereignty 
does not permit the State to maintain control over territory, without legitimate ownership.830 
Territorial demands, asserted by secessionist groups that they have a valid claim to a specific 
territory exists; however, these claims must be based on solid grounds and the importance 
should be acknowledged in international law. Brilmayer pointed out those secessionist 
territorial claims based on historic grievances are more striking and self-evident.831 However, 
in most cases, an assessment of historical wrong does not provide much practical help in 
resolving secessionist claims. Under this, we would asses territorial claims based on the law 
of the relevant period. Thus, only a few cases involve historical grievances such as Kosovo, 
Kurdistan and those involved in colonialism or the annexation of the Baltics. Those cases 
may generally be resolved without the reference to self-determination or secession.832  
Generally, Brilmayer provided two different perspectives in evaluating secessionist claims. 
Traditionally, theorists had focused on the cohesiveness of the group asserting the claim, 
whether the group in question was a distinct ‘people’ in the religious, linguistic, or ethnic 
sense.833 There is another issue however; the objective validity of the claim to a particular 
piece of territory espoused by the group.834 She believed that the legitimacy of claims to a 
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particular piece of territory will depend on a historical claim to land.835 Regardless of the 
identity of the group making the claim, ‘the claim itself might be more or less persuasive, 
depending on historical fact, legal and moral justifications, and so forth’.836 Thus, all 
separatist claims are valid when they possess a legitimate claim to specific territory. The 
group must be able to explain why they should own this territory. Brilmayer concluded that ‘a 
fully grasped comprehension of territorial integrity would embrace the principle of self-
determination. Secession disputes always focus on the quest for independent territory’.837 In 
her view ‘the principle of territoriality defines who the members of a particular political 
entity are, thus membership is construed not along lines of identity, but residence’.838 
Thus, this approach has explained when a self-determination seeking people should be 
allowed to form a new State, and cause a reduction of the parent State’s territory. However, 
the validity of the historical claim alone cannot explain the results of secessionist struggles 
over the past few decades. In other words, secessionist claims to independence are only 
convincing if the secessionist group can prove that their territory was illegally annexed into 
the parent State,839 and they have a legitimate and historical claim over the territory. 
Nonetheless, in Kosovo, the international community did not regard this as an abstract theory 
to justify secession.840 Accordingly, secession could be construed as consistent with the norm 
of territorial integrity because international law truly deals with secessionist claims by 
evaluating the people’s claim to a particular territory.841 In addition, the problem with this 
approach is that it tends to ignore internal self-determination and focuses on the exercise of 
external self-determination. In many situations, secession or total independence from the 
parent State is not the only or even necessary means of exercising the right of self-
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determination, and there is a strong presumption against secession in non-colonial situations. 
In addition, Chaulia argued that the territorial approach does not discuss how the influence of 
great powers has affected the alteration of territory, either to accommodate a people or to 
preserve the territorial status quo of the parent State.842  
Furthermore, it is assumed that the idea behind this approach is that the self-determining 
group is somehow taking land that belongs to the larger State. However, it is argued that the 
State does not own the territory, and that a person owns land. Brilmayer agreed with 
Buchanan when he said that, ‘the relationship between the State and its territory is not the 
same as that between a person and the land, which is in her private property’. In his opinion 
that the State governs, not owns, it is a matter of government not land, and that does not 
translate into a right of self-determination.843 A group must still make a territorial claim by 
‘demonstrating particular grievances and threats-discriminatory redistribution, cultural 
endangerment, and so on’.844 For him these criteria establish the right of self-determination 
and secession. However, one can still ask, why are these important? Once the right to secede 
has been founded, why does an additional territorial claim have to be made? Would it not be 
subsumed with that claim of an entitlement to secede? In what context is land an issue 
beyond the sense in which government is an issue?845    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
842 Chaulia pointed out that ‘peoples that struggle for independence from strong, powerful states will not 
succeed because “large and powerful countries with stable polities such as Russia, China, and India can defend 
their territorial integrity and are unlikely to become candidates for Kosovo-type challenges.” See,  S Chaulia, 'A 
World of Selfistans? After Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, Is the World Heading toward a Proliferation 
of New States?' (Foreign Policy In Focus, 2008) <http://fpif.org/a_world_of_selfistans/> accessed 17 February, 
2014. 
843 Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (n 53) 108. 
844 ibid. 
845 For more details see, Philpott, 'In Defense of Self-Determination' (n 780). 
153 
 
3.3.3. The theoretical justifications for constitutional secession  
 
The section will address arguments about how the right of secession should be 
constitutionalised. Should there even be any constitutional right of secession at all? To this 
end, an assessment of arguments both for and against constitutionalising secession will be 
made.  
Some countries with secessionist movements appear to have been influenced by prevailing 
liberal democratic doctrines, when it comes to the issue of inserting a right of secession into 
their constitution. Some countries have affirmed the right of secession, and improved 
measures how this right should be exercised, such as the constitution of Ethiopia and 
Austria.846 On the other hand, there are countries that are potentially or actually affected by 
secessionist movements such as, China, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, and Ukraine, and they have been resolutely opposed to the notion. They 
declare their States to be indivisible, and explicitly prohibit secession. Some other countries 
are consulting a range of experts to help guide them. For example, the government of Canada 
consulted with noted Rawlsian political philosopher and secession scholar Allen Buchanan 
on the Supreme Court of Canada's handling of the constitutionality of secession and its 
relation to liberal democratic political values.847 In relation to the territorial integrity of 
Quebec in the event of possible accession of sovereignty, the five experts, Frank, Shaw, 
Higgins, Pellet and Tomuschat have concluded that ‘in the case of Canada and Quebec, ‘the 
territorial integrity of the latter is guaranteed before independence by the constitutional rules 
of Canada, and would be after a possible sovereignty by the well-established and peremptory 
principles of general international law. There is no room for any intermediate situation in 
                                                          
846 Article 39(1) of the Ethiopian Constitution states that ‘every nation, nationality, and people in Ethiopia 
has the unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession’. See, 'Article (39) 1 of the 
Ethiopian Constitution'<http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/Ethiopian_Constitution.html>accessed 20 
February 2014. The current Ethiopian Constitution in fact includes such a right to secede that requires not only 
two super-majorities in favour of secession, but also a waiting period. See further, K Roepstorff, The Politics of 
Self-Determination (Routledge 2013) 106-107. Moreover, The Austrian Federal Constitution states that, ‘A 
change in the federal territory, which is at the same time a change in State territory, just as the change of a State 
boundary within federal territory, can, apart from peace treaties, only be effected by corresponding 
constitutional laws of the Federation and the State whose territory undergoes change’. The Federal government 
determines the secession referendum question and the national population (including both the seceding and non-
seceding groups) votes on the question. See, “Article 3 of The Austria Constitution” 
<http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/au00000_.html>accessed 20 February 2014. 
847 A Buchanan, ‘The Quebec Secession Issue: Democracy, the Rule of Law, and Minority Rights,' paper 
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which different rules would apply.’.848 Crawford and Wildhaber, on separate opinion, have 
denied that ‘the right carries with any right to unilateral secession from an independent State, 
in particular, for those whose rights to democratic participation within the State are respected 
on a bases of equality’.849 In addition, both Albert and Shaw have emphasised that ‘while the 
ability to exercise a choice undoubtedly lies at the very heart of the principle of the right to 
self-determination, it does not at all follow that sovereignty constitutes in every case one of 
the elements of this choice’.850   
Gewirth argued that, democratic theory shows either that liberal premises about individual 
values entail democratic political conclusions or that the collective value of democratic 
politic entails liberal conclusions.851 The two different approaches however may lead to 
different policy considerations. Liberal democrats, for instance, tend to favour the 
‘constitutional protection’ of individual rights against the decisions of popular majorities, 
whereas liberal democratics prefer disputes about rights to be settled by democratic 
procedures.852     
Liberal-democratic theory views the existence of a State, and in particular, a constitutional 
democratic State, as the necessary means for establishing a society that functions based on 
certain principles of justice.853 This view of the State is the modern embodiment of the 
Hobbesian paradigm854: ‘The State results from a social contract among the people 
themselves to be ruled by a sovereign monarch or democratic legislative body and 
membership in such State is permanent and irrevocable’.855 As such, the probability of 
incorporating a legal right of secession into the constitutional framework of the State is 
highly problematic. Daniel McCarthy has explained that: 
[The logic of liberal democracy is that there must be a supreme arbiter, the State, to uphold a universal set 
of rights. It follows from that that the State must be universal as well. If multiple arbiters are permitted in 
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the world, if there are other states (or non-states) with different procedures and values, then the authority 
of the liberal democratic State is in question. For the same reason, liberal democracy cannot permit 
secession].856 
John Rawls857 on the other hand, has another view; he wrote of distributive justice, where 
individuals participate in a hypothetical contract to form the ‘basic structure of society’. A 
constitutional democratic State, according to Rawls, must necessarily be a ‘just state’ since it 
is the only kind of political organisation that can protect and secure basic human and political 
rights. He further added, ‘a constitutional democracy possesses the institutional structure 
required to distribute the economic products of society in such a way that the only 
permissible inequalities are those that result in providing a minimal standard of living to the 
least well-off members of society’.858  
In addition, since a constitutional democratic State’s jurisdiction depends on secure territory, 
Buchanan treated the indefinite preservation and maintenance of the State's territorial 
integrity under modern international law as a fundamental political value.859 In this regard, he 
derived a strong presumption against secession, rebuttable only by oppression imposed by the 
State or gross human right violations. Here, for Buchanan, the primary utility of preserving 
the territorial integrity of perfectly just constitutional democracies is to ensure the 'effective 
exercise of political authority over those within it' because 'all citizens have a morally 
legitimate interest in the integrity of political participation’; he considered territorial integrity 
as vital to the enforcement of constitutional democracy.860  Scott Boykin, by contrast argued 
that 'because only persons have the ability to determine the legitimacy of the State’s 
jurisdiction over territory, once a group of persons has rejected such jurisdiction through an 
act of secession, any claim by that State over territory will be dismissed’.861 Daniel Philpott 
has proposed the additional argument that 'individual moral autonomy is the basis of both 
liberalism and democracy’.862 He argued that ‘once a group demonstrates a grievance with 
the existing State and a right of secession is established, it makes no sense to require the 
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group to make an additional claim to the territory in question before the secession of both 
persons and territory can be fully achieved’.863 Thus, liberal democrats consider the world’s 
constitutional democracies as real-world examples of the ‘perfectly just state’, in which 
secession would not be justified or even thought desirable.864 Accordingly, in light of these 
difficulties with the theory, the approach taken by Buchanan and Philpott seems to be the 
correct one.  
The obvious question is this: if these States are reasonably or perfectly just, what explains the 
emergence of secessionist movements in these very States? For example, countries like the 
United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Germany, and even the United States, all have secessionist 
movements.865 At present, most of these secessionist movements are politically weak, yet 
they exist nonetheless. Hence, the main problem faced by liberal democrats in the context of 
underplaying the secession option is to explain why secessionist movements emerge within 
perfectly just constitutional democracies.  
 
3.3.3.1. Liberal democrats and constitutional secession  
 
Liberal political theorists of secession are split on the issue of constitutionalising secession. 
Cass Sunstein, who argued against granting any constitutional right of secession has claimed 
that 'a right of secession would promote strategic behaviour by political subunits that are 
supposed to obediently carry out their democratic burden of providing the State with benefits 
necessary to carry out distributive justice’.866 For example, economically rich regions like the 
Canadian province of Alberta would try to avoid the hard work of creating a healthy 
democracy by not supplying the democratic State with the economic resources necessary to 
dispense justice to the citizenry.867 Sunstein believed that constitutionalising secession would 
further threaten 'constitutional pre-commitment strategies, in ways that both protect and 
constrain the excesses of majoritarian democratic politics.868  For him, 'if the right to secede 
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exists, each subunit will be vulnerable to the threat of secession by the other'869, that would 
mean a disabling or disruption of the democratic process. Thus for a liberal democrat, the 
occurrence of multiple secession movements among subunits of a larger democratic State 
resulting from a constitutional secession right would spell political disaster. Therefore, 
Sunstein concluded that the best way to deal with secessionist demands is to rely primarily on 
the internal mechanism provided by constitutional democracy.870  
In favour of constitutionalising the right of secession, many philosophers agree with Sunstein 
that a constitutional right to secession in democratic States should be avoided if at all possible 
because they believe that most Western-style democracies are already 'reasonably just'.871 For 
Rawlsians, ‘if most democratic States do a reasonably good job and guarantee minority rights 
872 (distributive justice), as liberal democrats claim, then no moral reason exists to justify the 
secession of any groups of individuals from such a State.’873 Norman has defended Sunstein’s 
point of view about the pernicious effects of secessionist politics on democratic deliberation 
and political stability.874  Norman gave several arguments as to why liberal democrats should 
or should not consider inserting a right of secession into a democratic constitution. In his 
opinion, a constitutional secession right is meant to act as a procedural means of forcibly 
keeping secessionists within the prevailing territory of the democratic State.875 In the first 
place, assuming that secessionists are better off staying within the existing reasonably just 
democratic State, Norman suggested designing a secession procedure in such a way that it 
serves as a 'choking mechanism' for secession.876 Such mechanisms according to Kreptul 
included ‘enforcement of minority rights within a democratic State and the brutal suppression 
of minority or ethnic secessionist leaders in non-democratic States’.877 Notably, Norman’s 
                                                          
869 ibid 103.  
870 Internal mechanisms provided by constitutional democracy: ‘Federalism checks and balances entrenchment 
of civil rights and civil liberties, and judicial review.’ See, ibid 112.   
871 ibid.   
872 Both Norman and Weinstock use the term ‘reasonably just’ to describe a well-functioning Western-style 
liberal democracy analogous to Allen Buchanan’s use of the term ‘perfectly just.’ 
873 Kreptul, 'The Constitutional Right of Secession in Political Theory and History' (n 853). 
874 Norman writes: ‘The issue here is not whether secessionist politics is bad for democracy and justice, but 
rather, what can be done through the constitutional engineering of a multinational state to take away the 
incentives for minority leaders to engage in secessionist politics. See W Norman, “Domesticating Secession’, in 
Stephen Macedo and Allen Buchanan (ed), Secession and Self-Determination (NUP, New York 2003) 193-237.   
875 Wayne Norman, 'Secession and (Constitutional) Democracy', in F Requejo (ed) Democracy and National 
Pluralism (London: Routledge 2001) 4. 
876 Norman has in mind ‘vanity secession’, which he defines as ‘secessions by groups lacking just cause.’ ‘As an 
example of this, one could think of a group of relatively well-off citizens within a democratic state who no 
longer consent to being economically exploited (taxed heavily) and who vote to secede and form their own 
government’. ibid 6-7. 
877 Kreptul, 'The Constitutional Right of Secession in Political Theory and History' (n 853).  
158 
 
‘choking mechanism’ ‘would establish a high threshold supermajority requirement, most 
likely a two-thirds vote in a secession referendum’.878 Second, he argued that, 
constitutionalising a right of secession serves to ground an instrumental mechanism to 
minimise the chance of disruption and violence to the democratic process’. He recognised 
that, if there were no constitutional right of secession, a victory for secessionists in a 
referendum amounts to little more than the strengthening of the secessionists’ hand in a game 
of power politics’.879 In other words, the constitutional right to secession should be treated as 
an essential institutional response to breakaway possesses and as compatible with 
constitutionalism.880 In Norman’s opinion, ‘secessionists should not be given an advantage 
over the central government in claiming the legitimacy to secede in a situation in which there 
are no legal rules in place to govern secession’.881 Thus, he argued it is better to have 
constitutional rules in place for secession than to have no rules at all. In addition, Norman 
makes a third argument for constitutionally entrenching a clause it would be ‘evidence that 
the State is united by consent and not force’.882 Therefore, instead of concluding that a 
constitutional right of secession should be a right used by non-consenting minority groups to 
correct the injustice of non-consent, Norman ‘instead justifies the legal right to secede as a 
tool to strengthen the seceding group’s consent to the existing democratic State’.883 
Weinstock on the other hand, tries to rebut Sunstein’s theory that such a constitutional right 
would have unfavourable consequences. He argued that in ‘the case of constitutionalisation, 
potential secessionists would be tempted to use the threat of secession as the strategic tool of 
their politics’.884 He reasoned for a legal right to secede, which is both moral and 
pragmatic.885 On the one hand, legalising secession in his opinion, would present 
secessionists with ‘a cold and lucid cost/benefit analyses of seceding versus remaining in the 
existing State, giving them the difficult legal obstacles they would have to clear before they 
could successfully secede.886 On the other hand, he based his ethical discussion on the 
                                                          
878 Norman, Secession and (Constitutional) Democracy (n 875) 4.   
879 In Norman’s opinion ‘secessionists should not be given an advantage over the central government in 
claiming the legitimacy to secede in a situation in which there are no legal rules in place to govern secession.’ 
see, Norman, 'Domesticating Secession’ (n 874) 198.  
880 Norman, 'Secession and (Constitutional) Democracy' (n 875) 5-6.   
881 ibid. 
882 ibid. In addition Norman argued that ‘Even in the democratic world, almost none of the existing national 
minorities ever gave their initial, democratic as-sent to their membership in the larger state; and few have had a 
formal opportunity to assent since. See Norman, 'Domesticating Secession’ (n 874) 193-237.  
883 Kreptul, 'The Constitutional Right of Secession in Political Theory and History' (n 853). 
884 D Weinstock, 'Constitutionalising the Right to Secede' (2001) 9 Journal of Political Philosophy 182. 
885 D Weinstock, 'Toward a Proceduralist Theory of Secession' (2000) 13 Can J L & Jurisprudence 251.  
886 ibid. 
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argument that the 'participants to a constitutional contract are placed behind a national veil of 
ignorance.’887 Because they do not know which side, they will fall as a national group within 
a multinational State. So that, he argued, they would not make secession too easy, because 
they would be forgoing advantages of democratic cooperation. On the contrary, they would 
not want secession made too hard, because if they were actually discriminated against, they 
would not be able to legitimately leave the remaining State. So that, he suggested that, ‘a 
balanced right of constitutional secession would be desired, which would necessarily entail 
the imposition of procedural hurdles’.888 Thus, Weinstock argued ‘a carefully regulated right 
to secede actually removes some of the incentives which are presented to political actors in 
an unregulated State’.889  
 To conclude, it seems that liberal democrats are split on whether to constitutionalise a right 
of secession. Norman and Weinstock argued for legalising secession because it could serve to 
ruin the secession process itself. Whereas, Sunstein argued against a constitutional right of 
secession because he thinks that legalising a right of secession could be used to sabotage the 
democratic process. On the other hand, Norman like Buchanan holds that under certain 
circumstances and strict conditions it is both desirable and feasible to use constitutional 
principles to bring secession under the rule of law. However, Buchanan goes further to 
suggest that it may be important to supplement constitutional processes with international 
involvement. Accordingly, one must concede that, liberal democracy depends on the structure 
of the centralised State as the necessary means to carry out its values of egalitarianism and 
distributive justice. Hence, Kreptul argued that ‘constitutional democracy is the best method 
to guarantee the universal and equal human rights of individuals and groups, as well as a free 
entry for all in the arena of democratic politics’.890 Thus, no matter how liberal democrats 
drawback or argue the merit of constitutional secession, both arguments are derived from the 
same premise, protecting the territorial integrity of the democratic State. Accordingly, in light 
of these difficulties with the theory, the present author agrees with the approach taken by 
Buchanan and Norman when they insisted on having constitutional rules in place for 
secession and to supplement constitutional processes with international involvement.  
                                                          
887 ibid. 
888 Weinstock suggested some of the procedural hurdles ‘include mandatory waiting periods between referenda 
and mandatory waiting periods between referendum calls and the actual vote, in order to prevent impulsive, 
public-opinion-driven secessions.’ See, ibid. 
889 Weinstock, 'Constitutionalising the Right to Secede' (n 884).  
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Overall, constitutionalising rights of secession may serve as a strategy to prevent parties from 
issuing unjust blackmail. It may potentially overcome the problems that can lead to secession. 
It may undermine democratic equality, especially in a society already characterised by 
inequalities of wealth and power. This right will eventually incentivise secessionist 
incitement on the part of nationalist entrepreneurs, which may undermine political stability 
and obstruct ordinary politics. However, the existence of a constitutional right of secession 
gives no guarantee that secession could be particularly achieved in a legitimate and peaceable 
way. Because, such secession provisions can always be designed and influenced by the 
central government, in such a way that the secession of a political unit with constitutional 
status, like a State or province, is made virtually impossible. On the other hand, the 
government can always choose to use force against secessionists, to prevent them from the 
withdrawal of the State.  
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3.4. Remedial Earned Sovereignty (RES) as an alternative remedial 
approach to the right of self-determination  
 
There are believed to be over fifty sovereignty-based conflicts throughout the world.891 The 
majority of these conflicts entail a high degree of violence, and a number of these conflicts 
are associated with territory and self-determination.892 The international community has 
generally failed to respond adequately to these conflicts, and in many instances may have 
participated in further violence. To remedy this, the international community is facilitating a 
new evolving process where sovereignty exists as a framework with a range of different 
sovereign statuses as part of the continuum.893 
The international community realises the notion of ‘sovereignty’, but inherent difficulties 
exist with the term.894 In the Corfu Channel case, Judge Alvarez pointed out that ‘by 
sovereignty, we understand the whole body of rules and attributes which a State possesses in 
its territory, to the exclusion of all other States, and also in its relations with other States’.895 
Crawford on the other hand observed that, in its most modern usage, sovereignty is the term 
for the ‘totality of international rights and duties recognised by international law, as residing 
in an independent territorial unit’.896 The term Crawford argued, is not itself a right, nor is it a 
                                                          
891 Countries involved in violent sovereignty-based conflicts include for example  Russia, China, Spain,  France, 
the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Macedonia, Sudan,  Israel, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, 
Turkey, Mexico, Morocco, and the Philippines. See, Michael P Scharf and James R Hooper Paul R Williams, 
'Resolving Sovereignty-Based Conflicts: The Emereging Approach Of Earned Sovereignty' (2011) 31 Denv J 
Int’l L & Pol'y 349. In addition, [Over one third of the Specially Designated Global Terrorists identified by the 
US Department of Treasury are associated with self-determination movements. Of increasing concern is the 
globalization of terrorism arising from sovereignty-based conflicts in terms of methods, mission, and 
cooperation. For example, while the Tamil Tigers have limited their attacks to the Island of Sri Lanka, they are 
credited with the dubious accomplishment of perfecting a method of suicide bombing that has been widely 
replicated in other conflicts. Further, the chronic status of the Israel/Palestine conflict has fostered a wave of 
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means of political expression]. See, Williams and Pecci, 'Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap Between 
Sovereignty and Self-Determination' (n 74).   
892 See, 'US Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Cumulative List of Recent OFAC 
Actions' (2002)< Http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/OFAC-Recent-
Actions.aspx> accessed 25 February 2014. 
893 For more details see, P R Williams and K Heymann, 'Earned Sovereignty: An Emerging Conflict Resolution 
Approach' (2004) 10 ISLA J Int’l & Com L 437.  
894 L M Graham, 'Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples After Kosovo: Translating Self-Determination into 
Practice and into Peace' (2000) 6 ILSA J Int’l & Comp L 455. (Stating that redefining sovereignty will be "the 
defining issue in international law for the 21st century"). It is also argued that (discussing the conflict in the 
defining the term sovereignty and the implications of the definition) See, Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty and 
Self-Determination The Accommodation of Conflict Rights (n 174) 14-15.  
895 Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v Albania) (9 April 1949) ICJ Rep, Para 39.  
896 See, Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (n 3) 32. 
162 
 
criterion of statehood; it is an attribute of States, not a precondition, ‘but a firmly established 
description of statehood’.897 As a legal term, ‘sovereignty refers to the totality of powers that 
States may have under international law. Conversely, as a political term, its concepts are 
those of unrestricted authority and power and it is in such discourse that the term can be 
problematic’.898  Similarly, Raič argued 'denotes the totality of competences attributed to the 
State by the international legal system, that is, the State's status of full international legal 
person’.899 Hence, the term, as observed by Crawford is ‘a brief term for the State's attribute 
of more-or-less plenary competence’.900 On the other hand, Raič pointed out that, the term 
‘independence’ ‘is often used as a synonym for State sovereignty, while the word 
independence is also employed to describe a criterion for statehood and vice versa’.901  
However, Brownile argued that ‘if only for reasons of juridical clarity, it must be deemed 
favourable to use the term 'independence' as a requirement for the acquisition of statehood, 
and sovereignty as the legal incident’.902 Thus, when one refers to a State as a 'sovereign' 
entity, Raič argued, ‘one in fact alludes to a full international legal person, that is to say, to an 
entity, which possesses statehood’.903 Therefore, Crawford demonstrated that ‘it has correctly 
been observed that no further legal consequences attach to sovereignty than attach to 
statehood itself’.904  
In addition, Krasner argued that the concept of sovereignty is not an ‘inseparable set of rules’ 
as we often witness it deployed to define the position of unrecognised entities; but it is a 
rather a more complex and evolutionary system for interactions between actors in 
international society.905 His conclusion is illustrated in 2011 papers, the complexity of 
sovereignty as a historical concept within international relations, by identifying sovereignty 
as being far removed from representing a static, conventional norm. He wrote that:  
 [New rules could emerge in an evolutionary way because of trial and error by rational but myopic    
actors. However, these arrangements, for instance, international policing, are likely to coexist with rather 
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900 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (n 3) 32-33. 
901 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (n 254) 27. 
902 Brownlie, Principle of Public International Law (n 269) 76. 
903  Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (n 254) 27. 
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905 S D Krasner, 'Abiding Sovereignty' (2001) 22 Int’l PS Rev 248. See also, Stephen D Krasner, Sovereignty: 
Organized Hypocrisy (PUP 1999) 9-25 (Explaining the four meanings of sovereignty that Krasner describes 
This section is concerned with what Krasner labels ‘International Legal Sovereignty’. 
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than supplant conventional sovereign structures. Sovereignty’s resilience is, if nothing else, a reflection of 
its tolerance for alternatives].906 
Accordingly, this 'tolerance for alternative' at the heart of the question of sovereignty 
reinforces some of the core hypotheses which propose that it is not the object (apropos 
sovereignty) which is of primary importance for solving the many theoretical problems 
concerning ambiguous state-like entities.  
In many instances, either an entity is sovereign and independent, or it is not, and, therefore, 
has no sovereign rights.907 Problems arise however because solutions to conflicts cannot turn 
on such a black-or-white distinction.908 In fact, in the past few years, the nature of conflicts, 
has led to an expansion of the concept of sovereignty.909 However, the propensity of 
international lawyers to adhere to a narrow understanding of the term sovereignty remains. 
Therefore, in conflict negotiations, the parties often have a difficult time understanding that a 
different level of sovereignty can be gained at varying phases, not necessarily always leading 
to total independence or statehood.910 Simply, parties may walk away from negotiations, 
because they cannot get past the use of the term sovereignty.911  
Today, sovereignty is evolving into a set of powers that may be granted and refused. 
Although, the traditional legal rules of sovereignty generally control, innovative approaches 
are emerging. The intensity and severity of sovereignty-based conflicts, their relationship to 
increasing levels of terrorism, and the lack of effective legal norms and principles have given 
rise to the need for a new approach to resolving sovereignty-based conflicts.912 A new 
approach, called ' Remedial Earned Sovereignty' (RES) has evolved.913 According to this 
approach, a self-determination seeking people must have demonstrated to the outside world 
that it is worthy of achieving statehood and that it has ‘earned’ its sovereignty. This approach 
                                                          
906 Krasner, 'Abiding Sovereignty' (n 905). 
907 (noting the absolute quality that some writers give to the term "sovereignty") see,  Hannum, Autonomy, 
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provides that, a people in a particular territory must show to the international community that 
it has already been ruled and administrated separately from its parent State, which has 
facilitated power sharing between the people and the parent State, and which has engaged in 
institution building and capacity-development for self-determination seeking people. Most 
importantly, such group must have shown that their central government is relatively weak and 
causing violence and unrest, and that its independence was needed to preserve or re-establish 
peace and security.  
Accordingly, the idea of RES is that a breakaway entity does not merit recognition as a new 
State immediately after its separation or quest to separate from its mother State, but that such 
an entity needs to earn its sovereignty.914 In other words, ‘RES’ implies  that only those 
peoples who have struggled for independence through legitimate means, by engaging in 
responsible arrangement with the State, and that have proven to external States that they 
would be a reliable new sovereign partner, will ultimately become sovereign States. In other 
words, those people that have been classified as violent and that have arguably used illegal 
means to assure their independence, would not be able to benefit from RES, examples would 
be Chechnya, Northern Cyprus, and The Republic of Srpska. Accordingly, for a legitimate 
claim to statehood, people must have shown to the international community that they can 
function and behave as a good world citizen. That political entity should have sovereignty. 
Finally, such an entity must have enjoyed significant support from the international 
community mainly from the great powers. Thus, the role of super power States would be 
fundamental for a successful ES process, as they exert influence and pressure on the parent 
State to let go of secessionist people. ‘RES’ as a conflict resolution process demonstrates that 
a new player on the international scene needs to show to the outside world that it is worthy of 
achieving statehood and that it has earned its sovereignty. Today, the need of this approach is 
required, in part, to the irrelevance and inadequacy of existing international principles and 
legal norms, including the right of self-determination of peoples.  As a way to facilitate status 
determination, RES can promote and ensure human rights, minority rights, and the creation of 
valid democratic structures. In other words, as a remedial approach to the external right of 
self-determination, RES can be considered as the most useful viable mechanism, based on the 
long-term success and minimization of short-term violence. 
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In 2007, Malanczuk concluded that, although rooted in sources of international law, thus far 
the international community has only applied ‘ES' prospectively in peace agreements and has 
not yet made such normative theories treaties or customary international law.915 Since then, 
ES, as a conflict-resolution approach, has become a tool for resolving the centuries-old 
tension between self-determination and sovereignty by managing the devolution of sovereign 
authority and functions from a State to a sub-state entity.916 As developed in recent State 
practice ‘ES’ as a technique for conflict resolution or management entails conditional and 
progressive devolution of sovereign powers and authority from a State to a sub-state entity 
under international supervision.917 For example, the sub-state entity may acquire sufficient 
sovereign authority and functions, which will then enable it to seek international recognition. 
Alternatively, in others the sub-state entity may be granted sufficient authority and functions 
to enable it to operate within a stable system of internal autonomy.918 The concept of ‘ES’ 
enables negotiation on both external and internal sovereign rights.919 For example, the sub-
state entity may not have the ability to defend itself externally or have sovereign immunity, 
but it does have the legal right to govern itself, by making laws, impose taxes, could sign 
international agreements, and be represented in international organisations.   
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3.4.1. Debates on ‘sovereignty first’ approaches and ‘self-determination first’ 
approaches  
 
Williams and Pecci argued that traditional approaches to resolve sovereignty based-conflicts 
can be characterised as either 'sovereignty first' approaches or 'self-determination first' 
approaches.920 The 'sovereignty first' approach is based primarily upon the principle of 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.921 Here, sovereignty is 
considered as the essential element of the political existence of a State, and forms the basis 
for international relations. Hence, Beitz argued that, sovereignty is the exclusive jurisdiction 
of a State to exercise political authority within its borders and to exercise all necessary rights 
to preserve its territorial integrity from internal and external threats.922 This approach is often 
adopted by mediators for appeasing aggressor regimes, for example, the preference of the UN 
Secretary General for a negotiated outcome and his aversion to the use of force against 
aggression in the former Yugoslavia.923 It is firmly rooted in the UN Charter provisions on 
peaceful settlement of disputes.924 The ‘self-determination first’ approach is based on the 
legal principles relating to self-determination and the protection of human rights.925 This 
approach is evolved within the context of decolonisation, is based upon the principle that 
dependent peoples are entitled to exercise self-determination.926 Accordingly, ‘all self-
identified groups with a coherent identity and connection to a defined territory are entitled to 
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collectively determine their political destiny in a democratic fashion and to be free from 
systematic persecution’.927 Self-government is generally achieved though the creation of an 
autonomy province within the parent State, or though secession in certain circumstances. In 
this regard, States eager to preserve their territorial integrity rely on the 'sovereignty first' 
approach, and secessionist movements rely on the 'self-determination first' approach. 
Examples from human rights abuses committed by parent States in the course of preserving 
their sovereignty and territorial integrity, the violation of Kurdish human rights in Iraq and 
Turkey, the Russian aggression in Chechnya, Southern Sudan, Kosovo, and Indonesia's brutal 
occupation of East Timor.  
In fact, these two approaches have failed to provide acceptable options for structuring 
peaceful resolutions to conflicts based on claims of sovereignty. The problem with strictly 
adopting the ‘sovereignty first’ approach is that it can justify the actions of regimes that 
pursue unlawful action against their own people under the auspices of maintaining territorial 
integrity and sovereignty.928 For example, the mantra of sovereignty has been used by States 
to shield themselves from international action resulting from human rights abuses committed 
as part of their attempts to stifle self-determination movements.929 On the other hand, the 
‘self-determination first’ approach can be criticised as well. The approach has been abused in 
the past and is often used by oppressed groups to justify violence, and sometimes outside 
self-determination context. In other words, the ‘self-determination first' approach  if it is to 
work needs to be dependent on the sub-sate entity to support a claim for heightened 
autonomy or secession, and to justify the use of force to defend its people against  the parent 
State.930 For example, ‘the mantra of self-determination has been used to justify the use of 
armed force, and frequently terrorism, by groups such as the Tamil Tigers, the Free Aceh 
Movement, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front in 
their efforts to achieve greater autonomy within or independence from the parent State.931  
For that reason, the ‘RES' approach seeks to bridge the inherent flaws with the self-
determination first' approach and the 'sovereignty first' approach, and to create an opportunity 
to resolve the conflicts and reduce human rights violations.   
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3.4.2. The concept of ‘Earned Sovereignty’   
 
The concept of ‘earned sovereignty’ was initially developed by the Public International Law 
and Policy Group (PILPG) and the International Crisis Group (ICG) in 1998, as a policy 
prescription and conflict resolution strategy for Kosovo. Then it has become a core element 
of the Rambouillet Peace Accords and UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Building on the 
remedial position, their 1998 report before of the NATO intervention, reasoned that Kosovars 
were entitled to heightened sovereignty because of past abuses by the Serbian Regime. 
However, they were required to ‘earn full sovereignty at the end of an interim period by 
demonstrating their commitment to democratic self-government, to the protection of human 
rights, and the promotion of regional security’.932 They required accordingly that the 
international community should intervene and oversee a three-to-five-year period of 
transition. During this transitional period, Kosovo would assume increasing levels of 
sovereign authority and functions, so long as it met certain conditions.933 The approach was 
described as an 'intermediate sovereignty', thereafter; it was referred to as ‘phased 
recognition’, ‘provisional statehood’, ‘conditional independence’, ‘supervised 
independence’.934 Thereafter, a number of expert commissions and think tanks further 
developed the approach, including the Goldstone Commission for Kosovo, the Centre for 
Strategic and International Studies, the International Crisis Group and the current UN 
doctrine of Standards before Status. Accordingly, ES was refined in response to 
developments in Kosovo, seven contemporaneous ‘sovereignty conflicts’ also drew on 
elements of earned sovereignty in efforts to deal with their disputes.935 Thus, through its 
application and development, the ‘ES’ approach competed for influence with the alternative 
approach of stability through accommodation and was shaped by the compromises inherent in 
the foreign policy decision-making process.936  
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933 ibid. 
934 ibid. 
935 As it has been mentioned the territories in question were Serbia and Montenegro, Bougainville, Northern 
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details see,  P R Williams, M P Scharf, J R Hooper, ‘Resolving Sovereignty-Based Conflicts: The Emereging 
Approach Of Earned Sovereignty’ (2011) 31 Denv J Int’l L & Pol'y 349.  
936 Williams, 'Earned Sovereignty: The Road to Resolving the Conflict over Kosovo’s Final Status' (n 916). 
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ES is described as entailing ‘the conditional and progressive devolution of sovereign powers 
and authority from a State to sub-state entity under international supervision’.937 Defined as 
comprising three core elements (shared sovereignty, institutional building, and a 
determination of final status), and there optional elements, phased sovereignty, conditional 
sovereignty and constrained sovereignty.938 In addition, Williams and Heymann have defined 
ES as a conflict resolution process that creates an opportunity for the parties to agree on basic 
requirements that sub-state entity must meet during an intermediate phase in order to attain or 
discuss final status.939 The need for this approach to solving sovereignty-based conflict is 
required, in part, to the irrelevance and inadequacy of existing international principles and 
legal norms, including the right of self-determination of peoples. In addition, as a way to 
facilitate status determination, ES can also promote and ensure human rights, minority rights, 
and the creation of valid democratic structures.  
Heymann suggested that, as a form of conflict resolution, ES allows the parties to agree on 
basic requirements that the sub-state must meet before the parent State will grant various 
sovereign powers, such as the right to govern and sign international instruments.940 Williams 
argued that, as a formula for progressive devolution of power, it could allow for greater 
negotiation power regarding democratic principles and the protection of human rights, 
because the sub-state is capable of exercising sovereign powers while ensuring democracy 
and human rights.941 Moreover, ES could protect minority rights by conditioning the grant of 
full sovereignty or further grant of individual sovereign powers on the protection of these 
rights.942 It is also supports the building of feasible democratic structures for popular 
representation of the people.943  
ES as a negotiated process has evolved without name or structure through its use by 
international negotiators and State parties to agreements. Examples given of recent 
precedents to support the argument that there is an emerging State practice and therefore, a 
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legal basis for ES, range from peace agreements in Northern Ireland and East Timor, Kosovo 
and Bosnia-Hercegovina,944 the Western Sahara (the Baker Plan)945 and the peace proposal 
for Israel/Palestine the so called (Roadmap).946 In Kosovo, the (‘UNMIK’) supported the use 
of ES when it laid out its ‘standards before status approach’. The two central statements of 
the approach were that a return to Serbian control was not in Kosovo's future, and that 
UNMIK would establish a set of ‘benchmarks’ that Kosovar institutions must meet’.947 Thus, 
in recent years, Scharf, Hooper and Williams argued that, the increasing number of States and 
sub-state entities willing to consider a process of ES for resolving self-determination conflicts 
is corresponded by the increasing ability of the international community to help States in 
institution building and transfer of sovereign powers and authority.948 For example, the UN 
with the creation of mechanisms to ensure the protection of human rights and implementation 
of the rule of law, while the EU is now possesses a significant experience with the creation of 
new State institutions.    
Overall, the new approach of ‘RES’ seeks to address the inherent flaws with the ‘sovereignty 
first’ approach and the ‘self-determination first’ approach.949 Accordingly, the idea of the 
concept of ‘ES’ is that a break-away entity does not merit recognition as a new state 
immediately after its separation or quest to separate from its mother state, but that such an 
entity needs to earn its sovereignty. In other words, the break-way entity must demonstrate to 
the outside world that it is capable of functioning as independent State, that would be a 
reliable sovereign partner, and that it is worthy of recognition.     
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3.4.3. Earned sovereignty elements   
 
As a dispute settlement approach, ES seeks to promote peaceful coexistence between a State 
and sub-state entity by establishing an acceptable power sharing arrangement, and promoting 
democracy and institution building in a disputed territory. Most importantly, ES may prevent 
the majority in a State from using a guise of State sovereignty and territorial integrity to 
justify committing horrible acts against the sub-state entity or the minority. It may also 
address some of the inherent problems with strict application of the self-determination first 
approach. This approach has been refined as an inherently fixable process implemented over 
a different period. Accordingly, as mentioned earlier ES is defined as comprising three core 
elements, shared sovereignty, institution building, and a determination of final status.950 It 
may also encompass three optional elements: phased sovereignty, conditional sovereignty, 
and constrained sovereignty.951 These optional elements have been employed to tailor the ES 
process to the particular needs of the parties and to the exceptional circumstances of each 
conflict, such as conditional and constrained sovereignty.952 Thus, as a peace process ES can 
be implemented in there ways: 
First: this approach endorses the international supervision of the self-determination unit both 
before and after sovereignty is achieved. In Kosovo, in pre-sovereignty phase ES prescribes 
an internationally monitored initial period of ‘shared sovereignty’ between the sub-state and 
the parent State or international institution.953 In this stage, the State and sub-state entity may 
exercise sovereign authority and function over a defined territory.954 The international 
community may occasionally exercise sovereign authority and functions rather to or in lieu of 
the parent State.955 Hence, Williams argued that, an international institution will be 
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responsible for monitoring the parties’ exercise of their authority and functions.956 Whereas, 
in the post-sovereignty phase, William and Pecci demonstrated that, the element of so-called 
constrained sovereignty that may be deployed to place ‘limitation on the sovereignty 
authority and functions of the new State’.957 For example, the Roadmap plan establishes a 
timetable for the possible creation of an independent Palestinian State subject to an enhanced 
international role in monitoring transition with the active, sustained, and operational support 
of the Quartet.958 In Kosovo, the Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General has 
recommended that ‘Kosovo Status should be independence, to be supervised for an initial 
period by the international community’.959 More radically, Drew argued that, the 2007 
‘Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement’ ‘set forth a basic formwork for 
governing a post-independent Kosovo, the implementation of which is to be monitored’960 by 
‘international civilian military presence’.961  
A second feature of the ES approach is the optional element of ‘conditional sovereignty’, or 
‘conditional independence’. Hopper and Williams argued that, sovereignty refers to the fact 
that the sub-state entity must meet certain benchmarks, such as protecting human rights, 
developing democracy, respecting the rule of law, and supporting regional stability, before its 
sovereignty may be increased.962 In Kosovo, the Independent Commission of Kosovo Report 
and encapsulated in UNMIK’s catchy (in popular) slogan, ‘Standards before Status’.963 This 
approach renders the exercise of self-determination conditional on self-determination unit 
meeting certain benchmarks such as ‘halting terrorism, instituting rule of law, protecting 
minority rights, and human rights, and promoting regional stability.964 It rather suspends any 
discussion of final status until after certain standards are met.965 For example, under the 
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Roadmap, ‘progress towards the creation of an independent Palestinian State depends on the 
Palestinians meeting a certain conditions relating to the cessation of violence and terrorism, 
constitutional reform, restructuring of the security services, elections, and so forth’.966 
A third, way in which the approach of ES can be implemented is the determination of final 
status for the sub-state entity, involves either a referendum to determine such final status, or a 
negotiated settlement between the mother-state and the sub-state entity, with the help of 
international mediation.967 William and Pecci argued: ‘The options for final status range from 
substantial autonomy to full independence. This decision is generally made through either 
some sort of referendum or instructed negotiations, but invariably involves the consent of the 
international community’.968 Examples of peace agreements, which suggest referenda, 
include those for, Montenegro, Sothern Sudan, as well as the Baker Plan for Western Sahara. 
Examples of agreements, which provide for structured negotiations include, the Road Map, 
and the Rambouillet Accord in relation to Kosovo.969 Accordingly, Drew argued that,  a 
review of the final status determination of the peace agreements and proposal, which endorse, 
and were endorsed by, an ES approach reveals a ‘tipsy topsy’ ‘world legally speaking, in 
which entities with no recognised right to external self-determination have been granted a 
right to a referendum including independent statehood as an option’.970 For instance, under 
the Road Map, the Palestinians are recognised as entitled to the fullest expression of the right 
to self-determination under international law are conditionally entitled to negotiate a 
settlement that ‘will result in the emergence of an independent, democratic, and viable 
Palestinian State’.971 In many instances, the parties may agree upon final status during the 
initial stages of the process, such as in East Timor, whereas in others such as Kosovo it may 
be determined after a period of shared sovereignty and institutional building. Ultimately, the 
final status will be determined by a referendum, it may also be determined through a 
negotiated settlement between the State and sub-state entity, often with international 
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mediation.972  Thus, once the final status has been determined, Hooper and Williams argued, 
‘constrained sovereignty applies limitations on the sovereign authority and functions of the 
new State, such as continued international administration and/or military presence, and limits 
on the right of the State to undertake territorial association with other States’.973 Williams and 
Pecci pointed out that, ‘the core and optional elements of earned sovereignty should be 
adopted by mutual consent’. However, they acknowledged that, in some cases, as in the case 
of Kosovo the international community may impose these elements against the will of the 
host State or sub-state entity.974   
The supporters of ES argue that, the consideration of sovereign rights as individual 
negotiating points and the ability to consider and discuss the elements allows the flexibility in 
negotiation to solve this problem.975 In addition, it is clear that the approach requires 
conclusive discussions regarding the powers the sub-state will initially hold, the speed with 
specified powers would devolve, and the determination of final status.976 For instance, it is 
obvious that the immediate discussions on Kosovo’s status was affected Serbia and this 
would potentially create an opportunity for reigniting violence.977 The second argument 
against the use of ‘ES’ is the domino theory. States and scholars worry that allowing phased 
sovereignty and conditional independence for sub-state entity would induce a fight for similar 
results in other multi-ethnic State. The Kosovo Commission maintained, however, that 
conditional independence in Kosovo would not give rise to the domino theory, arguing that 
‘ES’ is a legal rule that simply is not applicable to every fact situation.978 Consequently, 
without parameters in each case, it is too easy for the agreement to cause further conflict in 
the future.979 Moreover, it is argued that, from a traditional self-determination perspective the 
method of final status determination ignores the distinction between the different categories 
of self-determination claims and beneficiaries under international law, between 
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decolonisation, alien occupation, and secession; between the Palestinians and Sahrawi and 
the Kosovars.980 Consequently, there is an erosion of legal entitlements.   
Therefore, in order to overcome the weakness of ES the collaboration between the party 
seeking independence and the parent State is required. In addition, as explained earlier that 
‘remedial secession’ provides a theoretical framework for evaluating the root causes of the 
governance and sovereignty problems emanating from the gross violations of human rights, 
and the violation of internal rights to self-determination including the abolition of autonomy. 
However, remedial secession provides limited guidance in resolving the problems it so 
accurately predicts.981 This gap is filled by ES, which identified sex elements for analysis. 
Although, they overlap Bolton and Visoka argued, ‘a cautious application of these elements 
to Kosovo facilitates a comprehensive analysis of the different phases and shifting focus of 
the international administration of Kosovo, including supervised independence’.982 
Nevertheless, ES does not address violations of internal self-determination and human rights 
abuses, these conditions constitute the root of the problem that ES aims to resolve.  
Accordingly, the causal factors and conclusion of sub-state’s entity path towards successful 
legitimate independence can be explained by what we describe as ‘Remedial Earned 
Sovereignty’ (RES). Under this deviant approach, people in a sub-state entity may have to 
earn their internal sovereignty first. This refers to the efforts of people within a sub-state 
entity to comply with all conditional mechanisms to achieve the statehood capacities and to 
engage in good faith with final status negotiations. Eventually, this can be facilitated 
externally by independent sovereign States by the act of recognition. Externally, designed 
sovereignty relates to the set of norms and actions imposed by international administration in 
order to create the political, social, and economic infrastructure whereby the entity 
consolidates its statehood abilities with the capacity to make law, functioning democratic 
institution, a self-reliant market economy and contribute to regional stability. However, for 
constructing a long-term resolution of the self-determination seeking group dispute several 
considerations can be made. First, either domestic law or the federal constitution would need 
to make some provision for secession, whether through adoption of legislation specifically 
allowing it or some other methods. Secondly, it is necessary that there be a creation of 
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mechanisms for joint co-operation between the sub-state entity government and the parent 
State government. Third, the making of specific commitments on the part of the sub-state 
entity and the parent State is required, in the area of human rights and minority rights, and 
engaging in a series of defined confidence building measures. The final requirement is the 
preparation for status determination with possible assistance of the international community. 
Most importantly, the determination of the international mechanism would be based on self-
determination seeking group’s compliance with the commitments undertaken during the 
interim period, take into consideration parent State's compliance with its commitments as 
well, and the results of referendum held in sub-state entity.  
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3.5. Guidelines for the Recognition of Entities Created Through Secession 
After Exercise of the Right to Self-Determination.  
 
While self-determination is known as a right under international law, scholars disagree 
whether the right includes a right of secession and if so, under which circumstances. It is true 
that international law provides for a right to independent statehood in the context of 
decolonisation. Whereas outside the context of decolonisation it has been argued that, the 
right has to be exercised within the boundaries of the existing State.983 In this regard, the 
Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec case held that ‘the exercise of any self-determination 
right ‘must be sufficiently limited to prevent threats to an existing State’s territorial integrity 
or the stability of relations between sovereign States’.984 However, it is still questionable 
whether some groups may be entitled to full independent and statehood under certain 
conditions. For example, secession may be accepted in cases where it constitutes a group's 
only option to protect itself from gross human right violations committed by an oppressive 
State, as the case of South Sudan and Kosovo. Thus, despite the disagreement over the status 
of secession within international law and UN system, Kohen argued, ‘when secession 
actually occurs, international law imposes certain rules with regard to the procedural aspects 
of the creation of States, the territorial scope, governance, human rights and State 
succession’.985  
On the other hand, it cannot be argued today that international law prohibits secession. It 
cannot be denied that international law permits secession.986 There is a privilege of secession 
recognised in international law and the law imposes no duty not to secede. In recent years, 
State practice has shown that no rule in international law contained prohibition of 
declarations of independence unilateral secession. Accordingly, an entity may exercise its 
right of independence, on any matter, even if there is no specific rule of international law 
permitting it to do so. In these instances, an entity has a wide measure of discretion, which is 
only limited by the prohibitive rules of international law.987  
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In the Quebec case, the Supreme Court of Canada held that: ‘The right to secede and the 
possibility that a certain secession, once factually established, creates legal effects at 
international level were two different matters from a legal point of view. If the purported 
secession of Quebec was declared in defiance of the Canadian Constitutional principles, 
democratic principles, federal principle, rule of law, and the fundamental principles of the 
international community, respect Human rights, peaceful settlement of the disputes...etc..’.  
The process would most likely be seen as illegitimate and gain only limited if any recognition 
in the international community’.988 The Court goes so far as to state that: ‘one of the legal 
norms which may be recognised by States in granting or withholding recognition of emergent 
States is the legitimacy by which the de facto secession is, or was, being pursued.’989  
In this regard, Franck argued that: ‘it cannot seriously be argued today that international law 
prohibits secession. It cannot seriously be denied that international law permits secession. 
There is a privilege of secession recognised in international law and the law imposes no duty 
not to secede’.990 Therefore, the legal vacuum might confer as a positive entitlement to 
secede; peoples have a right, understood as a privilege, to secession.  
Buchheit has defined legitimacy through two criteria. First, the internal merit of the claim, 
which refers to the criteria for effectiveness of the self-determination unit, such as the ethnic 
and social cohesiveness, the occupation of a distinct territory and the economic viability of a 
future state. Second, the disruption factor: this refers to the potential threat of the secession 
for regional and international peace and security.991 On the other hand, Roepstorff argued 
that, secession can be legitimate if it was as a remedy of last resort for large-scale, persistent 
violations of basic human rights of a particular group residing on a particular territory.992 
Under this view, other States are required to recognise the new political entity as having all 
rights and privileges, immunities and obligations this status entails. Rather, Buchanan argued 
that, before the new political entity should be recognised as a legitimate State, it is required 
for the new entity to provide a credible assurance that it will respect the rights of minorities 
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within its territory.993 Thus, it seems scholars to envisage legitimacy built within an 
international legal framework as being pre-conditional to secession. Apparently, when it 
comes to the question of legitimacy of secession, scholars differentiate between consensual 
and unilateral secession. Roepstorff argued that, ‘cases of consensual secession are less 
disputed than cases of unilateral secession and do not raise the same legal and moral 
problems’.994 Accordingly, most scholars agree that the cases of unilateral secession are more 
controversial and more likely to escalate into a secessionist conflict.  
Even if there is no right, under the constitution or at international law to unilateral secession, 
this does not rule out the possibility of an unconstitutional declaration of independence 
leading to a de facto secession. The ultimate success of such secession would be dependent 
on recognition by the international community, which is likely to consider the legality and 
legitimacy of secession.995 In other words, if an entity fails to secede from its parent State in 
democratic fashion, through either a constitutional framework or essential agreement within 
the State, an entity then must demonstrate to the outside world that it’s capable to functioning 
as an independent entity, and earn its ‘internal sovereignty’, such sovereignty then can be 
facilitated externally by an independent sovereign States by the act of recognition.  
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3.5.1. Modern Day Guidelines for the Recognition of Entities Created After 
Exercise of the Right to Self-Determination: The Criteria that a Self-
Determination Seeking Group Must Fulfil In Order to be Able to 
Legitimately Gain Some Degree of Self-Determination.  
 
Drawing from present-day international law, the aforementioned arguments and theories of 
secession, and the admittedly erratic practice of States in this area, it is clearly important for a 
would-be State to be able to obtain international legitimisation. It is, after all, a territorial 
anomaly. I propose the following principled guidance for States in dealing with post-colonial 
situations where a people seek to exercise the external aspect of the right to self-
determination through secession; these obviously also serve as guidance to would-be States 
as to what they need to be or to have in order to gain the desired legitimisation.  It should be 
observed that this guidance is not necessary when the parent State has consented to the 
secession.  
1. A ‘people’ 
The group in question is indeed a ‘people’ entitled to the right to self-determination.  
For a group to be entitled to a right to collectively determine its political destiny, it must 
possess a focus of identity sufficient for it to attain distinctiveness as a people.996 In addition, 
such ‘people’ should have a homeland or being linked to a specific territory.  
2. An exceptional situation  
The right to self-determination has been grossly violated within the existing framework of the 
State. The situation must be exceptionally serious.  
The self-determination seeking group must prove that it has been oppressed, that its central 
government consistently and flagrantly violates human rights of the people concerned, and 
that they have been blocked from meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination 
internally.  Accordingly, the degree of oppression and suffering of the separatist people by its 
parent State plays a determinative role in self-determination quests.  
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3. Responsible behaviour 
The would-be entity has behaved responsibility within the existing framework of the State, 
including in consideration of the rights and entitlements of other groups within the larger 
unit, and has not itself violated any fundamental rights in the course of the dispute. If it has 
used force, it must have used force within the limits of the law of armed conflict and 
international human rights law. For successful legitimate secession, the self-determination 
seeking group must show the legality of its declaration of independence. Territorial illegality 
arises under a serious breach of certain fundamental norms of international law, in particular 
jus cogens, [for instance, the use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general 
international law].997  Where declaration of independence is issued in violation to jus cogens, 
it is illegal and other State under Articles 40 and 41 of ILC Articles on State Responsibility 
have a duty to withhold recognition. 
4. Either secession is the only option, or the option of secession is the choice of the 
majority of the population in the entity [obviously can’t be both] 
a. Secession is the only option 
All efforts at negotiation within that internal framework have failed and the continued 
relationship is impossible. There are no other realistic and effective remedies - secession is 
the only solution to the problem. In other words, if the central government has engaged in a 
consistent policy of ethnic war, remedial criteria would conclude that the self-determination 
seeking group has the moral right to secede. In this case, secession must be the only remedy 
to exercise it by secession (to remedy the harm). In a like manner, in the case of Quebec 
where the Canadian government has granted procedural equality and vast autonomy, no 
moral claim to any somewhat hard, external self-determination. 
b. Choice  
Secession should be the choice of the majority of the population in the entity in question. In 
this regard, public consultation would be essential for successful free democratic choice, 
having a mandate from the people to pursue certain political steps including the final one of 
                                                          
997 The ICJ in Kosovo advisory Opinion states that ‘the illegality attached to some other declarations of 
independence… stemmed not from the unilateral character of these declarations as such, but from the fact that 
they were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms 
of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character jus cogens’. See,  The  Kosovo 
Advisory Opinion, Para 81. 
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self-determination through secession. In other words, there must be a consensual agreement 
for independence. The best way for a population concentrated on a territory to make such a 
choice is, without any doubt, through a referendum or a plebiscite of all eligible voters.  
5. Capacity for self-governance and ability to provide and protect 
The entity must be able to demonstrate capacity for self-governance. It must be able to meet 
the basic requirements of, and provide essential protections to, those within its jurisdiction. 
The entity must show that it is functioning separately of the parent State going beyond the 
federal structure, is the level of independence such that there is a ‘de facto’ state within a 
State–it is on a separate path–political, cultural, economic, linguistic, social, etc… [From the 
parent State].  In other words, a people that chose to exercise an external right to self-
determination may need to demonstrate to the outside world that it satisfies the criteria of 
statehood, and function as an independent sovereign State. Most importantly, it must 
demonstrate that they are capable of protecting its population from violence, and consider 
itself required and under the obligation in accordance with the human rights conventions and 
United Nations Charter to protect its population from violence.   
6. The entity must demonstrate that its government is committing abuses, and cannot 
properly administer the people’s province or region.  
It is important for the self-determination seeking group to show that its central government is 
unrepresentative, abusive, and relatively weak, and cannot protect and secure its population 
and borders from violence. Consequently, such groups have been marred by violence and 
civil unrest, so that to have any kind of stability they must be allowed to break away.  
7. Contemporary standards of recognition 
In addition to the aforementioned, States should be guided by contemporary standards for 
recognition of States such as respect of human rights; minority rights and contribute to 
regional stability. These require evidence of the following:  
 Respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and Helsinki Final 
Act, respect of minority rights 
 Unconditional commitment to international law and being a ‘good partner’ 
 Effective government  
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 Ability to protect its population and borders 
 Contribution to the regional stability 
 Economic stability, sufficiently, and viability 
 Sharing a democratic values and the rule of law 
 A negotiated determination of new boundaries, and provision of security and 
defence.998 
Finally: and most importantly, the self-determination-seeking people must prove that 
external actors, including the Great Powers, view its struggle as legitimate, and that they are 
ready to embrace it as a new sovereign partner. In other words, peoples whose struggles are 
not viewed as legitimate by the Great Powers will never be able to garner Security Council 
support for the creation of some form of an international administration within their region.999  
Thus, for an entity seeking to join the family of nation-States it is important to rely more on 
the compliance with other fundamental principles of international law to justify legitimisation 
of a territorial situation produced by the act of secession. It must have proven their viability 
by establishing [rightful authorities], and with that have earned its sovereignty. It must then 
demonstrate that it merits recognition by external actors, and that it will be a reliable 
legitimate State on global sense. In addition, they should provide credible assurances that it 
will respect the rights of minorities within its territory. Eventually, such group must show that 
their quest warrants respect, and that their proposed territorial units should be treated as 
sovereign entities. Consequently, the international community including the Super-Power 
States may recognise the new political entity as having all the rights, immunities, privileges, 
powers, and obligations this status entails.  
Under RES approach, the primary aim is cooperation between the party seeking 
independence and the parent State. The process has two requirements. First, the parent State 
constitution and domestic law would need to make some provision for secession—whether 
through adoption of legislation specifically allowing it or some other method. Second, an 
entity would need to engage in ‘principled negotiations’ with the parent State government on 
the issue of independence. Such sort of discussion within the State would need to take to 
                                                          
998 For more details see, ‘European Community: Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the Guidelines on the 
Recognition of New States' (1992) 31 ASIL 1485 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20693758>accessed 20 
November 2013 (n 464). 
999 Sterio, 'On the Right to External Self Determination: ‘Selfistans,’ Secession and the Great Powers’ Rule ' (n 
99).  
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successfully gain independence, including a national referendum, addressing the rights of 
minorities and the interests of an entity and the parent State government. Means, the issue of 
independence within the State, cannot be accomplished without the principled negotiations 
with other participants within the existing constitutional framework.  
Thus, despite there being no rule, under the constitution or at international law, to unilateral 
secession, this does not rule out the possibility of an unconstitutional Declaration of 
Independence leading to a de facto secession. Accordingly, an entity may exercise its right of 
independence, on any matter, even if there is no specific rule of international law permitting 
it to do so. In these instances, an entity has a wide measure of discretion, which is only 
limited by the prohibitive rules of international law. In this regard, international law may 
‘adapt to recognise a political and/or factual reality, regardless of the legality of the steps 
leading to its creation’ draws some support from previous State practice’.1000 In this regard, 
‘if successful in the streets, right will lead to the creation of new State’.1001 Here, the ultimate 
success of secession will depend on recognition by the international community, which is 
likely to consider the legitimacy and legality of secession.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1000 ‘Reference re Secession of Quebec' (n 21) para 141. 
1001 ibid, para 142.  
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3.6. Conclusion     
 
It was argued that, international law does not regulate secession as such because secession is 
a fact. However, scholars have neglected the distinction between secession and a right to 
secession. Significantly, as secession falls in an international ‘free zone’, the international 
legal system is not neutral to the causes and legal consequences of secession. Any 
illegitimacy connected to secession might qualify secession to be unlawful.  
It has been argued that, if a theory of secession is to be of any function and value as guidance 
for international reform, international law must be taken into greater account. Buchanan has 
also shown that the arguments of political theory can be used to justify or prohibit secession, 
to locate the right to secede within the border context of contemporary political theory. 
According to the progressive interpretation of the theories of secession in recent years, the 
principle that the territorial integrity of existing States is not to be violated applies only to 
legitimate States, and not all existing States are legitimate. There is always disagreement 
about how strict the relevant notion of legitimacy is.  
Today, different considerations can count for or against a theory of the right to secede. The 
most urgent and significant task for political theory at this time is to answer the question, 
when and under what circumstances a right of secession may be justified, and may be 
feasible. In other words, which theory of secession is preferable to justify a right of 
secession?   
It was demonstrated that, secession can be a consequence of the exercise of the right to self-
determination. Under the doctrine of remedial secession, existing States have legitimacy 
under international law and have a valid claim to their territory. However, such claim can be 
overridden when the State persistently and seriously violates the rights of groups within the 
State. The idea is that the validity of the State’s claim to territorial integrity cannot be 
sustained when secession is the only remedy that can assure the respect of fundamental rights 
of the group. Thus, large-scale serious and persistent violations of basic human rights and the 
violation of internal rights of self-determination of the groups within a State may be a 
sufficient reason to justify unilateral secession under the doctrine of remedial secession. In 
other words, Buchanan argued that ‘a remedial right only theory legitimises a unilateral 
claim-right to secede only in severe cases of injustice and gross human rights violations and 
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is capable of capturing the reality of competing claims and entitlements’.1002 He further 
emphasised that secession should not result in non-compliance with the territorial integrity 
and the unity of the legitimate state since ‘individual rights, the stability of individuals’ 
expectations, and ultimately their physical security, depend upon the effective enforcement of 
a legal order’.1003  
It was explained that, the proponents of primary right theories, on the other hand, argue that a 
group can have a unilateral right to secede over and above whatever remedial right there may 
be. Primary right theories Buchanan argued; do not make the unilateral claim-right to secede 
derivative of the violation of basic human rights, but as a matter of majority rule. Primary 
right theories include ascriptivist theories as well as associative theories of secession. 
ascriptive characteristics are ascribed to individuals as members of a distinct people who as 
such are entitled to a right to an independent State. Accordingly, Buchanan argued that 
national self-determination theories fall into this category. In contrast, associative-group 
theory requires that a group have any ascriptive characteristic, such as ethnicity or having an 
encompassing culture, even as a necessary condition for having a right to secede. Buchanan 
demonstrated that what ‘confers the right to secede on a group is the voluntary choice of 
members of the group to form an independent State; no grievances are necessary.’ However, 
it is argued that Primary right theories proposed by Buchanan authorise the dismemberment 
of States even when those States are performing what are generally recognised as the 
legitimate sovereign functions. In contrast, remedial right only theories advance a more 
restricted right to secede, they are less of a threat to the territorial integrity of an existing 
State. In other words, remedial approach places major constraints on unilateral secession as 
unilateral secession that requires substantial justification. As such, Buchanan argued that the 
remedial approach allows for a reasonable explanation of how a State can lose its entitlement 
to its territory by balancing competing claims and rights, ‘by not fulfilling its obligations 
towards its citizens, the government loses legitimacy and therewith its legitimate control over 
the territory’.1004  
However, it has been argued that remedial right only theories have been criticised for being 
irrelevant to the concerns of many groups seeking self-determination. It is argued that, in 
                                                          
1002 Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law (n 601). 
1003 Buchanan, 'Theories of Secession' (n 600).  
1004 Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law (n 601) 
354. 
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most cases, nationalism causes the demand for self-determination, not grievances of injustice 
as such. Accordingly, a prima facie right of nations to independent statehood can be 
supported in two ways. First, Buchanan demonstrated that, nations need to have their own 
States in order to be able to protect themselves from external intervention and either form 
forces that threaten their distinctive character, or in order to create a strong and functioning 
political community.1005 Second, it is argued that States need to be mono-national. This 
argument has two aspects; on the one hand, Roepstorff argued that, ‘democracy can only 
function in mono-national States, because multinational States lack trust and solidarity that 
democracy requires for functioning properly.’ However, it can be argued that there are cases 
of multinational democratic States such as Switzerland Canada and Belgium that are stable 
and able to defend themselves from external threats and aggression, and they have democratic 
institutions and successful democratic mechanisms in resolving self-determination issues. 
These examples call into question the ‘argument that each nation needs its own State and 
serious objections can be raised against the argument that States need to be mono-national in 
order to function’.1006 On the other hand, Miller argued that States need to be mono-national 
in order to provide for distributive justice, ‘because distributive justice requires solidarity 
among citizens who are only willing to redistribute wealth if they see each other as members 
of the same nation’.1007 However, these arguments do not justify a general right of all nations 
to full independence and unilateral right to secession. The most reasonable strategy 
Roepstorff argued, ‘would be to ensure that States respect the human rights of their minorities 
and to encourage intrastate autonomy agreements rather than promoting homogeneous 
states’.1008  
In addition, it was examined that the choice theories restrict both the holders of the right of 
secession and the exercise of that right. They have insisted on avoiding certain harmful 
consequences of secession. On the other hand, Democratic theory is a view of legitimate 
power, and locates such power in the people, whereas the logic of liberalism is grounded in 
individual-related values, such as human rights or autonomy. At the same time, Beran’s 
Liberal theories deal not with a loosely defined notion of self-determination but rather with 
the act of secession.  He provided a liberal argument of secession based on the right to free 
political association. However, Beran’s theory has been criticised for being unrealistic, 
                                                          
1005 ibid 383. 
1006 Roepstorff, The Politics of Self-Determination (n 846) 110-111. 
1007 Miller, On Nationality  (n 796)  80-85. 
1008 Roepstorff, The Politics of Self-Determination (n 846) 110-112. 
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Buchanan on the other hand has proposed another liberal approach to secession,1009 derived 
from a variety of moral considerations. The first feature of his theory is that it emphasises 
economic discrimination, and the second feature is the low value that it accords to the 
preservation of cultural, as both relatively strong grounds for secession.1010 Hence, the desire 
to develop a practicable theory of self-determination leads Buchanan towards the remedial 
theory.1011 His theory thus balances between realism and liberalism that is unsympathetic to 
specifically nationalist considerations.  
It was also argued that, Brilmayer’s approach justified separatist claims when they possess a 
legitimate claim to specific territory. She argued that, secession is not simply the formation of 
a new political association among individuals or the refusal by a group of persons of their 
obligation to obey the State’s laws. It is the taking of a part of the territory claimed by an 
existing State. There are however; some issues at stake in her account, such as whether the 
group in question was a distinct ‘people’ in the religious, linguistic, or ethnic sense, and the 
objective validity of the claim that the particular group espouses. Moreover, it is argued that, 
the problem with this approach is that it tends to ignore internal self-determination and 
focuses on the exercise of external self-determination. Besides, secession or total 
independence is not the only or even necessary means of exercising the right of self-
determination, and there is a strong presumption against secession in non-colonial situations. 
To this end, the territorial approach does not discuss how the influence of Great Powers has 
affected the alteration of territory, either to accommodate a people or to preserve the 
territorial status quo of the parent State.  
It was further argued that, all people under the ‘Plebiscite Approach’ are entitled to self-
determination as a matter of right, regardless of their current political status. However, on a 
practical level there are different arguments advanced in support and opposition of this 
approach. It is obvious that an international community would never accept the Plebiscite 
approach, since States are aware of their territorial boundaries. Rather, allowing all people to 
determine their political destiny has the potential to introduce a high level of instability into 
the international system.      
                                                          
1009 Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (n 53) 48. 
1010 ibid 48-51. 
1011 Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination  (n 601).  Also, Buchanan, Self-Determination, 
Secession, and the Rule of International Law' (n 700).  See also, Buchanan, 'Theories of Secession' (n 600). 
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Furthermore, it was demonstrated that liberal democrats are split on whether to 
constitutionalise a right to secession. Sunstein argued against a constitutional right to 
secession because he fears that the right could be used to sabotage the democratic process, 
whereas Norman precisely argued in favour of legalising secession because it could serve to 
sabotage the secession process itself. Buchanan argued that ‘well-designed procedural 
hurdles such as waiting periods or super-majorities, for example through interim settlements, 
can make secession sufficiently difficult to prevent an unacceptable risk of premature exit 
while still making secession possible under appropriate conditions’.1012 Norman, on the other 
hand, argued some considerable advantages to provide for the resolution of conflicts over 
secession in the constitution. The Supreme Court of Canada supported this view finding on 
the question concerning the secession by Quebec, which argued that the potentially disruptive 
process of secession could be subjected to the rule of law by a process of negotiation and 
constitutional amendment.1013 Thus, constitutionalising the right of secession may be 
potentially overcome with the problems that can lead to secession, and undermine democratic 
equality, especially in a society already characterised by inequalities of wealth and power.  
Last, it was argued that, the changing faces of international conflicts necessities, the 
development, and exploration of evolving a new conflict resolution approach. The RES 
approach has proposed to assist the SState and sub-state entity involved in sovereignty based-
conflicts, and future peace negotiators to identify an emerging approach, which may be well 
suited to help them in the resolution of their particular conflict. The new approach may be 
attractive enough to those seeking to exercise the newly recognised right of remedial 
secession, who have grown unsatisfied with the prospect of simple autonomy. Similarly, as 
Scharf argued that, the possibility of permanent ES status may prove palatable to parent 
States, which oppose complete secession. ‘This approach challenges the weakness of the 
‘remedial secession’ and views support for the sub-state entity as arising from the fulfilment 
of the relevant conditions. The approach has successfully been applied for the Timorese, the 
Kosovars, and the Southern Sudanese peoples, however, it remains to be seen whether other 
cases can fulfil the same conditions. The recent developments in Kosovo, Montenegro and 
Iraq have indicated that the time has come to embrace de jure the new reality of RES that is 
emerging from diplomatic practice.  
                                                          
1012 M Weller and S Wolff (ed), 'Autonomy, Self-Governance, Conflict Resolution: Innovative Approaches to 
Institutional Design in Divided Society,' in M Weller (ed), Self-Governance in Interim Settlements: The Case of 
Sudan 2005 (Abingdon Routledge 2005) 158. 
1013 ‘Reference Re Secession of Quebec' (n 21) para 105. 
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Eventually, it has been explained that, in light of the insufficiency and irrelevance of existing 
international legal norms and principles, including the right of self-determination of peoples, 
RES is suggested as an alternative approach to solving sovereignty-based conflicts. The new 
approach demonstrates that a new player on the international scene needs to show to the 
outside world that it is worthy of achieving statehood and that it has earned its sovereignty. 
Accordingly, those peoples that have struggled for independence through legitimate means, 
and that have proved to the international community that they would be a reliable new 
sovereign partner, will eventually become sovereign legitimate States. The process would 
entail first both the provision of a level of sovereignty for a sub-state entity consistent with its 
right to self-determination, and the creation of mechanisms for joint co-operation between the 
sub-state government and the parent State government. The second phase would entail the 
establishment of specific agreements and commitments, provide for the protection of human 
rights and minority rights, and engage in a series of defined confidence building measures. 
Consequently, the determination of the final status would be based on the sub-state's 
compliance with the commitments undertaken during the interim period, taking into 
consideration parent State's compliance with its commitments as well, and the results of 
referendum held in the sub-state entity.  
Thus, RES is appealing; it is politically, legally, and morally pleasing to assert that those 
peoples that have shown their ability to become a good world citizens should become entitled 
to their sovereignty. In other words, this theory would grant independence and statehood to 
those peoples that have been labelled as peaceful, that have engaged through peaceful means 
with the international community, and that have used legal means to assert their 
independence, such as Kosovar, Albanians or the East Timorese, would have earned their 
right to exist as sovereign independent States.  
Accordingly, it is important for a people seeking self-determination and recognition to rely 
more on the compliance with other fundamental principles of international law to justify 
legitimisation of a territorial situation produced by the act of secession. The modern day 
criteria that a people must fulfil in order to be able to legitimately gain some degree of self-
determination and recognition. The chapter has suggested that for a people to benefit from the 
RES approach, they must satisfy several guidelines. Significantly, it is important for self-
determination seeking groups to demonstrate to the outside world that it has achieved 
statehood, and view its struggle as legitimate to the superpower States. In other words, the 
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Great Powers’ support for any self-determination-seeking movement has become an 
important criterion of dispositive value for any people’s struggle for autonomy from its 
mother State.  In this way, the ultimate success of secession will depend on recognition by the 
international community, which is likely to consider the legitimacy and legality of secession. 
Thus, one must concede that today the right of self-determination entails a mixture of 
political and legal criteria, the latter often privileges over the former.     
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Chapter Four: Emerging State Practice on Cases of Secessionist 
Movements 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
In recent years, the issues of self-determination and creation of States in international law 
have always been always treated more as political than they are legal questions. Generally, no 
State created by unilateral secession has been admitted to the UN against the declared will of 
the government of the Predecessor State. Outside the colonial setting, State practice is 
extremely reluctant to recognise unilateral secession. Arguably, the legal right of external 
self-determination is of questionable significance. Even if groups possess it, States may 
choose not to offer them much, if any, support; if groups lack it, States may nonetheless wish 
to support their claims even at the expense of obligations owed to the States within which 
such groups are located. 
The right of self-determination and secession are two of the most controversial issues in 
international affairs. It is true that, the existence of the right of self-determination is highly 
questionable, due to the international community’s continued and consistent support for the 
principle of territorial integrity. On the other hand, in international law, any attempt at 
unilateral secession with no agreement with the existing State, is without legal foundation. 
After examining the crucial legal issues to the contents of the right of self-determination, and 
the applicable rules of the rights of minorities, the act of recognition, the law of statehood and 
Secession. It is now important to turn the discussion to study how these elements of 
international law have manifested themselves on a practical level. Arguing how international 
practice responds to secession.  
This chapter evaluates the role of international law in legitimising secession as an accurate 
instance ‘remedial secession’ given the inability of the people to exercise their right to self-
determination within the parent State. Recent endorsement of Kosovo, South Sudan and 
Quebec, have indicated that the premise that the separation of an ethnic group is supposedly 
legitimate in certain exceptional cases. The Declaration of Kosovo Independence has raised 
several fundamental questions of international law in terms of the legal status of secessionist 
entities, as well as whether the independence of Kosovo is unique and cannot establish any 
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precedent. The chapter will briefly review the background to the Kosovo case, before 
focusing on the more recent declaration of independence by the Kosovar parliament. Then, 
the chapter will examine Kosovo's legal right to self-determination and the role of RS in 
enabling the Kosovar Albanian achievement of independence in 2008.  
Accordingly, the focus will be on the ICJ advisory opinion, in which the Court had been 
asked whether there was a specific right to effect secession under international law, and the 
present case, in which the Court was asked whether the declaration of independence was ‘in 
accordance with international law’.1014 In addition, the chapter argues that, despite the 
Declaration of Independence being considered as successful, the secession of Kosovo 
remains ‘unilateral’. It has however, attracted a huge amount of recognition. So that, does this 
mean that Kosovo is not a legitimate State? Rather, what lessons can be learned from Kosovo 
about the contemporary law of statehood and recognition and the role of ES, and RES in 
legitimising secession. The case may serve as an example to show how some concepts 
relevant for the law of statehood operate and what shortcomings they face in difficult 
situations. On the other hand, Kosovo has also evinced a major complication with ‘ES’ and 
‘RES’ core concepts of granting specific levels of sovereignty. Under these theories, Kosovo 
may have earned its sovereignty because the UN administered it, and because during this 
time, it demonstrated to the outside world that it was ready and capable of functioning as an 
independent State.  
The chapter will then turn to scrutinize and critically discuss the case of Quebec from the 
perspective of international law. How the Canadian Supreme Court distinguished between the 
right of internal self-determination and the right to external self-determination. When and 
under what circumstances may the external right of self-determination become an applicable 
solution? In addition, how the Supreme Court responded to the issue of the legality of 
secession, and the legal consequences of the Reference under Canadian law will be examined. 
The case of Canada may serve as an example to show where a State refused to treat a group 
of citizens as citizens, where their internal rights to self-determination were violated, those 
citizens in turn have the right to consider it no longer to be their State. This means that in 
democratic States, secessionist demands must not be ignored. In addition, how the exercise of 
                                                          
1014 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, ICJ 
Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010 [2010] ICJ Rep [hereinafter  'Kosovo Advisory Opinion'] Para 56, 2010 (n 
478).  
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any self-determination right ‘must be sufficiently limited to prevent threats to State’s 
territorial integrity or the stability of relations between sovereign States’.1015  
Finally, the chapter will examine the recent successful secession of Southern Sudan. 
Significantly, it will evaluate the role of international law in legitimising the secession as an 
accurate instance of ‘remedial secession’ given the inability of the people to exercise their 
right to self-determination within the parent State. The case of South Sudan shows that where 
a parent State waives its claims to territorial integrity, the international community 
undoubtedly accepts the emergence of a new State. This applies alternatively when the 
mother State rejects every compromise solution in a conflict situation, or when there is no 
realistic prospect of a conflict being resolved, especially when the methods of peaceful 
conflict resolution appear to have been exhausted.1016   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1015 The Canadian Supreme Court concluded that ‘exceptional circumstances,’ where a people is being denied its 
rights to internal self-determination, ‘as a last resort’, could be entitled to exercise its right to self-determination 
by secession: See, ‘Reference Re Secession of Quebec',  (n 21) para 135.  
1016 H Krueger, ‘Implications of Kosovo , Abkhazia and South Ossetia For International Law, The Conduct of 
the Community of States in Current Secession Conflicts’ (2009) 3 Caucasian Rev Int’l A 121.  
195 
 
4.2. Kosovo  
 
4.2.1. Factual background   
 
The debate on the Kosovar Declaration of Independence has proved to be a long, difficult, 
and complex process from a political, historical, as well as legal perspective. Kosovo was an 
autonomous region of Serbia dating from when Serbia was a State within the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (‘SFRY’).1017 The majority of its population are ethnically 
Albanian, and so distinct from Serbs who today still form about 10% and the vast majority of 
the population of Serbia as a whole. In the early 1990s, when the SFRY collapsed, Kosovo 
remained a part of the SFRY’s successor. In 2003, when the FRY ceased to exist, Kosovo 
became a part of Serbia and Montenegro, and when Montenegro seceded from Serbia in 
2006, Kosovo remained a part of the sole Serbian State.1018 
Kosovo's status in the SFRY was that of an autonomous province of Serbia. It was not 
formally equal in status to the SFRY's constituent republics and had no right to secede 
according to the 1974 constitution. The 1974 SFRY constitution granted Kosovo the status of 
an autonomous province within the country’s federal structure.1019 Under the terms of the 
1974 constitution, Kosovo had enjoyed some real autonomy from SFRY, including the right 
to its own constitution and institutions, the right to decide on changes to its territory; and was 
considered a 'constituent element' of the SFRY.1020 Most importantly, its predominantly 
ethnic Albanian population enjoyed multiple rights, for instance, the right to education in the 
Albanian language, the right to Albanian language media, the right to celebrate cultural 
holidays and generally preserve its ethnic structure and belonging.1021 However, in 1989, 
following the election of nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic, the nationalist tension that 
                                                          
1017 M Vickers, 'The Status of Kosovo in Socialist Yugoslavia', in Christian Tomuschat (ed), Kosovo and the 
International Community, A Legal Assessment (Springer, 2001) 1, 2-6. 
1018 Brown, 'Human Rights, Sovereignty, and the Final Status of Kosovo' (n 190).  
1019 Gruda, 'Some Key Principles for a Lasting Solution of the Status of Kosova: Uti Possedetis, The Ethnic 
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would subsequently tear the SFRY apart increased, and Kosovo's autonomy was 
abolished.1022 
In the early 1990’s, the SFRY dissolved, when four of its six republics, including Croatia, 
Macedonia, Slovenia  and Bosnia declared independence, Kosovo remained a part of the 
rump SFRY, which become the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) first. Then it became 
a part of Serbia and Montenegro, thereafter, when Montenegro broke away from the latter 
Kosovo remained a part of the state called Serbia. In 1996, guerrilla warfare broke out as 
Albanians rose in revolt against Serbian rule. The tension between Serbian forces and the 
Albanian UCK is recognised as a non-international armed conflict. Kosovo’s civilian 
population was driven into exile, and the Serbian carried out acts of violence towards them. 
As a result, Kosovo’s autonomous province status was removed, and the Albanian population 
was deprived of important civil and political rights.  
In 1998, the Serb government engaged in a brutal wave of oppression, which resulted in 
widespread atrocities. After Serbian and Kosovar leadership failed to persuade Milosevic to 
withdraw security forces from Kosovo, NATO countries launched an air campaign to force 
the Serb government to withdraw the police and the military.1023 In the aftermath of NATO’s 
intervention, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244 (1999).1024 The resolution 
authorised the UN’s administration of Kosovo through the United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
(‘UNMIK’), its safety was to be guarded by a NATO-led military force KFOR. The 
resolution set out a general framework for resolving the final legal and political status of 
Kosovo. The UN participated in the administration of Kosovo for the next nine years, while 
political negotiations over the final status of the territory were entirely inconclusive.    
In addition, the Resolution explicitly upheld the existing sovereignty of Serbia over Kosovo, 
reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region.1025 In this regard, 
Belgrade proposed that Kosovo be highly autonomous and remain a part of Serbia; Belgrade 
officials have repeatedly said that an imposition of Kosovo’s independence would be a 
                                                          
1022 See, T Jaber, 'A Case for Kosovo? Self-Determination and Secession in the 21st Century' (2011) 15 The 
International Journal of Human Rights 926. 
1023 Borgen, 'Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination, Secession, and Recognition' (n 244).   
1024 UNSC Rec 1244 (n 749).   
1025 J L Černič, 'Kosovo Declares Independence' (International Law Observers, 2008) 
<http://www.internationallawobserver.eu/2008/02/18/kosovo-declares-independence/> accessed June 13, 2013.  
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violation of Serbia’s sovereignty and therefore contrary to international law.1026 While on the 
other hand, Kosovo insisted that it deserved independence.  
After mediating negotiations between the parties for fifteen months, the UN Special Envoy 
for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari submitted in March 2007 the Comprehensive Proposal for the 
Kosovo Status settlement (the Ahtisaari Plan). The plan envisioned Kosovo becoming 
independent after a period of international supervision.1027 The proposal was rejected by 
Serbia while the Kosovar Albanian leaderships endorsed it. Moreover, in a response to the 
Secretary-General, the ‘Troika’ reported in December 2007 that ‘the parties however, were 
unable to reach an agreement on the final status of Kosovo. Neither party was willing to cede 
its position on the fundamental question of sovereignty over Kosovo’.1028 After the collapse 
of the negotiations, many countries grappling with some sort of secessionist issue in their 
own domestic politics such as Serbia and Russia argued that Kosovo’s secession would be a 
breach of international law.1029 In contrast, the US, UK, France, and most of the other States 
in EU supported Kosovar independence.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1026 ibid. 
1027 Borgen, 'Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence' (n 244).  
1028 From August to December, in an effort to receive the mediation process, the EU, Russia, and the US the 
(Troika) oversaw negotiations between the Government of Serbia and the Kosovar Albanian. See, ‘UNSC 
Report of the European Union/United States/Russian Federation Troika on Kosovo (4 December 2007) UN Doc 
S/2007/723’, 2007. Available at <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-
8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kosovo%20S2007%20723.pdf>accessed> accessed 13 June 2013.   
1029 Borgen, 'Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence' (n 244).  
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4.2.2. The Declaration of Independence 
 
 On 17 February 2008, backed by powerful world countries such as the US and UK, the 
Parliament of Kosovo issued a statement declaring ‘Kosovo to be independent and a 
sovereign State’.1030 The Parliament pledged compliance with the Comprehensive Proposal 
for the Kosovo Status Settlement envisioned in the Ahtisaari Plan. It represents a secession, 
which is heavily discouraged under traditional international law. However, despite strong 
Serbian protest, many countries including the US formally recognised Kosovo as a sovereign 
and independent new State.1031 However, it has not been recognised by countries such as 
Russia, China, and Spain, which face their own separatist issues.  
Russia and Serbia have argued that Resolution 1244 does not allow the secession of Kosovo 
without the consent of Serbia. In particular, they refer to the resolution’s preamble language 
‘reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’.1032 The EU on the other hand, has taken a position 
that the Resolution is not a bar to Kosovo’s independence, and it did not predetermine the 
outcome of final status talks.1033 On balance, one must concede that, the Resolution neither 
promotes nor prevents Kosovo’s secession. In other words, the substantial language of 
Resolution 1244 is addressed to the interim status of Kosovo. Moreover, the references to the 
territorial integrity of Serbia are only in the preamble language and not in the operational 
language.1034 Therefore, the document is silent as to what form the final status of Kosovo 
takes. 
 
 
                                                          
1030 Full text: Kosovo declaration, BBC News (17 February 2008) Available at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7249677.stm>accessed 14 June 2013.   
1031 For example, as of February 18, 2008, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Belgium had all 
expressed support for the “new state of Kosovo”  Ibid.  Today 108 UN Member States recognised Kosovo as an 
independent sovereign State. See, (…) 'Who Recognised Kosovo as an Independent State? Recognised or 
Announced the Recognition of Republic of Kosova' <http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/> accessed June 23, 
2014. Note however, that several States expressed their opposition to the Kosovar independence, including 
Spain, Russia, China, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka.   
1032 Borgen, 'Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence' (n 244).  
1033 ibid. 
1034 ibid. 
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4.2.3. International law and the secession of Kosovo 
 
In fact, the recognition of Kosovo would seem to extend the right of self-determination 
beyond the traditional colonial or foreign occupation situation.1035 Kosovo was never a 
colony, and the Serbian Army had withdrawn long before the independence issue was 
determined. However, Harris argued that, the only coherent legal basis for recognising the 
exercise of self-determination, by the Kosovo people in the form of an independent State is 
that, prior to that independence, while under Serbian rule; the Kosovar Albanians were 
subject to alien subjection, domination, and exploitation.1036 At the same time, a convincing 
case can be made that under the later years of Milosevic’s rule in Serbia, the Kosovars were 
being persecuted by the Serbian authorities, and ‘they were subjected indeed to subjugation, 
domination and exploitation by people, who although long part of the same country, were 
culturally different and could in that sense arguably be described as alien’.1037   
Furthermore, Kosovo’s independence must be assessed under the international law of 
secession. Thomas Frank, regarding a hypothesised secession of Quebec, wrote that: 
 [It cannot seriously be argued today that international law prohibits secession. It cannot seriously be 
denied that international law permits secession. There is a privilege of secession recognised in 
international law and the law imposes no duty on any people not to secede].1038   
In this way, while international law does not foreclose the possibility of secession, it does 
provide a framework within which certain secessions are favoured or disfavoured, depending 
on the facts.1039 Hence, the key is to determine whether Kosovo meets the standard for the 
legal privilege of secession.  
As has been canvassed in chapter three, the right of self-determination is comprised of two 
distinct subsidiary parts. The favoured one is ‘internal self-determination’, which is the 
protection of minority rights within a State. The group is said to have internal self-
                                                          
1035 P Harris, ‘Is Tibet entitled to self-determination?’ (2008) 18 CCPL Occasional Paper 
<http://www.law.hku.hk/ccpl/pub/Documents/OccasionalpaperNo.18Eng.pdf >accessed 14 June 2013.  
1036 ibid. 
1037 ibid. 
1038 T M Frank (ed), Expert Opinion Obtained Prior to the Reference, reproduced in, Anne Bayefsky, Self-
Determination in International Law, Quebec and Lessons Learned, Opinion Directed at Question 2 of the 
Reference in  (n 848) 421. See also, Lalonde, Determining Boundaries in a Conflicted World: The Role of Uti 
Possidetis(McGill-Queen’s UP 2003).  
1039 Borgen, 'Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence' (n 244).  
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determination, when a State provides them the ability inter alia to speak their language, 
practice their culture, and effectively participate in the political community. While the 
disfavoured one on the other hand is ‘external self-determination’, or secession. The Supreme 
Court of Canada found that ‘a right to external self-determination which in ‘re secession of 
Quebec’ case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession, 
arises only in the most extreme cases and, even then, under carefully defined 
circumstances’.1040   
Secession is regarded as one of the most contested controversial issues in international 
affairs. It rarely receives formal adjudication, court opinion, State practice and other 
authoritative writings, point the way to classifying what are the ‘carefully defined cases’ and 
‘extreme cases’ under which privilege of secession exists. A Special Committee on European 
Affairs, concerning the secessionist conflict in Moldova found that ‘any attempt to claim 
legal secession, that is, where secession trumps territorial integrity, must at least show that: 
a. The secessionists are a ‘people’, in the ethnographic sense; 
b. The State from which they are seceding seriously violates their human rights; and 
c. There are no other effective remedies under either domestic law or international law.1041     
Based on the evidence developed in previous chapters, there are several arguments why 
Kosovar Albanians should have the right to self-determination, in other words, it remains 
crucial to analyse the factual and legal arguments that characterize and give a distinct feature 
to the Kosovo case. The following analysis will highlight whether the Kosovo Albanians are 
a people, entitled to the right of external self-determination, because of a complete denial of 
their right to internal self-determination, and the heavy oppression exercised upon them by 
the central government, and whether secession was the only solution for Kosovo.   
 
 
                                                          
1040 ‘Reference re Secession of Quebec' (n 21) para 126.  ‘Such cases are those of colonial peoples and also 
‘where a people is subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation’. For the Court these different criteria 
were ‘irrelevant’ for Quebec case. See, ibid, paras 132, 133. 
1041 ‘Special Committee on European Affairs,Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist Crisis 
in Moldova, 61 REC’, The Association of the Bar of the City of New York 2006 
<http://www2.nycbar.org/Publications/record/vol_61_2.pdf>accessed 17 June 2013.   
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4.2.3.1. Are Kosovar Albanians a ‘people’?  
 
It has been understood that, the community, which claims the right to self-determination, has 
to fulfil certain objective criteria: they have to be perceived by themselves and by the world 
as the people, the nation; this is fulfilled by the common history, language, and culture.1042 
Moreover, they have to live on the particular territory in an organised way, presumably being 
a majority of the inhabitants. A subjected people are linked to have effective control over the 
territory. Likewise, the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec case discussed the meaning 
of ‘peoples’ as ‘somewhat uncertain’.1043 At different periods in international legal history, 
the term of ‘people’ has been used to signify citizens of a nation-State, the inhabitants in a 
specific territory being decolonised by a foreign power, or an ethnic group.1044 In addition, in 
1920, the Commission of Jurists who arbitrated the status of the Aland Islands found that ‘for 
the purposes of self-determination one cannot treat a small fraction of peoples as one would a 
nation as a whole’.1045   
Here one may argue that Kosovars are a ‘people’, having inhabited Kosovo for centuries. 
However, the Kosovar Albanians are more generally perceived as an Albanian ethnic 
enclave, rather than a nation unto themselves.1046 This definition of the term of ‘people’ as a 
‘nation’ has been criticised for being too restrictive. In Opinion No 2 (1992), the Arbitration 
Commission of the European Conference on Yugoslavia with regard to the Serbia population 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina Higgins comments that, ‘People’ is to be understood in the sense of 
all the people of a given territory. ‘Of course, all members of distinct minority groups are part 
of the people of the territory. In that sense, they too as individuals are holders of the right of 
self-determination. However, minorities as such do not have a right of self-determination. 
That means in effect that they have no right to secession, to independence or to join with 
comparable groups in other States’.1047 In addition, the ICJ in Western Sahara case found 
                                                          
1042 Černič, 'Kosovo Declares Independence' (n 1025).  
1043 ‘Reference Re Secession of Quebec' (n 21) para 123.    
1044 Borgen, 'Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence' (n 244).  
1045 ‘Aland Island case’ (n 169).   
1046 Borgen, ‘Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence' (n 244).  
1047 Quoted in Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (n 390) 120-121. It is rather argued that, ‘a 
group of minorities can qualify as a ‘people’ if they possess the will to be identified as a ‘people’ or the 
consciousness of being a ‘people’ and if they have institutions or other means of expressing their common 
characteristics and will.’ See, C Ijezie, 'Right of Peoples to Self Determination in the Present International Law,' 
(Academia.edu, 2014) 9 
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that, the lands were inhabited by peoples, which, if nomadic, were socially, and politically 
organised in tribes and under chiefs competent to represent them.1048 Accordingly, it is clear 
that in international law the right to self-determination only attaches to peoples, while 
minorities groups are protected through their parent State's commitments to the respect of 
basic human rights. Thus, Vidmar argued that, although Kosovo Albanians might qualify as a 
people for the purpose of the right of self-determination, the applicability of this right does 
not per se suggest that secession can be justified.1049 It is however questionable whether 
widespread support of Kosovo’s independence would signal a shift in the definition of 
‘people’, so that, the term no longer represents a complete ethnic nation, but can be used to 
refer to a homogenous ethnic enclave within another nation.1050    
 
4.2.3.2. Whether Kosovar Albanians rights to internal self-determination was respected   
 
 The Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec case concluded that a ‘people’ has a right to so-
called external self-determination only if its central government is not fulfilling its rights to 
internal self-determination.1051 Without doubt, it was clear that Kosovar Albanians’ right to 
internal self-determination had not been respected by the Milosevic-led Serbia.1052 While on 
the other hand, it seems that such rights were considerably respected in the pre-Milosevic era. 
In other words, the 1974 Constitution of the SFRY specifically granted autonomous status to 
Kosovo, and in practice Kosovo was a fully functional province operating in the federal 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
<http://www.academia.edu/2967647/RIGHT_OF_PEOPLES_TO_SELFDETERMINATION_IN_THE_PRESE
NT_INTERNATIONAL_LAW?login=&email_was_taken=true> accessed June 23, 2014. 
1048  The ICJ held that, ‘the application of the right of self-determination requires a free and genuine 
expression of the will of the peoples concerned.’ See, ‘Western Sahara Case' (n 103).  The Court however, 
continued:  The validity of the principle of self-determination, defined as the need to pay regard to the freely 
expressed will of peoples, is not affected by the fact that in certain cases the General Assembly has dispensed 
with the requirement of consulting the inhabitants of a given territory. Those instances were based either on the 
consideration that a certain population did not constitute a ‘people’ entitled to self-determination or on the 
conviction that a consultation was totally unnecessary, in view of special circumstances. See, ibid.  
1049 J Vidmar, 'International Legal Responses to Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence' (2009) 42 Vand J 
Transnat’l L 779.  
1050 Borgen, 'Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence' (n 244). 
1051 ‘Reference Re Secession of Quebec' (n 21) para 135.    
1052 Noting that from 1989 on, the Kosovar Albanians ‘were denied the ability to exercise any sovereign 
authority or functions or even to participate in the federal government,’ and that they were subjected to ‘a 
systematic denial of their basic human rights’. See, Williams, 'Earned Sovereignty: The Road to Resolving the 
Conflict over Kosovo’s Final Status' (n 916).  
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structure of the former Yugoslavia.1053 Kosovo was granted the status of an autonomous 
province, with virtually the same rights and responsibilities as the six Yugoslav Republics. 
The autonomous rights included the right to change and adopt its constitution, identity, 
territory, and judicial autonomy, the right to ratify treaties that were concluded with foreign 
States and international bodies; and representation in all organs of the Yugoslav Federation. 
Accordingly, under the constitution, both Albanians and Kosovars have acquired the right to 
internal self-determination, parallel to such rights existing for peoples living within other 
larger federal states.1054 Thus, while it is certain that the Milosevic regime was not respecting 
Kosovars’ right to internal self-determination, it is true that those rights had been respected in 
the past by the SFRY, and it was at least plausible that those rights would be respected by 
Serbia in the future.  In other words, if we were to conclude that the Kosovar rights to internal 
self-determination would be fulfilled in the future, our analysis would stop here because the 
Kosovars would have no right to external self-determination, like Quebec, and thus no right 
to secede from Serbia.  On the other hand, if we were to conclude that it is not likely that 
Serbia would respect the Kosovar rights to internal self-determination in the future, then the 
Kosovars would have the right to external self-determination and thus the right to secede 
from Serbia.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1053 Compare the general content of the right to internal self-determination, which includes the right of people to 
determine their political and social regime, the right of people to freely dispose of their natural resources and 
pursue economic development, and the right to solve all matters under domestic jurisdiction. With the rights 
conferred on the Kosovar Albanians by the 1974 SFRY Constitution, which included, inter alia, the right to 
adopt laws and a constitution, and the right to have judicial autonomy and a Supreme Court. Thus, it is clear that 
the 1974 SFRY Constitution enabled Kosovo and its citizens to exercise full internal self-determination. See, 
Gruda, 'Some Key Principles for a Lasting Solution of the Status of Kosova' (n 1019).  
1054 In addition, the 1974 Constitution provided political rights for Kosovar Albanians, such as the right to 
participate in the Yugoslav federal government and the right to form their own provincial parliament, linguistic 
rights, such as the right to have Albanian-language schools, university, and media, religious rights to freely 
exercise their religion, and general rights to preserve their Albanian culture and ethnicity. See,  ibid.  
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4.2.3.3. The third argument which is most supported in the international community is 
the right of self-determination to victimized people, whether there were serious human 
rights violations in Kosovo.  
 
The International Committee of Jurists in the Aland Islands case found that there was no right 
to secede absent ‘a manifest and continued abuse of sovereign power to the detriment of a 
section of population’.1055 The Serb regime persistently committed atrocities against 
Albanians, and they were responsible for serious human right violations against the Kosovars, 
as in 1999 Resolution 1244 noted ‘a grave humanitarian situation’ and a threat to 
international peace and security.1056 In particular, Serbian atrocities directed exclusively at 
Kosovars showed a clear intention to eliminate them from Kosovo. Only the NATO 
intervention in 1999 stopped Serbian forces from totally achieving their aim.  
On the other hand, it should be noted here that Kosovar Albanians themselves have also 
committed human rights abuses. To the extent, the international community considers it 
relevant whether human rights abuses are ongoing or historic, the situation in Kosovo is 
unclear. In this regard, ‘the on-going international presence in Kosovo is legally relevant as it 
is evidence of the international community’s determination that the situation in Kosovo was 
and is highly volatile and that it cannot be solved completely via a domestic political 
structure’.1057  
 
4.2.3.4. Was secession the only solution?  
 
The report of the Commission of Rapporteurs appointed by the League of Nations in 1919 
concluded that international law did not legally support the right of secession for the people 
of the Aaland Islands. It was argued that ‘the separation of a minority from the State of which 
it forms a part and in this case incorporation to another State, could only be considered as a 
last resort when the State lacks either the will or the power to enact and apply just and 
                                                          
1055 ‘Aland Island Case’ (n 169).  
1056 Borgen, 'Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence' (n 244).  
1057 ibid.  
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effective guarantees’.1058 In the same way, the Supreme Court of Canada in Quebec noted 
that international law did not support the right in cases where minorities freely choose their 
representatives and are given political, language and cultural protection. It did conclude, 
though, that when a people are blocked from the meaningful exercise of their right to self-
determination internally, they are entitled, as a last resort, to exercise it by secession.1059 
The situation in Kosovo prior to the Declaration of Independence was unlikely to offer any 
realistic alternative to secession. Since then, the two sides have failed to resolve their 
differences; it is unlikely that anything short of military intervention could keep Kosovo 
within Serbia.1060 As a result, it is clear that most realistic options other than secession had 
failed.  For that reason, the basic framework provided by international law is receptive to 
arguments for and against secession. On the one hand, in the interest of systemic stability, the 
international community has a bias against secession. Nevertheless, if it is assumed that 
secession is not totally prohibited by international law, then the case of Kosovo presents a set 
of facts that may be persuasive and an ethnic group, (though perhaps not a nation), within a 
region with historically defined boundaries ‘Kosovo as a province’, after the intervention of 
NATO to prevent humanitarian disaster, and after the deadlock of negotiations with the 
predecessor State, that seeks independence via a declaration that is coordinated and supported 
by the international community.1061 Thus, the argument is conversely to stand to another 
claim of a right to secede, for instance, those of Transnistria, which due to different material 
facts would fail under the same legal analysis.1062   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1058 After the secession of Finland from Russia Swedish, population of Aaland Island pleaded national self-
determination as set forth by Woodrow Wilson, to join their motherland, Sweden. See, ‘LN Doc B7 21/68/106 
(1921)’.  
1059 ‘Reference Re Secession of Quebec' (n 21) para 135.  
1060 Borgen, 'Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence' (n 244).  
1061 ibid. 
1062 'Special Committee on European Affairs,Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist Crisis 
in Moldova', 61 REC.   
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4.2.4. The legality of secession and recognition (The ICJ Advisory Opinion)   
 
Recognition of States has previously been discussed in chapter two. Crawford states that, ‘in 
international legal circles the assertion that the formation of a new State is a matter of fact, 
and not of law, continues to have considerable weight’.1063 Hence, an act of recognition is not 
an instrument whose function it is to create a State, but only to demonstrate acceptance of a 
given claim to statehood based on a neutral assessment of whether or not a given entity meets 
the criteria that are incumbent on that title.1064 While the dominant view is that, the act of 
recognition is not constitutive of a State, but rather declaratory in effect and nature, it merely 
affirms the fact of statehood. However, a State may exist in spite of negative reactions. In 
practice, widespread recognition appears to be of particular worth from the standpoint of 
those institutions claiming to meet the criteria of statehood.1065 Almqvist argued that 
recognition appears to be an essential condition for the new entity to be able to exercise the 
international rights and obligations that correspond to the status of statehood, including 
entering into international relations with States, and in this way becoming a fully-fledged 
member of the international community.1066 In addition, Crawford explained that, despite the 
non-decisive nature of recognition from an international legal perspective, recognition by 
other States can be used as evidence for the legal validity of the claims for statehood set forth 
by secessionist movements.1067 
The EU Resolution 1244 contends that ‘generally once an entity has emerged as a State in the 
sense of international law, a political decision can be taken to recognise it.1068 This reflects 
the general understudying that recognition itself is not a formal requirement of statehood; it 
                                                          
1063 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (n 3) 4.  
1064 Almqvist, ‘The Politics of Recognition, Kosovo and International Law’ (n 573).   
1065 See Statehood criteria: Crawford, The Creation of States In International Law (n 3) 37.  
1066 Almqvist argued that, it is important to know that in international practice ‘metropolitan recognition’ or 
recognition from the Parent State (and not simply third State recognition) constitutes an essential condition to 
become a member of the UN. See, Almqvist, 'The Politics of Recognition, Kosovo and International Law’(n 
573).  
1067 Crawford stated ‘Recognition is an institution of State practice that can resolve uncertainties as to status and 
allow new situations to be regularised. That an entity is recognised as a State is evidence of its status; where 
recognition is general, it may be practically conclusive. States, in the forum of the United Nations or elsewhere, 
may make declarations as to status or ‘recognise’ entities the status of which is doubtful: depending on the 
degree of unanimity and other factors, this may be evidence of a compelling kind. Even individual acts of 
recognition may contribute towards the consolidation of status; in Charpentier’s terms, recognition may render 
the new situation opposable to the recognising State’. See,  Crawford, The Creation of States In International 
Law (n 3) 27.  
1068 Borgen, 'Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence' (n 244).  
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rather merely accepts a factual occurrence.1069 Thus, as recognition is declaratory, this sort of 
argument goes, no State is required to recognise an entity claiming statehood? In other words, 
international law does not confer any obligations on States to participate in the process of 
recognition or offer a comprehensive recognition or objection statement.  
In contrast, it has been argued that, a State should not recognise a new entity if it constitutes 
intervention in the domestic affairs of a State, or if the State-creation process in any other 
way would perpetuate a breach of international law (such as in the case of illegal annexation 
of a territory). ‘Recognition may also be withheld where a new situation originates in an act 
which is contrary to general international law’.1070 In this regard, Serbia and Russia argue 
that, as Serbia did not consent to an attention of its territory and borders, to recognise Kosovo 
State would violate its own rights as a State. However, this argument cannot be legally 
correct, as changing the boundaries of sovereign State (Serbia) in and of itself would not 
make Kosovar independence illegal because, as argued in the previous chapter that, the 
international community has come to accept the legality of secession under certain 
circumstances.1071  
Furthermore, Borgen argued that, State practice has proven that, absence of a clear indication 
of illegality, in cases of State recognition there is considerable deference to the political 
prerogative of outside States to decide whether to recognise an aspirant State.1072 For 
example, the Security Council has condemned the establishment of the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus. There is however, no such resolution condemning the recognition of 
Kosovo, but rather, a growing number of States to accept its declaration. Nonetheless, Borgen 
argued this does not make Kosovo’s secession legal, but it does show that, ‘in cases of 
secession, law and politics are lightly intertwined’.1073  
Thus, the effect of recognition will vary according to the situation.  Malanczuk argued that 
‘where facts surrounding an entity's satisfaction of the criteria for statehood are clear, the 
evidentiary value of recognition or non-recognition will not be strong enough to affect the 
outcome, and in such cases, recognition is declaratory’.1074 However, in borderline cases 
where the facts are unclear, the evidentiary value of recognition can have a decisive effect, 
                                                          
1069 ibid. 
1070 Jennings and Watts (ed), in Oppenheim’s International Law (n 362) 183.  
1071 Borgen, 'Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence' (n 244).   
1072 ibid. 
1073 ibid. 
1074 Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (n 346) 84.  
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and in such circumstances, recognition is semi-constitutive.1075 Given Serbia's for instance 
continued claim to sovereignty over Kosovo, current recognition is having a decisive effect in 
affirming Kosovo's statehood. Today, 108 States have recognised Kosovo as an independent 
sovereign State.1076  
On the other hand, in July 2010, the UN’s highest Court (ICJ) ruled that Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of independence did not violate international law.1077 However, Cerone is one 
who found that the Court’s interpretation of the question too narrow,1078 as it avoided saying 
whether Kosovo is a State, or whether the State of Kosovo was legal under international law, 
whether recognition of Kosovo is legal, whether the right of self-determination is applicable 
to Kosovar Albanian peoples, or perhaps whether Kosovo could be a case of ‘remedial 
secession’. The Court has made it clear that it would not deal with these issues.1079 All it had 
to do was decide whether the declaration was prohibited by international law. The Court 
shows that the interpretation of the question and the identification of the authors of the 
Declaration had significant implications for the Court’s finding that the declaration of 
independence ‘did not violate any applicable rule of international law’.1080 The Court argued 
that, the rules, which could possibly prohibit the declaration of independence, apply under: (i) 
general international law; (ii) Security Council resolution 1244; and (iii) the Constitutional 
Framework for Kosovo.1081 
Furthermore, considering The Declaration of independence as a potentially illegal act under 
international law, the court argued that, ‘the illegality attached to the declarations of 
independence thus stemmed not from the unilateral character of these declarations as such, 
but from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use of 
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force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those 
of a peremptory character’.1082 Accordingly, Vidmar argued that, while the Court held that a 
unilateral character as such does not render a declaration of independence illegal, it is also 
implicitly pronounced that a declaration of independence, although not by itself creative of a 
new State, can violate (general) international law.1083 Thus, Aspremont argued that, the 
absence of prohibition did not simultaneously provide any entitlement to the authors of the 
declaration of Kosovo or to Kosovo as a whole.1084 In this regard, Judge Bruno Simma 
demonstrated that, the formulation 'in accordance with international law' should not only be 
interpreted as a question of whether or not there was a prohibition.1085 He found that, the 
question of being in accordance with international law also includes the question whether 
there was a right to adopt such a declaration of independence.1086 Simma thought this 
approach follows from a narrow consensualist approach to international law derived from the 
Lotus case1087 (what is not prohibited is permitted) and that the Court ought to have addressed 
whether the declaration was permitted by international law.1088 Thus, Akande argued that, 
‘the declaration is not prohibited only gives a partial answer to the question whether the 
declaration is ‘in accordance’ with international law’.1089 If international law actually 
expressly allowed the declaration (or provided a right to independence) that would be 
relevant in saying the declaration was ‘in accordance with international law’.1090 Hence, it is 
possible for international law neither to prohibit nor to permit declarations of independence. 
Akande argued that, the ‘answer given by the Court does not imply that international law 
permits declarations of independence in these sorts of situations’.1091  
Moreover, in addressing the issue of legality, the Court obviously adopted the view that the 
law was neutral on the matter of the unilateral declaration of independence by holding: ‘It is 
entirely possible for a particular act – such as a unilateral declaration of independence – not 
to be in violation of international law without necessarily constituting the exercise of a right 
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conferred by it’.1092 However, this reflects, Crawford argued the prevailing doctrinal 
interpretation that a unilateral declaration of independence is 'a legally neutral act the 
consequences of which are regulated internationally’.1093 Nevertheless, the Court made a 
broader argument that the principle of territorial integrity of States does not operate in 
situations in which an entity is trying to break away from its parent State. The Court pointed 
out that 'the scope of the principle of territorial integrity is confined to the sphere of relations 
between States'.1094 Accordingly, Vidmar pointed out that, only a State can violate the 
territorial integrity of another State.1095 Regardless, this argument is questionable. Because it 
has been argued that, the right of self-determination applies to peoples and not territories, 
although the internal boundary arrangement may well be very important for determination of 
the new international borders.1096 
Therefore, the Court held that 'a unilateral character as such does not render a declaration of 
independent illegal’; it also observed that a declaration of independence, would in certain 
circumstances violate general international law.1097 Significantly, the Court noted that in the 
case of Kosovo, the Security Council never proclaimed the illegality of the declaration of 
independence.1098 However, this does not mean that there can be no illegality unless the SC 
says so. The Court made a specific reference, Vidmar argued, to the unlawful use of force; 
this paragraph was the only one, which suggests that other norms are also capable of 
rendering a declaration of independence illegal.1099 Having said that, the UN organs and 
States practice confirms that the response will be very factual, and while a declaration in 
itself is not in breach of a specific (rule), that declaration may be accompanied by 
circumstances rendering the making of the declaration unlawful.  
Moreover, following the NATO intervention and UN Security Council Resolution 1244 
Kosovo was placed under international administration, removing Serbia’s sovereignty over it. 
With reference to these events, Earned Sovereignty ‘ES’, was proclaimed, initially as a policy 
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prescription in 1998, and then reflected in the approach taken by the Ramboillet Accord and 
Resolution 1244. The elements of ES have provided useful reference points for examining 
Kosovo's ongoing decade of international administration from 1999. During this time, the 
international administrator helped Kosovo to develop economy, proper industry, institutions, 
and infrastructure; so that they can function as a viable State once, the international 
administration ends. Kosovo, under this theory, may have earned its sovereignty because the 
UN administered it, and because during this time, it demonstrated to the outside world that it 
was ready and capable to function as an independent State.  
Thus, States that recognised Kosovo’s independence argue that it is the only way to promote 
regional peace and stability and describe Kosovo as a sui generis case, and Kosovo’s 
commitment to respect minority rights and accept ‘supervised independence’. In other words, 
they justify their recognition with reference to the elements of ES and RS.  In contrast, Bolton 
and Visoka argued that ‘States that withhold recognition support Serbia’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity and argued that  international law does not allow secession outside the 
colonial context and that ‘unilateral secession’, in the absence of parent State consent, should 
not have effect and sets a negative precedent.1100  Accordingly, as general international law 
contains no applicable prohibition of declarations of independence, the declaration of 
independence did not violate general international law. Hence, the declaration did not violate 
Security Council resolution 1444 (1999).  
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4.4.5. Is Kosovo an exceptional case?  
 
In fact, the case of Kosovo can be considered as a prominent and most recent example of 
possible remedial secession. This example is of special interest for academia, because 
although there is no clear consensus on the law on secession, Kosovo earned a widespread 
international recognition, including from the United States.1101 It has been established that 
after 1989, the internal right of self-determination of ethnic Albanians was denied and gross 
human rights violations took place, the circumstances that arguably make remedial secession 
justifiable.1102 Under the doctrine of remedial secession, secession is a remedy to the denial of 
internal self-determination by the State of Serbia and Kosovo people were entitled to exercise 
their right externally. This argument has not only been expressed by many scholars, but also 
by a number of States in The Kosovo advisory proceeding. Accordingly, secession was 
ultima ratio means a last resort, because there was no alternative, and the status talks had 
reached the point where further negotiations were meaningless. Tomuschat argued that the 
'Kosovo situation falls under purview of remedial secession'.1103 However, the question of 
possible remedial secession is at the centre of the international dispute about Kosovo. The 
Russian government argued that more time was needed for negotiations to achieve a positive 
outcome.1104 The Russian Parliament has issued a statement that read in part: ‘The right of 
nations to self-determination cannot justify recognition of Kosovo’s independence along with 
the simultaneous refusal to discuss similar acts by other self-proclaimed states, which have 
obtained de facto independence exclusively by themselves’.1105  
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Furthermore, Vidmar argued that there is ‘a tenable argument that the entitlement of Kosovo 
Albanians to remedial secession was born in the years of oppression, but was exercised with a 
delay. However, even with this interpretation the crucial element of the remedial secession 
the last resort seems to be missing’.1106 In other words, it can be argued that, there were no 
on-going human rights violations from the Serbian side at the time of secession. Rather, one 
can further posit that a new democratic Serbian government could have been willing to accept 
substantial autonomy of Kosovo and this could be a remedy in the form of internal self-
determination.1107 In addition, the debate on ‘failed talk’ is also a rather factual evaluation if 
there was indeed a remedy available and would it be effective.1108 However, who should 
evaluate the effectiveness and availability of remedies in this particular situation? This links 
to the question and decides if an entity is or is not a State?  
On the other hand, despite these arguments for the recognition of Kosovo, many States 
continue to insist that Kosovo is a unique case, which in their opinion, does not create a 
precedent for several reasons:  
First: in announcing the recognition of Kosovo, the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
has explained that:  
1-‘The unusual combination of factors found in the Kosovo situation, including the context of 
Yugoslavia's breakup, the history of ethnic cleansing and crimes against civilians in Kosovo, 
and the extended period of UN administration, are not found elsewhere and therefore make 
Kosovo a special case. Kosovo cannot be seen as a precedent for any other situation in the 
world today’.1109 
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2- The international community has administered Kosovo from 1999-2008. In other words, 
Borgen argued that the ‘reinintegrating such a territory is different from assessing a claim by 
a separatist group that, on its own, is seeking to overturn the authority of the pre-existing 
State and unilaterally secede’.1110 In the same way, Resolution 1244 has internationalised the 
problem of Kosovo from being an issue of domestic law, it moved Kosovo from being solely 
under Serbian sovereignty into the international administration.1111 However, it would be 
irrelevant whether Kosovo had been under international administration for the purpose of a 
special case.1112 Consequently, Kosovo was administrated by the international community as 
they considered the situation so violate. In this regard the ICJ concluded that ‘the object and 
purpose of resolution 1244 (1999) was to that order to establish a temporary, exceptional 
legal regime which, save to the extent that it expressly preserved it, superseded the Serbian 
legal order and was which aimed at the stabilisation of Kosovo’.1113 The Court noted that it 
was designed to do so on an interim basis.1114 Moreover, the SC identified the purpose of an 
interim administration for Kosovo, to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all 
inhabitations in Kosovo.1115       
Finally, it is clear that, the Kosovars Albanians are an ethnicity homogenous enclave 
physically separate and ethnicity different from the Serbs.1116 Since 2008, ethnic Albanians 
and Kosovars had predominantly inhabited Kosovo. They no longer Sterio argued, ‘spoke 
Serbian and no longer engaged with their Serbian neighbours and even the Serbian 
government recognised that autonomy was the only viable option’.1117 On the other hand, the 
international community was working in Kosovo for years, sharpening the difference 
between Kosovo proper and the rest of Serbia.1118 So that, Dion argued that ‘forcing the 
people of Kosovo to return under Serbian authority would inevitably cause instability in an 
already fragile region’.1119 In other words, having conducted ethnic cleansing, and having 
treated the Kosovars as second-class citizens continuously since annexation, Serb politicians 
proved unable to rule Kosovo equally with the rest of their territory, they have lost legitimacy 
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and a right to govern Kosovo.1120 The Kosovo Report in 2000 explained that, ‘After what 
Kosovars suffered in the hands of FRY authorities, they are absolutely unwilling to accept or 
even symbolic expression of FRY sovereignty on the province’.1121 At the same time, in light 
of such circumstances, it is almost impossible to believe that, Serbia would retreat on their 
promise of autonomy for Kosovo.   
Accordingly, it is possible to argue that Kosovo is both exceptional and a source of precedent 
at the same time. Significantly, the recognition of Kosovo will make the international 
management of those secessionist conflicts in the world much more fraught, it will rather be 
at the centre of all discussions on the settlement of secessionist conflicts. Coppieters argued 
that the question will be raised ‘as to why the EU favours the application of federal models in 
conflicts such as the one in Abkhazia if it considers these models as inappropriate for 
Kosovo’.1122 He added that the fact that Kosovo ‘is an inspiring model for the leaderships of 
breakaway States does not mean, however, that the external States protecting those 
secessionist entities will follow the Kosovo example by recognising them’.1123  
Notably, under the approach of RES, an entity must demonstrate to the outside world that it is 
capable of functioning as an independent State, that it would be a reliable sovereign partner, 
and that it is worthy of recognition. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General to 
Kosovo had proposed a formula called ‘standards before status’, whereby Kosovo would 
have to fulfil a number of standards as a prerequisite to international recognition.1124 This 
bench marks Williams and Pecci argued, identified during conditional sovereignty vary 
depending on the characteristics of the conflict and generally include conditions, such as 
protecting human and minority rights, developing democratic institutions, strengthening the 
rule of law and promoting regional stability.1125 Once the final status is determined, Williams 
and Hooper argued, ‘constrained sovereignty’ applies limitations on the sovereign authority 
and functions of the new entity, such as continued international administration and military 
presence and limits on the right of the State to undertake territorial association with other 
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States’.1126 In other words, according to this proposal, Gruda argued, Kosovo would be 
governed in a system of political trusteeship in the meantime, in order to advance the local 
population politically, economically, socially and educationally.1127 In fact, the intermediary 
step of international administration has helped Kosovo to develop institutions, proper 
industry, economy, and infrastructure; so that it can function as a viable State once, the 
international administration ends. In other words, the elements of ES have provided useful 
reference points for examining Kosovo's ongoing decade of international administration from 
1999. During this time, Bolton and Visoka argued, institutions of self-government were 
consolidated for Kosovo’s ‘future status’, be that wide autonomy within Serbia, or 
independent statehood.1128 In 2008, upon the failure of extensive UN-sponsored negotiations, 
Kosovo declared its independence.     
Thus, despite the declaration and solid arguments for the recognition of Kosovo, just saying 
that it is exceptional may not be enough. States and academia must ask why one claim of 
independence is purportedly unique and then consider its downstream political and legal 
effect.1129 Serbia and the majority of States on the other hand, will never recognise the 
independence of Kosovo. This leaves Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, with 
partial, restricted recognition throughout the world, and with an uncertain future.      
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4.3. Quebec  
 
Quebec was a French colony, which was ceded to Great Britain in 1738.1130 In 1863, it 
became one of the four initial provinces of Canada at confederation; however, Crawford 
argued that, despite a major contribution to Canadian public life, many French-speaking 
Quebeckers were concerned at the risk of being submerged by English Canada.1131   Shortly, 
after the enactment of the Constitution Act of 1867, which was marked the birth of the 
Canadian federation, there was an attempt by Nova Scotia to sever its links with the 
federation.1132 The constitution guaranteed the use of French in addition to English in both 
the federal and Quebec legislature and courts.1133 This constitutional framework Radan and 
Pavkovic argued, ‘provided few, if any; legal obstacles to the development of the 
francophone nationalist movement, which in the late 1960s took up its main political goal the 
secession of Quebec from Canada’.1134 In 1976, the Parti Quebecois was elected into office 
in the province of Quebec. For the first time a provincial government advocating secession 
from the Canadian federation took regional political control in the country.1135 The Parti 
Quebecois has had full sovereignty from Canada as its main objective, combined with 
economic association with Canada. The Province conducted referenda in 1980 and 1995.1136 
However, Crawford argued that ‘the defeat of the 1995 referendum by a few thousand votes 
raised concern in Canada as a whole as to the impact and consequences for the nation of an 
eventual yes vote’.1137 In this regard, the federal Government in 1996 asked the Supreme 
Court for an advisory opinion on three questions relating to the ‘unilateral secession’ of 
Quebec.      
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4.3.1. in Re Secession of Quebec  
 
The Supreme Court of Canada was asked by the federal government for an advisory opinion 
on three questions relating to the ‘unilateral secession’1138 of Quebec. The Court asked to rule 
on the legality or constitutionality of a unilateral secession of Quebec, thus attempting to 
specify a legal or constitutional framework for any future attempts of Quebec to secede.1139  
The three questions of the Reference were as follows: 
1. Under the Constitution of Canada, can the National Assembly, legislature, or Government 
of Quebec effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? 
2. Does international law give the National Assembly, legislature, or Government of Quebec 
the right to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? In this regard, is there a 
right to self-determination under international law that would give the National Assembly, 
legislature, or Government of Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec from 
Canada unilaterally?1140 
3. In the event of a conflict between domestic and international law on the right of the 
National Assembly, legislature, or Government of Quebec to effect the secession of Quebec 
from Canada unilaterally, which would take precedence in Canada? 
The Court first described secession as a ‘legal act as much as a political one’ and defined it as 
the ‘the effort of a group or section of a State to withdraw itself from the political and 
constitutional authority of that State, with a view to achieving statehood for a new territorial 
unit on the international plane’.1141 In addition, it defines ‘unilateral’ secession as one 
‘without prior negotiations with the other provinces and the federal government’.1142 The first 
question tackled by the Court was whether Quebec could legally secede unilaterally under the 
Constitution of Canada. For the Court, 'the legality of unilateral secession must be evaluated, 
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at least in the first instance, from the perspective of domestic legal order of the State from 
which the unit seeks to withdraw'.1143 Later, the Court noted that ‘international law leaves the 
creation of a new State to be determined by the domestic law of the existing State of which 
the seceding entity presently forms a part’. And that international law is likely to be 
consistent with the conclusion that a unilateral secession is illegal, only subject to the 
possibility that such right may be recognised to this entity based on the right of peoples to 
self-determination’.1144 The Canadian constitution is silent on this question. In this regard, 
Dumberry argued that, scholars generally agree that the unilateral secession of Quebec would 
be unconstitutional under Canadian Law.1145 On the other hand, it has been argued by some 
commentators that the constitution of Canada would nevertheless permit secession, even 
unilaterally, based on a constitutional convention resulting inter alia, from federal 
acquiescence in the holding of both 1980 and 1995 referenda.1146 The Court eventually put an 
end to this argument in concluding that 'although the Constitution neither expressly 
authorises nor prohibits secession and act of secession 'would purport to alert the governance 
of Canadian territory in a manner which undoubtedly is inconsistent with our current 
constitutional arrangements’ and would therefore be illegal'.1147 It found that secession would 
require an amendment of the constitution of Canada.1148 Thus, the Court did not have to 
venture into such controversy in order to answer Question 1 of the Reference; its silence may 
also be ‘politically motivated’.1149 In other words, while Quebec had no right to unilateral 
secession, there was, the Court decided, a constitutional duty on the part of the federal 
government and the provinces to negotiate the terms of secession should Quebecers 
democratically and unambiguously express a will to secede.1150 The Court Lalonde argued 
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proceeded, in effect, to set out the legal framework for such an eventuality.1151 As 
Schneiderman concluded, 'the federal government got what it wanted then, but much more 
than it bargained for'.1152  
Furthermore, in the absence of explicit provisions in the constitution of the country, The 
Supreme Court suggested that, ‘the seceding process must be constrained by four underlying 
structural principles: the democratic principle, the principle of federalism, the principle of the 
primacy of the constitution and of the rule of law, and the principle of protection of 
minorities’.1153  Any province could in principle initiate a secession process.1154 However, 
there has been a referendum on secession. The question must be clear, concise, and short.1155 
The Court indicated that the referendum result ‘must be free of ambiguity both in terms of the 
question asked and in terms of the support it achieves’.1156 The democratic principle must be 
interpreted by the rule of absolute majority. There must be also negotiations after the 
referendum on various important issues, such as tax and borders.1157 The Court also 
Dumberry argued, identified that the other provinces as well as ‘other participants’ would 
take part in these negotiations.1158 Ultimately, the negotiations would have to ‘address the 
interests’ of all participants, as well as ‘the rights of all Canadians both within and outside 
Quebec’.1159  
 Accordingly, the Court acknowledged that a referendum ‘undoubtedly may provide a 
democratic method of ascertaining the views of the electorate’, but also that ‘in itself and 
                                                          
1151 Lalonde, 'Quebec’s Boundaries in the Event of Secession' (n 674).   
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See also, Dumberry, Lessons Learned from the Quebec Secession, Reference before the Supreme Court of 
Canada (n 1145) 429. 
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whatever that may be’. ‘Reference Re Secession of Quebec' (n 21) paras 92, 93.   
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without more, it has no direct legal effect, and could not in itself bring about unilateral 
secession’.1160 This democratic process ‘would confer legitimacy on the efforts of the 
government of Quebec to initiate the Constitution’s amendment process in order to secede by 
constitutional means’.1161 Thus, it can be argued that, the refusal of any party to take part in 
the negotiations, would ‘seriously put at risk the legitimacy of the exercise of its rights, and 
perhaps the negotiation process as a whole’.1162 Consequently, a breach of this obligation to 
negotiate ‘may have important ramifications at the international level’ with respect to the 
international recognition of the new State.1163 A unilateral secession of Quebec, following or 
preceding a referendum, Radan argued, is proclaimed illegal in both domestic and 
international law.1164 
On the other hand, regarding the ‘legal basis’ for the unilateral secession of Quebec under 
international law,  it is widely believed in doctrine that Quebec cannot invoke the right of 
peoples to self-determination to support any right to secession under international law. 
Quebec simply does not meet the criteria set by international law; it is neither a colonial nor 
an oppressed people under Canadian Federation. In this regard, Frank reported that:   
 [O]ne cannot reasonably maintain that the Quebec people is a colonial people, nor that it is deprived of 
the right of its own existence within Canada as a whole or to participate in the democratic process… 
Consequently, the Quebec people effectively exercise its right to self-determination within the whole of 
Canada and are not legally justified in invoking such right to found a possible independence].1165 
The Court alluded thus to the possibility that when a peoples’ right to self-determination is 
'being totally frustrated internally', it may be entitled to exercise it externally by secession. 
However, the Court found that, the population of Quebec was 'equitably represented in 
legislative, executive, and judicial institutions, and that the State of Canada fully respected 
the principle of internal self-determination with respect to Quebec.1166 So that, according to 
the Court, the Quebecois people were not denied their rights to internal self-determination 
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and, accordingly, it was unnecessary to discuss the possibility of rights to external self-
determination.1167 The Court concluded that, ‘exceptional circumstances’, where a people is 
being denied its rights to internal self-determination, are not applicable to the people of 
Quebec’.1168 In fact, Quebec has a degree of relative autonomy within the Federation, is fully 
participating and represented in all aspects of Canadian democracy and is not subject to 
discrimination.1169 On the other hand, some commentators argued that, under international 
law Quebec population would not constitute a 'people' for the purpose of self-
determination,1170 they have already exercised their right to self-determination,1171 secession 
would thus not be accepted by the international community because of its negative results on 
its stability.1172 For that reason, The Court unanimously ruled out that Quebec had no right to 
secede unilaterally in constitutional or international law. Similarly, upon the request from the 
Federal Government, Crawford reported that ‘the Quebec did not enjoy a right to secede 
unilaterally from Canada in international law therefore that Question 2 of the Reference 
should be answered in the negative.1173     
Among Quebec supporters of secession, Dumberry argued that ‘the argument of the legality 
of the process by which secession would be achieved is generally supplanted by reference to 
its legitimacy if corresponding to the expression of the democratic will of the population’.1174 
Relying on the arguments of legitimacy and popular will, sovereignties’ scholars pointed out 
that while international law might not confer upon the Quebecois people a positive right to 
independence, neither did it prohibit secession.1175 International law, Lalonde argued was 
‘natural with respect to secession, and in certain circumstances, it might well adapt to 
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recognise effective political realities’.1176 In a like manner, the federalist commentators1177 
have acknowledged that the consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence, if 
successful, might eventually be 'regulated internationally'.1178  
In addition, the Court was required to consider whether there exists a positive right under 
international law for the secession of Quebec. The position of the Attorney General of 
Canada, which was not refuted by the amicus curiae, was that no such right exists for 
Quebec.1179 In this regard, the Court stated that ‘international law contains neither a right of 
unilateral secession nor the explicit denial of such a right, although such a denial is, to some 
extent, implicit in the exceptional circumstances required for secession to be permitted under 
the right of a people to self-determination’.1180 The Court then examined the content of the 
right of self-determination of people. This right however can be exercised ‘within the 
framework of existing sovereign states1181 and consistently with the maintenance of the 
territorial integrity of those states’.1182 Accordingly, the right to self-determination of a 
people 'is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination, people pursuit of its political, 
social, and cultural development within the framework of an existing State’.1183 On the other 
hand, the right to external self-determination only arises in the most extreme of cases and, 
even then, under carefully defined circumstances’.1184 It proclaimed that a right to secession 
only arises under the principles of self-determination of people at international law, ‘when a 
people is subjected to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation, and possibly when a 
people is denied any meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination internally.1185 For 
the Court, these criteria were, ‘irrelevant’ for this Reference. In addition, it concluded that it 
was unclear whether this last possibility ‘actually reflects an established international law 
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standard’.1186 Thus, in so deciding, Dumberry argued, the Court disregarded several theories 
put forward in the doctrine to enlarge the right to secession to non-colonial situations1187, 
such as, the various ‘moral theories’1188, the 'liberal theories’1189, as well as those grounded in 
the concept of legitimacy.1190 Accordingly, it can be concluded that, Quebec does not meet 
the threshold of a ‘colonial people’ or an ‘oppressed people’, nor can it be suggested that 
Quebecers have been denied or ‘blocked’ meaningful access to government, to pursue their, 
social, political, economic, and cultural development.1191 In other words, it can be concluded 
that, ‘even if the Quebecois are considered a people, that in itself does not give them the right 
to unilaterally secede from Canada’ because they are neither oppressed nor under colonial 
domination.1192 Therefore, the National Assembly, the legislature or the government of 
Quebec ‘do not enjoy a right at international law to effect the secession from Canada 
unilaterally’.1193  
In fact, in answering Question 2, the Court avoided the conversational issue of the existence 
of the Quebec propel under international law. The Court proclaimed that, ‘much of the 
Quebec population certainly shares many of the characters, such as a common language and 
cultural, that would be considered in determining whether a specific group is a people, as do 
other groups within Quebec and/or Canada’.1194 Dumberry argued that, the Court was 
dismissed to determine whether such people of Quebec would 'encompass the entirety of the 
provincial population or just a portion thereof'.1195 It was suggested that there exist not only 
one people in Quebec, but also a juxtaposition of many. According to this opinion, Turp 
argued that, ‘the French-speaking majority in Quebec is a people because of their common 
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language, culture, history, religion, and their ‘collective desire to live together’.1196 Similarly, 
Dumberry argued that, ‘the ten Amerindian nations as well as the Inuit nation living in 
Quebec are also, without a doubt, peoples under international law’.1197  
Furthermore, the Court accepted the argument advanced by the amicus curiae that, ‘while 
international law might not confer on Quebec a positive right to secede, international law 
equally did not prohibit secession’.1198 It proclaimed that, international recognition could be 
conferred upon such a political reality if independence emerged via effective control of the 
territory of what was now the province of Quebec.1199 Later, the Court acknowledged the 
importance of effectiveness: ‘it is true that international law may well, depending on the 
circumstances, adapt to recognise a political and/or factual reality, regardless of the legality 
of the steps leading to its creation’.1200 In the context of Quebec, ‘legal consequences may 
flow from political facts’ and its secession ‘if successful in the streets, might well lead to the 
creation of a new State’.1201 Webber argued that, although Quebec has no right to secession 
under international law, a secession may nevertheless occur by illegal means, and could 
ultimately be successful if, for example, an independent Quebec were to establish its effective 
control over its territory, and international recognition from other States was soon to 
follow.1202 Here, the ultimate success of such secession would be dependent on recognition 
by the international community, ‘which is likely to consider the legality and legitimacy of 
secession’.1203 Professor Abi-Saeb, on the other hand, gave another positive answer to 
Question 2 of the Reference, by adopting a reasoning based on the principle of effectiveness 
in international law. He does not rely on the theories of self-determination granting rights to 
unilateral secession; he insisted that, secession is a question of fact rather than law.1204  
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However, Lalonde argued that, the Court did warn that; subsequent recognition of a unilateral 
declaration of independence could be taken to mean that secession had been achieved under 
colour of ‘legal rights’.1205 For that reason, the Court did not pursue the question of Quebec 
having effective control of the territory concluding that, ‘the principle of effectiveness had no 
real applicability to the second question submitted’.1206 Consequently, the Court did not 
confer upon the Quebec people a legal right to secession; it had satisfactorily answered 
Question 2.1207 In other words, ‘even if Quebec granted such recognition it would not, 
however, provide any retroactive justification for the act of secession, either under the 
constitution of Canada or at international law’.1208 Thus, the Court adopted the declaratory 
theory on the question of the recognition of an independent Quebec by third States. 
According to which recognition is not necessary to achieve statehood, ‘the viability of a 
would-be State in the international community depends, as a practical matter, upon 
recognition by other States’.1209 The Court nonetheless concluded that, international 
recognition occurs only ‘after a territorial unit has been politically successful in achieving 
secession, and that it could not ‘serve retroactively as a source of a ‘legal’ right to secede in 
the first’.1210  
It is true that the Court referred to the European Community Declaration on the Guidelines on 
the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. However, it does 
not provide any explanation as to the scope of such Declaration its relevance in the context of 
Quebec secession.1211 The Court stated one of those ‘legal norms’ which may be taken into 
account in the process of granting or withholding recognition of a new State is the 
‘legitimacy’ of the process of secession.1212 Legitimacy was described, as a ‘precondition for 
recognition by the international community’,1213 would include whether secession was 
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achieved legally in accordance with the law of the State from which the territorial unit 
secede.1214 However, Turp argued that, the ‘legitimacy of the process’ of secession, as 
important as it may be, is not a ‘precondition’ for international recognition and clearly not a 
‘legal norm’ as the Court is suggesting.1215 Although, recognition is becoming increasingly 
collective, and that it is also more and more made conditional upon certain warranties. 
Nonetheless, it has always been and remains today essentially a ‘discretionary political’ act, 
which is not conditioned by any ‘preconditioned’ or ‘legal norms’, even in the European 
context. 1216 Thus, in its application of these different criteria and its relevance in the context 
of Quebec the Court indicated that: 
 [Secession an emergent state that has disregarded legitimate obligations arising out of its previous 
situation’ such as the obligation to negotiate its secession under municipal law ‘can potentially expect to 
be hindered by that disregard in achieving international recognition’, and that, on the contrary, 
compliance by Quebec ‘with such legitimate obligations would weigh in favour of international 
recognition].1217 
However, Dumberry concluded that, ‘the Court's suggestion that States are more likely to 
hesitate to recognise a new State if the latter has failed to fulfil an obligation under 
‘municipal law’ to negotiate with the parent State is merely an ‘opinion’ and certainly not a 
statement of law’, as no such principle exists under international law.1218 In addition, recent 
States practice, has shown that third States have indeed recognised seceding entities prior to 
their recognition by the parent State, for instance, the unilateral declaration of independence 
of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, which were undoubtedly unconditional under ‘Yugoslavia 
Law’, however; it did not prevent third States from recognising them as an independent 
States.1219 
Finally, In view of the answers to Questions 1 and 2, there is no conflict between domestic 
and international law to be addressed in the context of this Reference.1220 Thus, it can be 
concluded that, secession is neither legal nor illegal in international law, but, a legally neutral 
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act the consequences of which are regulated internationally. International recognition on the 
other hand can only be occurred after a territorial unit has been politically successful in 
achieving secession. As a remedial approach, RES, demonstrates that a self-determination 
seeking group does not merit recognition as a new State immediately after its separation or 
quest to separate from its mother State, but that much a group needs to earn its sovereignty.  
Accordingly, where there is no rule or legal framework allowing the self-determination 
seeking group to secede from its mother State, such group must demonstrate to the outside 
world that it is capable of functioning as an independent State, that is it would be a reliable 
sovereign partner, and that it is worthy of recognition. Here, the ultimate success of secession 
would be dependent on recognition by the international community, as a political act an 
independent State may play a significant role in justifying a group’s secession. In this way, if 
the right to secede has been conceded in international law, this would imply that the 
legitimacy of secession could be verified.  
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4.3.2. The Clarity Act 
 
In 2000, the Canadian Parliament sought to take matters further, by adopting ‘an Act to 
clarify’ the meaning of the right to negotiate.1221 The Act, Lalonde argued ‘purports to clarify 
the Court’s ruling that for a referendum result to give rise to an obligation to negotiate the 
secession of a province it would have to be free of ambiguity both in terms of the question 
asked and the support achieved’.1222 According to Crawford, it provides that the House of 
Commons shall consider the text of any future referendum question ‘relating to the proposed 
secession of a province, in order to determine ‘whether the question is clear’.1223 In addition, 
it sets some factors the House of Commons would take into account in considering whether 
there had been a clear expression of will by a clear majority of the population of a province in 
favour of secession.1224 However, Crawford concluded, whether this attempt to make clarity 
doubly clear was worthwhile remains to be seen.1225  
Thus, it was held in the Quebec Case that secession may possibly be justified ‘where a people 
is subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation outside a colonial context,’ and 
further ‘when a people is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to self-
determination internally, it is entitled, as a last resort, to exercise it by secession.’ Hence, 
Crawford argued that ‘the astute balance achieved by the Court in its unanimous opinion that, 
no right of unilateral secession either under constitutional or international law, but a 
constitutional right to negotiate independence in the event of a clear affirmative answer to a 
clear question about secession, did much to clarify the situation and to reduce the tension’.1226 
He added that ‘the constitutional right to negotiate terms of separation has seemed to reduce 
the likelihood of separation altogether’.1227 The present author agrees with Crawford when he 
says that the question of any future referendum should be clear, and there should be a clear 
expression of will by a clear majority of the population in favour of secession.  
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Moreover, it is true that, in certain circumstances, the right to self-determination may include 
the right to secede; however, there is still dispute among the scholars on who should be 
allowed to exercise that right.1228 In this regard, the UNHRC has explained that ‘people have 
a right to self-determination but mere minorities do not have the same right’.1229 Here, it is 
significant to mention that the Government of Canada has recognised that the Quebecois have 
a history that is distinct from the majority of Canada. Further, in 1987 the Meech Lake 
Accord recognised Quebec as a distinct society.1230 Consequently, in the Charlottetown 
Accords in 1992 reiterated this recognition and sough to give Quebec the authority to 
preserve and promote that society.1231 However, neither the Meech Lake Accord nor 
Charlottetown Accords have been ratified because of fears about their impact on Quebec’s 
language minorities and distinct society.1232 On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Canada 
has recognised Quebec’s distinctiveness in its discussion of federalism, and secession under 
international law.1233 However, the Court concluded that ‘although Quebecois are culturally 
unique, uniqueness alone does not confer the right to secede. This conclusion is in accordance 
with the current requirements of international law. This discussion can be found in chapter 
two.   
In addition, for a group claiming the right to self-determination, the central government 
should have oppressed them. The purpose of this requirement Hana argued, is to ensure that 
States who do not violate a group’s rights will not be dismembered unnecessarily.1234 
However, the Quebecois have not suffered oppression under the Canadian government.1235  In 
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this regard, the Supreme Court states that ‘because the Quebecois are manifestly not an 
oppressed people, they are not entitled to unilaterally secede under international law’.1236  
Buchanan on the other hand argued that, ‘there may be a basis for secession on a culture 
preservation ground if a culture is in genuine danger of being destroyed in the near 
future’.1237 Hence, Richardson argued that ‘the Quebecois Party bases their claim that Quebec 
should secede on the belief that the government of Canada does not protect French culture 
sufficiently’.1238 However, Hana argued that ‘secession on the grounds of an immediate and 
serious threat to the survival of French culture does not seem justified’.1239 In this regard, the 
Supreme Court did not consider cultural oppression, or oppression of identity; it is unlikely 
that Quebec would have the right to secede on this ground. 
Thus, Hana argued that ‘for a group in the situation of the Quebecois a balancing test may be 
applied between the level of oppression and the degree that foreign domination played in 
creation of the situation’.1240 Accordingly, it can be concluded that, Quebec is not oppressed. 
On the other hand, although the Quebecois may, be a distinct people, however, because they 
have meaningful access to government and they are not oppressed they are not entitled to 
secede. In other words, for a Quebec to have a right of secession they must show that the 
Canadian government is highly unrepresentative and oppressive, which at present is not the 
case?   
In sum, it must be accepted that the Court's opinion is important for the assessment of the 
legality of secession. However, legal arguments are neither completely decisive of the 
question nor irrelevant. The question is both legal and political. The Court comprehensively 
evaluated the circumstances in which secession in a non-colonial context may be allowed 
under international law, and as such is a very important useful reference for future disputes 
involving questions relating to the legality and legitimacy of secession. 
                                                          
1236 ‘Reference re Secession of Quebec'  (n 21) para 132. The Court ultimately concludes that, Quebecois have 
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1237 Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (n 53).   
1238 D Richardson, 'The Quebec Independence Vote and Its Implications of English Language Legislation' 
(1997) 26 GA J Int’l & Comp L 521.  
1239‘The law declaring that French and English are the official languages and must both be recognised and 
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French language’. See, Hanna, 'Right to Self-Determination in In Re Secession of Quebec' (n 1228).  
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4.4. The Case of South Sudan, as an Example of the Emergence of States in 
International Law between Territorial Integrity and the Will of the People 
 
The case of South Sudan is considered as one of the most devastating self-determination 
conflicts the world has seen. In January 2011, further to a peace agreement, the majority of 
the people of South Sudan voted in referendum to separate from Sudan. International 
recognition followed promptly1241 and on July 2011, it became a member of the UN.1242 The 
secession of South Sudan ‘can be viewed as a delayed exercise of decolonisation, if one were 
to accept the idea that South Sudan should have become independent when the British 
withdrew from the colony’.1243 On the other hand, South Sudan’s statehood can be examined 
as a true case of secession outside the decolonisation paradigm; it ‘is a generally accepted 
legal fact and its legal status not subject to controversy’.1244  This case can be considered as a 
rare example of a right to self-determination being exercised under domestic constitutional 
provisions.   
 
4.4.1. History of South Sudan 
 
Sudan was a British colony, and, when it won independence, ‘the territory of South Sudan 
remained incorporated into new State of Sudan, pursuant to the principle of uti possidetis and 
the global acceptance of the idea that decolonisation entitled the creation of new States 
pursuant to the existing colonial borders’.1245 South Sudan was a part of the larger State of 
Sudan until the 2011 independence referendum. Sudan’s colonial borders were drawn in 1884 
at the Berlin Conference, at which European powers divided the African continent among 
themselves.1246 Thus, Sudan became a part of the British colonial empire. Its borders were 
drawn randomly by European leaders who had cared little about the culture, ethnicity, 
                                                          
1241 See, ‘South Sudan: World leaders welcome new nation', BBC News (9 July 2011)   
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1243 Sterio, The Right to Self-Determination under International Law (n 140) 161.  
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religion, or language of the inhabitants of such a newly created State.1247  Under British rule, 
the North and the South were administrated separately. The North encompasses 
predominately Arab descendent of colonisers, and different ethnic groups of black African in 
the South.1248 The British colonial rule emphasised under the North-South divide, and under 
the British administration, ‘the North quickly established political and economic domination 
before beginning a campaign of infrastructure destruction throughout the South’.1249  
Subsequently, an agreement was reached in 1899, establishing Anglo-Egyptian rule in Sudan, 
until its independence, de facto British rule continued to rule over Sudan.1250       
In 1947, at the Juba Conference, ‘the Great British decided to unite formally the North and 
the South into a single administrative unit, and the British ensured that South Sudan would 
not have meaningful representation in the new unified colony of Sudan by hand picking 
representatives for the South’.1251 Chand argued that ‘the Conference was a window dressing 
organised to dictate to South Sudan leaders that the political developments though painful, 
they must accept as irreversible decision to hand over the South to the new Arab and Muslims 
masters from the North’.1252 Sterio further argued that ‘the British should never have handed 
South Sudan to North Sudan because this unjust decision created an internal colony (the 
south) within a unified Sudan’.1253 In 1956, in the wake of the global decolonisation 
movement, Sudan finally won its independence1254 from the British1255 and became an 
independent State. However, it was no surprise that from the beginning of its independence, 
‘Sudan was a country deeply divided between the Muslim North and the Black South’.1256    
                                                          
1247 ibid. 
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Because of the unequal development system applied in the country during the colonial period, 
‘the end of British colonisation simply gave place to the internal domination of the South by 
the North’.1257 In 1962, South Sudan fought its first independence war, this war was one of 
secession, rebels under the movement of the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), 
fought the central government of Sudan.1258 However, when the rebels failed to win 
independence, they settled for autonomy within the framework of the 1972 Addis Ababa 
Agreement.1259  The agreement resulted in the establishment of the ‘High Executive Council 
in South Sudan led by a southern president as well as a southern region assembly’.1260 In 
addition, English was recognised as the principal language of the South, while both parties 
recognised Arabic as the official language of the whole State of Sudan.1261 Thus, the rebels in 
1972 settled for a form of internal self-determination, when their claims for external self-
determination remained rebuked by the State of Sudan and the international community.1262 
However, it is true that the central government failed to respect the terms of the 1972 
Agreement, as a result, in 1983, Islamic politics and policies were forcibly imposed 
throughout the nation. In this regard, Chand argued that:   
[the denial of democratic values, equal justice for all, superimposition of Sharia (Islamic law) to be the 
law of the land in 1983; the abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972; the annulment of secular 
democratic institutions and replacing them with sectarian system based on Islamic precepts have 
immensely attributed to the continuous paranoia and irreversible institutional paralysis in the country and 
negated any concept of unity in diversity in a united Sudan].1263   
In sum, the central government of Sudan retreated on its promise to respect the internal self-
determination of the South. As a result, a second civil war erupted, which was largely the 
continuation of the first one1264, ‘it did call for secession’.1265 The second civil war also failed 
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to achieve their objective, however; it resulted in the signing of a Declaration of Principles 
(‘DOP’) in 1994. The DOP was neither a ceasefire nor a peace agreement; but rather an 
expression of the parties ‘wish list’ of issues on which they desired future negotiations.1266 
During the second civil war, the current Sudan’s president Al-Basher seized power through a 
bloodless coup in 1989.1267 Sterio argued that, his regime ‘aligned itself with radical Islamists 
and resulted in a prolonged denial of any meaningful autonomy for the South’.1268 His policy 
toward the South has not represented a radical change from those of his predecessors. For that 
reason, Al-Bashir has faced not only resumption of rebellion in the South, but also growing 
pressure on behalf of the international community to respect South Sudanese rights.1269 In 
light of such pressure, in 2005 the Al-Bashir regime opted for substantive negotiations with 
the South Sudan Liberation Movement (‘SSLM’), ‘which resulted in the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)1270 and the establishment of the Inter-Governmental 
Authority on development’.1271 The CPA is comprised of texts of previously signed 
agreements and protocols. For instance, the ‘Machakos Protocol’ (July 20, 2002), the 
‘Protocol on Power Sharing’ (May 26, 2004), the ‘Agreement on Wealth Sharing’ (January 7, 
2004), and the ‘Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei Area’ (May 26, 2004).1272 
The Machakos Protocol given that ‘that the people of South Sudan have the right to self-
determination through a referendum to determine their future status’.1273 It further established 
a six-year interim period at the conclusion of which the internationally monitored referendum 
would take place.1274 In addition, Articles (17.8, 20.1, 20.2, and 21.2.) regulated technical 
details pertaining to South Sudan’s departure from the common State in case of a decision for 
independence.1275  
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The CPA provided ‘autonomy for the South, wealth sharing between the South and the North, 
and the holding of a referendum for self-determination in the South on 9 January 2011’.1276 It 
induced the parties to a ‘negotiate settlement based on a democratic system of governance 
which’, on the one hand, recognises the right of the people of Southern Sudan to self-
determination and seeks to make unity attractive during the Interim Period.  While at the 
same time is founded on the values of justice, democracy, good governance, respect for 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, mutual understanding and tolerance of 
diversity within the realities of the Sudan.1277 Thus, after the adoption of the CPA, Sudan 
promulgated a new interim constitution, which granted substantive autonomy to Southern 
Sudan.1278 The Constitution ‘further specified that a referendum on the future status of 
Southern Sudan would be held six months before the end of the six-year interim period’.1279 
The referendum question was initially indicated in the Interim Constitution by providing that 
the people of Southern Sudan would either ‘(a) confirm unity of the Sudan by voting to 
sustain the system of government established under the CPA and this Constitution, or (b) vote 
for secession’.1280 The Southern Sudan Referendum Act subsequently specified the 
referendum rules on December 31, 2009.  
The interim Constitution of Sudan ‘has defined Southern Sudan as a self-determination unit, 
in principle, created a constitutional right to secession’.1281 The right was then Vidmar argued 
that ‘operationalised in the Southern Sudan Referendum Act, promulgated on 31 December 
2009’.1282 Article 41 of the Act specified the referendum rules and made specific provision 
for the required quorum (60 per cent of all eligible vote) as well as the wining majority (50 
per cent plus 1 vote of the total number of votes cast).1283 While Article 67, inter alia, 
provided that in the event of Southern Sudan’s vote for secession, the government would 
apply the constitutional provisions, which foresaw Southern Sudan’s withdrawal from the 
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Sudanese institutional arrangement.1284 The referendum was held on July 2011. The option 
for secession was voted for by 98.83 per cent of voters, at a turnout of 97.58 per cent, and Al-
Bashir’s government announced that it would respect the referendum results.1285 South Sudan 
was admitted into the UN on 14 July 20111286, and the central government of Khartoum 
announced its formal recognition a day after the declaration of independence was issued.1287 
However, Sterio argued that ‘despite successful independence, some areas in South Sudan 
such as the region of Abyei and the Nuba Mountains remain disputed.1288 Moreover, since its 
independence South Sudan plagued by conflict and inter-ethnic war. It has been reported that, 
the government of South Sudan is currently at war with at least seven armed groups.1289 
Besides, ‘tough negotiations remain on how to divide up economic resources between north 
and south, which has the bulk of oil’.1290  
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4.4.2. The legality of the South Sudanese case for self-determination under relevant 
international law        
 
Many commentators have categorised the case of South Sudan as a case of independence 
possibly in light of the fact that South Sudanese independence resulted from popular 
referendum, the most commonly prescribed method of self-determination.1291 Significantly, 
South Sudan’s way to independence was marked by a prolonged civil war, atrocities, and a 
grave humanitarian situation.1292 However, these circumstances did not create a right to 
independence under international law.1293 South Sudan did not become an independent State 
in terms of international law, until Khartoum’s Government formally agreed to hold a 
referendum on independence at which an overwhelming majority supported secession. Thus, 
unlike the case of Kosovo, South Sudan can be considered as a State created with the 
approval of the parent State.        
While the people of South Sudan have effectively exercised their right to external self-
determination, it is important to assess the legality thereof. Accordingly, this section will 
analyse the legal case for self-determination in South Sudan.   
 
4.4.2.1. Whether South Sudanese constitute a ‘people’, for the purpose of self-
determination  
 
On a legalistic perspective, the peace agreement recognised the South Sudanese as entitled to 
self-determination as a matter of Sudanese law. Roepstorff argued that, ‘Sudan owes its 
existence to colonial history and is divided by religion, encompassing 70 per cent Muslims, 
25 per cent animists, and 5 per cent Christians’.1294 Some South Sudanese are Christian, 
‘having been converted into Christianity by missionary present throughout the colonial era, 
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while others practice a variety of indigenous religions’.1295 Chand argued that, ‘over 62 per 
cent of its population is of African stock, 34 per cent of mulattoes Arabs, and 4 per cent of 
conspicuous classification and origin’.1296 At the time of independence, English has been 
recognised as the official language.1297 Thus, objectively, it is argued that, the inhabitants of 
South Sudan cannot be constituted a single people. In other words, ‘the self seems divided 
into myriad mini-selves and tribal ‘selfistans’.’ Subjectively, it would also be hard to 
conclude that the inhabitants of South Sudan share a common sense of belonging to the same 
unity’.1298 Thus, under traditional view of what constitutes a people, the South Sudanese 
would fall short of this assessment.               
On the other hand, many have argued that the South Sudanese ‘self’ may consist of a 
sentiment of exception form the largest State of Sudan.1299 It is true that, when the British 
colonisers annexed the South into the North at the Juba Conference in 1947, they betrayed the 
interests of the South at the expense of creating a North-dominated entity. Thus, when Sudan 
became independent in 1956, the principle of ‘uti possidetis’ dictated that South Sudan 
remain a part of Sudan.1300 In 1964, the OAU at the Cairo Conference recognised the 
principle of respect for colonial borders, in essence, however; random or unfair colonial 
borders appeared, such borders would remain the guiding principle throughout 
decolonisation.1301 While this position Sterio argued that ‘was espoused by African leaders to 
avoid chaos and territorial warfare during the creation of so many new States’.1302 Thus, 
Chand demonstrated that ‘since the independence of Sudan in 1965, the inhabitants of the 
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South have been internally colonised and subjected by their official leaders.’ He claimed that, 
the OAU Cairo Resolution on the preservation of the inherited colonial boundaries should be 
declared to be as legally void and null.1303 For decades, it has been impossible for the South 
and the North to coexist as one heterogeneous State because of ‘historical animosities such 
continue to prevail today such as slavery, genocidal war and the inculcation of religion into 
the political theatre of a diverse, multi-ethnic, multi-political, multi- religious an multi-
political society’.1304 The sentiment of oppression and injustice has resulted in two wars for 
independence fought by South Sudan against the Khartoum Government. Since its 
independence, Sudan has been in constant conflict and largely divided between the North and 
the South. Thus, the South Sudanese ‘self’ may be defined by this sentiment of oppression, 
injustice, and non-belonging to the larger State of Sudan.    
Further, it can also be argued that the inhabitants of South Sudan are distinct from those of 
the North in two ways. First, Sterio argued that ‘Northern Sudan is inhabited by non-black 
Arabs, whereas the South is particularly populated by black Africans. Second, Northern 
Sudanese are Muslim, and have been attempting to impose Islamist policies and even 
‘shari’a’ law on all Sudan.1305 South Sudanese are Christian or animist, and have since the 
1947 annexation been the victim of Islamic fundamentalism and policies. Thus, although 
South Sudanese are both black African and non-Muslim; these two factors differentiate them 
from the Muslim Arab inhabitants of North Sudan. Mamdani described ‘unity’ in South 
Sudan as one brought about by choice and through freedom.1306 Such unity must be respected 
and recognised as a legal case for self-determination because of the inherent injustice of the 
opposite choice.1307 Thus, it can be argued that as a matter of international law fact, the 
inhabitants of South Sudan constitute a people that have the right to self-determination.   
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4.4.2.2. Whether the South Sudanese right to internal self-determination was respected 
 
 As noted earlier, international law has recognised the right to internal self-determination to 
all people, a form of autonomy within the parent State, whereby a people’s rights to political 
representation, as well as rights to linguistic, social, cultural freedoms are guaranteed and 
respected by the mother State.1308  The Canadian Supreme Court, like the League of Nations, 
held that ‘a people has a right to internal self-determination first, and that only if that right is 
not respected by the mother State, the same people’s right to break off may accrue’.1309 
Traditionally, the right to independence involving secession as a mode of self-determination 
has only applied to people under colonial domination or some kind of foreign occupation.1310 
However, the modern-day international law has come to embrace the right of non-colonial 
people to secede from an existing State, ‘when the group is collectively denied civil and 
political rights and subject to egregious abuses’.1311       
In the case of South Sudan, it was clear that the central government did not respect the South 
Sudanese people’s rights to internal self-determination, between the decolonisation in 1956, 
and the end of the first independence war.1312 The Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 
considerably established meaningful autonomy for South Sudan and guaranteed the respect of 
internal self-determination rights for its people.1313 However, in 1983, Sudan retreated on this 
promise and from then until 2005; the South Sudanese did not enjoy any form of internal self-
determination.1314 Internal self-determination had failed as an option. Although, South 
Sudanese settled for a form of internal self-determination in 1972, and their claims for 
external self-determination remained rebuked by Sudan and the rest of the international 
community.1315 However, the central Sudanese government failed to respect the terms of the 
1972 Agreement and, Islamic politics and policies were imposed throughout the entire nation, 
until 2005, when the CPA was negotiated, the South Sudanese did not enjoy any internal self-
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determination rights.1316 In other words, al-Bashir or his successors would never grant 
meaningful autonomy to the South, and that the South’s rights to internal self-determination 
would never be respected. Thus, it can be concluded that, the people of South Sudan have 
been entitled to external self-determination, because their rights to internal self-determination 
had not been respected.      
The case of South Sudan’s self-determination can be categorised as one occurs within the 
decolonisation model, or one occurring outside such parameters. In other words, Sterio 
argued that ‘the case South Sudan can be considered as a case of delayed decolonisation, that 
they should have been granted independence at decolonisation and should not have been 
incorporated into larger Sudan’.1317 The ICJ had acknowledged this in the East Timor case, so 
the case stands for the proposition of delayed decolonisation.1318 In the case of East Timor, 
Portugal withdrew from this country as a coloniser but Indonesian forces swept in and 
forcibly annexed East Timor.1319 After 25 years of Indonesian occupation, the people of East 
Timor were ultimately allowed to vote for independence in a popular referendum.1320 Thus, 
East Timor was a case of self-determination exercised through delayed decolonisation and 
independence from Portugal, not a remedial secession case from Indonesia. Accordingly, the 
right of self-determination continues to exist until it is exercised, and even when it continues 
to exist in its post-colonial form as internal self-determination, with external self-
determination available in the form of secession in the most exceptional circumstances. 
Similarly, ‘the people in South Sudan could claim that they were unjustly and forcefully 
annexed at decolonisation to the larger State of Sudan, and that, accordingly, their 
independence now represents a case of delayed decolonisation’.1321 However, it can also be 
concluded that South Sudan seceded from Sudan outside the parameters of decolonisation, 
which may make it more problematic legally, because Sudan has existed as an independent 
nation since 1956 and the territory of South Sudan separated itself therefrom decades after 
Great Britain withdrew as the coloniser. Thus, as noted earlier, whether international law 
recognises the right of self-determination of people outside the colonial context, such 
                                                          
1316 Wakengela and Koko, 'The Referendum for Self-Determination in South Sudan and Its Implication for the 
Post-Colonial State in Africa' (n 1256). 
1317 Sterio, The Right to Self-Determination under International Law (n 140) 167.  
1318 Case Concerning East Timor (n 114) para 103.  
1319 See, Sterio, The Right to Self-Determination under International Law (n 140) 104-112.  
1320 ibid. 
1321 ibid 167. 
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argument is certainly possible but doubts persist as to its absolute legality.1322 Accordingly, if 
the case of South Sudan seceded from Sudan, in the same way as Kosovo seceded from 
Serbia,1323 and then debates can be raised about the legality of such non-colonial external 
self-determination.      
 
4.4.2.3. Whether South Sudanese self-determination violated the territorial integrity of 
Sudan  
 
 In the case of South Sudan, we have a concrete illustration of the intersection of the 
principles of self-determination and territorial integrity. The ICJ in the Western Sahara case 
concluded that the ‘people of Western Sahara were entitled to self-determination,’ however, 
the Court stopped short of analysing territorial claims to this region laid in Morocco and 
Mauritania.1324 It specifically said that, although there were some ties, these ties did not 
amount to ‘any legal tie of territorial sovereignty’. Thus, in its Advisory Opinion, the Court 
has not addressed the issue of self-determination and its possible conflict with the principle of 
territorial integrity.1325 Similarly, in the case of South Sudan, Sterio argued that ‘the 
decolonisation process took place under the principle of uti possedetis, without taking into 
consideration any territorial claims that remained present since decolonisation, causing a civil 
war and eventually resulting in the partition of the State of Sudan’.1326  While in the case of 
Western Sahara, no such partition has taken place, but talks on a popular referendum for the 
people of Western Sahara have been present over the last decade.1327  Thus, serious legal 
issues arise concerning these cases about how to reconcile the principle of self-determination 
                                                          
1322 For more details see, Chap 1 ibid. (Whether international law recognises the right to external self-
determination to  non-colonialized people).    
1323 See, T Christakis, 'The ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo: Has International Law Something to Say about 
Secession?' (2011) 24 Leiden J Intl L 73.  Also, UNSC Rec 1244 (10 June 1999) (n 749).  
1324 ‘Western Sahara Case'  (n 103).  For more details see, Sterio, The Right to Self-Determination under 
International Law  (n 140) Chap 5.   
1325 In his Separate Advisory Opinion Swedish judge, Sture Petren wrote that: ‘The decolonisation of a territory 
may raise the question of the balance which has to be struck between the right of its population to self-
determination and the territorial integrity of one or even of several States. The question may be raised, for 
example, whether the fact that the territory belonged, at the time of its colonisation, to a State which still exists 
today justifies that State in claiming it on the basis of its territorial integrity’. See, ‘Western Sahara Case', ICJ 
Separate Opinion of Judge Petren [1975] ICJ Rep 110 <http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/53/5605.pdf>accessed 
9 October 2013.   
1326 Sterio, The Right to Self-Determination under International Law (n 140)168.  
1327 See, ibid Chap 5. 
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with the territorial integrity of the parent State, ‘or of another neighbouring State which has 
asserted territorial claims to self-determination exercising entity’.1328      
Overall, the strongest legal argument to self-determination of the people of South Sudan 
would be the acceptance of several assumptions. First, that the inhabitants of South Sudan 
constitute a ‘people’, that their rights to internal self-determination were seriously violated by 
the ‘Khartoum’s government’ and that their case does not represent here a case of delayed 
decolonisation, but the emergence of a new State outside the process of decolonisation. This 
legal argument would be interesting in the near future, if the ICJ were called to rule on South 
Sudanese independence, or of any similarly acquired independence in another region of the 
world. Having the ICJ's stamp of approval would effectively develop a normative legal 
framework of external self-determination in such complicated circumstances.1329 On the other 
hand, Remedial Earned sovereignty, 'RES', as a process can be suggested as an indeterminate 
solution consisting of very limited, narrow normative farmworkers under which external self-
termination, leading to remedial secession. ‘RES’ is legally, morally and politically pleasing 
to assert that those peoples that have demonstrated their capacity to function as an 
independent sovereign State and to become a good world citizens should become entitled to 
their sovereignty. This process would eventually avoid self-determination seeking group to 
engage in violent secession tactics. Without such framework, it would appear that external 
self-determination remains heavily influenced by the act of recognition and ultimately by the 
‘Super Powers’ rule. In other words, in practice, an entity seems to be treated as a State only 
if the outside world wishes to recognise it.  
Thus, the people of Sudan grounded their claims to the right to self-determination on the 
massive human rights violation, and the continuing of domination by the Arab north.1330 As is 
arguably the case of Kosovo, South Sudanese people realised their right to self-determination 
by way of secession. South Sudan emerged as a new State through use of force, as well as a 
political process, which led to approval being given by its parent State.1331 The mechanism 
for secession was rooted in the 2005 CPA and the constitutional arrangement that resulted 
from this agreement. The separation of South Sudan is a rare example of a right to 
                                                          
1328 ibid 168. 
1329 Although the ICJ does not do this, it can only apply Article 38 (1) of its status, it is a misconception of the 
function of the ICJ. Perhaps, the PCA through arbitration agreed by the parties. 
1330 Roepstorff, The Politics of Self-Determination (n 846) 140.  
1331 Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law. The Emergence of New States in Post-Cold War 
Practice (n 365) 76.  
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independence being exercised under domestic constitutional provisions, which would surely 
make it a non-colonial case. Such ‘constitutional provisions tend to be implemented 
exceptionally as an interim solution aimed at peaceful settlement of the contested entity’s 
legal status’.1332  In other words, Vidmar argued that ‘in terms of international law, South 
Sudan did not become an independent State before the central government formally agreed to 
hold a binding referendum on independence, at which secession was supported by 
majority’.1333 In the other words, it can be argued that, the consent of parent State is the 
reason why, unlike the case of Kosovo, the new legal status of South Sudan is undisputed. In 
addition, it is true that, similar to East Timor,1334 the legal case for self-determination of the 
people of South Sudan may stand for an example of coincidence between international law 
and the great powers rules. As in the case of Kosovo, where the some great powers 
essentially enabled the Kosovar Albanians to form their own independent State, the Western 
great powers arguably were a key factor in allowing for the South Sudanese independence.  
Thus, it can be concluded that, that the CPA can be considered as legally binding agreement. 
In this regard, Sheeran argued that, international law must strive to be as coherent or 
complete system as is possible using the rules and principles available.1335 The legitimacy and 
effectiveness of an agreement such as the CPA depends in large part on its legal status. The 
CPA makes it very difficult for the Khartoum government not to recognise the right of self-
determination of the people of South Sudan under customary international law.1336 It provides 
a clear foundation that the right was considered to exist for the people of South Sudan, and 
set the parameters for its exercise consistent with international law.1337  
                                                          
1332  Vidmar, ‘South Sudan and the International Legal Framework Governing the Emergence and Delimitation 
of New States’ (n 51). 
1333 Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law. The Emergence of New States in Post-Cold War 
Practice (n 365) 76.   
1334 Sterio argued that ‘In East Timor, the legal rules pointed toward a favourable outcome for the East 
Timorese. In other words, the people of East Timor most likely had a valid legal case for delayed colonial self-
determination (or even a good legal case for remedial secession from Indonesia, in light of Indonesian abuses of 
the East Timorese people). However, despite the existence of a solid legal case for self-determination, the East 
Timorese would never have been able to ‘declare’ independence from Indonesia without the involvement of the 
great powers.’ See, Sterio, The Right to Self-Determination under International Law (n 140) 104-113.  
1335 S P Sheeran, 'International Law, Peace Agreements and Self-Determination: The Case of the Sudan' (2011) 
60 Int’l & Comp L Q 423.  
1336 In term of implementation, the detailed processes prescribed by the CPA fulfil that which is required under 
customary international law. As the ICJ put it in the Western Sahara case, the exercise of the right ‘requires a 
free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples concerned’. See, ‘Western Sahara Case ' (n 103) paras 54-
59. 
1337 Sheeran, 'International Law, Peace Agreements and Self-Determination' (n 1335). 
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4.5. Conclusion  
 
It can be concluded that, under international law, the people’s right to exercise external self-
determination accrues if its parent State has not respected its rights to internal self-
determination. In other words, international law seems to recognise an exceptional case of 
remedial self-determination in the non-colonial context only when the parent State engages in 
such oppressive behaviour that the minority people no longer can coexist within the larger 
society of the parent State. At that point, the presumption of territorial sovereignty can be 
overcome.  
The chapter addressed that in Kosovo, international law rules were not as clear, and a good 
argument can be mounted that the Kosovars did not have a solid legal case for self-
determination. Its case poses important questions regarding the contemporary understanding 
of the international legal theories of secession, statehood, and recognition. It challenges 
scholars to assert new theories as justification for such unilateral act of secession. In addition, 
the case poses other solutions to the Kosovar people, such as an ‘interim settlement’ resolves 
the self-determination conflict by establishing the secessionist unit as a constitutional self-
determination entity,1338 conditional independence, the creation of an international 
protectorate, and the division along ethnic lines should be conceptualised before full 
independence for Kosovo. This situation indicates that, international community recognises 
only a very narrow set of circumstances under which self-determination may be realised by 
way of independent statehood, namely, in the case of massive human rights violations 
committed by an oppressive State and in the case when a parent State is consistently violating 
the internal rights of self-determination. On the other hand, Earned Sovereignty, ‘ES’, as a 
conflict resolution theory, has helped Kosovar people to realise statehood. During the interim 
period, the people in Kosovo have demonstrated to the outside world that it is capable to 
                                                          
1338 Weller explained that the ‘[colonial self-determination conflicts are not covered, as it is clear from the outset 
that the colonial entity in question is entitled to independence and there is no need for settlement on that issue 
the secessionist party suspends its claim for independence for a period during that period, autonomy or self-
governance is developed and applied in good faith, with a view to demonstrating that this solution sufficiently 
answers the requirements of the secessionist entity.’ Interim settlements of this kind require that continued 
territorial integrity be ‘given a chance’. After a fixed period of the application of autonomy or self-governance, 
there is a provision for a referendum on independence, often with international involvement. The referendum 
will be held in the secessionist unit only, and is decisive in it].’ For more details, see, Weller and Wolff (ed) 
'Autonomy, Self-Governance, Conflict Resolution: Innovative Approaches to Institutional Design in Divided 
Society' (n 1012) 160.  
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function as an independent State, that it would be a reliable sovereign partner, and that it 
worthy of achieving statehood and that it has ‘earned’ its sovereignty.   
The case of Kosovo has shown that the issues of self-determination and creation of States in 
international law have always been much more political than they are legal questions. The 
great powers have played a major role in securing the realisation of the legal rules in Kosovo.  
In Quebec case, the main argument of the amicus curiae was that even if Quebec had no legal 
right to secession under Canadian or international law, this would not rule out the possibility 
of a de facto successful secession based on the principle of effectively, and international 
recognition from other States was soon to follow. The Court rightly investigated by stating 
that, ‘international law contains neither a right of unilateral secession nor the explicit denial 
of such a right, although such a denial is, to some extent, implicit in the exceptional 
circumstances required for secession to be permitted under the right of a people to self-
determination’.1339 
The Canadian Supreme Court distinguished the right to internal self-determination from the 
right to external self-determination. While the former refers to a level of provincial autonomy 
within the existing State (Canada in this instance), including political, civic, cultural, 
religious and social rights, the latter refers to the right to separate from the existing State in 
order to form a new, independent State.1340 It concluded that the right to separate is 
conditioned on the non-respect of the right to some form of provincial autonomy. The case of 
Quebec has shown that, if the group’s rights to internal self-determination will be fulfilled 
and respected in the future, such group would have no right to external self-determination, 
and thus no right to secede from its mother State.  However, if the mother-State fails in 
significant ways to respect the group’s rights to internal self-determination, then the group 
would have the right to external self-determination and thus the right to secede from the 
mother-State.   
At the end, the chapter discussed that, the case of South Sudan is a good illustration of the 
nature of the emergence of new States in modern international law. Arguing that this does not 
happen automatically based on meeting the statehood criteria, and/or the existence of historic 
                                                          
1339 ‘Reference Re Secession of Quebec'  (n 21) para 112. 
1340 ibid, para 126.   
248 
 
entitlement, rather it is a legal-political process, which leads to a new legal situation.1341 For 
decades, it was impossible for the North and the South to co-exist as one heterogeneous State 
because of historical animosities, political unrest, and cultural position. The people of South 
Sudan based their claim to the right to self-determination to the forced Arabisation and 
Islamisation and ethnic cleansing in the South, as well as, to the grave breach of fundamental 
human rights by the Arab north. Thus, the conflict in Sudan between the North and the South 
can be described as a self-determination conflict in which the South sought independence 
from the North. Although, the fact South Sudan has had a solid legal argument to support 
their people’s exercise of self-determination however; it can be concluded that the great 
powers were instrumental and a key factor in preparing the South Sudanese for independence.  
Significantly, all successful secessionist peoples (Kosovo and South Sudan) have enjoyed 
support from the theory of ‘RS’. For Kosovo, ‘RS’ has been instrumental in ensuring the 
people’s safety, and capacity-building for the emerging State, and in political and institutional 
assistance culminating in the new State’s ability to access international institutions and to 
engage in international relations. On the contrary, peoples that have not earned their 
sovereignty, because of willingness to engage in warfare and at times human rights abuses at 
the expense of the mother State or other regional ethnic groups, such peoples have been left 
to their own devices in the struggle for secession and statehood. On the other hand, the 
secession of South Sudan can be considered as a unique case in African history. The high 
level of international participation in the constructing of the ‘CPA’, which led to the eventual 
secession, meant that the international community was willing to recognise South Sudan as 
soon as it declared independence. Hence, it can be concluded that, the role of ‘RS’ as a 
conflict resolution agreement was essential, as to why South Sudan quickly became the 
world’s newest country, and received recognition from the international community. Through 
the ‘interim period’, South Sudanese people have engaged in building measures that 
international community require, such as, democracy and respect of human rights and 
minority rights. They have proven that they are capable of functioning as an independent 
State, and that they have earned their sovereignty, because of willingness to respect all 
conditional mechanisms provided in ‘CPA’ and respect the will of the international 
community. So that, it can be concluded that the international community had supported their 
claims to self-determination and statehood, because, South Sudanese people have 
                                                          
1341 For more details see, Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law. The Emergence of New States in 
Post-Cold War Practice (n 365) 77.  
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demonstrated their capacity to become good world citizens, and that they should become 
entitled to their sovereignty and recognition. 
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Chapter Five: The case of Iraqi Kurdistan Region IKR 
 
5.1. Iraqi Kurdistan 
 
The Kurdistan region of Iraq, known as ‘southern Kurdistan’, occupies the mountainous north 
part of modern day Iraq. It has a population of six million and covers an area of 83,000 
square kilometres. Religiously, the majority are Muslims Sunni; however, there are also 
Christians, and Yazidis. Historically, Kurdistan Region KR was a colony of the Ottoman 
Empire, until the end of WWI, 1918. However, when the Ottoman Empire collapsed in WWI, 
the victorious Allied Powers, Britain, France and Russia, stripped all Middle Eastern colonies 
of the Ottoman Empire and divided them among themselves in accordance with ‘Sykes-Picot’ 
agreement of 1916. Thereafter, Iraq became a mandate of Britain according to the decision of 
the League of Nations in 1929. The Kurds had no option except seeking local autonomy or 
even independence under Britain’s auspices.        
Since the establishment of the League of Nations, the experts of international law and 
political scientists have been waging a continuous debate concerning the viability of an 
independent State of Iraqi Kurdistan. By scrutinizing the historical events that have placed 
the Iraqi Kurds in their current situation, the aspects of international law that might enable or 
prevent them from achieving independence, and the effects that Kurdish independence from 
Iraq or continued statelessness would have on the region and the international community. 
This chapter aims to show that the controversies are with the Kurds being able to carve out 
their own independent State in the near future, while respecting the territorial integrity of the 
State of Iraq.  
The chapter will examine a historical development of the Iraqi Kurds, who were first 
detached by the Allied Powers to the State of Iraq after WWI. it assesses the Iraqi Kurds 
situation by employing a critical rhetorical perspective. Who are the Kurds, and how does has 
Kurdish nationalism bubbled to the surface? How the Kurds and Iraqi government are sharply 
divided over the most fundamental issues in the Constitution relating to the nature of their 
future State  and to the governmental system that is to role it will be discussed. In particular, 
whether the Kurdish region will be defined territorially or ethnically and whether it will 
include Kirkuk. A continuing territorial dispute between the central government in Baghdad 
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and Kurdistan Region Government over the area in and around the city of Kirkuk may be at 
the crux of a stable Iraq. The outcome of city’s statute after normalising the situations 
according to the Iraqi constitution could have a large impact on Iraqi unity, an existing 
strategy of the US, and reaction of neighbouring countries. How long the Iraqi Kurds can be 
persuaded to remain part of a federal Iraq? While the majority of Kurds would like to break 
free of Iraq, and create an independent State. If Iraq cannot unite, can a peaceful secession be 
achieved that will maintain stability in the region? This chapter will be addressing these 
issues, later the thesis will investigate the application of the relevant theory to the situation of 
IKR in Chapter VI, while discussing whether the rules of international law and theories of 
secession will help them create their own independent State, and the challenges facing their 
quest for independence.   
 
5.2. Historical Background  
 
To begin to understand the Kurdish case in Iraq, it is first important to look at the history of 
the Kurds, their struggle for independence and autonomy, and the region known as Kurdistan.  
The roots of the Kurdish problem lie in the events following the ending of WWI were the 
Kurds under the control of the Ottoman Empire, attempted to establish their own State. The 
Kurds are native inhabitants of their land and as such, there is no strict beginning for Kurdish 
history and origins.1342 They are a mountain dwelling Indo-European people, comprise the 
fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East, but they have never obtained statehood.1343 
They are speared into four countries Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq, in an area referred to as 
Kurdistan.  
The term of Kurdistan first appeared in the twelfth century, meaning the land of the 
‘Kurds’.1344 The area of northern Iraq where Kurds predominate is a region of about 83,000 
square kilometres, this is roughly the same size as Austria, Smaller ethno-linguistic 
communities of Assyrian-Chaldeans, Turcoman, Arabs, and Armenians are found in Iraqi 
                                                          
1342 M A Izady, ‘Origin of the Kurds’ (Kurdistanica, 1991) <http://www.kurdistanica.com/?q=node/2> accessed 
10 December 2013.  
1343 K Katzman, ‘The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq’,  (CRS Report for Congress, 2010) 
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22079.pdf> accessed 10 December 2013.  
1344 D McDowall, A Modern History of The Kurds (3th  rev edn, I.B. Tauris London 2004) XII.  
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Kurdistan.1345 The majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslim;1346 ‘they do not have a single 
common language but speak a number of different dialects, they have a distinct culture that is 
not at all like their Persian, Turkish and Arabic neighbours'.1347 The Iraqi Kurds, numbering 
about (6 million), constitute between one-fourth and one-fifth of Iraq’s population, despite 
much repression, they have always been recognised by the State as a separate ethnic 
group.1348  
The Kurds have had a long history of conflict with other ethnic groups in the area for 
autonomy and independence, without its own State, they struggled to maintain its identity. 
Under the various regional powers, they enjoyed a degree of semi-autonomy, seeking to 
exercise territorial control over the lands inherited and inhabited by Kurdish tribes. However, 
the desire for a Kurdish homeland did not begin until the early 1900's, around the time of 
WWI. In his Fourteen Points, President Woodrow Wilson ‘promised the Kurds’ a sovereign 
State.1349 The 12th point stated that, ‘the Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire should be 
assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities, which are now under Turkish rule, 
should be assured an undoubted security of life and an unmolested opportunity of an 
autonomous development'.1350 ‘The process of re-drawing a new political map for the post-
war Middle East seemed to offer the new nationalities, such as the Kurds, Arabs, and 
Armenians, an unprecedented opportunity to realise their long-held political aspirations'.1351 
This was a first Kurdish opportunity to establish an independent State, which was supposed 
to have been accomplished through the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920.  
The Treaty of Sèvres1352, signed by the Allied Powers and Turkish government on 10 August 
1920, recognised the political rights of the Kurdish people. For the Kurds, McDowall argued 
that, Sèvres (Articles 62, 63, and 64) promised the formation of an autonomous region, 
‘which would have the right to elect for complete independence one year after the formation 
                                                          
1345 C A O’Leary, ‘The Kurds of Iraq: Recent History, Future Prospects’ (2002) 6 MERIA 17.  
1346 McDowall, A Modern History of The Kurds (n 1344) 11.  
1347 C Bird, A Thousand Sighs, a Thousand Revolts: Journeys in Kurdistan (Random House of Canada Ltd 
2004) 10-15.  
1348 ibid 9.  
1349  Ed Kashi, When the Borders Bleed: The Struggle of the Kurds,  in  Hitchens Christopher (ed) (Pantheon 
Books 1994) 32-61.  
1350 ‘President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, (8 January, 1918) Lillian Goldman Law Library’, 
<http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp> accessed 14 December 2013.  
1351 S Eskander, ‘Britain’s Policy in Southern Kurdistan: The Formation and the Termination of the First 
Kurdish Government, 1918–1919’ (2000) 27 BJMES 139.  
1352 ‘The Peace Treaty of Sèvres, (HR-Net, 20 August 1920) Part III (Political Clauses)’  
<http://www.hri.org/docs/sevres/part3.html>accessed 12 December 2013.   
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of the autonomous area, if the League of Nations were persuaded of their capacity for such 
independence'.1353 In addition, the Treaty allowed for the adhesion of southern Kurdistan 
(IKR) to such a future Kurdish State.1354 However, the Treaty was never ratified, and, three 
years later, with the rise of Turkey’s Kemal Ataturk, another Treaty was negotiated.1355 The 
1923 Treaty of Lausanne1356 recognised a new Turkish republic, and made no mention of the 
Kurds or of a State of their own, it rather paved the way for the new British Mandate of Iraq 
to acquire the oil-rich Kurdish province of Mosul.1357 The Treaty of Lausanne completely 
ignored the Kurdish claim to any form of independent State and carved up Kurdistan. As a 
result, the Kurds have found themselves divided between four countries (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, 
and Syria).1358   
At the end of WWI, Iraq was still a British protectorate, and the British were no more 
interested in Kurdish self-determination than the Turks were.1359 Everest argued that, what 
the British were interested ‘in was making sure that the former Ottoman Province of Mosul, 
an area populated by Kurds and Turks, was incorporated into the new State of Iraq, and not 
into Turkey.  The reason was oil'.1360  They believed that the new State of Iraq would not be 
able to develop and survive a ‘self-sufficient economy’ unless it maintained possession of the 
oilfields near the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk.1361 In other words, ‘it became clear that, 
because of the impeding Treaty of Lausanne, Kurdish districts in Iraq could not be 
incorporated into an independent or autonomous Kurdistan, the British made some efforts at 
providing limited autonomy to Kurdish enclave within Iraqi boundaries.’1362 In 1931, a 
United Kingdom report to the Council of the League of Nations pointed out that 'any serious 
attempt to form an independent Kingdom in these districts was impossible for many reasons. 
It was not an economic proposition; it would have been regarded with neighbouring pow-
regarded with intense distrust by neighbouring powers who were also having difficulties with 
subjects; and it would have difficulties with their own subjects; and postulated a degree of 
                                                          
1353 McDowall, A Modern History of The Kurds (n 1344) 137.  
1354 ibid. 
1355 Bird, A Thousand Sighs, a Thousand Revolts: Journeys in Kurdistan (n 1347) 13.  
1356 ‘The Lausanne Treaty’ (HR-Net, 24 July 1923) <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2189174?origin=crossref> 
accessed 12 December 2013.  
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1358 See, P Sluglett, Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country (CUP, Columbia 2007) 121.  
1359 L Everest, Oil, Power, & Empire: Iraq and the U.S. Global Agenda (CCP 2003) 64.  
1360 ibid. 
1361 ibid. 
1362 I T Naamani, ‘The Kurdish Drive for Self-Determination’ (1966) 20 The Middle East Journal 279.  
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cohesion and cooperation among the Iraqi Kurds themselves which, as has been shown, did 
not exist'.1363  
Thus, at the end of WWI, Hunt argued that ‘the Victorious Allies at the Conference of San 
Remo drew the borders of the Middle East in April 1920'.1364 The European allies made 
borders ‘that were essentially straight lines drawn on a map of the Middle East that did not 
consider the traditional boundaries of the region'.1365 As a result, the borders divided some 
tribes and placed rival tribes together. Polk argued that ‘the British were given control of 
Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul provinces, and decide to combine them into one territory that 
would later become the State of Iraq'.1366 Thus, Hunt argued that the British 'had no empathy 
or understanding of the cultural impact of combining the Shiite and Sunni segments of the 
territory into ne country'.1367 These imposed borders split the Kurds, and left them without a 
State.1368  
In 1930, The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty ended the British Mandate and recognised the independence 
of the Kingdom of Iraq.1369 The Treaty did not specify Kurdish rights; as a result, the Kurds 
rose and rebelled under the leadership of Sheikh Mahmoud, furious that neither the Iraqi 
government nor the British fulfilled the League’s 1925 recommendations.1370 In 1946, 
Mustafa Barzani founded the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). The Party Tripp argued 
‘adopted a nationalist programme and it as dedicated to the creation of an independent 
Kurdish State from Iraq'.1371 Fighting between the KDP and the Iraqi government continued 
until 1970, when a peace agreement signed between the Kurds and the Iraqi government that 
called for Kurdish self-determination, a census was supposed to be held in 1974 to determine 
the borders of the Kurdistan region. Tripp argued that, the government seemed ‘to commit 
itself to a recognition of Kurdish rights that far exceeded anything that had been conceded 
before; the distinct national identity of the Kurds was recognised, as was their language, and 
they were promised participation in government and predominance in the local 
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administration'.1372 However, in 1974, fighting resumed when the Iraqi government refused to 
implement the manifesto’s elements, and refused to give the Kurds control over their 
traditional territory including control over oil-rich province of Kirkuk.1373 The Kurds, 
however; failed to resist the renewed Iraqi offensive and the revolt collapsed within 
weeks.1374   
In 1975, the festering divisions within the KDP led to a major split between its leaders. Jalal 
Talabani broke with the KDP and formed the Popular Union of Kurdistan (PUK), ‘attracting 
many who had found Brazani’s tribal leadership hard to reconcile with their own nationalist 
and socialist principles'.1375 Since its foundation, the PUK has been working for human 
rights, self-determination, and democracy for the Kurdish people.1376Although the PUK has 
tried to be closer to the government in Baghdad, and held out the possibility of a favourable 
renegotiation with the centre of the term of the autonomy agreement.1377 However, it was 
clear that, the Iraqi government was unwilling to accede to the PUK’s demands concerning 
financial autonomy, Kurdish control of the Kirkuk oil fields, or the question of local control 
of the security forces (peshmerga forces). This led to the collapse of the talks.1378 Especially 
McDowall argued that ‘after the US, the USSR, and France provided substantial assistance to 
Saddam for fear that, the Islamic Republic would win the war and destabilise the oil 
producing States in the gulf region.’1379 Consequently, fighting erupted between the Kurdish 
liberation movements and Iraqi government. The period from 1987 to 1990 was marked by 
gradual territorial devastating of Iraqi Kurdistan and massacre of innocent civilian Kurds.   
In 1979, when Saddam Hussain took power in Iraq, the relations broke down irretrievably 
with the Kurds.1380 In 1980, during the Iraq-Iran war, the Kurds were sent to the frontlines by 
both Iraq and Iran, and more than two million died there.1381 Hussain tried to use the war as 
an opportunity to exterminate the Kurds and systematically redraw the map of Iraqi 
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Kurdistan, however; the Kurds resisted more heroically than he had bargained for.1382  In 
1986, the main Kurdish political parties the KDP and PUK formed a military coalition 
against Saddam. This unity threatened the Iraqi government; they therefore hit back with 
unspeakable brutality and launched the Anfal Operations.1383 The ‘Anfal campaign’ has been 
characterised as a major genocide campaign in Kurdistan. The operation included Bengio 
argued that, ‘the destruction of hundreds of villages situated in strategic areas; the transfer of 
between 100,000 and 500,000 Kurds from the heart of Kurdistan to remote areas near the 
Jordanian or Saudi borders or, at best, to Kurdish areas more readily controlled by the regime 
such as Erbil; and the sporadic gassing of Kurdish villages with chemical weapons'. 1384 
In 1987, Saddam appointed Ali Hassan Al Majid (The Chemical Ali) as military governor of 
Iraqi Kurdistan, and initiated the violent campaign Al-anfal (the spoils of war).1385 Chemical 
weapons were used against Kurdish towns and villages, as much to inspire terror as to 
achieve any strictly military purpose.1386 Saddam Hussein adopted a policy of eradicating the 
Kurds from his country. Over the next fifteen years, the Iraqi army bombed Kurdish villages, 
and poisoned the Kurds with cyanide and mustard gas, it is estimated that during the 1980's, 
Iraqis destroyed some 5000 Kurdish villages and nearly 500,000; civilians were taken away 
and placed in detention camps in the desert areas of south and west Iraq.1387 In March 1988 
attacks by Iraqi forces resulted in the massacre of upward to 5000 Kurdish civilians of the 
Kurdish town of Halabja, by gassing them with chemical weapons, which is considered under 
Article (II) and (III) of the 1948 Convention on the prevention and punishment a ‘genocide’ 
and as one of the most severe ‘crimes against humanity’.1388 However, the government in 
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Baghdad never seriously punished for these attacks and the international community took no 
significant measures to punish these actions; in fact, countries continued to supply Iraq with 
weapons. This inaction Clark argued ‘stands in stark contrast to the international response to 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait a few years later, the international community took no action 
against Iraq for gassing Kurds because most countries regarded the action as an "internal 
matter" rather than a violation of international law'.1389 Thus, failure to take any action 
against Saddam was singley assuring him he could get away anything, ‘the invasion of 
Kuwait was another sign of this'.1390     
 In 1991, a major Kurdish popular rebellion was launched against Saddam Hussein's 
regime.1391 After the Iraqi army was defeated in the first Gulf War in 1991, the US allowed 
Saddam to crack down on an initially successful Kurdish uprising.1392 As a result, over 2 
million Kurds abandoned their homes and fled to the mountains, thousands of them died of 
cold and starvation.1393 After the repression, and the mass exodus of Kurds from Northern 
Iraq, the US and UK decided to protected them.1394 On 5 April 1991, the UNSC passed 
Resolution 688 in order to restrain Baghdad. The Resolution condemned ‘the repression of 
the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in a Kurdish 
populated area’ and demanded that ‘Iraq, as a contribution to removing the threat to 
international peace and security in the region immediately end this repression, and that Iraq 
allow immediate access to international humanitarian organisations to all those in need of 
assistance in all parts of Iraq'.1395 The resolution McDowall argued was historic and raised a 
number of important issues in international law. It was the first international document since 
the League’s arbitration of the Mosul province in 1925 to mention the Kurds by name, thus 
lifting their status internationally. It was also the first time the UN had insisted on the right of 
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interference in the internal affairs of a member State'.1396 In addition, an internal act of 
repression by the ‘Iraqi government was included in the resolution’s definition of 
international peace and security, where they had the consequence of generating an outflow of 
refugees towards and across international borders'.1397 However, the resolution was not 
passed under Chapter VII and it did not authorise the use of force.1398 The enforcement of the 
unilaterally proclaimed no-fly zones Gray argued has come to be seen as illegitimate, despite 
UK protestations of humanitarian necessity.1399 Thus, although the US and UK have offered 
little by way of legal justification at the time,1400 however, the creation of 'Operation Provide 
Comfort' (OPC) which established a 'Safe Haven'  protected the Kurds from Saddam’s 
brutality in northern Iraq and without it, many thousands of people would have died in a very 
short time. Dewhurst argued, it allowed the Kurds to be internationally recognised as a 
repressed group that deserved to be protected.1401       
In 1992, the Kurds established their own Parliament and local authorities that ruled the region 
in complete independence of the central government consequently the Iraqi State’s control 
over northern Iraq has completely disappeared. Meanwhile, the Kurds in Kurdistan of Iraq 
‘have been in control of their own region, and they have been able 'to institutionalise self-rule 
in northern Iraq through the Kurdistan Regional Government’ (KRG).1402 As a result Iraqi 
Kurdistan became a 'de facto' Kurdish State from 1991-2003. In 1994, the two major Kurdish 
parties KDP and PUK fought each other, ‘underlying tension was clearly exacerbated by the 
double embargo imposed on the region (The central government economic siege and the UN 
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sanctions against Iraq)’.1403 They were heading down a path toward mutual destruction of the 
region until they agreed to a cease-fire in 1998.1404  
In 2003, the Second Gulf War removed Saddam’s regime from the power. The Kurds became 
key allies of the United States in overthrowing Saddam’s regime, by joining American forces 
in capturing the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul, ‘and this paved the way for even greater Kurdish 
autonomy'.1405 The Kurds generally have participated, as a strong ally in the central 
government, in two national elections in 2005, Talabini, the PUK leader, became President of 
Iraq.1406 In addition, the Kurdistan National Assembly democratically elected Massoud 
Barzani, the leader of the KDP as the new regional president of Iraqi Kurdistan.1407 The 
Kurds ‘want to maintain as much autonomy as possible in a federal Iraq,’ and they have 
insisted on the validity of their historic claim to the oil-rich, ‘ethnically mixed city of Kirkuk 
as their regional capital'.1408  
Historically, Dawoody pointed out that, it is difficult to determine the ‘exact ethnic 
composition of Kirkuk prior to the Iraqi government's Arbization policy in the 1980s and 
after'.1409 However, the most reliable census available dates back to 1957. Gunter and Yavuz 
argued that, the census indicated that Kirkuk city (as distinguished from Kirkuk province or 
governorate) had a slightly larger Turcoman (39.8 percent) than Kurdish (35.1 percent) 
population. The Arabs (23.8 percent) constituted only the third-largest group, the 1957 
census, however, also showed that Kirkuk province had a Kurdish majority of (55 percent), 
while the Arabs numbered only (30.8 percent) and the Turkmens (14.2 percent).1410 
Nonetheless, successive Iraqi governments tried with varying degrees of intensity to change 
the ethnic character of the Kirkuk region. Thus, it is estimated that between the 1970s and 
2003, Saddam Hussein uprooted more than 100,000 Kurds in his efforts to Arabinize the city 
of Kirkuk.1411 By expelling and killing thousands of Kurds, and replacing them with Arab 
settlers, the percentage of Arabs in Kirkuk rose from 30% of the total population according to 
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the 1957 census to 44% according to the census taken in 1977.1412 In addition, the US 
Department of State has reported that, between 1991 and 1999, 'In north Iraq, the government 
continued its campaign of forcibly deporting Kurdish and Turcoman families to southern 
governorates, as a result of these forced deportations, approximately 900,000 citizens were 
internally displaced throughout Iraq'.1413  
Kirkuk is ultimately considered as one of the World’s largest oil fields, and one of the most 
contested disputed areas.1414 It has been the subject of much conflict and debate, over the 
control of the oil revenue. While it is unclear whose claim to the land will win out, 'it is 
evidence that the outcome of the Kirkuk issue, which has been an area of major focus in the 
Post-War conflict, will have a significant effect on both the long-and short term stability of 
Iraq'.1415 The City has been the source of most of the tension between the Iraqi Kurdistan 
region and Baghdad in recent years. The city of Kirkuk and Kirkuk Governorate status is not 
resolved in the Traditional Administrative Law (TAL), and will have to be settled in the 
negotiation of the permanent Constitution.1416 The City rich in Petroleum has been one of the 
principle obstacles to finding a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question in north Iraq. 
Meanwhile, if the Kurds are to secede or gain independence from Iraq, control of Kirkuk is 
somehow essential, meaning that the city is of immense strategic and economic importance to 
the Kurds. In 2005, a permanent constitution was approved by the Iraqi Council of 
Representatives, and provides Article (140).1417 The completion of the implementation of 
Article (58) from the (TAL) has been reaffirmed, and the Statue of Kirkuk according to 
Article (140) will be determined in three stages: First, the demographic situations (the 
Normalisation) in the region will be brought back to level it was before Saddam’s era and by 
the Arabization campaigns. Then 'a census will be conducted to determine the make-up of the 
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province’s population followed by a referendum to decide whether or not to include Kirkuk 
in the Kurdistan region'.1418   
The Iraqi constitution envisions a referendum on the status of Kirkuk, but the vote, although 
planned earlier, has never taken place because pre-referendum requirements, such as a 
census, could never be carried out. Today, many groups in Kirkuk believe Article (140) 
supports only Kurdish interests in the region, and they will act properly as an obstacle in the 
way of implementing the Article.1419 Turcomans claims that they have historically dominated 
the city; while an Arab leader claims that they have a right to stay because they were legally 
settled there. Kurds say that before the start of the Saddam-led ethnic-cleansing policies, 
Kurds constituted the majority of the population in the city. On the other hand, the Kurds will 
be opposed to any provincial elections in the city until its status is resolved. Because, Cogan 
argued that, the ‘Kurdish control of Kirkuk would provide the economic foundations for the 
long-term perspective of Kurdish nationalists a separate Kurdish State'.1420 At the same times, 
as tensions increased between Baghdad and the Kurds, Iraqi minorities in northern Iraq are 
increasingly fearful of their status. Thus, Kirkuk’s question cannot be delayed, without some 
political solution; the result might be more violence in Kirkuk and in the entire region. Seen 
as a microcosm of Iraq for its mix of several ethnic groups, Salih argued that 'Kirkuk  awaits 
an uncertain future as disagreements about the future of the city increase, a victim of its oil 
wealth, Kirkuk has for long been a divisive issue in Iraq's politics'.1421  
Until the summer 2014, the Kurds enjoyed relative stability, compared to the rest of the 
country; violence in the Kurdish region had drastically disappeared. The relative stability in 
the Kurdistan region has allowed the Iraqi Kurds to enjoy the country’s highest living 
standard and highest level of foreign investment.1422 The region is stable enough to allow the 
Iraqi Kurds to engage in foreign relations with other countries, and even hosts travellers and 
businessmen from Europe and around the world. Most importantly, the Kurds have succeeded 
in a achieving a federal form of government within the State of Iraq. As a federal entity of 
Iraq, the Kurdish language has been recognised as an official national language of Iraq 
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alongside Arabic.1423 Moreover, the Kurdish provinces have united into a single, largely 
autonomous region capable in maintaining its own internal security, armed forces; impose 
taxes and overruling federal rules.1424  
From the 1990s onwards, the international community and specifically Washington appears 
to have decided that the Kurds have a role to play in preserving regional security and 
stability, which has always been an objective of its Middle Eastern policy.1425 In the 
aftermath of the Iraqi War (2003), the U.S. viewed the Iraqi Kurds as constituting the only 
factor of stability in the country’s domestic affairs.1426 However, this does not imply that the 
U.S. no longer has the 'state' as the centrepiece of its policy, still the U.S. deals with the 
Kurds of Iraq only within an Iraqi federal framework.1427 Today, Charountaki argued that the 
Kurds can be defined as a ‘non-state’ actor in the sense that they constitute a political entity 
other than the States that interact in the international political system (with big States) and are 
formally organised, as such they play an important role in international politics.1428 Carole 
O’Leary described Iraqi Kurdistan as a 'crucible for democracy' and a model for post-Saddam 
Iraq.1429 Meanwhile, the majority of Kurds want to secede from Iraq and form an independent 
Kurdish State.1430 On the other hand, the Kurdish leaders would not push for outright 
independence, instead they have been involved as a pillar force in holding Iraq together, 
'helping to write and adopt a national constitution that, although gives great powers to the 
regions, has kept Iraq intact as a federal State'.1431 The reasons why the Kurdish leaderships 
have taken this stance are numerous but are due to a mixture of American pressure in favour 
of preserving Iraq’s territorial integrity, fears of international especially regional countries' 
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reaction to an independent Kurdish State, and the Kurdish parties’ lack of a unified strategy 
for achieving Kurdish national aspirations. 1432  
Nevertheless, in July 2014, the situation has worsened in Iraq, the country has witnessed 
drastic changes since the Jihadist extremists seized the northern cities of Iraq and declared a 
caliphate1433 in the areas they control.1434 This could have dramatic effects on regional and 
international stability. After the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS-ISIL) the 
‘extremist militants’ have captured the city of Mosul and the majority of Sunni areas in 
northern Iraq from the Iraqi army. The Kurdistan regional government (KRG) are seen to 
have come under the obligation to protect its population from the violence, as the Iraqi 
government is no longer capable to take the responsibility to protect and secure its citizens 
and borders. After the sudden collapse of the Iraqi army in the north by ISIS, the Kurds have 
advanced to take over disputed areas, including the oil rich city of Kirkuk1435, as the Kurds 
feared the city's oil reserves would be captured by the Islamic militants.1436  
Accordingly, it is important to realise that Iraq is plunging towards civil war, sectarian 
violence is out of control, security is non-existent, regional and international security is 
threatened, basic services are found wanting, the majority of the population are being 
internally displaced, this indicates that Iraq is falling into being a failed State. These events 
have proven to the international community that the government in Baghdad is no longer 
capable to protect the existence of Iraq as a federal State. However, despite the turmoil 
around it, IKR remains an oasis of stability and the only secure region in the area.  
In fact, as Iraq descends deeper into chaos, the Kurds have taken advantage of the tumult to 
expand and tighten their control in the oil-rich Kirkuk province and that could boost the 
Kurdish dreams for independence. In other words, things are definitely going in the right 
direction for the Kurds, as they have been in full control of Kirkuk and the other contested 
areas, the Kurds could not risk leaving the city's Kurdish residents, who comprise the 
majority in these areas. On the other hand, as Iraq has fallen to an ethnic civil war between 
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the north Sunni extremists and the south Shia groups, the creation of a Sunni enclave along 
IKR’s borders will have security, social, political, and economic effects on the region. For 
that reason, KRG must consider itself required and under the obligation to protect its 
population from violence. This could also justify the Kurdish legitimate breakaway from Iraq 
and create an independent Kurdish State in north Iraq. These issues will be examined further 
in the next chapter.       
Finally, it is clear that, outside the colonial context the UN is extremely reluctant to accept 
unilateral secession of part of independent States if the government of that State opposes the 
secession.1437 Moreover, in international law, ‘self-determination for peoples or a group 
within an independent State is achieved by participation in the political system of the State, 
based on respect for its territorial integrity'.1438 In other words, in the case of non-colonial 
peoples, ‘the right to self-determination does not grant them directly the right to secede, since 
their identity as a distinct group is recognised within the parent State'.1439 Meanwhile, Frank 
argued that, ‘international law does not give a right of secession per se, but neither does it 
prevent it'.1440 Accordingly, Buchheit argued that international law provides a right to 
secession only for people subject to extreme persecution or unable to realise their right to 
self-determination internally.1441  
Nevertheless, despite all the difficulties the main question is what would be possible to 
develop a strategy or a theory, which will enable the Kurds in Iraq to claim a sustainable 
solution and prevent any potential any ethnic and territorial conflict in future. Significantly, 
how long the Kurds can be persuaded to remain part of a united Iraq. Whereas the majority 
would like to freely separate and create an independent State. In other words, do the peoples 
of Iraqi Kurdistan, specially the Kurds have a right to external self-determination that would 
enable them to create their own State in accordance with international law? These issues will 
be further examined in the next chapter while discussing the application of the theory of 
Remedial Earned Sovereignty ‘RES’, on the situation of the IKR.  
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1440 Bayefsky further argued that, ‘No prohibition exists in international law upon person or groups preventing 
secessionist attempts.’ See, ibid. In addition, Professor M Frank in his analysis of Question 2 of the Reference re 
secession of Quebec has pointed out that, ‘the law cannot be invoked to achieve secession, but it cannot be 
invoked to prevent it either’. See, Frank, Report for the Amicus Curiae  (n 990).  
1441 Buchheit, Secession, The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (n 29) 220-223.  
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5.3. Constitutional arrangements within the state of Iraq: A decentralised 
form of governance)  
 
In post-Saddam Iraq, the Iraqi Kurds have managed to gain formal limited autonomy in the 
form of the IKR within the Iraqi State, as stipulated in the constitution. Today, the IKR rules 
much of the Kurdish areas of Iraq and the Kurdish Parliament exercises significant legislative 
powers. The region of Kurdistan after Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003 has been 
recognised as a constitutionally federal region within Iraq and it enjoys broad international 
diplomatic relations.1442  
On October 15 2005, Iraqis approved the constitution in a referendum. The Kurds firmly 
believe that four core principles cannot be omitted: federalism, equal rights for women, 
freedom of individual conscience, and justice for the victims of Baathism.1443 The 
constitution establishes a federal central government and regional governments as a form of 
self-rule. It approved the IKR and its regional and federal authorities. Kurdish is recognised 
as an official language alongside Arabic.1444 Rather, ‘oil and gas revenues belong to all Iraqis 
and the revenue will be shared equitably by the regions'.1445 It is also agreed to decide the 
status of Kirkuk and disputed areas according to Article 140. The constitution, guarantees 
small minorities such as Turkomen, Chaldeans, Assyrians and all other constituents, ‘the 
administrative, political, culture, and educational rights'.1446 Article 35 (4), which states that 
the ‘State will promote cultural activities and institutions in a way that is appropriate with 
Iraq’s civilizational history and cultural'.1447 However, the provision Yildiz argued could be 
‘used by the State to sanction the discrimination of funding of activities and organisations of 
minorities and it is recommended that the provision be amended to include the guarantee of 
non-discriminatory State support’.1448 Eventually, the constitution states that Iraq will be an 
independent federal State with full sovereignty, parliamentary and democracy.1449  
                                                          
1442 See, Article 117 'Iraqi Constitution’ (n 84). 
1443 Q Talabani, 'What the Kurds want', The Wall Street Journal (NY, 22 August 2005). 
1444 Article 4 ‘Iraqi Constitution' (n 84).  
1445 Dewhurst, ‘Assessing the kurdish question: what is the future of kurdistan?’ (n 1401).  
1446 Article 125 'Iraqi Constitution' (n 84). 
1447 Article 35 (4) ‘Iraqi Constitution’, ibid. 
1448  Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq, the Past, Present and Future (n 107) 138.  
1449 Article 1 ‘Iraqi Constitution’ (n 84). It is true that the Iraq established is re-established based on 
“administrative federalism” and not geographical, ethnic, or historical regional distinctions. See, Rebwar Fatah, 
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Significantly, the constitution creates a federation, 'federations incorporate elements of self-
rule in the sense that their component units enjoy a certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the 
federal government even as they share in the control of that government'.1450 It concerns IKR 
relationships with the Iraqi central government, based on freedom and independence. The 
constitution is built on the concept of voluntary unity and sovereignty and optional 
partnership between the Kurds and Arabs. The last item of the preamble states that, 'We are 
the people of Iraq, who in all our forms and groupings undertake to establish our union, 
‘freely and by choice’ and to adhere to this constitution, which shall preserve for Iraq its free 
union of people, land, and sovereignty, adhering to this constitution will protect the Iraq’s 
free union as people, land, and sovereignty'.1451 It is true that, the preamble shows that the 
Kurdish participation in establishing the constitution and volunteering in building the Iraqi 
State. Hence, it is argued that the Kurds can abandon their participation anytime if the desire 
is not there. This right to abandon the Union-which means 'Separation', is affirmed by the 
same constitution through many other clear statements; since the Kurds have the right to 
abandon the voluntary union and separate at any time they feel that their rights have been 
violated or broken. Given the attachment of Kurds to Kirkuk and to other disputed territories, 
any attempt to prevent their union with Kurdistan in the future, would be likely to provoke 
more violence, rather than peace.1452 In other words, the Kurdish relationships with the 
central government McGarry and O’Leary argued that, they are built in congruence with the 
condition of not breaching the constitutional rights of the Kurds by the central 
government.1453 Meanwhile, any violation of Kurdish rights gives them the right to practice 
the external dimension of the right of self-determination.1454 Thus, Dawoody argued that, ‘by 
identifying the unity of Iraq as a ‘free’ act of its people, at least indirectly acknowledges that 
the Iraqi union is a form of ‘union at will’ that is subject to change according to the 
determination of its groups'.1455 Alongside Article 106 obligates the federal government 
‘alone’ with the responsibility of maintaining the integrity of the Iraqi State by stating that, 
‘the federal authorities shall preserve the unity, integrity, independence, sovereignty of Iraq, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
‘Kurdistan Identity Denied in the Iraqi Constitution’ (UNPO, 2006) <http://www.unpo.org/article/3897> 
accessed 29 December 2013.  
1450 J McGarry and B O’Leary, ‘Iraq’s Constitution of 2005: Liberal consociation as political prescription’ 
(2007) 5 ICON 670.  
1451 See, the Preamble of 'Iraqi Constitution’ (n 84).  
1452 McGarry and O’Leary, ‘Iraq’s Constitution of 2005: Liberal consociation as political prescription’ (n 1450). 
1453 ibid. 
1454 ibid.  
1455 Dawoody, ‘The Kurdish Quest for Autonomy and Iraq’s Statehood’ (n 79).  
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and its federal democratic system’.1456 This Article Dawoody argued, considerably exonerates 
the region of Kurdistan from such obligation and frees it to secede if it chooses to do so in the 
future.1457   
Furthermore, some elements in the Iraqi constitution such as, the constitutional provisions on 
natural resources are a source of controversy. An instance of this, Baghdad's control over the 
country's natural resources is a sine qua-non for centralisation.1458 O’Leary argued that ‘the 
constitution makes clear that natural resources are not an exclusive competence of the federal 
government'.1459 Article 111, states that 'oil and gas are owned by all the people of Iraq,' is 
McGarry argued deliberately not a sub-clause of the preceding Article 110, which specifies 
precisely the exclusive competences of the federal government.1460 Article 111 functions as a 
saving clause, and should be read in conjunction with Article 115, which states that, 'All 
powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal government belong to the 
authorities of the regions and governorates that are not organised in a region.1461 With regard 
to other powers shared between the federal government and the regional government, priority 
shall be given to the law of the regions and governorates not organised in a region in case of 
dispute'.1462 Here, Dawoody explained that ‘how is it possible for the federal government to 
share its power in matters as specified as the priority of the regional government?’1463 In 
addition, Article 116 (2)  states: ‘The regional authority has the right to amend the 
implementation of the federal law in the region in the case of a contradiction between the 
federal and regional laws in matters that do not pertain to the exclusive powers of the federal 
authorities.’ Rather, Article 111 should also be read in conjunction with Article 121, which 
gives ‘the regions a general power of nullification outside the domain of exclusive federal 
competences'.1464 Here, if the constitution is the Supreme law of the land, how is it possible 
for the region to amend or abolish such a law?1465 Moreover, Article 116 (5) grants 
considerable power to the regional governments, stating, 'Offices for the regions and 
                                                          
1456 Article 116 ‘Iraqi Constitution’ (n 84). 
1457 Dawoody, ‘The Kurdish Quest for Autonomy and Iraq’s Statehood’ (n 79).  
1458 McGarry and O’Leary, ‘Iraq’s Constitution of 2005: Liberal consociation as political prescription’ (n 1450) 
1459 M E Bouillon, David M Malone and Ben Rowswell, Iraq: Preventing a New Generation of Conflict, in 
Brendan O’Leary (ed), Federalizing Natural Resources (Lynne Rienner 2007) 189.   
1460 McGarry and O’Leary, ‘Iraq’s Constitution of 2005: Liberal consociation as political prescription’ (n 1479).  
1461 Dewhurst argued that ‘the Constitution contradicts itself in Article 13 and Article 116 with respect to the 
supreme law of the Federal Constitution and the ability of the regional governments to amend Federal Laws.’ 
see Dewhurst, ‘Assessing the kurdish question: what is the future of kurdistan?’ (n 1401).   
1462 Article 115 ‘Iraqi Constitution’ (n 84). 
1463 Dawoody, ‘The Kurdish Quest for Autonomy and Iraq’s Statehood’ (n 79).  
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governorates shall be established in embassies and diplomatic missions, in order to follow 
cultural, social, and developmental affairs'.1466 Thus, Dawoody argued that, ‘Iraq would be 
the only country in the world that allows diplomatic representation of its provinces in its 
embassies'.1467 Accordingly, the Iraqi constitution's federal system (union system) Fatah 
argued, is contradictory, and the authorities of the regional governments are very limited and 
weak, and arguably threatens the disintegration of the State of Iraq.1468 
In the early drafts of the constitution, Article 114 stated that two Regions can unite to create a 
larger Region, that two Governorates or more can unite to create a Region, and a Governorate 
can declare itself as a Region based on a request for a referendum.1469 However, in the current 
constitution draft this Article has been removed.1470 Although, the new constitution approved 
the region of Kurdistan and its authorities, however; it is true that, the Kurdish areas outside 
the Kurdish government’s control cannot unite with the region of Kurdistan in the future. 
They also cannot declare themselves, ‘in a referendum, a Kurdish Governorates according to 
Article 114, because Kurds do not make up the majority in these Governorates'.1471 This 
means that Kirkuk and other disputed areas cannot legally unite with the Kurdistan region 
even after their normalisation. Thus, Baker and Hamilton argued that ‘the fear is that these 
provisions will promote an ethnic or communal federation, with associated dangers of 
ethnocentrism/sectarianism and dissolution'.1472 
Additionally, Article 112 is the second major constitutional article dealing with oil and gas, 
which states that, 'The federal government, with the producing governorates and regional 
governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from present fields, 
and that the federal government, with the producing regional and governorate governments, 
shall together formulate the necessary strategic policies to develop the oil and gas wealth in a 
                                                          
1466 Article 121 (4) ‘Iraqi Constitution’ (n 84).  
1467 Dawoody, ‘The Kurdish Quest for Autonomy and Iraq’s Statehood’ (n 79).  
1468 Section 5, Articles 116 to 121, explain authorities of regional governments cannot be compared to the 
authorities of the dominant central government. In addition, Article 117 states that regional governments cannot 
interfere with the agendas of the central government. Regional constitutions and laws must not contradict the 
central constitution as described in article 13. The regional constitutions therefore must shadow the central 
government’s constitution (Articles 13 and 118). See, Fatah, ‘Kurdistan Identity Denied in the Iraqi 
Constitution’ (n 1449).  
1469 ‘Text of the Draft Iraqi Constitution’, 2005 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/24_08_05_constit.pdf>accessed 29 December 2013.   
1470 Fatah, ‘Kurdistan Identity Denied in the Iraqi Constitution’ (n 1449). 
1471 (…), ‘Kirkuk can’t come back to Kurdistan’ (AlIraqi, 2005) 
<http://www.aliraqi.org/forums/showthread.php?t=56233> accessed 29 December 2013.  
1472 J A Baker III and L H Hamilton, ‘The Iraq Study Group Report’,  (Vintage Books, New York 2006) 
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way that achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi people'.1473 In fact, Article 112 and 114 
establish other areas in which the regional governments and the federal government share 
power.1474 However, Article 112 should also be read in conjunction with Article 115 and 121, 
‘which authorise regional supremacy'.1475 Most importantly, Article 112 Horowitz argued 
‘restricts the federal government's role to present fields, and claims that this 'seems to tie the 
distribution of future oil revenue to the location of the resource in one region or another'.1476 
Iraq's oil is in the Shiite south and Kurdish north.1477 Consequently, this would alarm and 
leave the Sunni Arab community landlocked and without oil.1478 In addition, McGarry and 
O’Leary argued that, the constitution makes clear that, 'the territorial status of the Kirkuk 
governorate has been decoupled from the oil revenues that flow from its oilfields'.1479 
Meanwhile, as Kirkuk's oil comes from currently exploited fields, its revenues are to be 
redistributed across the State regardless of whether Kirkuk joins Kurdistan or not. This fact 
needs to be clearly understood, it is a major constitutional compromise.1480 Thus, Dewhurst 
argued that, the constitution explains that oil and gas revenues will be shared equally by the 
regions but is unclear on the exploration rights of oil.1481  
Perhaps, the most problematic aspect about the new constitution is its embodiment of articles 
that threaten the disintegration of Iraq. Dawoody argued that, depending on a ‘quota system’ 
in governance is ‘an attempt to resolve the country's historic social problems at the expense 
of a weak central government'.1482 In other words, the constitution contains articles that are 
vague, ‘and that would leave a large room for misinterpretation and speculation’, which 
properly threatens the disintegration of the State of Iraq, specifically the relationship between 
the federal government and Kurdistan region.1483 The following examples are specific 
concerns that may pose a threat on the federal structure and the national security of Iraq in the 
future.    
                                                          
1473 Article 112 ‘Iraqi Constitution’ (n 84).  
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 Article 13 and 116 contradict each other, with respect to the supreme law of the 
Federal constitution and the ability of the regional governments to amend Federal 
Laws. Accordingly, regional laws and constitutions must not contradict the central 
constitution; they must therefore shadow the federal government’s constitution.1484 
The role of the Kurdish parliament will be similar to the role of a 'Council' for the 
region, and will not have the power of a regional parliament in a federation.  
 Article 1, 107 and the Preamble threatens integration and the free union system in 
Iraq. Importantly, the constitution does not describe Iraq as a ‘voluntary union’ 
between the two peoples the Arabs and the Kurds.  
 Articles 113-122 recognises a balance of power between the federal government and 
the regional governments of Iraq, whereas they leave many details to be determined 
by the council of representatives. With respect to the distribution of authorities, they 
grant a considerable power to the regional governments, and limit the powers of the 
federal government. In particular, the Federal system in Iraq has been highly 
interpretive and vague. The system is in a very loose arrangement that would support 
the regions especially the Kurdistan region's maximum autonomy over their own 
affairs. In other words, Hiltermann argued that the constitution describes the federal 
system with two exceptional characteristics: ‘it guts the powers of the federal State 
through extreme devolution to federal regions, and it provides scope to governorates 
to form regions, either standing alone or in conjunction with other governorates, that 
would replicate the Kurdistan region in their powers'.1485  Hence, the KR has been the 
principal, and so far sole beneficially of this arrangement, being the first through the 
gate. While the other Iraqi regions will depends on the ability of the territories parties' 
power, to mobilize enough support in each concerned governorate to win a local 
referendum, which is key to forming a region.  
 Article 9 requires the Iraqi armed security and forces, to keep in consideration their 
‘balance and representation’, whereas it (sec B) bans militias from being formed 
outside of the framework of armed forces. However, the Kurdish ‘Peshmerga’ is 
allowed in the Kurdistan region, and that would permit the current Shiites and Sunni 
militias to be incorporated into the Iraqi armed forces. In other words, the federal 
                                                          
1484 Fatah, ‘Kurdistan Identity Denied in the Iraqi Constitution’ (n 1449).  
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government will have to come to terms with its militias and Armed forces. With the 
Kurdish Peshmerga as the most established, each prominent ethnic group has 
established militias to protect their regions. The Armed forces in Iraq are made up of 
all ethnic groups, to protect the country from external and internal threats.  However, 
Dewhurst argued that ‘some Iraqi units are composed of a majority or entirely of one 
sect or group in their ranks, the militia’s loyalty is first to their ethnic group, and 
region; many Shiite and Kurdish units take their orders from the Shiites and the 
Kurdish political parties'.1486 Thus, in order for a federal government to succeed, the 
role and the use of these forces will have to be clarified, so that, the particular points 
in the new constitution are considered as enormous challenges toward the new 
government, may require amendments for clarification to assist in the creation of a 
successful federal system.  
 The quota system has extended to the exploration of oil and gas in Articles 110 and 
112, with respect to the fair distribution in a manner compatible with the demographic 
distribution of the country. However, it is unclear on the exploration rights of oil and 
gas.    
 Article 1 and 2, defines Iraq as a ‘Democratic’ and ‘Islamic’ country. However, Fatah 
argued that ‘there are no universal agreements on the meaning of these two totally 
different, even contradicting, concepts'.1487 Accordingly, based on such concepts, no 
law can be legislated or enacted that contradicts the immutable standards of Islam; 
similarly, no law may contradict democratic standards.1488 Consequently, such illusive 
language will restrict the democratic, civil, and human rights of the entire Iraqi 
populations.    
 Article 23 (2), states that ‘ownership with the purpose of demographic change is 
forbidden.’ Does this mean that one ethnic group could not own property in another 
ethnic group region? If this is correct, then the constitution is indefensible and does 
not represent all Iraqi equally.  
 Article 140 is the most contested and the major reason behind the rising tension 
between the federal government and the region of Kurdistan. It represents 30 to 40 
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territories in dispute in Iraq.1489 Its status has not been resolved in the Traditional 
Administrative Law (TAL), and was supposed to have been completed in the 
negotiation of the permanent constitution in accordance with Article 140.  However, 
its implementation dead line of December 2007 was not met by the federal 
government, which has frustrated the Kurds.1490 So that, after the Kurdish Peshmerga 
forces claimed to have taken control of Kirkuk on 12 June 20141491, Kurdish President 
Masoud Barzani announced that ‘Article 140’ of the Iraqi constitution, on the 
disputed areas, has been implemented in Kirkuk province, stressing that 'no return 
shall be for this decision'.1492  
Thus, perhaps it was a historical milestone by the Kurdish political leadership when the 
Kurds voted for the Iraqi constitution in 2005. However, many argue that, the Iraqi 
constitution marks a new era in the history of Kurdish oppression. On the one hand, the idea 
of federalism is not helpful to the Kurds; especially as it has been diluted to a very simple 
form of federation.1493 The federation does not recognise the ethnic, historic, and 
geographical reality of a Kurdish homeland.1494 Most importantly, it will not lead to the right 
to self-determination in the future, unlike the case in Sudan. In Sudan, it has been illustrated 
earlier that, the constitution allowed the South to attain independence, if their people are not 
satisfied with the central government after 4 years of the accord.1495 On the other hand, the 
constitution Fatah argued does not clearly mention that Kurds are one of the two main people 
in Iraq, it also deprives Kurdish religious groups of their rights, for example: it does not 
identify some a half million Kurdish religious group Kakeyies, who have their own customs 
and rules, while it gives Arab Hussiyniye tribes freedom.1496 In addition, it fails to recognise 
crimes against humanity committed against the Kurds in the past few decades, such as, the 
Operation of Anfal, Arabization campaigns, murdering and burying people alive, destroying 
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thousands of Kurdish villages, and the genocide of the Kurds in Halabja. Thus, dismissing 
such terms in the constitution as a vital parts of Kurdish identity is a step ‘towards dissolving 
the Kurdish identity, it is cultural genocide, and the Kurds must never compromise on their 
historical identity'.1497  
Generally, federalism as an organising structure for governance. O’Leary argued ‘can 
promote stability in multi-ethnic or multi-religious States through the establishment of 
political units whose relationship to the centre is defined in a constitution that provides 
written principles concerning structures and rules for governance and appropriation of federal 
funds'.1498 Federal arrangements are often used as a way of keeping deeply divided societies 
together. In particular, Steytler and Mettler argued that, where divisions, be they ethnic, 
linguistic, or religious, could develop into violent conflicts or the threat of a civil war, 
constitutional arrangements for self-rule and shared rule have been put forward as a key to 
peace.1499 The federal distribution of power is then used to satisfy sectorial demands for self-
determination.1500 Yet a federation involves as self-rule as well as shared rule, 'and how Iraq's 
different communities and regions share power within institutions at the federal level will 
determine, arguably, whether loyalty to the federation can be developed and if the State will 
survive intact'.1501 Dewhurst pointed out that, ensuring successful federalism however to a 
country lacking in a democratic tradition with strong religion and ethnic division, is a 
massive challenge.1502 Specifically, Gunter and Yavus argued, ‘federalism as a sophisticated 
division and sharing of power between a central government and its constituent parts would 
probably require a democratic ethos for its successful operation'.1503 However, it is true that 
the Iraqi form of federalism is based on ethnic and sectarian considerations.1504 It originated 
Morgan discussed ‘among formerly, exiled Shiite politicians and clerics and has never been 
an 'Iraqi solution', a demand arising from among all sections of the peoples and 
corresponding to their common needs and aspirations'.1505 It has been strongly rejected by the 
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Iraqi Sunnis,1506 who see it favouring the economic and politic interests of Shiites, and 
supported by Iraqi Kurds, who see it considerably favourable to keep their autonomy.1507 
Rather, Dawoody argued that ‘basing federalism on sectarianism and ethnicity undermines 
the right of those in minority and transforms the country into warring factions'.1508  
Alternatively, to create a successful system of federalism, it will ultimately depend on the 
people of Iraq to make it work. A successful Iraqi federation must be democratic and 
voluntary, based on mutual trust and recognition among all ethnic groups,1509 with the full 
panoply of liberal democratic rights. Most importantly, Dawoody argued, is ensuring 
responsibility in governance, ‘balance in the distributions of missions among regional and 
federal authority, ethical standards of public officials, and maintenance of unity among the 
different components of the federated system'.1510 Hence, without these standards, a federal 
system is not going to work, and ‘ultimately will lead to internal disturbance and the partition 
of the State'.1511 However, the federal system in Iraq appears to be on a different path to other 
successful ones, on the one hand, it has failed to gain a national acceptance, on the other 
hand, it has been criticised for its proportional representation and promoting a national 
fragmentation.1512 This irregularity paved the way for Iraqi political groups to be interested in 
catering to their own political interests than to support the common interest of all Iraqis.1513 
Similarly, after the collapse of Saddam's regime, it is thought that, Iraq may provide a legal 
mechanism for keeping the territorial integrity of the country and imminent Kurdish 
secession. In this regard, Mukhlis stated that:  
[The constitution was written with the interest of only one group in mind: the Kurds. The Shiites seem to 
think they can shape the country to their wishes if only they can appease the Kurds and gain their 
cooperation. However, the Kurds have their own plan: their ultimate goal is to form an independent State 
of Kurdistan, with or without Iraq's help. Even now, a "greater Kurdistan," which would absorb Kurdish 
areas of neighbouring countries, is in the cooking].1514   
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Thus, since the constitution exonerates the regional governments from preserving the 
integrity of the country, the IKR is not therefore required to remain within this union. In 
addition, since the constitution in Article 115, permits the regions to include any number of 
provinces in a referendum, Dawoody argued that ‘the inclusion of Kirkuk and other disputed 
areas into the region of Kurdistan is legally permissible by insuring their Kurdish identity'.1515   
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5.4. Conclusion  
 
The case of IKR towards independence from Iraq is quite compelling. The chapter has argued 
the role of Iraqi Kurds in the history of Iraq, their treatment and the rights granted or denied 
to them as Iraqi citizens and inhabitants of a distinct Kurdish region. The Kurds are native 
inhabitants of their land and as such, there is no strict beginning for Kurdish history and 
origins. Based on their common background, cultural, history, language, the Kurds of Iraq are 
a distinct group of people, inhabited in the area of north Iraq. They have had a long history of 
conflict with other ethnic groups in the area for autonomy and independence, without its own 
State, they struggled to maintain its identity. At the end of WWI, the formation of a Kurdish 
State was suggested, to have been accomplished through the Treaty of Severs. However, the 
Treaty was scrapped and substituted by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, where no mention of 
the Kurds was made. Since being left without a State, the Kurds of Iraq have suffered 
tremendously and faced enduring hardship, including human rights violations, military 
attacks, economic embargoes, and the destruction of their native region. Most importantly, 
they were the victim of a systematic extermination, and poisoned gas by Saddam’s regime 
during the Anfal Campaigns. With Saddam’s removal in 2003, the Kurds have an incredible 
opportunity for greater autonomy or even independence from Iraq.  
Today, the Iraqi constitution cannot guarantee peace; the Kurds have constantly renewed 
their warning against violations of the Iraqi constitution over the status of Kirkuk and oil 
resources and the other major problems. The Kurds insist that the problem of the ethnically 
divided city of Kirkuk is a constitutional issue and that it must be solved according to the 
constitution. Until its status is resolved, the Kurds are firmly opposed to any provincial 
elections in Kirkuk. However, the situations have changed drastically after the insurgents of 
the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham took control over the major key cities of northern Iraq 
including Mosel and Tikrit. Consequently, after the long-standing dispute over an oil-rich 
Iraqi city, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces claim to have taken control of Kirkuk, long the 
object of their dreams and aspirations, considering Article 140 to have been implemented. In 
this regard, President Barzani has said that the ‘dispute is finished’, meaning Kurdish control 
of the area would continue.1516  
                                                          
1516 (…), ‘Iraq: Kurdish president proposes independence referendum’, The Guardian (3 July 2014).  
277 
 
Moreover, most compiling evidences have proven that the Iraqi constitution contains articles 
that threaten the disintegration of the state of Iraq. The linguistic structure of the constitution 
text is complex and contradictory, which ultimately leaves a large room for speculation and 
misinterpretation. In addition, it is argued that, the federal system in Iraq is a major 
controversial political problem. Ultimately, it will depend on the people’s reliance and 
support to make it work. To ensure a successful federation, it is indeed an enormous 
challenge to a country lacking a democratic tradition and-with strong ethnic and religious 
divisions. After the fall of Saddam’s regime, the Kurds generally have participated as a strong 
ally in the central government. However, for the Kurds, the future federal government remain 
ill-defined. Today, the Kurdish leaders consider independence is a natural right of the people 
of Kurdistan.1517 The recent situations have proven that Iraq is effectively partitioned. The 
Kurds are pushing themselves further towards independence after president Barzani asked the 
MPs to form a committee to organise an independence referendum.1518 Barzani said: ‘The 
Kurdish people will not relinquish their right to a referendum and they will make their 
decision’.1519 He said 'if Maliki insists on a third term, then Iraq will be driven towards a 
precipice and no one can predict what will happen,'  'And no decision will bring the country 
back to its previous state'.1520 In his words, the constitution has been violated in many ways 
and on many occasions by Iraqi premier. Barzani said, all these years, ‘we have only been 
asking for the implementation of the constitution’.1521 Thus, Kurdish leaders have long 
accused the central government of ignoring the constitution, particularly articles on disputed 
areas and on an oil and gas law, that are now under Kurdish control and Erbil’s share of the 
national budget.  
To sum up, it is true that there are many contested issues between the IKR and the central 
government, which may threaten a breakdown of constitutional order.1522 As a consequence, 
                                                          
1517 ibid.  
1518 ibid.  
1519 (…), ‘President Barzani Blasts Accusations by Baghdad against Kurds’, Rudaw (Erbil, 9 July 2014).  
1520 ibid.  
1521 ibid.  
1522 In the 2008 Iraqi budget deliberations (adopted February 13, 2008); Iraq’s Arab leaders tried but did not 
succeed in efforts to cut the revenue share for the Kurds from 17% of total government revenue to 13%., the 
Kurds did agree to abide by a revenue share determined by a census that is to be held. The Kurds further require 
the Peshmerga’s salaries to be paid out of national revenues. It is also not clear whether the Constitution allows 
the IKR to buy weapons from foreign resources. See, Katzman, ‘The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq’ (n 1343). In 
addition, ‘Tensions between the Iraqi central government and the IKR have risen recently over oil revenue 
disputes and Exxon's controversial decision to sign a contract with IKR to develop oil fields partly within the 
DIBs.’ See, D A Ollivant, ‘Renewed Violence in Iraq,’ (Council on Foreign Relations, 2012) 
<http://www.cfr.org/iraq/renewed-violence-iraq/p28808> accessed 7 January 2014.  
278 
 
a deepening constitutional crisis could be taken as an advantage ‘to try to break up the Iraqi 
State (such as through a declaration of Kurdish independence and/or a concerted push for 
Sunni ‘federalism’ an attempt to set up a separate Sunni region analogous to the KRG)'.1523 
These developments have signalled that ‘the Kurds could be hedging their bets and preparing 
for independence if a united Iraq does not come to fruition'.1524  
The next chapter will examine the adaption of the theory of ‘Remedial Earned Sovereignty’ 
to the situation of the IKR. Whether such a theory can be used as an effective remedy to end 
sovereignty based conflict, in a country which has had a long history of violence and ethnic 
struggle. A successful implementation of ‘RES’ could potentially provide peace and 
prosperity for Iraqi Kurds and ultimately respect the territorial integrity of the State of Iraq.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1523 ibid. 
1524 Dewhurst, ‘Assessing the Kurdish question: what is the future of Kurdistan?’ (n 1401).  
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Chapter Six: The Application of the Reconceptualised Theory of ‘Remedial 
Earned Sovereignty’ RES to the Situation of Iraqi Kurdistan Region IKR 
 
6.1. Introduction  
 
Self-determination is a fundamental principle of the international system. Though widely 
applied in the decolonisation era as a right of colonial people to independence, however; the 
applicability of self-determination outside this paradigm has been subject to continuing 
debate. Over the past decades, courts and scholars have struggled to delineate parameters to 
the question, under which propel would be entitled to such a drastic form of self-
determination. The first limiting factor in this thesis is the purposeful distinction between 
propel and minority groups. Under international law, any right of self-determination, whether 
external or internal, is granted to the former, but not the latter.1525 The second factor in the 
application of the self-determination theory lies in the distinction between internal and 
external self-determination and the controversy over the applicability of the external self-
determination to non-occupied and non-colonial people. Most scholars have simply 
concluded that, the right to external self-determination can only occur for colonised peoples 
and peoples subject to foreign domination and occupation. According to this view, non-
occupied and non-colonised peoples have only rights to internal self-determination under 
international law (rights within the existing mother State). On the other hand, many scholars 
and some courts have suggested the possibility of external self-determination for people 
outside the decolonisation context. According to this argument, a right to external self-
determination may exist for peoples in some exceptional circumstances, leading to remedial 
secession and the disruption of the territorial integrity for their existing mother State.  
For most scholars and courts Sterio argued, ‘such a right to external self-determination may 
only be occurred in extreme circumstances where no possibility exists for the peaceful 
cohabitation of the mother State and the struggling people'.1526 Hence, most debate exists 
over the application of self-determination and the accurate contours of this theory. 
                                                          
1525 Minority groups are entitled to the protection of some rights under international law, but those rights do not 
entail the right to political autonomy or self-governance. Rather, minority group rights entail the respect of the 
group’s culture, heritage, language, or religion. See further, Sterio, The Right to Self-Determination under 
International Law: Selfistans, Secession, and the Rule of the Great Powers (n 140) 2-4. 
1526 ibid. 
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Unfortunate results of self-determination struggles have demonstrated the difficulty of 
applying this theory to real-life situations. While the people in Kosovo, Southern Sudan, and 
Crimea have been successful in exercising rights to external self-determination, peoples in 
South Ossetia, Chechenia, Abkhazia, Western Sahara, Tibet, Biafra, and Iraqi Kurdistan have 
been denied for decades to exercise such rights, and their claims to self-determination have 
never been formally accepted.  
An examination of the recent State practice as a source of the right of self-determination has 
shown that new States emerged as a result of consensual and non-consensual dissolution; as a 
result of consensual secession from their mother States, and in certain cases perhaps as a 
result of successful unilateral secession. Most of these new States have been recognised 
instantly, but some were not and were nevertheless considered a State. The new States 
Vidmar argued, ‘have emerged upon the exercise of the right of self-determination and some 
of them possibly even under the doctrine of remedial secession'.1527 Likewise, most States 
existed with the overwhelming support of the will of the people, expressed at independent 
referenda. Besides, many States have been created after the post-Cold War as a result of 
international involvement, which included the creation of democratic institutions.1528  
This chapter argues that self-determination seeking groups need to meet certain criteria in 
order to have their requests legitimated by the international community. In other words, for 
an entity to become a State, it has firstly to fulfil the requirements of statehood and secondly, 
to have been created lawfully and view its struggle as legitimate to the international 
community. 
Today, the Kurdistan region of Iraq can be seen as one of the Middle East's great recent 
success stories. The area occupies much of what is now Northern and North-Eastern Iraq. The 
Kurds have a distinguished and eventful history; their capital, Erbil, claims to be the oldest 
continuously inhabited city. Occupying strategically important lands and formidable mineral 
reserves, the region has from ancient times been a magnet for invaders. Since the fall of 
Saddam Hussain in 2003, the Kurds of Iraq have experienced the best-protected autonomous 
governance; they have made significant achievements in securing their rights, perhaps 
                                                          
1527 Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law. The Emergence of New States in Post-Cold War 
Practice (n 365) 2-3.  
1528 For more details see, J D’Aspremont, 'The Rise and Fall of Democracy Governance in International Law: A 
Reply to Susan Marks' (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 549 
<http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/ejil/chr024> accessed May 31, 2014.  
281 
 
signalling a milestone towards a new culture of human rights in the Middle East. However, 
an independent Kurdish State has long been the dream of Kurds. Nevertheless, despite 
atrocities Iraqi Kurds have never given up their struggle for achieving their rights.  
This chapter examines the Kurdish drive for self-determination based on the theory of 
‘Remedial Earned Sovereignty’ as a settlement short of secession and alternative to changing 
established international boundaries. What is thus so unique and special about Iraqi Kurds 
that can explain its success at achieving full independence so quickly and so relatively easily? 
Is the IKR justified in unilaterally seceding from Iraq, because its people have a right to self-
determination? Does the IKR fulfil the relevant criteria of statehood? What does recognition 
by other States imply?  Are there other legal theories that can justify and legitimate the IKR's 
separation from Iraq? Are there other viable options for the IKR, short of full independence, 
that could have presented a better solution legally and politically? This chapter answers these 
questions and explores a new normative theory of secession ‘RES’, as a way of assessing 
post-colonial breakaway movements in their different manifestations.  
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6.2. The application of relevant international law theories to the situation of 
IKR  
 
Over the past few years, the facts underlying the issues surrounding the Kurdish struggle for 
self-determination in Iraq, as well as, the applicable norms of international law have 
determined that a solution to the conflict could be possible based on the respect of such 
norms becomes rather simple. To do this, a number of relevant international law theories will 
be reconceptualised to the situation of IKR including theories of secession, statehood, 
recognition, and remedial sovereignty. In other words, does IKR have an international legal 
right to secede from Iraq; if so, does it satisfy the relevant criteria’s of statehood; finally, does 
recognition by IKR as a new State (or its absence) impact the place of IKR on the global 
scene?  
 
6.2.1. Iraqi Kurds and the elements of Self-determination  
 
It was noted in Chapter 2 that the right of self-determination is included in many international 
documents; it has never been explicitly defined. The lack of a clear and universally accepted 
definition is one of the primary reasons the international community is unable to respond 
coherently to the increasing number of claims to self-determination and demands for 
secession. Despite the fact that most of the material analysed earlier refers to all peoples 
having the right of self-determination, in reality a factual consensus on self-determination 
seems to have developed in the colonial context only.1529 In other non-colonial cases, it is not 
as yet as well established, but generally the case for it is strong whenever an ethnic group is, 
in the words of the Supreme Court of Canada in Quebec case, subject to 'extreme and 
unremitting persecution'.1530 
Iraqi Kurds can be considered as one of the peoples that lie outside of the obvious colonial 
context. They are in a unique position considering that the in 1920 the Treaty of Sevres 
initially promised them the right to determine their political future, but that they were only to 
be denied that right by the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 without any regard for their wishes. 
                                                          
1529 For instance, Crawford, Harris, and Dixon, agree that in the colonial context the right of self-determination 
is an established right.  
1530 ‘Reference Re Secession of Quebec' (n 21) para 126. 
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Since then the land of Kurdistan has been divided between the State of Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and 
Syria, by the demarcations of the borders set out in the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923.1531 
For a group to be entitled to a right to collectively determine its political destiny, it must 
possess a focus of identity sufficient for it to attain distinctiveness as a ‘people’.1532 The 
criteria for establishing what group of people are sufficiently 'distinct' can be split into 
objective elements and subjective elements.1533 Objective elements include ‘common racial 
background, ethnicity, language, religion, history and cultural heritage and the territorial 
integrity of the area which the group is claiming'.1534 On the other hand, to satisfy the 
subjective element, the group has to perceive itself collectively as a distinct 'people'1535 and 
'the degree to which the group can form a viable political entity'.1536 
The Iraqi Kurds satisfy both sets of criteria. First, they share a belief of unity and 
separateness from the rest of the peoples in Iraq. They expressed such feelings of ethnic 
difference throughout various political and military protesters since the establishment of the 
Iraqi State in 1920.1537 In January 2004, Kurdish non-governmental organisations ‘NGO's’ 
collected 1,700,000 signatures on petitions demanding a vote on whether Kurdistan should 
remain part of Iraq. In just one month, the people of Kurdistan almost unanimously preferred 
independence to being part of Iraq.1538 In addition, after the fall of Saddam's regime, the 
Kurds submitted a proposed constitution to the Iraqi Governing Council that would make 
Kirkuk the Kurdish capital and give the Kurds the constitutional right to secede from Iraq at 
any time.1539 Although Sunni and Shiites have rejected the proposal, it demonstrated however 
the Kurdish desire for independence.1540 The common Kurdish identity has been particularly 
evident since the first Gulf War. Since 1992, the Kurds have enjoyed the longest period of 
self-rule in a century, allowing them to freely express their regional identity in substantive 
                                                          
1531 McDowall, A Modern History of The Kurds (n 1344) 115-261. For more details see chapter 5.  
1532 For more details see, Christian Tomuschat, Modern Law of Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
1993) 102-124. 
1533 See, Chapter 2.   
1534 'The Nagorno-Karabagh Crisis:' A Blueprint for Resolution, A Memorandum Prepared by the Public 
International Law & Policy Group and the New England Center for International Law & Policy 
<http://www.nesl.edu/userfiles/file/center for international law and policy/nagorno.pdf> accessed 14 July 2014.  
1535 V P Nanda, 'Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to Secede' (1981) 13 Case W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 257.  
1536 See, Crawford, 'State Practice, and International Law in Relation to Unilateral Secession’ (n 586) 115.  
1537 See Chapter 5.  
1538 See,  P W Galbraith, 'Kurdistan in Federal Iraq', in Brendan O’Leary, John McGarry and Khaled Salih (ed) 
The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq (UPP 2005) 243. 
1539 B Park, 'Iraq’s Kurds and Turkey: Challenges for US Policy' (2004) 34 Parameters 18. 
1540 ibid. 
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and symbolic form.1541 The Kurdish language has been developed and deployed in the public 
sphere. Most importantly, there has been widespread development and display of national 
symbols such as a Kurdish flags, hymns and the erection of statues and portraits of Kurdish 
national leaders, and a new Kurdish calendar.1542 These symbols are significant because they 
are tangible indications of a Kurdish sense of common identity. Given the Kurds to see 
themselves collectively as Kurds and have been fighting for self-rule and independence. 
Thus, the Kurds in Iraq are can be considered as a ‘people’ because they satisfy the subjective 
element of self-determination.  
Second, Iraqi Kurds share a common language, culture, religion, and mode of life and thus 
qualifies objectively as a 'people' for the purpose of self-determination. The Kurds share a 
common language of Kurdish, but with four distinctive dialects.1543 All dialects are however 
commonly referred to as simply 'Kurdish'. Kurdish has become a common language 
throughout the area. Schools and universities teach Kurdish and both broadcast and print 
media.1544 According to Stansfield in their unambiguous efforts to break 'linguistically' from 
the rest of Iraq, 'English is now being promoted as the second language in Kurdish schools 
and colleges'.1545 The younger generation does not speak Arabic, few under twenty-five even 
understand Arabic,1546 the older generation cautiously observes the new Iraq, and looks 
optimistically toward possible independence.  
The Kurds are not homogeneous religiously. The vast majority of Kurds share a common 
religion, approximately, 75 per cent follow Sunni Islam. However, McDowall argued that, 
the religious particularism of the remaining Kurds may point to longstanding difference of 
origin.1547 Nevertheless, in the region of Kurdistan, all religious groups and sects have been 
allowed to freely follow their religious practices and methods.1548 Furthermore, Freen argued 
                                                          
1541 O Bengio, 'Autonomy in Kurdistan in Historical Perspective', in Brendan O’Leary, John McGarry and 
Khaled Salih (ed) The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq (UPP 2005) 176.  
1542 ibid. 
1543 Dawoody, 'The Kurdish Quest for Autonomy and Iraq’s Statehood' (n 79).    
1544 Bengio, 'Autonomy in Kurdistan in Historical Perspective' (n 1541) 176.  
1545 G Stansfield, 'Divide and Heal' (Prospect Magazine, 2006) 
<http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2006/4/independentstate685.htm> accessed July 16, 2014. 
1546 (…), 'Iraqi Kurdistan: Does Independence Beckon?'  (Economist.com, 2007) 
<http://www.economist.com/node/9769132> accessed July 16, 2007. 
1547 Other religious communities exist in Kurdistan such as, Jews, Christian, Armenians, and Yazidis. For more 
details see, McDowall, A Modern History of The Kurds (n 1344) 10-13.  
1548 Hadji, 'The Case of Kurdish Statehood in Iraq' (n 949).   
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that, the primary form of social organisation in rural Kurdistan continues to be the tribe.1549 
Likewise, Kurdistan, while possessing a Kurdish majority, also encompasses Turkoman, 
Arab, Armenian, and Assyrian populations.1550  
In addition, the Kurds are a distinctive ethnicity with a common history. Dawoody argued 
that, ‘the earliest evidence of a distinct ethnicity dates back to 2000 BC when the first 
vanguard of ‘Indo-European-Speaking’ people arrived and settled in the area known as 
Kurdistan'.1551The settlers established the first State called the ‘Medean Empire’, ‘which 
disintegrated later into smaller kingdoms and city-states that gradually fell under the 
domination of the Roman Empires'.1552 No significant Kurdish State emerged until 1750, 
when a large Kurdish kingdom of the ‘Zand’ was born and continued for 117 Years.1553 In 
1867, however, it collapsed at the hand of the Ottoman Turks.1554 Thereafter, no other 
Kurdish entity was established until 1945, when the former Soviet Union aided in the 
creation of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in western Iran.1555 However, within a year this 
republic collapsed once the Soviets withdrew their support.1556 Thus, over the centuries, 
despite turmoil and upheaval in the region, the Kurds have struggled with other ethnic groups 
to preserve their identity; they are bonded more by their heritage and common history than by 
any territorial line. Today, Iraqi Kurds can be considered as a national group, and as a distinct 
‘people’ from the State, who are struggling to create their own independent State.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1549 M Freen, 'Iraqi Kurdistan' (ATLIS, 2005) <http://atlismta.org/online-journals/0607-journal-development-
challenges/iraqi-kurdistan/> accessed July 17, 2014. 
1550 ibid. 
1551 Dawoody, 'The Kurdish Quest for Autonomy and Iraq’s Statehood' (n 79). 
1552 ibid. 
1553 ibid. 
1554 ibid. 
1555 ibid. 
1556 On 27 November, the Iranian army attacked the Republic. Mahabad surrendered on December 16 on 31 
March 1947, Qazi Mohamad the President of the Republic was hanged in a public place. The same place where 
he had proclaimed fourteen months before the birth of the Republic of Mahabad. For more details see, A KILIC, 
'The State of the Republic of Kurdistan' (2009) Pen-Kurd.org <http://www.pen-kurd.org/englizi/ali-kilic/The-
State-of-the-Republic-of-Kurdistan.pdf>accessed 17 July 2014. 
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6.3. Statehood criteria and the region of Kurdistan 
 
Statehood is a legal theory that seeks to justify the attribution of statehood on objective 
criteria, which are at least in theory independent from the political reality underlying many 
attempts at secession or separation.1557 Accordingly, if IKR decide to break away from Iraq, it 
has to prove that it satisfies the legal criteria of statehood: that it is has a defined territory, a 
permanent population, a government, and the capacity to enter into international relations.1558 
Harris argued that these provisions have acquired the status of statehood criteria under 
customary international law.1559 However, it is suggested that these requirements have 
recently been supplemented by others requiring that a State is not created as a result of the 
illegal use of force1560, in violation of the right of self-determination1561 or in pursuance of 
racist policies1562 and of a political or moral character.1563  
First, it has been argued that there is no limit to the size of a State’s population and 
territory.1564  Today, it can be argued that, the region of Kurdistan satisfies the permanent 
population and defined territory elements, because, Iraqi Kurds are clearly a permanent 
population of about 6 million living in the Kurdistan Region.1565 This is enough people to 
qualify as a State, since countries such as, Nauru with less than 9,000 inhibitions and is only 
eight square miles in area is recognised by the United Nations.1566 On the other hand, the 
                                                          
1557 Article 3 of the of the Montevideo Convention states that [t]he political existence of the state is independent 
of recognition by the other states]. See, The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (n 342).    
1558 The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, in its Article 1, provides: ‘The State as a person 
of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined 
territory, (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states.’ See, ibid. For more details, 
see Chapter 2.  
1559 D Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (7th  edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010)  92. 
1560 Crawford suggested that independence obtained by the use of force contrary to art 2(4) of the UN Charter 
may in some cases not give rise to statehood. See Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (n 3) 
118. 
1561 It is argued that, secession of Southern Rhodesia has violated the self-determination principle, because the 
secessionist government did not represent the majority population and did not express their will for external 
self-determination (colonial self-determination). For more details see, Chapter 2.  
1562 See, McCorquodale, 'The Creation and Recognition of States’ (n 662) 192. 
1563 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (n 3) 106 and 226. 
1564 Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (n 1559) 92. Raič argued that, the criteria of a permanent 
population and a defined territory do not prescribe any minimum population figure or a minimum requirement 
of the surface area.  See, Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (n 254) 60. For more details, see 
Chapter 2.  
1565 (…), 'The People of the Kurdistan Region' (Kurdistan Regional Government KRG, 2014) 
<http://www.krg.org/p/p.aspx?l=12&p=214> accessed July 17, 2014. 
1566 Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (n 1559) 92.  
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territory of Kurdistan has formally been recognised by the Iraqi constitution.1567 The 
Kurdistan region has 40,643 square kilometres in area.1568 Although, the boundaries of the 
region have not been settled, more than half of southern Iraqi Kurdistan is so-called disputed 
areas. Much of these areas were under the Iraqi army control until the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS) attacked Mosul and Kirkuk, and the Iraqi army shockingly retreated without 
defending the land or their people. As a result, the Kurds have advanced to take over disputed 
areas, including the oil rich city Kirkuk. Based on the recent turmoil in the area, Kurdish 
President Masoud Barzani announced that Article 1401569 of the Iraqi constitution, on the 
disputed areas, has been implemented in Kirkuk province.1570 At the same time, many argued 
that article 140 has not been implemented yet for the safety of Kirkuk1571, it has been claimed 
that from 1,050 km about only 15 km of the Iraqi-Kurdish border is currently under the 
control of the Iraqi army.1572 A militant group known as ISIS, has defeated Iraqi armies and 
gained control of the completely remaining border area. In fact, unsettled boundaries do not 
disqualify the Kurdistan region from being considered a State as Vidmar argued, international 
law does not require that all borders of a State to be undisputed, but rather demands 
‘sufficient consistency’ of the territory.1573 Thus, in practice, Dunoff argued, many entities 
that we routinely consider States have a disputed and often undefined territory.1574 For 
example, Israel boundary disputes with Arab neighbours; the two Koreas have battled over 
their border for decades; and Sudan’s territories are disputed with the South by potent rebel 
movements.  
                                                          
1567 See, Article 4  'Iraqi Constitution 2005' (n 1417).   
1568 (…), 'Kurdistan’s Geography and Climate' (Kurdistan Regional Government KRG, 2014) 
<http://www.krg.org/p/p.aspx?l=12&s=020000&r=303&p=213> accessed July 17, 2014.  
1569 Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution concerns the holding of a referendum in Kurdish disputed regions, 
including Kirkuk. See chapter 5.  
1570 (…), 'Kurdistan’s Barzani: Article 140 of Iraqi Constitution Completed for Us and Will Not Talk about It 
Anymore' (Ekurd.net, 2014) <http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2014/6/kirkuk829.htm> accessed July 
17, 2014. 
1571 (…), 'A Murad: Article 140 Has Not Been Implemented' (Kirkuknow, 2014) 
<http://kirkuknow.com/english/index.php/2014/06/adil-murad-article-140-has-not-been-implemented/> 
accessed July 17, 2014.  
1572 Kurdistan originally shared 1,050 km of their border with the Iraqi government. Since early July when ISIS 
militants began their attack against the Iraqi army, much of the border control has been lost. Now the Peshmerga 
only have control of about 15 km of their border with Iraq. See, B Kakayi, 'Peshmerga: Most of Iraqi Border 
with Kurdistan under ISIS Control' (BasNews, 2014) <http://basnews.com/en/News/Details/Peshmerga--Most-
of-Iraqi-border-with-Kurdistan-under-ISIS-control-/25406> accessed July 17, 2014.  
1573 Vidmar explained that, ‘a group of and nor can a people without a territory cannot establish a State’ territory 
alone become a state without a group of people intending to inhabit it permanently. See, Vidmar, Democratic 
Statehood in International Law. The Emergence of New States in Post-Cold War Practice (n 365) 40. See also, 
Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (n 1559) 93. For more details, see Chapter 2.  
1574 Dunoff, Ratner, and Wippman, International Law Norms Actors Process (n 533) 115-116. 
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The criteria of government Crawford argued, has been described as ‘the most important 
single criterion of statehood, since all the others depend upon it’.1575 Vidmar argued that, ‘a 
government of a State needs not only to exist as an authority but also to exercise effective 
control in the territory of a State’, as well as to operate independently from the authority of 
governments of other States.1576 It is also argued that traditionally the type of government is 
not required; there must be some authority exercising governmental functions.1577 The 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was formed in 1992, ‘by the first democratically 
elected parliament in Kurdistan (and in Iraq) following the no-fly zone designed to protect the 
Kurdistan Region from the violence of Iraq’s former Ba’ath regime'.1578 The Iraqi 
constitution recognises the Kurdish region and gives the KRG a considerable control of it.1579 
Article 117 gives the KRG the power to amend the application of national laws; to maintain 
internal security forces; and to establish embassies abroad.1580 In addition, the KRG has the 
right to cancel federal laws, determine the tax rates of people living in the Kurdish region, 
and control the oil and water in the region.1581  Ironically, the KRG is responsible for security 
in the Kurdish region and its population from the violence and threats. Since 1992, The KRG 
is working independently from the government in Baghdad.1582 The KRG is a parliamentary 
system of government similarly structured to democratic countries such as the government in 
the UK. The Kurdish Parliament has been elected five times since 1992,1583 the KRG 
developed experience and expertise throughout successive cabinets, especially after the fall of 
the former regime in 2003.1584 Accordingly, it can be argued that the Kurdistan region 
satisfies the government criteria because it has an independent effective government. 
Nonetheless, in practice, it is seen that entities with collapsed governments have remained 
'States' in the past.  For example, Afghanistan throughout the 1990’s did not have a stable 
                                                          
1575 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (n 3) 56.  
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1578 (…), 'About the Kurdistan Regional Government' (Kurdistan Regional Government KRG, 2014) 
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government, and yet it remained treated as a State and retained its seat in all major 
international organisations.1585 
Finally, Raič argued that ‘the capacity to enter into international relations with other States 
needs to be distinguished from the actual existence of relations, which is a matter of policy 
for States'.1586 In other words, Vidmar argued that ‘the international law of statehood does not 
impose an obligation upon States to enter into relations with other states if they do not wish 
to do so'.1587 Most importantly, it is claimed that an entity claiming statehood must show that 
it effectively exists on the international plane as a State. However, in practice, many entities 
routinely considered States do not have the capacity to enter into international relations.1588 
For example, Liechtenstein and Monaco depend on Switzerland and France respectively for 
their national defence. In addition, several Pacific island nations, likewise, depend on the 
United States and New Zealand for their defence and have been dubbed 'freely associated 
States'.1589 Other small nations depend on the United States, and/or other economically 
powerful nations, for trade and commercial relations.1590  
The KRG established the Department of Foreign Relations (DFR) in September 2006 to 
conduct relations with the international community.1591 Today, ‘the KRG coordinates 
activities outside of the Kurdistan Region through its 13 representative offices worldwide'.1592 
Erbil is now host to a number of diplomatic representations.1593 The Iraqi constitution 
guarantees the right of the Kurdistan Region to continue its practice of maintaining 
representative offices abroad in order to promote its economic, cultural, and educational 
interests.1594 The KRG receives members of foreign governments and conducts both foreign 
policy and public relations independent of Baghdad.1595 The KRG aspires to maintain 
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international relationships based on mutual understanding and respect. It promotes cultural, 
educational, business, investment, and trade relations with all of its friends abroad.1596 Most 
recently, the KRG hosted the US Secretary of State1597 and with the UK Foreign 
Secretary.1598 They held talks with Kurdish leaders about international efforts to confront the 
Islamic State threatening to overrun parts of Iraq, and the role of Kurdish peshmerga troops 
in the battle against ISIS. After each of these official meetings, there was a press conference 
with the UK or US leader and KRG President and Prime Minister.1599 The press conferences 
looked exactly like those held in other recognised sovereign countries that these foreign 
secretaries have visited. On the other hand, a high-level KRG delegation has recently met 
United States government officials in Washington, including the Vice President and Secretary 
of State, as well as foreign policy experts, think tanks, business leaders, non-governmental 
organisations, and the media to discuss the crisis sweeping Iraq and future options for 
Kurdistan.1600 Thus, in recent years, the KRG as an effective government has conducted and 
supported activities that enhance the image of the Kurdistan region and liaised successfully 
with the diplomatic community in the Kurdistan region. For years, the KRG was operating 
and conducting independently with foreign countries, it was essentially conducting its own 
foreign policy. This is notable, given that conducting foreign policy is something reserved for 
sovereign States, not provinces of countries.1601 Accordingly, it can be admitted that the KRG 
is able to enter into relations with other States, in many respect, it appears as if it already is 
conducting its own foreign policy.  
Eventually, it is argued that, a State must have the legal competence to engage in 
international relations that means it must be both sovereign and independent. In this regard, 
Crawford argued that, ‘depends partly on the power of internal government of a territory, 
without which international obligations may not be carried into effect, and partly on the entity 
concerned being separate for the purpose of such relations so that no other entity carries out 
                                                          
1596 (...), 'KRG Policies' (Kurdistan Regional Government KRG, 2014) 
<http://dfr.krg.org/p/p.aspx?p=29&l=12&s=010000&r=336> accessed July 17, 2014. 
1597 (...), 'Iraq Crisis: Kerry Urges Unity to Expel Isis Rebels', BBC News Middle East (24 June 2014).  
1598 (...), 'Hague Holds Talks with Kurdish Leaders in Northern Iraq', BBC News Politics (27 June 2014).  
1599 (…), 'UK Foreign Secretary Meets Prime Minister Barzani in First Visit to Kurdistan' (Kurdistan Regional 
Government KRG, 2014) <http://www.krg.org/a/d.aspx?s=040000&l=12&a=51796>accessed July 17, 2014. 
Also, (…), 'President Barzani Welcomes US Secretary of State John Kerry in Erbil' (Kurdistan Regional 
Government KRG, 2014) <http://www.krg.org/a/d.aspx?s=040000&l=12&a=51767> accessed July 18, 2014. 
1600 (...), 'High-Level Delegation Discusses with Washington Crisis Sweeping Iraq and Future Options for 
Kurdistan' (Kurdistan Regional Government KRG, 2014) 
<http://www.krg.org/a/d.aspx?s=040000&l=12&a=51819> accessed July 17, 2014. 
1601 Hadji, 'The Case of Kurdish Statehood in Iraq' (n 949). 
291 
 
and accepts responsibility for them’.1602 Accordingly, it is that independence that provides a 
capacity to enter into international relations with other States, as a State. According to this 
view, independence can be defined through factual and legal aspects.1603 Factual 
independence means the physical capability to govern a territory independently, whereas 
legal independence means that there are no other legitimate claims by other States to govern 
that territory. So that, it is argued that, combining both factual and legal independence 
coincides with the path to statehood and is easy. However, it remains problematic where there 
is a factual independence but claims of legal dependence. That means that the independence 
criterion is not fulfilled by factual independence alone. Accordingly, it can be concluded that 
for ‘non-recognised states’, a de facto authority may engage in foreign relations and could be 
held legally responsible, for example, in cases involving foreign investment, entry into 
diplomatic relations (in some levels), making of a bilateral treaty and so on. In other words, 
unrecognised entities such as IKR, could demonstrate their capacity to engage in foreign 
relations, especially through economic engagement to consolidate itself as a State, and 
acquire de facto status existence in the international community.  
Accordingly, it can be concluded that arguments regarding IKR fulfilment of statehood 
criteria can be made on the other side and that many States exist which are fully recognised 
and treated as States, but which do not satisfy all statehood criteria.  However, most of these 
entities seem to have been able to fulfil the criteria of statehood at the time of their 
independence such as, Southern Sudan and Kosovo, and seem to have been thwarted by civil 
war and instability, which in turn have played a role on those states’ attributes of sovereignty. 
IKR, on the other hand, seems to have satisfied the criteria of statehood, however, the 
question about the legal validity of its possible rise into the realm of statehood remain 
uncertain. 
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292 
 
6.4. The role of recognition  
 
The legal statutes of unrecognised entities such as IKR have been discussed in the ‘greater 
debate’ between constitutive and declaratory theory. Under constitutive theory, an 
international personality cannot be created automatically. Crawford argued that, ‘in every 
legal system, some organ must be competent to determine, with certainty, the subjects of 
system;’ the school of constitutive theory concludes that such an act can only be 
accomplished by the States through recognition.1604 Kelsen argued that, without recognition, 
the unrecognised State does not exist vis-à-vis the other States.1605 Thus, according to this 
theory, recognition is a precondition for an entity to be brought into legal existence in 
relations with recognising States.1606 On the other hand, under the declaratory theory, 
recognition is a political act independent of the existence of the new State.1607 Crawford 
indicated that ‘subjects other than the State may also possess a bundle of rights and duties at 
international level;’ thus, he considers the meaning of statehood to derive from standing on 
the international level that is to say, to possess a range of powers and responsibilities at the 
international level.1608 According to this theory, Brownlie argued that the ‘personality of an 
existing State is conferred by the operation of international law, rather than other existing 
States'.1609 Thus, most modern writers have adopted this theory.1610 This means that, Vidmar 
argued ‘State may exist without being recognised, and if it does exist, in fact, then whether or 
not it has been formally recognised by other States, it has a right to be treated by them as a 
State’.1611 Accordingly, recognition whether it is considered as a legal or political act, has a 
direct impact on the pragmatic determination of statehood: whether an entity will be able to 
truly act as a State on the international scene.1612  
Furthermore, Crawford argued that in international legal circles the assertion that the 
formation of a new State is a matter of fact, and not of law, continues to have considerable 
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weight.1613 Accordingly, an act of recognition is not an instrument whose function it is to 
create a State, but only to demonstrate acceptance of a given claim to statehood based on a 
neutral assessment of whether or not a given entity meets the criteria that are incumbent on 
that title.1614 In other words, an act of recognition is not constitutive of a State, but rather 
declaratory in nature and effect: it is not capable of revising, but merely of affirming the facts 
of statehood. However, Crawford demonstrated that a State may exist in spite of negative 
reactions, including radical condemnations from third States, in practice; a widespread 
recognition appears to be of particular worth from the standpoint of those institutions 
claiming to meet the criteria of statehood.1615 Particularly, recognition appears to be an 
essential condition for the new State to be able to exercise in an effective manner, the 
international rights and obligations that correspond to the status of statehood, including 
entering into international relations with other States, and in this way becoming a full 
member of the international  community.1616 Furthermore, it is true that, the concept and 
relevance of recognition in international law is controversial. Recognition applies to the 
variety of subjects of status, rights, and privileges of legal persons in the international legal 
system. On the other hand, it can be argued that, recognition merely follows the lawful 
establishment of statehood. It is not a criterion of statehood and does not affect whether or 
not the relevant entity is actually entitled to it. In this regard, Crawford’s reasoning clarifies 
the non-conclusive nature of recognition, 
 [If State recognition is definitive then it is difficult to conceive of an illegal recognition and impossible to 
conceive of one which is invalid or void. Yet the nullity of certain acts of recognition has been accepted 
in practice, and rightly, so; otherwise recognition would constitute an alternative form of intervention, 
potentially always available and apparently unchallengeable].1617  
This also entails that, 'the test for statehood must be extrinsic to the act of recognition'. As 
Crawford suggested, individual State pronouncements on statehood are not constitutive of the 
legality of that statehood.1618 
Accordingly, under the declaratory view of recognition, outside actors would be free to 
recognise or deny recognition to the IKR, but such political decisions would not affect the 
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IKR’s legal status as a State in the future.1619 Thus, the fact would be that most countries that 
will recognise the IKR as a State would have no bearing on the legal question of whether the 
IKR has achieved statehood. However, under the constitutive view, recognition of the IKR by 
outside actors is one of the elements of its statehood.1620 Under this view, countries that have 
chosen to recognise the IKR would indicate that at least one of the criteria of the IKR's 
statehood has been fulfilled. Nonetheless, the IKR would still need to prove that it satisfies 
the four other criteria of statehood. Likewise, under the intermediary view1621, it is argued 
that outside actors would have a duty to recognise the IKR as a new State if it fulfilled the 
four objective criteria of statehood.   
In practice, within the context of the former Yugoslavia, many outside actors quickly 
recognised Croatia after it declared independence, although its fulfilment of statehood criteria 
was dubious at best, and although its fulfilment of the Badinter Commission requirement of 
respect of minority rights was more than questionable.1622 On the other hand, EU member 
States refused to recognise Macedonia after it declared independence, despite the fact that 
Macedonia satisfied the four criteria of statehood and that the Badinter Commission 
recommended that Macedonia be recognised as a new State.1623  In addition, the international 
community may sometimes require additional criteria of recognition. With respect to 
Macedonia, the Badinter Commission recommended that ‘Macedonia not be recognised as a 
new State unless it agreed to insert a clause in its constitution promising not to claim 
additional territory against neighbouring States'.1624 Dunoff argued that, after Macedonia 
agreed to follow the Badinter Commission recommendations, the EU foreign ministers 
decided to impose an additional requirement on Macedonia by indicating that this new State 
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would be recognised only if it used a name, which did not include the term Macedonia.1625 
Thus, Sterio argued that, ‘these examples indicate that recognition truly is a political act, and 
that the geo-political reality of a given region dictates whether an entity will be recognised as 
a new State'.1626 Accordingly, it can be concluded that, the recognition of the IKR will be 
potentially political rather than legal: that politically, outside actors determined that it would 
be best to accept the IKR as a new independent sovereign partner, in this case, the actors will 
ignore the legality of Kurdish independence.    
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6.5. Theories to justify IKR independence   
 
Numbers of legal and political issues plague the IKR's attempt to secede from Iraq.  Namely, 
what theories can be offered to justify such attempt in the first place, and what kinds of 
problems does this troubled region face in its near future if the Kurds succeed to breakaway 
off from Iraq? 
 
6.5.1. The application of Territorial claim theory 
 
It has been claimed that secessionist claims to independence are only convincing if the 
secessionist group can prove that their territory was illegally annexed into the parent State, 
and they have a legitimate and historical claim over the territory.1627 In fact, when the Iraqi 
State was established, the British rewarded the Kurdish territory to the Iraqis.1628 The British 
did not own Kurdistan and the Kurds were not consulted on the transaction, therefore the 
British gave away territory to which they never had any legitimate ownership.1629 Thus, the 
process was invalid from the beginning. The Iraqi State was itself a pure invention of the 
British. Brilmayer argued that, ‘the State of Iraq is a mockery because it incorporates territory 
to which in never had any legitimate right'.1630 In this regard, Atarodi explained that:  
[This was a marriage forced upon the Kurdish population of Mosul [vilayet] by the British and confirmed 
by the League of Nations, absolutely without the consent of the Kurdish people, who have fought against 
it, and tried to get out of it, for the last seventy-two years].1631   
Rather, from the historic grievance perspective, it can be argued that the Kurds in Iraq do 
possess a legitimate case to break away from Iraq. After WWI, the Kurdish territory was 
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forced to become part of the newly created Iraq.1632 The unnatural boundaries of Iraq were 
drawn to include Kurdistan within a predominately-Arab State.1633 Iraqi Kurds, who 
preserved their identity and cultural for centuries, were expected to assimilate into the newly 
established State regardless of ethnic, culture and linguistic difference and the legitimacy of 
their own territorial aspiration. In other words, for centuries, the Kurds have never willingly 
acquiesced their territory to any outside group. They have struggled to keep their claim for 
land and independence alive. Thus, since the Kurds have occupied the same territorial region 
for thousands of years, managing to stay on their homeland and retain their distinct identity 
and culture despite both efforts by other countries to take over their land, assimilate them, 
and general regional upheaval they possess a legitimate claim to the territory.1634  Iraqi Kurds 
lay their claim only to Kurdistan, not to other territory. Their historical grievance is based on 
a legitimate claim to territory, since this territory has been considered Kurdistan from a time 
beyond recorded history, it has only considered as Iraqi Kurdistan since 1925. Thus, since the 
Treaty of Lausanne failed to include an independent Kurdish State, the Kurds subsequently 
struggled to obtain independent or autonomous homeland.1635 Accordingly, based on 
historical facts, it can be concluded that the Iraqi Kurds have a legitimate claim to the 
territory. However, as it has been canvassed earlier that, over the past few decades, the 
validity of a historical claim alone cannot explain the results of secessionist struggles. In 
addition, this approach tends to ignore internal self-determination and focuses on the exercise 
of external self-determination. In many situations, secession or total independence from a 
parent State is not the only or even necessary means of exercising the right of self-
determination, and there is a strong presumption against secession in non-colonial 
situations.1636 According to this view, Iraqi Kurds cannot base their claim on the territorial 
claim theory since the Iraqi constitution considers the IKR as largely autonomous from 
federal Iraq.  
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6.5.2. The application of Buchanan's remedial theory of secession 
 
Under this theory, international law provides a right to secession for people subject to 
extreme persecution or unable to realise their right to self-determination internally.1637 
Buchanan holds that secession must be 'a remedy of last resort for persistent and grave 
injustices, understood as violations of basic human rights'.1638 Accordingly, it has been 
argued that remedial secession comes into existence when certain conditions are met. First, 
secessionists must qualify as a ‘people’, for the purpose of self-determination, there must be 
serious human rights violations or a denial of self-determination, and finally, secession must 
be the only solution to remedy the injustice.  
In practice, several examples have been evaluated in the light of remedial secession doctrine. 
These secessionist groups were seceded from existing State due to human right abuses, and 
the violation of internal self-determination, but not connected to decolonisation, occupational 
regimes, or dissolutions of the States such as the case of Southern Sudan and Kosovo.1639 
Significantly, it has been argued that lawfulness and legitimacy of secession can be verified 
in international law.1640 However, the successfulness rather depends on the recognition and 
international community support for secession.1641  
It has been illustrated that the Kurds have a distinct identity, and represent a clear majority 
within a given territory. Accordingly, the Kurds qualify as a 'people' for the purpose of self-
determination.1642 On the other hand, autonomy for Iraqi Kurds as a part of Iraq’s 
constitutional and political equation dates back to March 1970, when Iraqi Kurds and the 
Iraqi government signed a manifesto that called for Kurdish self-determination, a census was 
supposed to be held in 1974 to determine the borders of the Kurdistan region.1643 It purported 
to establish Kurdistan as a self-governing region that had considerable autonomy over its own 
social and economic affairs and recognised the Kurds as people.1644 However, the autonomy 
agreement fell far short of Kurdish demands. It does not cede Kirkuk, and more critically, it 
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imposed a vastly more central government control over the region than was envisaged by the 
agreement.1645 As a result fighting erupted between the Kurdish liberation movements and 
Iraqi government. Consequently, the Iraqi army bombed Kurdish villages, and poisoned the 
Kurds with cyanide and mustard gas, it is estimated that during the 1980's, Iraqis destroyed 
some 5000 Kurdish villages and more than 100,000 Kurdish civilians disappeared and were 
executed.1646   
The autonomy accorded by 1974 agreement lasted until 1991, when Iraqi authorities 
withdrew from north Iraq in accordance with SC Resolution 688.1647  In 1991 upon the Iraqi 
occupation of Kuwait, the Kurds created a self-rule local province. In 1992, the Kurdistan 
region was consolidated in the first 'free and fair' democratic elections, to fill the political 
vacuum created by withdrawal of the Iraqi administrations and services in the region. The 
Kurds established their own Parliament and local authorities that ruled the region in complete 
independence of the central government. As a result Iraqi Kurdistan became a 'de facto' 
Kurdish state from 1991-2003.1648 In 2005, as a form of shared rule and self-rule, Iraqi 
constitution established a Federal central government and regional governments. The new 
Iraq’s constitution McGarry argued creates a federation, 'Federations incorporate elements of 
self-rule in the sense that their component units enjoy a certain degree of autonomy ‘vis-à-
vis’ the federal government even as they share in the control of that government'.1649 Today 
Iraqi Kurds enjoy the country’s highest living standard, international isolation has ended, and 
notably the level of security and foreign investment has increased. The situation was far 
different, just years ago, while Iraqi Kurds have enjoyed de facto autonomy since 1991, and 
uncertainty overshadowed their daily life.  
In fact, successive Iraqi governments have clearly violated the social cultural and economic 
rights of the Kurds.1650 Between 1974 and 1991, there was clear denial of self-determination 
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and Iraqi governments committed gross human rights violations against the Kurds. Brilmayer 
argued that, 'the strongest rationale for declaring a self-determination claim superior to 
territorial integrity claims is very simple: democratic self-government is more righteous than 
the feudal, undemocratic, and oppressive values associated with preserving territorial 
boundaries'.1651 She added, there is no stronger case for applying this rationale than in the 
case of genocide.1652 In this regard, Hannum considered that if the remedial secession 
doctrine would be accepted in the international legal system, 'international law should 
recognise a right to secession only in the rare circumstance when the physical existence of a 
territorially concentrated group is threatened by violations of fundamental rights'.1653 He 
argued that, 'Genocide is illegal under customary international law; gross violations of human 
rights are also prohibited'.1654 In February 1988, Saddam Hussain launched the Al-Anfal 
operation, which now can be categorised as a major genocide campaign in Kurdistan to end 
the Kurdish aspiration for independence.1655 In March 1988, attacks by Iraqi forces resulted 
in the massacre of upward to 5000 Kurdish civilians of the Kurdish town of Halabja, by 
gassing them with chemical weapons, which is considered under Article (II) and (III) of the 
1948 Convention on the prevention and punishment a genocide and as one of the most severe 
crimes against humanity.1656 Thus, justifying secession by the Kurds in response to anything 
less that the most serious human rights violations assumes a principle to which there has 
never been agreement.  
Logically, this position cannot be applied to the current situation in the IKR, as there are no 
gross human rights violations and the Iraqi government cannot be considered as oppressive. 
In addition, remedial secession requires that there have to be real options to redress the denial 
of self-determination, and the remedy must effectively end the violations, abuses of human 
rights, and guarantee the genuine exercise of self-determination of peoples. In other words, if 
the other remedies are not available or effective, the right to secession can be exercised as a 
last resort remedy. Nonetheless, if secessionists secede from the existing State while having 
alternative remedies, such as autonomy, or any sort of power sharing, such secession does not 
have legitimacy under remedial secession theory.1657 The Iraqi constitution has given a 
                                                          
1651 Brilmayer, 'Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation' (n 46 ).  
1652 ibid. 
1653 Hannum, 'Rethinking Self-Determination' (n 151).    
1654 ibid. 
1655 For more details, see chapter 5. 
1656 ibid.  
1657 For more details, see chapter 3.  
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considerable power to the IKR.1658 The constitution however, concerns the Kurdistan regional 
government’s relationships with the Iraqi central government, based on freedom and 
independence. The Kurdish relationships with the central government have been built in 
congruence with the condition of not breaching the constitutional rights of the Kurds by the 
central government. Meanwhile, any violation of Kurdish rights gives them the right to 
practice the external dimension of the right in self-determination. Thus, Cassese argued that, 
'any licence to secede must be interpreted very strictly'.1659 In other words, the right to 
secession must be conferred to peoples only in exceptional situations.1660 Accordingly, as the 
Kurds have been given a chance to exercise internal self-determination, be it autonomy or 
other forms of self-determination within the existing State, the element of last resort cannot 
be applied under remedial secession theory. However, if the Kurdish rights have been 
violated by, the central government and the other remedies were not available or effective; 
the right to secession can be exercised as a last resort remedy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1658 Iraqi Constitution (n 84), Articles 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121.  
1659 Cassese, Self-Determination of People, A Legal Reappraisal (n 25). 112. 
1660 Murswiek, 'The Issue of a Right to Secession-Reconsidered' (n 161) 27.   
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6.6. The application of remedial earned sovereignty approach to the 
situation of IKR and whether the IKR can peacefully secede from Iraq 
through the approach of RES 
 
It has been illustrated that an entity that fulfils the criteria of statehood does not automatically 
become a State (Taiwan and IKR, for instance), and an entity that does not fulfil the criteria is 
not prevented from becoming a State (Kosovo and Bosnia/Herzegovina, for example).1661 
Therefore, for forming a new independent sovereign State, the Kurds must first secede from 
Iraq. A unilateral secession or any poorly planned secession could jeopardize their chances of 
international recognition, which depends considerably on the legality and legitimacy of 
secession. In order to maximize their chances of achieving international recognition, the 
Kurds must pay close attention to the concern of the legality and legitimacy leading to 
secession from Iraq. In this regard, the Supreme Court of Canada states that ‘One of the legal 
norms which may be recognised by states in granting or withholding recognition of emergent 
states is the [legitimacy] by which the de facto secession is, or was, being pursued’.1662   
Under international law, Iraqi Kurds may be entitled to the right of self-determination, 
including the right to form an independent State. Specifically, after the collapse of the Iraqi 
army in the north by the Islamic extremist the radical Islamic State (IS), the Kurds have 
advanced to take over disputed areas, including the oil rich city of Kirkuk, the region’s large 
oil reserves it considers as immense strategic and economic importance to the IKR. At the 
same time, the Kurdish Regional Government KRG has been required to come under the 
obligation to secure and protect their population from violence. This could justify the Kurdish 
legitimate breakaway from Iraq and create an independent Kurdish State in north Iraq. On the 
other hand, it has been argued that, any immediate unplanned secession could not be the best 
way to ensure stability in the region and achieve enough support in the international 
community to merit recognition. The most useful viable mechanism, based on the long-term 
success and minimization of short-term violence, is the approach of 'Remedial Earned 
Sovereignty’. Today, the need of this approach is required, in part, to the irrelevance and 
inadequacy of existing international principles and legal norms, including the right of self-
                                                          
1661 For more details, see chapter 2.  
1662 ‘Reference Re Secession of Quebec' (n 21) para 143.   
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determination of peoples.1663 As a way to facilitate status determination, 'RES' can promote 
and ensure human rights, minority rights, and the creation of valid democratic structures.  
The approach has been described as entailing ‘the conditional and progressive devolution of 
sovereign powers and authority from a State to a sub-state entity’.1664 In other words, as a 
conflict resolution process it creates an opportunity for the parties to agree on basic 
requirements that sub-state entity must meet during an intermediate phase in order to attain or 
discuss final status.1665 In the light of recent State practice, the emerging conflict resolution  
approach of ‘RES’ may be characterised as encompassing six elements, three core elements 
and three optional elements.1666 It demonstrates that a new player on the international scene 
needs to show to the outside world that it is worthy of achieving statehood and that it has 
earned its sovereignty. Accordingly, those peoples that have struggled for independence 
through legitimate means, and that have proved to the international community that they 
would be a reliable new sovereign partner, will eventually become sovereign legitimate 
States.1667 In other words, the breakaway entity does not merit recognition as a new State 
immediately after its separation or quest to separate from its mother State, but that such an 
entity needs to earn its sovereignty.1668 The relative peace and prosperity in Kosovo, East 
Timor, and Southern Sudan explains that ‘RES’ can be used effectively to end sovereignty-
based conflict in countries that have been plagued by violence and war. Accordingly, 
applying an ‘RES’ approach in the case of IKR could potentially insure lasting peace and 
prosperity for the Kurds. In other words, the realisation of IKR's right to self-determination 
may be achieved through 'RES' approach.  
It has been noted earlier that, 'RES' consists of two phases, intermediate sovereignty (or 
conditional sovereignty), and earned recognition.1669  
                                                          
1663 See chapter 3.  
1664 Williams and Pecci, 'Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap Between Sovereignty and Self-Determination' 
(n 74). For more details, see chapter 3.  
1665 Williams and Heymann, 'Earned Sovereignty: An Emerging Conflict Resolution Approach' (n 893).   
1666 Scharf argued that, ES is defined as comprising three core elements, shared sovereignty, institution building, 
and a determination of final status.  It may also encompass three optional elements: phased sovereignty, 
conditional sovereignty, and constrained sovereignty. Scharf, 'Earned Sovereignty: Juridical Underpinnings' (n 
75).  For more details, see chapter 3.  
1667 Williams, 'Earned Sovereignty: The Road to Resolving the Conflict over Kosovo’s Final Status' (n 916).   
For more details, see chapter 3.  
1668 Scharf, Hooper, and Williams, 'Resolving Sovereignty-Based Conflicts: The Emereging Approach Of 
Earned Sovereignty' (n 935).  For more details, see chapter 3.  
1669 See chapter 3.  
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The first core element is shared sovereignty. In this case, of earned sovereignty the State and 
sub-state entity may both exercise sovereign authority and function over a defined 
territory.1670 International institutions may occasionally exercise sovereign authority and 
functions rather to or in lieu of the parent State. Similarly, the international community may 
exercise shared sovereignty with international recognised State in rare situations.1671 Hence, 
an international institution will be responsible for monitoring the parties’ exercise of their 
authority and functions. 
It can be argued that, the relationship between the IKR and Iraq can be described now as 
shared sovereignty. The element prescribed by a period where the sub-state entity is given 
substantial elements of self-government. Since 1992, the IKR has been autonomous and the 
Kurds have been forced to govern themselves. The Kurds could establish their own 
parliament and local authorities that ruled the IKR in complete independence of the Iraqi 
government, it can be farther considered as relative success that can be improved 
substantially, as a compare to other areas of Iraq and Middle East areas.1672 Today, the Iraqi 
federal constitution creates a federation, 'Federations incorporate elements of self-rule; in the 
sense that their component units enjoy a certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the federal 
government even as they share in the control of that government'.1673  
The second core element is conditional sovereignty or conditional independence. This 
element is applied during the period of shared sovereignty prior to the determination of final 
status. In other words, this approach renders the exercise of self-determination conditional on 
the self-determination unit meeting certain designed benchmarks1674 such as, democratic 
institutions, the rule of law, freedom of movements, protecting human and minority rights, 
                                                          
1670 Hooper and Williams, 'Earned Sovereignty: The Political Dimention' (n 914).   
1671 As a non-colonial territory, for an initial period, Kosovo has been represented and supervised by the 
international community. The 2007 Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status recommended that ‘Kosovo’s 
status should be independence; it sets forth a basic framework for governing a post-independence Kosovo, the 
implementation of which is to be monitored by ‘international civilian and military presences.’ See, Drew, 'The 
Meaning of Self-Determination: The Stealing of the Sahara Redux?' (n 960) 97. For more details, see chapter 4.  
1672 For more details, see chapter 5.  
1673 McGarry and O’Leary , 'Iraq's Constitution of 2005: Liberal consociation as political prescription' (n 1450). 
1674 The Roadmap for example requires comprehensive institution building prior to any further discussions of 
Palestinian provisional statehood. In addition, Michael Steiner, the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General to Kosovo, had proposed a formula called ‘standards before status’, whereby Kosovo would have to 
fulfil a number of standards as a prerequisite to international recognition. According to this proposal, Kosovo 
would be governed in a system of political trusteeship in the meantime, in order to advance the local population 
politically, economically, socially and educationally. see, Drew, 'The Meaning of Self-Determination: The 
Stealing of the Sahara Redux? (n 960) 98. Also, Sterio, 'The Kosovar Declaration of Independence: ‘Botching 
the Balkans’ or Respecting International Law?' (n 1621). 
305 
 
halting terrorism, constitutional reform, and promoting regional stability.1675 In this way, the 
sub-state entity undertakes to build institutions for self-government and to construct 
institutions capable of exercising increasing sovereign authority and functions.   
In fact, compared to Kosovo and Southern Sudan, the IKR is more advanced at the inception 
of its pursuits of statehood in terms of the institutions that are necessary to have a fully-
functions democratic government.1676 The IKR already administers local government 
services.1677 The Kurds are governing themselves through their own democratic Parliament. 
The Parliament is the Region's democratically elected legislature.1678 The Kurdistan 
parliament has considerable power to debate and legislate on policy in a wide range of 
areas.1679 It rather shares legislative power with the federal authorities. Under Article 121 of 
the Iraqi constitution, the Kurdistan Parliament has the right to amend the application of Iraq-
wide legislation that falls outside of the federal authorities’ exclusive powers.1680  In addition, 
IKR’s institutions exercise legislative and executive authority in many areas, including 
allocating the regional budget, police and security, education and health policies, natural 
resource management and infrastructural development.1681  
The KRG makes no distinction between the various religious and ethnic groups in the 
Region.1682 The KRG protects people’s freedom to practice their religion and promotes inter-
faith tolerance.1683 Today, enough freedom has been given to all religions in IKR. This 
culture of tolerance is promoted by the KRG and the Region’s other institutions, which 
                                                          
1675 Hooper and Williams, 'Earned Sovereignty: The Political Dimention' (n 914). For more details, see chapter 
3.  
1676 Hadji, 'The Case of Kurdish Statehood in Iraq' (n 949). For more details, see chapter 4.  
1677  (…), 'Iraqi Kurdistan: Does Independence Beckon?' (n 1546).  
1678 (…), 'The Kurdistan Parliament' (Department of Foreign Relations KRG, 2014) 
<http://www.krg.org/p/page.aspx?l=12&s=030000&r=317&p=229&h=1> accessed July 29, 2014.  
1679 As provided in Iraqi constitution, The Kurdish Parliament has considerable power in areas: ‘health services, 
education and training, policing and security, the environment, natural resources, agriculture, housing, trade, 
industry and investment, social services and social affairs, transport and roads, culture and tourism, sport and 
leisure, and ancient monuments and historic buildings’. See, ibid. Also, Iraqi Constitution (n 1417) Articles, 
114, 115, 117, 120, 121, 126 and 141. For more details, see chapter 5.  
1680 ibid, Article 121. 
1681 (…), 'Kurdistan Regional Government' (Department of Foreign Relations KRG, 2014) 
<http://dfr.krg.org/p/p.aspx?p=88&l=12&s=030400&r=403> accessed July 29, 2014. 
1682 (…), 'KRG and UN Announce Regional Human Rights Regional Action Plan' (Kurdistan Regional 
Government KRG, 2012) <http://www.krg.org/a/d.aspx?a=42884&l=12&r=223&s=010000> accessed July 29, 
2014. 
1683 (...), 'Religious Freedom and Tolerance' (Kurdistan Regional Government KRG, 2014) 
<http://www.krg.org/p/p.aspx?l=12&s=020000&r=310&p=220> accessed August 08, 2014. For more details 
about tolerance and religion in IKR see, François-Xavier Lovat, Kurdistan: Land of God (London: GID; Arbil 
(Kurdistan-Iraq): Silver Star H Corp 2007). This book of photographs tries to present all these religious facets, 
which make Kurdistan a unique Land of God.  
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protect the religious, linguistic, and cultural rights of all groups.1684 The KRG committed 
itself to the creation of a federal, democratic, pluralistic Iraq.1685 KRG officials believe that 
‘citizens are all responsible for respecting the rights of ethnic minorities throughout the 
nation.’1686 In the Region, ‘the reality on the ground demonstrates respect for diversity and 
commitment to human rights'.1687 In the meantime, President Obama talks about recent 
turmoil in Iraq, he stated that ‘the Kurdish region is functional that way we would like to see, 
it is tolerant of other sects and other religion in a way that we would like to see 
elsewhere’.1688   
Most recently, the IKR with the Office of the High Commission of Human Rights (OHCHR) 
under the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) launched the Regional action 
plan for human rights.1689 The plan emphasises the critical role that all civil society 
organisations, and human rights activists throughout the Region had in working together with 
members of parliament, legislators, and relevant KRG ministries in drafting the action plan 
for promoting human and minority rights and democratic civilized society.1690 Thus, The 
KRG has taken the initial step of recognising the importance of protecting human rights by 
creating a Ministry of Human Rights and Justice.1691 By building the Ministry of Justice, the 
KRG is now working properly to make sure that the legal system is effective. Failure to 
convince the international community of its ability to protect human and minority rights 
would be a fatal below to international recognition in accordance to the modern day criteria 
of statehood.  
Economically, in recent years, the KRG has adopted a clearer economic vision.1692 More than 
90 per cent of the KRG’s revenues come from oil.1693 In addition, the IKR has enormous 
                                                          
1684 (...), 'Welcome to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq' [2014] skchamber.ch 
<http://www.skchamber.ch/sites/default/files/download/Kurdistan.pdf>accessed 8 August 2014. 
1685 ibid. 
1686 ibid. See also, (…), 'Religious Freedom and Tolerance' (n 1683). 
1687 (…), 'Welcome to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq' (n 1684). 
1688 T L Friedman, 'Obama on the World', The New York Times (8 August 2014).  
1689 (…), 'KRG and UN Announce Regional Human Rights Regional Action Plan.' 
1690 ibid. 
1691 (...), 'Ministries and Departments' (Kurdistan Regional Government KRG, 2014) 
<http://www.krg.org/p/page.aspx?l=12&s=030000&r=315&p=228&h=1> accessed August 01, 2014. 
1692 (...), 'Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Finance and Economy' (Kurdistan Regional Government 
KRG, 2014) <http://mof-krg.org/?page=categoryn&c=yasa> accessed July 29, 2014. 
1693 The Iraqi constitution gave the Kurdistan Regional Government at least 17% of the federal budget for the 
Kurdish government; however, Baghdad government never gave more than 10%. See, (…), 'Kurdistan Regional 
Government: What Are the Kurds Main Sources of Income?' (Kurdistan Regional Government KRG, 2014) 
<http://www.quora.com/Kurdistan-Regional-Government/What-are-the-Kurds-main-sources-of-income> 
accessed July 29, 2014.  
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alternative resources such as trade, agriculture, tourism, and industry.1694 Lastly, the KRG 
established the Department of Foreign Relations (DFR) and leaderships that have already 
begun to conduct relations with the international community.1695 Accordingly, to manage the 
relationship between IKR and Baghdad during the interim period it will be necessary to 
establish mechanism for cooperation and interaction between them. To prepare IKR for the 
full exercise of its right of self-determination and the possibility of international recognition, 
it would rather be important to allow the IKR to enter into formal relationships with 
neighbouring countries and international organisations. 
A final way in which the ‘RES’ approach can be applied to the situation of the IKR is the 
eventual determination of the final status of the IKR and its relationship to the State of Iraq. 
In many instances, the parties may agree upon final status during the initial stages of the 
process, such as in East Timor, whereas in others such as Kosovo it may be determined after 
a period of shared sovereignty and institutional building.1696 In other words, Williams and 
Pecci argued that, ‘The options for final status range from substantial autonomy to full 
independence. This decision is generally made through either some sort of referendum or 
instructed negotiations, but invariably involves the consent of the international 
community’.1697 Significantly, the nature of final status will be determined by a referendum, 
it may also be determined through a negotiated settlement between the State and sub-state 
entity, often with international mediation.1698 At the same time, the consent of the 
international community is important to the determination of the final status for the IKR in 
the form of international recognition. For successful implementation of the third stage, it is 
suggested that the role of international community may sometimes be essential in monitoring 
and implementing the interim arrangement and assisting with preparation for eventual 
independence.1699   
At the end of the interim phase earned recognition would occur. The determination of the 
international mechanism would be based on IKR’s compliance with the commitments and all 
                                                          
1694 (...), 'Kurdistan Regional Government: Ministry of Trade and Industry' (Kurdistan Regional Government 
KRG, 2014) <http://mtikrg.org/Default.aspx?l=1> accessed July 29, 2014. 
1695 (...), 'Foreign Relations' (n 1681).  
1696 Chapter 3.  
1697 Williams and Pecci, 'Earned Sovereignty : Bridging the Gap Between Sovereignty and Self-Determination' 
(n 74). 
1698 Scharf, Hooper, and Williams, 'Resolving Sovereignty-Based Conflicts: The Emereging Approach Of 
Earned Sovereignty' (n 935). 
1699 For more details, see chapter 3.  
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conditional mechanisms undertaken during the interim period, taken into consideration Iraqi 
government’s compliance with its commitments, and the results of referendum held in the 
IKR.  
Thus, for the successful implementation of ‘RES’ the collaboration between the IKR and the 
State of Iraq is required. In other words, for legitimate independence, the Kurds must first 
earn their internal sovereignty, understood as the efforts of people within the IKR to comply 
with all conditional mechanisms to achieve the statehood capacities and to engage in good 
faith with final status negotiations (status determination).1700 Eventually, this can be 
facilitated externally by independent sovereign States by the act of recognition. Externally, 
designed sovereignty relates to the set of norms and actions imposed during the interim 
period in order to create the political, social, and economic infrastructure whereby the IKR 
consolidates its statehood abilities with the capacity to make law, functioning democratic 
institution, a self-reliant market economy and contribute to regional stability.1701  
Nonetheless, it has been suggested earlier that, for constructing a long-term resolution of the 
IKR and the Iraqi government dispute several considerations can be made. First, either 
domestic law or the federal constitution would need to make some provision for secession, 
whether through adoption of legislation specifically allowing it or some other methods. 
Secondly, it is necessary that there be a creation of mechanisms for joint co-operation 
between the IKR and the government in Baghdad. Third, the making of specific 
commitments on the part of the IKR and the Iraqi State is required, in the area of human 
rights and minority rights, and engaging in a series of defined confidence building measures. 
The final requirement is the preparation for status determination with possible assistance of 
the international community. Most importantly, the determination of the international 
mechanism would be based on the IKR’s compliance with the commitments undertaken 
during the interim period, take into consideration Baghdad’s compliance with its 
commitments, and the results of referendum held in the IKR. Accordingly, under the theory 
of ‘RES’ the Kurds must demonstrate to the outside world that it is capable of functioning as 
an independent State, that it would be a desirable new sovereign partner, and that it is worthy 
of recognition. Most importantly, they must demonstrate to the international community that 
they have struggled for independence through legitimate means, and that it is worthy of 
                                                          
1700 See chapter 3.  
1701 For more details, see, ibid.  
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achieving statehood and that they have earned their sovereignty.1702 In addition, the primary 
aim of this theory is the cooperation between the IKR and the government in Baghdad. Thus, 
it can be demonstrated that, RES has two requirements. First, Iraqi Federal constitution and 
domestic law would need to make some provision for secession whether through adoption of 
legislation specifically allowing it or some other method. Second, the IKR would need to 
engage in 'principled negotiations' with the Iraqi government on the issue of independence. 
Such sort of discussion within the State of Iraq would need to take to successfully gain 
independence, including a national referendum, addressing the rights of minorities and the 
interests of the IKR and the Federal government. Means, the issue of independence within the 
State of Iraq, cannot be accomplished without the principled negotiations with other 
participants in the state.       
Thus, for the Kurds to obtain international legitimisation, the thesis suggested several 
guidelines that the Kurds must fulfil in order to be able to legitimately gain some degree of 
self-determination.1703 However, it should be observed that the principled guidance is not 
necessary when the parent State has consented to the secession.  
1.  A ‘people’: it has been proven that under the principles of international law, the 
Kurds in question are indeed a ‘people’ entitled to the right to self-determination.1704 
Rather, it is important for the group to have a homeland or being linked to a specific 
territory. For groups to qualify as a people they must clearly geographically 
situated.1705  
2. An exceptional situation: It has been argued that, historically, Iraqi successive 
governments have violated the Kurdish rights of self-determination. Besides, most of 
the Iraqi governments systematically consistently and flagrantly violated human rights 
of the Kurdish people. In addition, the Kurds have been blocked from the meaningful 
exercise of its right to self-determination internally. Rather, other effective remedies 
were not available, and secession was a last resort to remedy the harm. Under this 
view, a remedial doctrine would be accepted under international legal system. 
                                                          
1702 According to Sterio, The theory of earned sovereignty deny statehood to those peoples that have been 
labelled as violent and that have arguably used illegal means to assert their independence, such as Republika 
Srpska, Chechnya, or Northern Cyprus. See, Sterio, The Right to Self-Determination under International Law: 
Selfistans, Secession, and the Rule of the Great Powers (n 140) 175. For more details, see chapter 3.  
1703 See chapter 3.  
1704 See chapter 5.  
1705 See chapter 2.  
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However, today, it cannot be argued that the Kurds have no alternative remedies 
under the current constitutional framework. Despite having some difficulties, the 
Kurdish right to internal self-determination, political representation, and power, 
sharing has been somehow respected by the central government. However, after the 
recent turmoil, a discussion regarding the possibility or inevitability of a power 
sharing arrangement is not complete without a critical assessment of Kurdish position. 
Because of their conflicting interests in both remaining a part of Iraq, which would 
provide them with oil revenue and bargaining power with their neighbours, and in 
seeking independence, which has been pursued for decades.1706 So that, in light of the 
recent and rapid changes on the ground in Iraq, it is uncertain whether the power 
sharing is possible and whether or not Iraq will remain united or dissolve.1707  
3. Activity to be a State: an entity claiming statehood must show that it effectively exists 
on the international plane as a State. In this regard, it is important for the entity to 
function as an independent State and work separately from the parent State, is the 
level of independence such that there is a ‘de facto’ state within a State–it is on a 
separate path–political, cultural, economic, linguistic, social, etc…  [From the parent 
State]. It has been demonstrated that, from 1992 to 2003, the IKR has been a ‘de 
facto’ state in north Iraq that was acting as an independent State and separately from 
Baghdad.1708 From 2003, the IKR has become a part of decentralised federal Iraq. 
Today, the Kurdish parliament has considerable power.1709 The KRG exercise 
executive power according to the Kurdistan Region’s laws, as enacted by the 
democratically elected Kurdistan Parliament.1710 Through the KRG, the IKR is now 
acting effectively as a separate and an independent State from Iraq.1711   
4. Responsible behaviour: The would-be the Kurds have behaved responsibility within 
the existing framework of the State, including in consideration of the rights and 
entitlements of other groups within the larger unit, and have not themselves violated 
any fundamental rights in the course of the dispute. For successful legitimate 
                                                          
1706  For more details, see, 'POWER-SHARING IN IRAQ: IMPOSSIBLE OR INEVITABLE?' Roundtable 
Series Report, PILPG (2014).  
1707 ibid. 
1708 See, chapter 5.  
1709 (...), 'The Kurdistan Parliament' (n 1678). 
1710 (…), 'Welcome to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq' (n 1684). 
1711 (…), 'Kurdistan Regional Government' (n 1711). 
311 
 
secession, it has been argued that the Kurds must show the legality of its declaration 
of independence.1712 
5. Choice: it has been illustrated that, secession should be the choice of the majority of 
the population in the entity in question. In this regard, public consultation for the 
Kurds would be essential for successful free democratic choice, having a mandate 
from the people to pursue certain political steps including the final one of self-
determination through secession. In other words, there must be a consensual 
agreement between all Kurdish political parties for independence. The best way for 
the Kurds to make such a choice is through a referendum or a plebiscite of all eligible 
voters. 
6. Capacity for [self-governance] and ability to provide and protect: under this view, it is 
important for the KRG to demonstrate capacity for self-governance. They must be 
able to meet the basic requirements of, and provide essential protections to, those 
within its jurisdiction. Since 1992, the territory of the IKR has been protected 
throughout, the Peshmerga forces. The Iraqi constitution has recognised the 
Peshmerga as a legitimate regional military force in Iraq, to serve and protect all areas 
administered by the Kurdistan Regional Government.1713 In most recent days, despite 
the Iraqi government has not helped the Kurd in their fight against the IS armed 
militants, the Peshmerga forces has played a key role in defending the IKR’s territory 
and civilians, with their humble abilities they have been able to protect the region 
from ISIS threats. On the other hand, under customary international law, armed non-
state actors have obligations to respect and protect civilians and those hors de 
combat.1714 In the same way, Ronen argued that, international human rights bodies, 
both legal and political, have demonstrated greater willingness than States to attach 
obligations to territorial Non-State Actor NSAs, namely on those that exercise 
effective territorial control to the exclusion of a government (territorial NSAs), 
although their limited mandate does not permit any definitive conclusions on the 
matter.1715 
                                                          
1712 For more details, see chapter 3.  
1713 Article 121 (5) of the Iraqi federal constitution states that ‘The regional government shall be responsible for 
all the administrative requirements of the region particularly the establishment and organization of the internal 
security forces for the region such as police, security forces, and guards of the region’. See, Iraqi Constitution 
2005 (n 84) Article 121 (5). 
1714 Y Ronen, 'Human Rights Obligations of Territorial Non-State Actors' (2013) 46 Cornell International Law 
Journal 21. 
1715 ibid. 
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7. The Kurds must demonstrate that its central government committing abuses, and 
cannot properly administer the people’s province or region:  It is important for the 
Kurds to show that its central government is unrepresentative, abusive, and relatively 
weak, and cannot protect and secure its population and borders from violence. The 
recent events have proven that the Iraqi government is unrepresentative and cannot 
protect the country from violence, consequently, to have any kind of stability and 
peace the Kurds must be allowed to break away from Iraq.  
8. Contemporary standards of recognition: rather to the aforementioned, the IKR should 
be guided by contemporary standards for recognition of States such as respect of 
human rights; minority rights, unconditional commitment to international law and 
being a ‘good partner’, effective government, contribution to the regional stability, 
economic stability, sufficiently, and viability, sharing democratic values and the rule 
of law, and negotiated determination of new boundaries.1716 
9. For the IKR to join the family of nation-States it is important to rely more on the 
compliance with other fundamental principles of international law to justify 
legitimisation of a territorial situation produced by the act of secession. The Kurds 
must have proven their viability by establishing [rightful authorities], and with that 
have earned its sovereignty. In other words, the Kurds must demonstrate to the 
international community that they have achieved statehood, that they have struggled 
for statehood through legitimate means, and that they are ready to embrace the 
international community as a new sovereign partner.  
Thus, if the Kurds failed to break away from Iraq in democratic fashion, through either 
constitutional framework or essential agreement within the State, they must demonstrate to 
the outside world that it’s capable to functioning as an independent entity, and earn its 
‘internal sovereignty’1717, such sovereignty then can be facilitated externally by an 
independent sovereign States by the act of recognition. Despite there is no rule, under the 
constitution or at international law, to unilateral secession, this does not rule out the 
possibility of an unconstitutional Declaration of Independence leading to a de facto 
                                                          
1716 For more details, see chapter 3.  
1717 Internally earned sovereignty refers to the efforts of people within IKR to comply with all conditionally 
mechanisms to achieve the statehood capacities and to engage in good faith with final status negotiations. See 
chapter 3.  
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secession.1718 Accordingly, the Kurds may exercise their right to independence, on any 
matter, even if there is no specific rule of international law permitting it to do so. In these 
instances, the Kurds have a wide measure of discretion, which is only limited by the 
prohibitive rules of international law. In this regard, international law may 'adapt to recognise 
a political and/or factual reality, regardless of the legality of the steps leading to its creation 
draws some support from previous State practice'.1719 Here, the ultimate Kurdish success of 
secession will dependent on [Recognition] by the international community, which is likely to 
consider the legitimacy and legality of secession. In this regard, Quaye argued that, ‘the 
legitimacy of any secessionist movement depends on whether or not that movement succeeds, 
and, to a certain extent, without any regard to how that success is brought about’.1720  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1718 ‘Reference Re Secession of Quebec' (n 21) para 143.  Vidmar argued that, international law is actually 
neutral on the question of unilateral secession. Neither this means that unilateral secession is prohibited nor an 
entitlement. See, Vidmar, 'Crimea’s Referendum and Secession: Why It Resembles Northern Cyprus More than 
Kosovo' (n 9).  For more details, see chapter 2.  
1719 ‘Reference Re Secession of Quebec' (n 21).   
1720 C O Quaye, Liberation Struggles in International Law (TUP, US 1991). For more details, see chapters 2 and 
3.  
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6.7. Issues surrounding IKR independence   
 
In fact, post-Saddam’s politics and the constitution, coupled with the IKR close relations with 
the international community mainly with the United States, gave the Kurds political and 
economic strength. However, this strength caused Iraqi Arab leaders and Iraq’s neighbours to 
perceive the Kurds as asserting excessive requests and threatening the territorial integrity of 
Iraq.1721 Most recently, after the collapse of Iraqi army in the north by the Islamic extremist 
the radical Islamic State ISIS, the Kurds have advanced to take over disputed areas, including 
the oil rich city Kirkuk, as the Kurds feared the Islamic militants would capture the city’s oil 
reserves. Today, Iraq plunges towards civil war, sectarian violence is out of control, security 
is non-existent, regional and international security is threatened, basic services are found 
wanting, the majority of the population are being internally displaced, this indicates that Iraq 
is falling to bits. On the other hand, despite the turmoil around it, the IKR remains somehow 
an oasis of stability and the only secure region in the area. Out for years, the U.S. supported 
the Kurdish aspiration for autonomy, and used them to take over northern Iraq and fighting 
Sunni extremist insurgences. Now, despite the ongoing chaos and violence around the IKR, 
the U.S. is putting great pressure on its Kurdish allies to give up any moves toward 
independency or greater autonomy, instead they calling for maintaining Iraq as a single 
State.1722  
Accordingly, if uniting Iraq fails, then the international community must plan for the strong 
possibility of the Kurds declaring independence.1723 On the other hand, the U.S. cannot deny 
that a Kurdish pursuit of independence is improbable.1724 History has shown that States have 
been broken up into new States such the Former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. If a 
unified Iraq does not materialise, the precedents has been established for the Kurds to claim 
their independence. Today, the majority of Kurds would prefer independence and create a 
sovereign State. The Kurdish ambition for independent is evidenced in two unofficial 
referendums that were conducted by the Referendum Movement in Kurdistan (RMK).1725 
                                                          
1721 Katzman, 'The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq' (n 1343). 
1722 'POWER-SHARING IN IRAQ: IMPOSSIBLE OR INEVITABLE?’ (n 1706).   
1723 Dewhurst, 'Assessing the Kurdish Question: What Is the Future of Kurdistan?' (n 1401).    
1724 ibid. 
1725 For more details, see chapter 5.  
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Today, the question of outright Kurdish independence can be considered as an active source 
of friction between the Iraqi Kurds and the central government at this time, but it remains a 
concern of Iraq’s neighbours that have Kurdish minorities. Obviously, the majority of Iraqi 
Kurds aspire for an independent Kurdish State. However, the major threat to the existence of 
an independent Kurdish State would be without doubt the Iraqi’s neighbouring countries. In 
other words, an independent Kurdish State in north Iraq would be confronted by hostile 
surrounding countries.1726 Turkey and Iran each has a minority population of Kurds. They 
have deep concerns that the greater autonomy for Iraqi Kurds or independence will be a 
threat to their own national integrity.1727 Turkey fears that the proclamation of an independent 
Kurdistan could be a simple formality if chaos were to follow the collapse of Iraqi 
government.1728 Some Turkish leaders would regard the creation of a Kurdish State as a 
declaration of war, and most want to intervene militarily to prevent its consolidation.1729 
Hence, Iraq’s neighbours intensively oppose the idea; they fear an independent Kurdish State 
would include the Kurdish minorities within their own States, and it will somewhat threat 
their own territorial integrity and nation’s sovereignty. However, it can be argued that there is 
no fear of what Kurdish self-determination might do to regional stability. On the one hand, 
Waters argued that, Turkey still officially opposes independence, but its response has been 
complex and muted because it has close economic ties with Kurdistan and sees it as a 
stabilising hedge against Islamic militancy and Iraqi chaos.1730 Thus, Turkey is now the 
strongest supporter of Kurdish self-determination in Iraq.1731 Iran, on the other hand, is likely 
to have considerable influence in an independent Kurdistan and is equally eager to stop the 
Sunni militants of the Islamic State who are threatening the Shiite-dominated government in 
Baghdad.1732 
Furthermore, another consideration is an independent Iraqi Kurdistan would have to 
overcome its landlocked situation and develop an economic base. Landlocked situation 
                                                          
1726 A Rafaat, 'An Independent Kurdish State: Achievable or Merely a Kurdish Dream?' (2007) 32 The Journal 
of Social, Political and Economic Studies 267. 
1727 G Stansfield, 'Kurdistan Rising: To Acknowledge or Ignore the Unraveling of Iraq'  [2014] Middle East 
memo 16 <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/07/kurdistan iraq isis 0731/kurdistan 
iraq isis stansfield 0731.pdf>accessed  5 August 2014. 
1728 O’Leary, 'Federative Possibilities' (n 1414) 188. For more details, see chapter 5.  
1729 ibid. 
1730 T W Waters, 'Kurdish Option: An Independent State for the Kurds, an Ally for the U.S. in Iraq,' Los Angeles 
Times, US (7 July 2014). See also, Stansfield, 'Kurdistan Rising: To Acknowledge or Ignore the Unraveling of 
Iraq' (n 1727). 
1731 ibid.  
1732 ibid. 
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means that the IKR will always be vulnerable to embargos and blockades.1733 In this regard, 
Özcan argued that, ‘If an independent Kurdistan failed to integrate with the world economy, 
and if it is geographically trapped, it could survive only if an outside power such as the 
United States offered support and protection, or if a special relationship were established with 
a neighbouring country'.1734 This geopolitical consideration is however mostly based on the 
mistaken belief as an independent Kurdistan has become now increasingly seen as essential 
to Turkey’s own security.1735 Most recently, Khalil argued that, ‘the Kurdish-Turkish 
relationship has been partially transformed by business and trade, with a large segment of the 
KRG economy bolstered by Turkish investment and potential energy export’.1736 However, 
after the fall of Mosul, the IKR faces immediate problems. On the one hand, for several 
months the Baghdad government suspended the KRG budget1737 due to the Kurdish moving 
ahead with signing bilateral oil and gas export agreements with Turkey and other 
countries.1738 On the other hand, with the new government of Iraq has still not been formed 
and with the State's institutions in chaos, the need for the KRG to generate revenue has 
become even more acute.1739 The financial burden has been increased recently by the war 
with ISIS as the Kurdish forces need to be re-supplied and re-equipped so they at least have 
the tools with which to defend the region on an equal basis to the abilities of ISIS to 
attack.1740 In addition, by the addition of half a million internally displaced Iraqis and Syrian 
                                                          
1733 H J Barkey and E Laipson, 'Iraqi Kurds and Iraq’s Future' (2005) 12 Middle East Policy 66. 
1734 N A Özcan, 'Could a Kurdish State Be Set up in Iraq' (2004) 6 Middle East Policy 119. 
1735 Stansfield argued that,  an in independent Kurdish state in north Iraq is now important for Turkey’s own 
security, by allowing for the engaged management of Turkey’s own ‘Kurdish issue’ with regard to the PKK, as 
important for Turkey’s energy security – by being a source of much-needed natural gas, and serving as a buffer 
between Turkey and what is seen as either a jihadist-dominated Sunni Arab region, or a region in the throes of 
what could well be one of the most devastating sectarian conflicts the Middle East has witnessed. See, 
Stansfield, 'Kurdistan Rising: To Acknowledge or Ignore the Unraveling of Iraq' (n 1727).   
1736 L Khalil, 'Stability in Iraqi KurdiStan: Reality or Mirage?' 41The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution  
(2009)<http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/6/kurdistan%20khalil/06_kurdistan_khali
l.pdf>accessed August 04, 2014. 
1737 It is argued that, with the KRG financially dependent upon Baghdad for the transfer of virtually its entire 
working budget, to fund salaries and programmes, and to also fund the staffing of the peshmerga, the notion of 
the Kurdistan Region making the transition from federal region of Iraq to the independent, sovereign, Republic 
of Kurdistan has always been weakened by this stark reality. For more details, see Stansfield, 'Kurdistan Rising: 
To Acknowledge or Ignore the Unraveling of Iraq' (n 1727).  
1738 ibid. 
1739 ibid. 
1740 ibid. 
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refuges,1741 which had a transformative effect on the IKR economy; competition for resources 
has been greatly affected, resources which are limited.1742  
In fact, the control over oil revenue and new exploration can be considered as a major hotly 
debated issue, which created friction between Baghdad and KRG. Article 111 of the Iraqi 
Constitution states that 'oil and gas revenues will be shared equally by the regions',1743 but it 
is unclear on the exploration rights of new oilfields. Recently, the KRG has begun to hand out 
contracts to foreign firms to search for new oilfields. For the next few years, it has planned to 
be pumping new crude, and has contracts for more drilling, exploration and a new pipeline. 
Lawrence argued that, the KRG has always announced that their actions were all in line with 
the Iraqi Constitution and therefore wouldn't be in conflict with any law central government 
eventually passed. New oil discovered in Kurdistan would go out of Iraq through the Turkey 
and be divided (83 percent) for Baghdad and (17 percent) for the KRG.1744 However, 
Katzman argued that, some suspect that the Kurds want to control their own oil reserves in 
order to ensure they have the economic resources to support a future drive for outright 
independence.1745 Elsewhere, the Iraqi constitution unilaterally asserts Kurdish sovereignty 
over disputed territories, which have long been a source of tension between KRG and the 
central government including oil-rich province of Kirkuk.1746 At the same time, Baghdad has 
called these deals illegal, as they have been signed without their consent and permission. On 
the other hand, The KRG has concluded oil development contracts with some 50 overseas 
natural resources companies in a bid to bring the production of crude oil to 1 million barrels 
per day in 2015 and 2 million in 2019.1747 However, crude oil produced in IKR, which used 
to be exported to Turkey through the pipeline under the management of Baghdad has become 
unusable in recent days because of repeated terror attacks by Islamic extremists.1748   
                                                          
1741 (…), '2014 UNHCR Country Operations Profile-Iraq' (UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency, 2014) 
<http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486426.html> accessed August 05, 2014. 
1742 (...), 'Impact of the Refugee Population on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq' (Kurdistan Regional Government 
KRG, 2014) <http://www.krg.org/p/page.aspx?l=12&s=000000&r=401&p=484&h=1&t=407> accessed August 
05, 2014. 
1743 Iraqi Constitution (n 84) article 111.  
1744 Q Lawrence, Invisible Nation: How the Kurds’ Quest for Statehood Is Shaping Iraq and the Middle East 
(Bloomsbury Publishing USA 2009) 316. 
1745 Katzman, 'The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq' (n 1343).   
1746 See chapter 5.  
1747 R Hanafusa and N staff, 'Oil Exports from Kurdish Region Shaking Iraq' (Asian Review, 2014) 
<http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Oil-exports-from-Kurdish-region-shaking-Iraq> 
accessed August 05, 2014. 
1748 ibid. 
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Corruption and internal division between Kurdish political parties are another pressing 
governance issues that threatens internal stability in the IKR. Today, the Kurdish citizens are 
making the connections between corruption and cronyism and the lack of essential 
services.1749 Most recently, the peoples are growing more frustrated and more vocal about 
their dissatisfaction with the KRG leadership.1750 The division and hostility between the 
major political parties the ‘KDP’, and the ‘PUK,’ and most recently the ‘Change Party’ who 
are rivals and control different territories, and sharing a major power in the KRG, they would 
have to settle their disagreements and differences in order to achieve the Kurdish ambition 
toward legitimate independence. On the other hand, the KRG must work effectively to 
articulate and administrate the rampant corruption. The KRG must work on maintaining law 
and order and unified Kurdistan, that would possible, give legitimacy to the Kurdish 
independence in the future.  
Settling borders and disputed areas has become the IKR's primary challenge. The main 
dispute regarding the boundaries of the IKR is determining the fate of Kirkuk and most 
recently the war with ISIS alongside the Sunni areas. The Iraqi constitution is failed to solve 
the problem of Kirkuk and its surrounding areas.1751 Salih argued that ‘Kirkuk awaits an 
uncertain future as disagreements about the future of the city increase, a victim of its oil 
wealth, Kirkuk has for long been a divisive issue in Iraq's politics'.1752  However, after the 
recent turmoil and the fall of Mosul by the ISIS the Kurdish forces seized disputed oilfields 
and controlled Kirkuk and the other contested areas, the Kurds could not risk leaving the 
city's Kurdish residents, who comprise the majority in these areas.1753 On the other hand, the 
Kurds are now share up to 1,000km of border with Sunni extremist groups, which is a sign of 
the major security challenges the IKR faces.1754 Iraqi is now divided into Kurds, Shia, and 
Sunni provinces, territory is being fought over by Kurdish Peshmerga, Iraqi army, and ISIS, 
the lines are not clear, most recently, the ISIS had routed the Kurdish peshmerga warriors 
guarding the northwest Iraqi towns, killing dozens and menacing the rest of Kurdistan.1755 
                                                          
1749 Khalil, 'Stability in Iraqi KurdiStan: Reality or Mirage?' (n 1736). 
1750 ibid. 
1751 See chapter 5.  
1752 M A Salih, 'Bloody Fight over Kirkuk’s Future,' Asia Times (Hon Kong, 7 October 2006). 
1753 See chapter 5.   
1754 (...), 'Kurdish Forces Seize Disputed Oilfield,' Aljazeera Middle East (12 July 2014).  
1755 B Daragahi, 'ISIS Advances Puncture Kurdistan Self-Confidence,' The Financial Times, Middle East and 
North Africa (4 August 2014).  
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Thus, settling border disputes will prove challenging, it is something that must be done 
regardless of whether or not the IKR becomes an independent State.   
Simultaneously, the Kurds have used the current crisis to expand their control over oil-rich 
Kirkuk by taking over positions from Iraq's army when it retreated in the face of attacks from 
ISIS militants. However, it is not clear whether the Kurds will withdraw should the crisis 
subside. They are so far making the most of the current tactical situation. The Kurds have 
begun pumping oil from the Kirkuk field into its own network, on the other hand, Baghdad, 
has not fulfilled its commitment to support the regional government's budget. 
Finally, many argue that it is most likely for an independent Kurdish State to come into being 
because of the subsequent breakdown of Iraqi constitution order or because of the failure of 
negotiations for the reconstitution of Iraq.1756 The Kurdish leaders are aware that 
independence would be dangerous and unwise because such a move would reduce the 
chances for a peaceful post-war transition in Iraq and endanger stability in the entire 
region.1757 Whether the Kurdish people eventually remain as an autonomous State within 
their respective countries or form an independent State, or choose any other path through 
their struggle; it is for them to decide their political fate. As a long-term goal, many Kurds 
insist on independence as a distant possibility, in the next few years Iraqi Kurds may prove 
more nationalist, and ultimately they might seek independence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1756 S Wanche, 'Awaiting Liberation: Kurdish Perspectives on a Post-Saddam Iraq,' in Brendan O’Leary, John 
McGarry and Khaled Salih (ed) The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq (UPP 2005) 188-189.  For more details, see 
chapter 5.  
1757 ibid 191. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 
7.1. Conclusion  
 
To conclude, it seems best to start at the beginning, where the vision of this research was laid 
out: 
'The thesis argues that the right of self-determination should normally be 
exercised within the framework of existing State, whereas the right of 
external self-determination appears under carefully defined circumstances. 
Outside the colonial paradigm, a non-consensual independence is much more 
problematic, and no right to independence is applicable. The thesis 
hypothesis is that, if the Kurdish right to internal self-determination will be 
fulfilled within the framework of Iraqi State in the future there would be no 
right to external self-determination and then no right to secede from Iraq. 
However, if we were to conclude that it is unlikely the Iraq would respect the 
Kurdish rights to internal self-determination in the future, and conducted 
itself in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination, 
then the Kurds would have the right to external self-determination and thus, 
the right to secede from Iraq. The thesis demonstrates that, the old restrictive 
doctrine of self-determination does not help resolve the issue in the post-
colonial era. Neither does exaggerating the problem. Accordingly, as a 
remdial approach, 'Remedial Earned Sovereignty'  has been adopted to offer 
alternative short of secession if it can be avoided or as a step toward 
independence where it is investable. Thus, ‘RES’ will be a useful and 
legitimate tool to address secessionist conflicts if the self-determination claim 
itself is deferred or denied'. 1758  
 
The author has, through the preceding 6 chapters, achieved all that he set out to achieve. Four 
research questions were formulated to assist in the development of the thesis. They have all 
been answered:  
                                                          
1758 From Introduction.  
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First: The study has determined the content of the right to self-determination in the post-
colonial world order. Does it include the right to secede from the parent State? If so, in what 
contexts? Second: Is the theory of ‘earned sovereignty’ adequate for addressing external self-
determination?  If not, how can it be improved?  Third: Can a doctrinally sound and practical 
method for assessing the validity and legitimacy of external self-determination claims be 
developed? And Finally: Do the peoples of the Iraqi Kurdish region, specifically the Kurds, 
have a right to external self-determination that would enable them to establish their own State 
in accordance with international law?     
The author’s methodological approach in this multi-disciplinary area has combined normative 
analysis of provisions of relevant legislative documents such as treaties, legal approaches in 
judgements, scrutiny of abstract conceptual approaches put forward by academics, and 
establishing the critical realities of State practice with particular focus on Quebec/Canada, 
South Sudan, and Kosovo.  
This research set to examine the Remedial approach of RES as a response to the increasingly 
limited utility of the self-determination approach to resolving sovereignty-based conflicts. As 
self-determination seeking groups become increasingly intertwined, and as local conflicts 
increasingly undermine regional stability, as in the case of the IKR, scholars are in need of a 
larger tool kit of approaches for resolving secessionist conflicts.  RES may offer lessons for a 
broad array of conflict resolution situations, beyond the classic scenario involving the 
breakup or seccession of States. 
The following paragraphs of this conclusion will now capture the essence of the hypothesis 
put forward in this ground-breaking research, and demonstrate how it is located within the 
existing normative and theoretical frameworks, and actual State practice. The aim of this 
thesis has been to discuss theoretical and conceptual problems encountered in the study of 
self-determination, statehood, recognition, and secession in contemporary international law. 
It represents the first book-length assessment of theoretical and conceptual trends within 
literature on the subject of the right to self-determination in the post-colonial context in 
general and, in so doing, achieves a depth of analysis, which has not previously been 
available. 
 It set out to establish a new understanding of the right to self-determination in the post-
colonial context, and from that, develop an original way of guiding States in evaluating 
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contemporary claims to external self-determination. It represents the right of self-
determination as it applies to the groups controlled by the State. It explores the idea that post-
colonial self-determination seeking groups cannot attain independence without threatening 
the territorial integrity of their sovereign State. It considered that, for a group to be entitled to 
exercise its right to self-determination, it must qualify as a ‘people’. This is well established. 
However, it is important for the group to have a homeland or being linked to a specific 
territory.  
This research set out to examine how the exercise of the right of self-determination should 
not violate the ‘territorial integrity’ of a State, which means that it is normally to be exercised 
within the framework of existing sovereign State. Outside colonial system the exercise of the 
right to self-determination does not usually result in creation any State, it can only take place 
with the approval of the parent State, through constitutional framework or follow an initial 
declaration of independence or unilateral secession. Most importantly, the author has 
concluded that the right of minority groups or sub-groups is distinguishable from the right to 
self-determination. It was argued that whatever the definition of minorities appears not to 
have the right to self-determination in the form of secession.1759   
A central objective in this project was the concept of statehood in international law. The work 
highlighted the role of classic statehood criteria and the development of additional conditions, 
and analyses the role and the significant of recognition, to see if they are problematic in light 
of the perceived role of recognition in contemporary international law.   
This thesis further aimed to discuss a strong normative debate on the merit, advantages, and 
disadvantages of secession. Significantly, how the international community need to overcome 
the default presumption against secession, on the other hand, it need to establish a means to 
assess and recognise secession claims within an international law framework. Arguing that 
outside colonial context, the external self-determination can potentially be exercised only in 
the form of ‘secession’. A clear confusion in various legal writings about secession and right 
to secession has been identified in this research, which has argued that secession is primarily 
a matter of fact rather than law. Make it simpler and easier to understand.  Say what the 
positions are, and then why you like Buchanan and his RS theory. In the view of the present 
author, Buchanan and those of his school of thought would be interested in partitioning States 
                                                          
1759 See, chapter 2.  
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as a measure of protection for a minority population and would not be interested in breaking 
up a State that is democratically considerate of the minority territory. It provided that there is 
only a remedial right to external self-determination, or secession, besides, whether the 
violation of internal self-determination can be a remedial right for seceding. For the purpose, 
numbers of international law theories have been analysed to the issue of the group separation 
from State: secession, statehood, and recognition.1760  
Primarily, the thesis focused on the post-Cold-War practice of State creation, and most 
importantly, post-colonial State creation.1761 It concentrated on situations, which led to new 
State creation, on the matter, clarify the role of international law concerning exercise the right 
of self- determination, and to new State creations. It argued that independence could provide 
more stability for Iraqi Kurdistan Region the IKR while respecting Iraqi territorial integrity, 
and avoiding encouragement to other separatist groups operating throughout the world. 
Concerning the reconceptualization of ‘Remedial Earned Sovereignty’ RES as a useful 
approach that could be applied in the case of IKR to achieve self-determination, in a manner 
that gains international support and causes minimal disruption to the region.1762   
This thesis has through the proceeding pages argued that international law provide that for a 
group to be entitled to exercise its right to self-determination, it must qualify as a ‘people’. At 
the same time, it stresses that the territorial integrity of States must be respected. Both are 
fundamental principles of the international order. Even so, the orthodox view is that the right 
to self-determination to is to be exercised within the framework of the existing sovereign 
State; that is to say, the right to self-determination is subordinated to the territorial 
sovereignty of the parent State. Thus, a colonised people would exercise their choice, for 
example through a referendum, within and as part of that colonial empire. If that is not 
possible, for example, because the colonial empire refuses to countenance the risk of a break-
up, the colonised people may have to take control of their political future through unilateral 
non-consensual secession.1763  
The normative scope of the right of principle of self-determination continues to lack 
precision. Firstly, it is unclear whether the concept of ‘peoples’ now includes minorities, and 
secondly, it is unclear what the appropriate objective remedy of for a claim of self-
                                                          
1760 See, chapter 3.  
1761 See, chapter 4. 
1762 See, chapter 3.  
1763 See, chapter 2.  
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determination should be in a post-colonial context (for example, creation of an independent 
State, or any other political status freely determined, as stated in the UN Friendly Relations 
Declaration). However, is there any role for unilateral, non-consensual secession in the post-
colonial world?  Authority for this comes from the landmark finding of the Supreme Court of 
Canada that territorial changes without the consent of the State can be a remedy in extreme 
circumstances involving grave breaches of fundamental human rights. 
This thesis takes up the argument of ‘Remedial Earned Sovereignty’ as a fresh way of 
looking at the content of the right to self-determination, and providing grounds for 
overcoming the default presumption of territorial integrity. This builds on the work of Alan 
Buchanan who originally developed the theory of remedial sovereignty. In 1991, he launched 
the contemporary academic debate about the morality of secession. However, his initial 
theories were taken further in his 2004 magnum opus, where he proposed a justice-based 
reorganisation of international law, incorporating a ‘just cause’ theory of secession as a 
remedial right only. In his view, secession can only be justified if important harms have been 
committed to the seceding people or entity. Buchanan’s approach has been most convincing 
of the authorities, but that this work has needed further development because it is not enough 
that a ‘people’ wishes to have a future outside of and independent from the parent State; these 
‘people’, entitled to the right to self-determination, must have a good cause for wishing to 
secede from their parent State. There is an additional element here, which did not exist for 
colonial peoples (possibly, the mere fact of being colonised can be equated with this modern 
additional element). Buchanan stipulated that a ‘people’ entitled to the right to self-
determination is also entitled to secede unilaterally when confronted with the parent State's 
persistent violation of previous agreements affording them some limited from of self-
government. In the situation where there may be autonomy arrangements within the 
constitution, systematic violations by the parent State may provide justification for 
secession.1764  
Based on, remedial secession theory, and arguments raised by the Supreme Court of Canada 
in the matter of Quebec, the present author has crafted a new way of guiding the international 
community in this area, a new method for assessing the legality and legitimacy of external 
self-determination claims within the post-colonial international law framework. This thesis is 
called Remedial Earned Sovereignty, ‘RES’. The thesis views the creation of the would-be 
                                                          
1764 See, chapter 3. 
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State through secession as a remedy in certain limited circumstances. The thesis is grounded 
in the right to self-determination, one that has evolved from its colonial-era roots to the 
contemporary post-colonial era. The thesis demonstrated that the right to self-determination 
has never been monolithic. It has had different aspects depending on the group one was 
dealing with. It is now uncontroversial that colonised people had the right to determine their 
political future and destiny, but these people lived with others within the colonial empire that 
also had entitlements. These others, such as those within the Metropolitan area, may not have 
been ‘colonised’, but they did have rights to determine their political future and destiny (at 
least once democracy had spread around the world). These rights were exercised in different 
ways, one gave the opportunity for externality, and the other for internality; another way of 
looking at it is that one gave the right to choose (among a range of options) external self-
determination (from among a range of options), and the other gave the right to make choices 
internally, the right of self-determination exercised within the State. My point is that self-
determination, already at the colonial stage, had inherent flexibility and this links to the 
flexibility that I believe it must have today.1765  
This thesis has presented that, moving out of the colonial era, that self-determination still 
exists for all ‘people’. However, it now takes an internal shape; another way of looking at it is 
that the default is self-determination is to be exercised internally, within the legal and socio-
political structures and procedures of a State. Democratic participation is about exercising the 
right to self-determination internally. This is the default position. However, in exceptional 
(and necessarily limited) situations, the default position can be overridden. There has to be a 
way to manage situations where the exercise of the right to self-determination, understood in 
this internal way, is impossible or involves breaches of fundamental norms of international 
law. Thus, if the right to self-determination is to have a moral and just content, it must allow 
for escape routes, or exceptions, when things just do not work out. These remedies have been 
referred to in processing pages. In support of this, the thesis has drawn from the Supreme 
Court of Canada and Buchanan, and argued that in certain extreme circumstances, the 
modern right to self-determination must include an external element, the right to secede from 
the parent State.1766   
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The present author has argued that the ‘RES’ approach affords a way of assessing post-
colonial breakaway movements in their different manifestations. A new entity may come into 
being lawfully through negotiated and consensual constitutional processes; on the other hand, 
a new entity may come into being through use of force as the only remedy for the ‘people’ 
denied a right to determine their future internally and whether these entities have earned their 
sovereignty. Some such movements may be lawful at creation; some may be unlawful at 
creation. What is lawful may become unlawful, what is unlawful may become lawful; 
although the fact of statehood, once accepted, is a mere fact, a State exists or does not exist.  
The ‘RES’ approaches allow us to add another layer of consideration that goes beyond the 
superficiality of pure ‘legality’, by delving into the legitimacy of the new entity.1767  
Legitimacy has been argued as a second layer of essential consideration, and it involves a 
deeper and more holistic level of analysis. Consideration of legitimacy involves but goes 
beyond consideration of criteria relevant to the ‘RES’ argument. This thesis has demonstrated 
the circumstances that led to the secession, also how the entity has conducted itself, and how 
it has organised itself internally. In the course of the author’s work, it became apparent that a 
set of coherent and principled guidelines could be developed in order to guide States in 
dealing with post-colonial self-determination. These were developed and defended in chapter 
(3). For the sake of completeness, the Guidelines are reproduced as follows:  
 [A people,  
 An exceptional circumstances, 
 Choice,  
 Responsible behaviour, 
  Effectiveness, 
  Either secession is the only option, or the option of secession is the choice of the 
majority of the population in the entity obviously can’t be both,  
 Capacity for self-governance and ability to provide and protect, 
  The entity must demonstrate that its government committing abuses, and cannot 
properly administer the people’s province or region, 
  Satisfying contemporary EU standards of recognition,  
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 Most importantly, the self-determination-seeking people must prove that external 
actors, including the great powers, view its struggle as legitimate, and that they are 
ready to embrace it as a new sovereign partner].1768  
Accordingly, the thesis demonstrated that, for an entity seeking to join the family of nation-
States it is important to rely more on the compliance with other fundamental principles of 
international law to justify legitimisation of a territorial situation produced by the act of 
secession. It must have proven their viability by establishing [rightful authorities], and with 
that have earned its sovereignty. It must then demonstrate that it merits recognition by 
external actors, and that it will be a reliable legitimate State on global sense. In addition, they 
should provide credible assurances that it will respect the rights of minorities within its 
territory. Eventually, such group must show that their quest warrants respect, and that their 
proposed territorial units should be treated as sovereign entities. Consequently, the 
international community including the Super-Power States may recognise the new political 
entity as having all the rights, immunities, privileges, powers, and obligations this status 
entails.  
Having conceptually validated the reformulation of the ‘RES’ theory, and scientifically 
justified the ‘RES’, the thesis has tested this approach by applying it to the situation of the 
peoples of Southern Sudan, Quebec and Kosovo and ultimately to the situation of Iraqi 
Kurdish Region the IKR. 
This study has established that the process of individual State recognition may have the effect 
of accepting the legal status of a de facto State as a fact. Crawford demonstrated that, in 
international legal circles the assertion that the formation of a new State is a matter of fact, 
and not of law, continues to have considerable weight.  Accordingly, an act of recognition is 
not an instrument whose function it is to create a State, but only to demonstrate acceptance of 
a given claim to statehood based on a neutral assessment of whether or not a given entity 
meets the criteria that are incumbent on that title. In other words, an act of recognition is not 
constitutive of a State, but rather declaratory in nature and effect: it is not capable of revising, 
but merely of affirming the facts of statehood. However, a Sate may exist in spite of negative 
reactions, including radical condemnations from third States, in practice; a widespread 
recognition appears to be of particular worth from the standpoint of those institutions 
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claiming to meet the criteria of statehood he added. Particularly, recognition appears to be an 
essential condition for the new State to be able to exercise in an effective manner, the 
international rights and obligations that correspond to the status of statehood, including 
entering into international relations with other States, and in this way becoming a fully 
member of the international  community.1769  
Crawford further emphasised that, recognition by other States can be used as evidence for the 
legal validity of the claims for statehood set forth by secessionist movements. On the other 
hand, the thesis argued that, States do not emerge automatically from the application of legal 
criteria (the Montevideo criteria or additional criteria of statehood). In Vidmar’s view, States 
emerge out of a political process whereby a declaration of independence is accepted. Vidmar 
concluded that, the criteria of statehood (Montevideo and the additional criteria) are at the 
best, policy guidelines, rather than legal norms. Accordingly, an entity which fulfil the 
criteria of statehood does not automatically become a State (Taiwan for instance), and an 
entity which does not fulfil the criteria is not prevented from becoming a State (Kosovo, 
Bosnia Herzegovina for example).1770  
The thesis has further analysed that, recognition can at least in some cases, be constitutive, 
and collective recognition can be constitutive. However, Bosnia was admitted as a Member 
of the UN by General Assembly resolution A/RES/46/237 of 22 May 1992, despite having no 
effective government controlling its territory. In this regard, The Badinter Commission and 
the recognising States did not find it problematic that large parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina were 
not under the effective control of the central government and therefore that the statehood 
criteria were not satisfied. It is further argued that, if an entity is not recognised, this does not 
mean that it does not have rights and duties under international law. Harris constructed an 
argument, he concluded that, a State may exist without being recognised, and if it does exist 
in fact, then, whether or not it has been formally recognised by other States, it has a right to 
be treated by them as a State. For that reason, most writers have adopted a view that 
recognition is declaratory. According to this view, State may exist without being recognised, 
and if it does exist, in fact, then whether or not it has been formally recognised by other 
States, it has a right to be treated by them as a State.  According to this view, recognition can 
only be considered as a political act recognising a pre-existing State of affairs. Shaw on the 
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other hand has demonstrated that, recognition is a method of accepting factual situations and 
endowing them with legal significance, but this relationship is a complicated one. 
Accordingly, because of the political nature of recognition, States are never under an 
obligation to grant it. As a result, there may be States, which remain non-recognised, 
sometimes virtually universally on political grounds. On the other hand, Vidmar had argued 
that the withholding of recognition is not always a matter of policy, but may be required by 
international law.  This obligation thus makes the political act of recognition an act, which is 
at least partly governed by law, in the sense that States are not always free to grant 
recognition. Thus, Harris concluded that, for recognition, there are no universally prescribed 
acts, and State practice varies. Importantly, however, there may be certain actions that imply 
recognition, such as entry into diplomatic relations, making of a bilateral treaty, and support 
for a State’s admission to the United Nations.1771 
In addition, based on the practice of States and UN organs, Crawford concluded that the 
traditional statehood criteria have been supplemented by additional ones, and an entity, which 
does not meet them, is not a State.  For instance, the creation of an entity in breach of jus 
cogens is illegal and cannot produce legal rights to the wrongdoer; in other words, such an 
entity cannot become a State. However, while the concept of additional criteria can explain 
why certain illegally created effective entities did not become States, Southern Rhodesia for 
instance), it cannot explain why some other effective entities cannot become States even in 
the absence of territorial illegality (Somaliland for example). Thus, it is questionable whether 
these criteria are sufficient for Statehood, as well as being necessary.  
The situation of the IKR provided a highly topical case study on which to test the application 
of the author’s theory of ‘RES’ and the guidelines have been proposed in proceeding pages. 
This testing of the author’s conceptual approach demonstrates that the IKR has an even 
stronger case for post-colonial statehood than the leading established ‘exception’ to post-
colonial self-determination, Kosovo and Southern Sudan.  This is because after the collapse 
of Iraqi army in the north, the ISIS advanced to take over major key cities in the north and 
attacking Kurdistan region. At the same time, the KRG are come under the obligation and 
required to protect its population from the violence, as Iraq is no longer a viable effective 
State to takes the responsibility to protect its citizens and borders. Today, sectarian violence 
is out of control in Iraq, security is non-existent, regional, and international security is 
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threatened, basic services are found wanting, the majority of population are being internally 
displaced. Nevertheless, despite the turmoil around, the IKR remains an oasis of stability and 
the only secure region in the area. In addition, the Kurds have created an oasis of political 
stability, fuelled by their own oil reserves and protected by one of the most disciplined 
fighting forces in the region, the peshmerga. The IKR boasts security and internal stability 
and reflects the democratic spirit of inclusion and tolerance. The IKR is one of the few places 
in the region where Muslims, Christians, Arab, Turkoman, and Jews are living openly and 
comfortable side by side, without the fear of oppression or subjugation. On the other hand, 
the region is developing a strong and diversified economy based on natural resources, 
agricultural, tourism and industry, all of which are powered by hard work of Kurdish people 
and the emerging middle class.1772  
Simultaneously, the Kurds through their struggle for freedom and their desire to become a 
free and independent nation have powerful moral claims to statehood, claims denied after 
WWI, when a Kurdish State first proposed under Woodrow Wilson's principle of self-
determination was instead divided among Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. Iraqi Kurds' decades of 
suffering under Baghdad, including Saddam Hussein's genocidal gassing campaign, give 
them grounds for exit now. Today, it can be argued that there is no fear of what Kurdish self-
determination might do to regional stability. On the one hand, Turkey still officially opposes 
independence, but its response has been complex and muted because it has close ties with 
Kurdistan and sees it as a stabilising hedge against Islamic militancy and Iraqi chaos.  Iran, 
on the other hand, is likely to have considerable influence in an independent Kurdistan and is 
equally eager to stop the ISIS militants who are threatening the Shiite-dominated government 
in Baghdad. Therefore, Kurds see their moment for exit, the international community 
specifically the U.S. should recognise such right and recognise their right to independence. 
Otherwise, objecting to recognition because of the risk utterly ignores the very real and rising 
tide of bloodshed that present U.S. policy of a unified Iraq entails. It is like objecting to the 
dangerous qualities of the only exit before one hurtles off a cliff. Accordingly, the Kurdish 
question must be considered as an exceptional case, the international community must fulfil 
its moral obligation to support the people of Kurdistan and their ambitions for freedom and 
national sovereignty.1773  
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Eventually, as a remedial approach ‘RES’ will be a useful and legitimate tool to address 
ongoing post-colonial self-determination cases and  guide international responses in future if 
the self-determination claim itself is denied or deferred by the State. The thesis offers an 
alternative short of secession, in those circumstances where alternatives are possible and the 
finality of inherently destabilising secession can be put off. This approach can be used as a 
fresh way of looking at the content of the right to self-determination, and providing grounds 
for overcoming the default presumption of territorial integrity. Under this approach, an entity 
must demonstrate to the outside world that it is capable of functioning as an independent 
State, that it would be a desirable new sovereign partner, and that it is worthy of 
recognition.1774 Most importantly, they must demonstrate to the international community that 
they have struggled for independence through legitimate means, and that it is worthy of 
achieving statehood and that they have earned their sovereignty. The present situation in the 
Middle East strongly suggests a people-powered dismantling of the Sykes-Picot division of 
the region, and the Guidelines are a timely and critical tool for guiding international 
responses. International stability will be facilitated through an open, transparent, coherent, 
and principled common approach. 
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